Russia’s primary global strategy is to become a great power and to establish a multipolar global order. Thus, Russia sees rivalry with the U.S. as inevitable to accomplish these.

The fact that Turkey is both a NATO member and a U.S. ally is one of the most important factors that determines the relationship between Ankara and Moscow. For Moscow, NATO is a vehicle for the U.S. to establish its global dominance and is a threat to Russia’s national security. Russia engages in a variety of strategies to balance or reduce the threat it perceives from the U.S. and NATO. One of these is establishing close relationships with countries that are members of NATO.

The fact that Turkey has the second largest military in this alliance introduces a new and distinct direction to Moscow’s policies towards Ankara. Turkey’s relative importance compared to other NATO members in the dimensions of geopolitical position, economy, human capital and military capabilities prompts Moscow to search for more methods of establishing closer relationships with Ankara. However, the aforementioned strategic capabilities of Turkey mean the emergence of a strong geopolitical rival for Russia at the same time. Russia that regards itself a “great power”, establishes relationships with other countries according to their status. It works to establish closer relationships with strong countries and perceives Turkey within this framework.

Turkey is both a NATO member and a U.S. ally and this is what mostly determines the relationship between Ankara and Moscow.

The fact that Turkey does not limit itself to an alliance with the West and the fact that Ankara maintains close relations with Russia and other Eastern countries by occasionally maintain a foreign policy that is independent of its alliance with the West is perceived positively in Russia. The fact that the Ankara administration places importance on its relationship with Moscow and does not display a radical attitude towards Russia like other U.S. allies is also perceived positively by the Russian administration.

By occasionally maintaining a foreign policy that is independent of its alliance with the West is perceived as proof that the Western alliance is not a monolith and that the divisions between the members of this alliance can serve Russian interests. Since the Western alliance fails to act as a single body, it becomes less of a threat to Russia, which is in a comparatively isolated position today.

Turkey, Russia and the West

According to Russia, a reason behind Turkey distancing itself from the West and becoming closer with Russia is the problematic relationship that it has with the U.S. and other European countries. Meaning that in some way, the worsening relationship between Turkey and its western allies opens room for development in the Ankara-Moscow relationship. This in turn makes Turkey and Russia “partners by fate.”

Turkey, which has been waiting to become an EU member for decades, does not trust the West anymore. Russia has also experienced a similar situation. Wanting to become part of the West following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was continuously marginalized by Western countries and the promises given to Moscow were not kept. At the same time, this process resulted in the West approaching Russia’s borders close enough to become a threat to Russia’s national interests. Thus, the distrust that both Turkey and Russia hold against Western countries is based on justified reasons. According to Moscow, the one-sided policies the West maintains under Washington’s leadership are against Turkey’s interests as much as they are against Russia’s interests.

The worsening relationship between Turkey and its western allies opens room for development in the Ankara-Moscow relationship. This in turn makes Turkey and Russia “partners by fate.”

One of the main reasons for the deterioration in relations between Ankara and Washington is that the U.S. does not seek Turkey’s interests. The common opinion that the U.S. was behind the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, the U.S. refusing to extradite the Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) leader Fetullah Gulen, its alliance with the PYD in Syria, the disagreement on the subject of the purchase of air-defense systems, and the U.S. introducing tariffs on Turkish iron and steel are the main subjects that have caused the relationship between Ankara and Washington to worsen. Thus, the deterioration of this relationship has led to expectations that Turkey will distance itself from the U.S. and draw closer to Russia. This situation is perceived by Russia as a crisis in the Western alliance and is considered a geopolitical loss for the U.S. In short, all developments against the interests of the U.S. are seen as in favor of Russian interests.

The Syrian crisis

The intensification of the crisis in Syria, the U.S. stopping its support for the Syrian opposition and strengthening its cooperation with the PYD, and the separation of Ankara’s and Washington’s priorities in Syria forced Turkey to seek strategies alternative to the U.S. The balance of power in Syria shifted with Russia becoming directly involved in the conflict in September 2015 and the emergence of a refugee crisis following the military operations conducted on the border with Turkey, which left Ankara face-to-face with serious security problems. The main reason why relations between Turkey and Russia improved following the rapid deterioration during the “jet crisis” is that both actors need each other for the development of a solution regarding the Syrian crisis, which has become an international security problem.

The fact that Turkey and Russia, along with Iran, have come together to seek their common interests has been an important development for Moscow. The beginning of the Astana Talks following the failure of the Geneva peace talks and the fact that the parties managed to reach a consensus on the subject of security has led to Russia perceiving Turkey as an effective and constructive power as well as an irreplaceable actor. Russia has understood that the solution of the Syrian crisis and the presence and security of Russian forces in Syria is dependent on cooperation with Turkey to a significant degree. Turkey’s potential to greatly contribute to the re-building and development of Syria due to its significant influence over the Syrian opposition and its long border with Syria is an important matter from the Russian perspective. The successful diplomatic and military operations Turkey held during the Syrian crisis has also led to Ankara becoming a more important actor in the eyes of Moscow.

S-400 Deal

Another subject that has had a negative effect on relations between Turkey and the U.S. and which is also closely followed by Russia due to its involvement is the subject of the S-400 air defense systems. According to Russia, there are several reasons why Turkey wants to purchase the S-400 air defense system from Russia: The first is that the U.S. does not want to provide Turkey with the patriot systems. Secondly, not wanting to hand over its air space to the West, Turkey seeks to possess its own national defense system in the long-run. Finally, Turkey prefers the S-400 system over the Patriot systems due to its more advanced technology.

Stating that it can provide the weapons and technologies that the U.S. avoids giving to Turkey, Russia seeks to strengthen its relationship with Turkey in the field of military as well. Russia sees this relationship from two points of view: First is keeping Turkey, a NATO member, close to itself by distancing it from the U.S. The second is to create a market for its own military industrial complex. Russia knows that Turkey intends to establish a “relationship equilibrium” with Washington and Moscow and wants to be part of that equation. On the other hand, these intentions do not mean that they will comply with all weapons technology transfers requested by Turkey.

Another reason why Moscow wants to sell an advanced technology such as the S-400 to Ankara is that Russia has started selling these systems not only to Turkey but to other countries that wish to possess this kind of technology and have or intend to establish close relations with Russia. Furthermore, the existence of the S-500 defense systems that possess more advanced technologies compared to the S-400 systems and the continued work on the development of the S-600 systems opens the door for the delivery of the S-400s to Turkey.

While Moscow wants to establish close relations in the military-technical field with Ankara due to geopolitical reasons, it has certain hesitations. One of these is that Russia does not like the idea of Turkey increasing its power. This is because it considers the possibility of Turkey becoming a rival to itself. The second of these is the common opinion in Russia that due to Turkey’s NATO membership, its preferences will be more in line with this alliance rather than Russia.

Russia is aware that Turkey maintains an independent foreign policy and establishing close ties with Moscow is beneficial to its own interests and sees this as a geopolitical gain. However, the Russian administration also approaches Turkey’s policies with suspicion and due to this, intends to establish a strategy of balance.

Once again, Turkey-U.S. relations are signaling of going through another turmoil. This time it is about Turkey’s purchase of S-400 air defense systems from Russia. Charlie Summers, head of the American forces in Europe and NATO’s top military officer stated, “If Turkey takes the S-400, there would be grave consequences in terms of our military relationship, and the Patriots and the F-35s.” It is yet to be known how binding or how backed this statement is given the complexities and ambiguities in the American state apparatus in recent years. Nevertheless, it is serious in its tone. The statement is not the first of its kind but is unprecedentedly tough. The statement also brings in some retaliatory measures, such as pulling out of the Patriot missiles purchase and denying the transfer of F-35 fighter jets to Turkey.

Despite this pressure from the U.S. side, Turkey seems solid in its deal over purchasing S-400s. During a TV interview last week, President Erdogan said that it was a “done deal,” “as we conclude the S-400 issue, signed a deal with the Russians, and will start co-production.” He even stated that after this deal is finalized, Turkey and Russia may work on a possible S-500 deal. Erdogan is well-known for his firm stance against pressure, whether coming from domestic or international parties. This is more than a simple choice though. This is a strategic choice that might re-shape Turkey’s overall position in international politics. Turkey is known as a loyal ally to the U.S. since the Cold War, but it seems like some factors have pushed Turkey to question this role.

Turkey’s purchase of S-400s from Russia is more than a simple choice. It’s a strategic choice that might re-shape Turkey’s overall position in international politics. 

In fact, it is quite a simple equation. Turkey has very concrete and longstanding worries with regard to its national security. Two of them are paramount. Two organizations, the PKK and FETO, have caused many casualties for the country. Yet both organizations have found safe havens under U.S. support. The U.S. hosts FETO leader Fetullah Gulen, a Turkish citizen, and has not complied with Turkey’s extradition request. Many other FETO members and FETO institutions still remain active in the U.S. Last week, First Lady Melanie Trump even visited one of the organization’s schools in Oklahoma.

The U.S. support for the PKK is even more threatening. This is because they are operating right across Turkey’s Syrian border. The U.S. is providing weapons, training, and active surveillance for the PKK’s Syrian branch, the PYD. This is the organization that sends suicide bombers into Turkey from Syria. Amongst the 11 such attacks documented prior to Turkey’s operation against the PYD in Syria, one was quite significant. In December 2016, the PYD conducted a terrorist attack in Besiktas, Istanbul, and caused 46 deaths, including 39 police officers and 7 civilians. The attack occurred right after a football game and the suicide bomber blew herself when she was noticed by the policeman surveilling for the game. The militant who carried out the suicide bomb received training and instructions in the PYD-ruled Kobani (Ayn-al Arab) and crossed the Turkish border illegally.

As the U.S. keeps pushing Turkey away, Turkey will now have to seek for alternative partnerships and alliances.

This is one of many examples where the PYD directly targeted Turkey, which later caused the Turkish government to conduct an operation against the PYD in Afrin. The only power that keeps this organization alive today in Syria is the U.S. It would be ridiculous to expect a blind loyalty from Turkey while the U.S. backs this group, which poses a serious threat to its national security. Naturally, Turkey is seeking security partnerships with other regional and global actors – the ones that do not support terrorist organizations that target Turkey.

This is the recent story of Turkey’s shift away from the U.S. As the U.S. keeps pushing Turkey away, Turkey will now have to seek for alternative partnerships and alliances. The bad news for relations between Turkey and the U.S. is that Turkey has never felt more threatened from any other power than it feels today about the U.S. support for terrorist organizations attacking Turkey. The S-400 deal might create grave consequences, but Turkey seems to be okay with this as it feels that it has no other choice. If the U.S. genuinely wants to re-build relations with Turkey, it is as simple as stopping the support provided for the PKK and FETO.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H-9qws51mlY 

The evolving uncertainties of world politics and diverse forms of threats have compelled Turkey to take new decisions in terms of strategy. There are both realized and impending changes that are to follow these tendencies in order to establish partial alliances and to increase the capacity of strategic weaponry. In this respect, the S-400 missile system is at the junction of the aforementioned two trends.

Global fluctuations and security threats evolving around Turkey requires the country to be prepared for multiple risks. While new phenomena, such as using terrorism as a weapon and proxy wars have emerged, these have not completely eradicated the concept of conventional war. Therefore, precautions against conventional and nuclear warfare are as vital as those taken against terrorism. In this respect, the threats Turkey has faced in the last 7 years, especially those after June 2015, are striking.

Allocating events in chronological order might provide some clues about the bigger picture: In June 2012, a Turkish military aircraft was downed and in response, the air defense systems demanded from NATO were placed six months later. Turkey changed its rules of engagement and transitioned into an alert state. Later in March 2014 and November 2015, Turkey downed a Syrian and a Russian military aircraft, respectively. While the PKK declared autonomy in Syria, Daesh was on the border of Turkey, and the YPG/PKK threat become more prominent after Daesh’s attack to Ayn al-Arab. After the said siege, Daesh bombarded Turkish soil with mortars and rockets. By the end of 2015, Russia placed S-400 missile systems in Syria. Turkey was at the brink of war with Russia after the downing of Russian military aircraft. Following the June 7 elections, the PKK started to commit terrorist attacks in Turkish cities. The terrorist organization tried to gain ground through its “trench strategy.”

First Germany then the US withdrew their Patriot air defense missile systems from Turkey. In other words, they left Turkey vulnerable to attacks from terrorist organizations and other international actors.

Amongst these crises and attacks, first Germany then the US withdrew their Patriot air defense missile systems from Turkey. In other words, they left Turkey vulnerable to attacks from terrorist organizations and other international actors. Turkey fought against these threats on its own and incapacitated many of them. The most prominent consequence of these series of events was Turkey’s further advance into the defense industry – there were also certain initiatives in the past years in this respect.

While on one hand the Turkish administration accelerated the production of weapons with use of its own resources, the government preferred to buy products, such as defense systems, whose production and usage is feasible in the long-run, from other countries. While the pursuit to acquire defense systems goes back to the 90s, an important step in this regard was taken by announcing a tender for the procurement of such systems. With the ultimate aim of protecting its own territory, the conditions declared that Turkey also placed importance on common production and technology transfer. While these conditions suspended the financial burden of such systems, the condition of “50% joint production” was a premise for developing, diversifying and nationalizing the imported defense system in the following years. While the Chinese company CPMIEC satisfied the requirements of the Turkish administration and thus won the bid, the process was later cancelled in September 2015, as it was announced that Turkey decided to initiate the process of producing its own long-range missiles.

The Process of Procuring S-400s

After 4 years, Turkey was back to square one in terms of air defense systems. Comments made by Western politicians and military figures along with the discussions in the public sphere were reminiscent of what can be called a “déjà vu” – Same arguments, similar statements! Not so concerned about the country’s national security, the western public sphere, media and bureaucracy once again diverted their criticisms towards Turkey. This attitude is embodied in the statement made by the US Chief of Staff, merely “concerning.” This matter was also up to debate in the US Congress, and the purchase of S-400s were described as “worrying.” Ironically however, it is also a US Special Forces commander who is able to mockingly state that they advised the YPG to change their name. More, it is the US that supplies the YPG in Syria with weapons that many countries do not even possess. The US can only guarantee by word of mouth that these weapons will not be used against Turkey. This reminds us of the withdrawal of Patriot air defense missiles from Turkey, as discussed earlier. It can strongly be stated that, the guarantees provided by these actors in regards to Turkey’s fight against threats it faces is only bound by words. Hence therefore, Turkey has to take necessary precautions.

Responding to a question asked by reporters on the way back from his Gulf tour in July, 2017, President Erdoğan stated that negotiations for the S-400 defense system was coming to an end. Following, during the second week of September, Erdoğan announced that the agreement was almost complete and that a deposit payment had been made to Russia. The cost of this system for Turkey is going to amount to approximately US$2.5 billion. The first two systems and its equipment will be transported from Russia to Turkey, while the rest of them will be produced in Turkey. Nowadays, there are reports that an intensive work process is continuing for S-400s to be placed and become ready for use in Turkey. Since the emergence of the issue into the public agenda, many questions have begun to be debated intensively. These are the main questions:

How does an S-400 function and what are its features?

What is an S-400 defense system? Why does Turkey need it? Is it possible to integrate with NATO?  Does this preference mean that Turkey has detached from the West on a political level? Is co-production and technology transfer possible in the short term?

The main function of an air defense system is to detect and destroy attacking aircraft and ballistic missiles. In general, the system has four stages of operation: detection, identification, tracking and destruction. The only defense system that has the ability to detect a missile from its launch and destroy it out of the atmosphere is currently possessed by the US alone. The US realizes this tracking system through satellites. Other systems are usually able to detect and destroy missiles after they enter a certain range. The length of this range can vary depending on the radar support of the defense system. For instance, NATO has numerous command centers, radar systems and missile launchers deployed in very large and diverse locations.

The system works as a whole. Simply put, satellites, or the radar system in Kürecik detects a missile, relays the information to the command center in Germany and the battleships in the Mediterranean destroy the missile.

One of the questions raised at this point is whether this system will be integrated into NATO. When reviewing different explanations made at different times in this regard, Turkish experts stated that they could create an interface for the defense system that was to be acquired from China, which would allow integration with the NATO system. This is also true for the S-400 defense system. The latest statement made by the NATO Secretary General is also significant in this respect. While Stoltenberg stated that member states were free to acquire any equipment they wanted, he did not make a technical statement about NATO compliance. He only mentioned that this matter could be discussed in case of such a demand. This indicates that the will of respective parties will be the determining factor in this matter. It is certain that there will be many concerns and drawbacks. For instance, US military experts are talking about the possibility of Russia accessing NATO data by manipulating the system. It is important to note that this disclosure is directed at the public, as the system has not yet been tested in this sense. Moreover, the deployment of S-400s in Turkey does not account for the dismissal or replacement of NATO.

Will the S-400s not integrated into NATO remain completely dysfunctional?

This question is answered with a “yes” quite boldly. Although the reasons are not explained, it is asserted that S-400 defense systems that are not integrated with the NATO system will be unable to detect and destroy ballistic missiles. However, although the radars integrated into the S-400 system do not have satellite capability, they are able to destroy missiles in the specified range, as illustrated in Table 1. Moreover, S-400 defense systems can also detect all kinds of hostile aircrafts, ranging from fighter jets and heavy bombardment aircrafts to UAVs. Turkey’s primary technical aim is to reconfigure the detection system according to its own military doctrine and friend-or-foe definition.

In this respect, it could be asserted that S-400s have the capacity to satisfy the needs of Turkey in the short-term. Naturally, advanced defense systems that are integrated with satellites could be preferred. However, as stated earlier, only the US possesses such systems and they are reluctant to sell them. Turkey’s preference of S-400s is not limited to facilitating its security in the short-term. The publicized information suggests that work on joint production, technology transfer and human resources are prominent aspects of this agreement. While the details of the agreement are yet to be announced, it is definite that the first batteries will be transported from Russia and the remaining batteries (50%) are to be produced in Turkey. Therefore, this procurement will allow Turkey to establish an infrastructure for defense systems in the long-term.

Air defense system is a must for Turkey

Considering the transformation of international politics and the emerging potential of threats posed, Turkey’s need for a defense system is urgent. The preference of S-400s was thus shaped within the framework of Turkey’s needs and the positions of its allies. It was frequently expressed that the first offers were made to the Western allies of Turkey in respect to eliminating this need. However, the US and other NATO allies’ reluctance to sell or jointly produce these defense systems had the potential to increase Turkey’s dependency. Therefore, Turkey’s preference of S-400s as an alternative is partially an outcome caused by the attitude of its allies.

The point to be questioned here is that although Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952, and the closest to the Soviet threat in terms of proximity, the country still does not have a defense system and is totally dependent in this area. The circumstances of the Cold War are now irrelevant as the threat is not posed by a single actor. Turkey is not a country that could ensure its security by being completely dependent on either NATO or Shanghai. A Turkey failing to achieve independence in terms of defense and offense can never become a true global actor. In short therefore, Turkey’s quest for a defense system and its insistence on S-400s should be regarded within this framework.

During the Cold War era, under the security umbrella of the U.S. specifically and NATO in general, Turkey followed a defense strategy in order to fulfill her defense and security needs in relation to the elimination of threats defined rather statically. Some specific changes in the nature, origin, speed of spread, feature, identity and scope of the threats were observed due to the impact of a newly-emerged security environment in the post-Cold War era. In the period following, the ‘security paradigm’ that Turkey previously had along the axis of the threat perception shaped by the Cold War and in terms of the strategies imposed by conjectural conditions has evolved into a ‘security vulnerability’.

The awareness about this transformation has increased more in the period following the early years of the post-Cold War – in particular since the early 2000s. Turkey was compelled to rethink her national security and defense strategy in the upcoming period by several factors introduced by the emerging threats and transformation of Turkey’s strategic landscape. In other words, the leading dynamics to be highlighted behind Turkey’s leap-forward are numerous threats caused by the geopolitical chaos on a regional scale and the quest to boost her own emerging power profile. To summarize, the emergence of new kinds of threats and the need to develop the country’s defense capability to the maximum level against both conventional and WMD warhead ballistic missiles through her own means, have played a determining role in Turkey’s tendency towards developing her own national missile defense system.

Besides, one of the most valid factors why Turkey urgently has to possess her own precautions against any kind of threat is obviously her neighbors and their capabilities with regards to ballistic and cruise missiles. That is to say, Syria’s, Iran’s and Russia’s missiles, which may launch either from their borders or indeed from deeper into their territories, would be capable of reaching the most strategic points of Turkey. In addition, Turkey has many vulnerable targets: industrial zones (like Gebze), bridges (on the Bosporus), dams (especially in southeastern region), highly populated cities (İstanbul, İzmir, Ankara), seaports (İzmir, İstanbul, etc.), petrochemical and storage facilities (Aliağa, Gebze, Yumurtalık), no need to list the many other well-known military bases, factories, facilities, airbases, supplies and locations.

All in all, it is a clear fact that Turkey’s territorial depth displays a disadvantageous defense position and as a result, she urgently requires a comprehensive missile defense system covering the wide geographical areas of her homeland and without doubt, Turkey must unconditionally take urgent and active measures against the threats of attack by ballistic and cruise missiles of varying ranges and with the capability of maneuverability to avoid air defenses, not to mention the ability to carry conventional and WMD warheads. It is an undeniable and unavoidable fact that Turkey is surrounded by strategic and tactical ballistic missile depots and is under a significant potential threat.

To outline Turkey’s capabilities of missile defense since the Cold War era; as an ally of NATO and depending on the capabilities of the Alliance, Turkey hosted NIKE Hercules missile systems. After the retirement of NIKE Hercules, Turkey was in possession of IHAWK missiles. Thereafter, in the 2000’s a project entitled “Turkish Long-Range Air and Missile Defense System (T-LORAMIDS)” was enhanced in response to the aforementioned security questions. At the “Defense Industry Executive Committee (DIEC)” meeting on June 30, 2006, the launch of T-LORAMIDS project was decided; preparations were started for the feasibility and invitation to tender documents in the same year. Through foreign direct procurement, firms from the U.S., France-Italy Partnership (the European Consortium), and Russia and China participated in the T-LORAMIDS tender.

Following the DIEC’s meeting on September 26, 2013, the DIEC announced that China was top in the ranking of the bidding process and requested the three other bidders to extend the bidding periods, due on October 31, 2013, to January 31, 2014 and update their offers. However; although the Defense Industry Executive Committee cancelled the entire tendering process for T-LORAMIDS on 13 November 2015 with a final decision, the project was not canceled; rather the approach was changed to meet the goals, so still committing to the aim of the project constitutes a crucial parameter for the nationalization and modernization of the defense industry policy of Turkey.

Following the aforementioned process of strengthening of Turkish air defense system, Syria, one of the main sources of neighboring threats, has taken much more attention with the latest developments. For instance, the concerns on Turkey’s security and defense were emerging when Syrian missiles dropped into Turkish territory. This growing concerns and the increasing threats perceived from Syria led Turkey to call for NATO to deploy Patriot missiles on Turkish territory on November 21, 2012. In response to Turkey’s request, which needed an urgent response, NATO gave an affirmative answer on December 4, 2012, during the NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting. As part of a NATO mission to provide defense support to Turkey, Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands provided six Patriot batteries in total for a limited time in the southeastern provinces of Kahramanmaraş, Gaziantep and Adana. Right after Germany’s decision to pull her Patriot batteries back to her homeland, Italian-made SAMP/Ts were deployed in June 2016.

However, even though these attempts were taken in order to strengthen and sustain Turkey’s air defense, critical developments and recent experiences have made it very essential to seriously question whether the reliability and functionality of Patriot batteries deployed on the Turkey-Syria border are at the required level. The answer was, and still is, that the Patriot batteries supplied by NATO allies were not sufficient to meet Turkey’s need for a complete missile defense system.

In addition to foreign aid regarding Turkey’s air defense, Turkey continues to develop domestically produced defense systems. One of the productions that came into service is the HİSAR, a family of multi-purpose advanced technology surface-to-air missile systems being developed by ASELSAN and ROKETSAN, which consists of the Low Altitude Air Defense Missile (HİSAR-A) and the Medium Altitude Air Defense Missile (HİSAR-O) system. HİSAR-O’s first unarmed test was conducted in 2014, in Aksaray. Thereafter on December 3, 2016, the test launch of HİSAR-O was carried out. HİSAR-A, a low-attitude version of the same defense system, initiated in 2011 is expected to be delivered to the Turkish Armed Forces by 2020. However, due to Turkey’s recent difficult experiences in procuring the necessary materials or subcomponents from United Kingdom and more importantly from Germany, the estimated delivery date of HİSAR missiles might be postponed to a later date.

To carry on, another among the significant elements of the ongoing developments in the Turkish defense industry that need to be highlighted are ‘KORKUT’, ‘SERHAT’ and ‘BORA’. To begin, the Self-Propelled Low Altitude Air Defense Gun System KORKUT and its Counter Mortar Radar SERHAT are also both domestically produced systems. Being developed for the effective air defense of mechanized troops and mobile units, the KORKUT system has firing-on-the-move capability with a stabilized and unmanned gun turret. After the first phase ‘KASIRGA’ and the second phase ‘YILDIRIM’, BORA missile system is the third phase of joint missile systems production, which has been accomplished with Chinese cooperation. It is the first national, long range (an operational range of 300 km) and surface to surface missile reflecting Turkey’s transition from defensive to offensive capabilities.

The project BORA was decided between the years of 2006-2008. Afterwards, in 2009, Turkey came to an agreement in cooperation with China on jointly producing a missile system, which was later coined BORA. In this joint-production process, ROKETSAN was the Turkish representative and producer that contributed to the project. Thereafter, first deliveries were made in 2014. The project for the BORA missile system has finally come to light when the project was first revealed publicly on 6 February 2017. Furthermore, at IDEX-2017, which was held from 19 to 23 February 2017 in Abu Dhabi, ROKETSAN released an image of the export version of the short-range ballistic missile ‘BORA’ known as ‘KHAN’.

Recently, Turkey has started to take a different turn for the better in order to consolidate the progress of her air defense system capability. During the Putin-Erdogan meeting held at the Kremlin on March 10, 2017, the leaders also discussed the procurement of Almaz-Antey S-400 “Triumf” which is a powerful long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. As stated by high-level officials, Moscow and Ankara are still in the negotiation phase, which is actually a much more intense level and the crucial stage of the acquisition process of Russian S-400s.

While Turkey has already been warned and criticized by other NATO allies about purchasing and using Russian-made S-400 Triumf air missile defense systems, Ankara insistently reminds other members states’ practice of being Russian arms customers in the Alliance. As a latest progress, during a press conference on April 21, 2017, Turkish Minister of Defense, Mr. Fikri Işık, stated that Turkey and Russia have come to a conclusion about the negotiations on the procurement of Russian S-400s even if both Turkish and Russian sides have many processes and procedures which need to still be completed.

Besides, by addressing Turkey’s need for an air and missile defense system, Mr. Işık recalled Turkey’s final aim to domestically build up a complete system. By saying this, he underlined that Turkey is not only trying to meet her immediate needs by procuring systems such as the Russian-made S-400 Triumf air missile defense system, but she has also been taking many steps to become capable of producing her own systems. Furthermore, Mr. Fikri Işık also drew attention to Turkey’s awareness that it will not be able to integrate S-400s into NATO systems; therefore, he expressed his high expectations from NATO to appreciate this significant step of Turkey.

It must be underlined once again that Ankara’s interest in buying one of the best advanced air and missile defense systems to date, the S-400 Triumf, should not be perceived as a core indicator of Turkey’s abandonment of a major national development project to build-up her own air defense system. Conversely, this ongoing process with Moscow and all other initiatives of Ankara must be regarded as the steps to have an integrated complex layered air and missile defense system, which might be built up by national and foreign firms.

In order to ramp up production based on the use of national resources, thus diversify domestically produced technologies and goods, Turkey has to strengthen and support her defense industry. As well as independently meeting the needs of the Army, this attempt is required not only to just become more capable of countering potential missile threats, but also to enhance military capabilities. As a matter of fact, by calculating her long term goals, interests and objectives, Turkey needs to enhance existing research and development programs while evaluating the future conditions and impact of alternative planning strategies.