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n a strategic move to upgrade its military capabilities, Turkey has announced plans to acquire 40 Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets, as stated by National Defense Minister Yaşar Güler on November 16, 2023. This significant defense procurement aims to enhance Turkey’s air force, ensuring readiness for current and future operational requirements.

The Eurofighter Typhoon, a highly effective multirole combat aircraft, is the product of a European consortium involving the UK, Germany, and Spain. Minister Guler informed the Turkish parliament that while the UK and Spain have signaled their assent, efforts are ongoing to secure Germany’s agreement to finalize the deal.

This development comes amidst Turkey’s ongoing quest to modernize its air forces. The F-16 and F-4 jets, currently in service within the Turkish Air Force, are considered adequate for Turkey’s immediate tasks. However, the defense strategy is forward-looking, seeking advanced options beyond the existing fleet.

Removal from the F-35 program

Turkey’s path to this procurement has not been without its challenges. Ankara faced removal from the F-35 fighter jet program in 2019 by the United States, following its acquisition of the Russian S-400 missile defense system—a move the U.S. argued could jeopardize the security of the fighter jets.

Despite the U.S. claim, Turkey has consistently argued that there is no conflict between the S-400 system and its NATO commitments, advocating for a commission to examine the issue more closely.

In addition to the Eurofighter jets, Turkey has expressed intentions to modernize its F-16 fleet by acquiring 40 ready-made F-16 Block 70 Vipers and upgrading 79 aircraft at Turkish Aerospace Industry (TUSAS).

A request to Washington in 2021 for the F-16 jets and modernization kits was met with informal notification to Congress about the potential sale, though various congressional objections have introduced a degree of uncertainty into the proceedings.

Commitment to self-sufficiency

Despite these hurdles, Turkey’s defense ministry remains committed to self-sufficiency in defense capabilities. The nation has made significant strides in its domestic defense industry, notably developing its own two main planes, including the Hürjet and the 5th-generation KAAN aircraft, which is expected to make its maiden flight later this year.

Turkey’s defense agenda under President Erdoğan’s administration has been marked by a push towards local production, reducing foreign dependency for military needs. The nation’s domestically manufactured arsenal now includes unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), air defense systems, and national warship and tank programs.

The Eurofighter Typhoon procurement and the modernization of the F-16 fleet are seen not only as a boost to Turkey’s defense autonomy but also as a reinforcement of its commitment to NATO’s collective security framework.

As Turkey navigates these complex procurement processes, it showcases its determination to maintain a robust and modern defense posture on the international stage.

Sources: Anadolu Agency and Daily Sabah

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uran Kalkan, a member of the PKK/KCK Executive Committee, described the operations carried out by Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) against the organization’s top leadership as a declaration of “mobilization’’ aimed at purging the PKK leadership. Kalkan even targeted the terrorist wanted list prepared by the Ministry of Interior, lamenting that the PKK’s top leadership had been placed on a “death list.’’

Kalkan characterizes these operations as political pandering, and speaks openly against both the MIT and the Ministry of Interior at an institutional level. However, the targeting of the executive and operative elements of terrorist organizations by the security bureaucracy and its forces is not a new strategy. On the contrary, it is a part of the state’s counterterrorism policy that has been resolutely implemented for many years, and is expected to have strategic, operational, and political outcomes.

Tactical and strategic counterterrorism operations gain momentum

In the MIT’s 2022 annual activity report, Hakan Fidan, its director, underlines the activities carried out by Turkey’s security institutions to realize this successful counterterrorism policy. The MIT possesses proactive intelligence disciplines such as human intelligence, signals intelligence, electronic intelligence, and imagery and satellite intelligence, including unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capacity.

The MIT demonstrates its technological capacity and capabilities in cross-border operations that neutralize a terrorist organization’s leadership, destroy critical infrastructure facilities belonging to a terrorist organization, and capture many of its members, including the perpetrators of terrorist attacks in Turkey. In 2022 alone, 133 leaders and operative terrorist elements whose identities were shared in open sources were neutralized through internal security and cross-border operations.

Regardless of the terrorist organization and its area of operation, the counterterrorism operations discussed by Fidan continue to be carried out in 2023. The operation in Hasaka neutralized Zeki Gürbüz, the so-called Syria officer of the terrorist organization Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP), and Özgür Namoğlu, code-named “Fırat Neval,’’ the organization’s so-called Syrian sabotage officer; the operation in Qamishli neutralized Halil Menci who planned the 2022 Taksim attack; the operation that captured Ramazan Güneş, code-named “Soreş/Soreşger,’’ a member of the organization’s “special forces” who carried out 12 terrorist acts in Turkey, and brought him to Suleymaniye, Iraq; the operation in Sinjar neutralized the terrorist Saad Ali Bedel, code-named “Ceko Pir,’’ the so-called military commander of the PKK-affiliated Sinjar Defense Units (YBŞ); and the operation in Aleppo neutralized Mehmet Yıldırım, code-named “Hamza Kobani,’’ the so-called finance officer of Aleppo and Tel Rifat.

Such tactical and strategic counterterrorism operations which aim to eliminate the leadership cadres of the terrorist PKK organization have been effective since 2015 and have gained momentum in Turkey since 2018, in Iraq since 2019, and in Syria since 2022. These operations target the leader or the operative elements directly, and also involve coordinated operations in which the physical infrastructure and resources of the terrorist organization such as shelters, positions, arsenals, logistical support lines, rear basing points, and financial resources are targeted alongside the command control echelon.

Following the detection of the target, the data received from the UAVs is used to identify the target by examining in detail the number of people, weapons, clothes, and whether the targets are civilians or not. After the identification process is completed, the targets in question are tracked by UAVs. At this point, tracking takes a few hours or a few days, depending on who the target is, and where and what kind of activity they is carrying out.

In the analysis phase, plans are made for the neutralization operation. In this context, special attention is paid that the target moves away from civilian areas and that there are no civilians in the operation area. In addition, information from intelligence officers in the field and data from the UAV center are compared. Ultimately, bearing all the data into consideration, when there is a definite conviction that the target is a terrorist element and there are no civilians around, a few operators destroy the target in accordance with the orders they receive from the relevant commander. After the target is neutralized, an evaluation phase is initiated and a report is prepared, thus ending the operation process.

As is evident from the statements of PKK member Kalkan, the psychological damage of these successful operations on the morale and motivation of the terrorist organization and terrorist elements is undeniable. According to the statements of captured or surrendered members of the organization, such operations cause confusion, anxiety, loss of authority, and give rise to situations in which subordinate cadres take initiative independent of the leader. As the number of such operations increases, members of a terrorist organization will have to constantly hide and take stricter measures in internal communication. Consequently, communication problems will lead to a lack of coordination and will seriously hinder senior leaders and operatives’ flexibility.

There will also be several collateral consequences. For example, the terrorist organization will be forced to undergo tactical transformation, and develop avoidance and protection mechanisms and counterattack tactics against the threats targeting the leadership and operative cadres. Meanwhile, while the imminent threats from the PKK are removed from Turkey through preventative counterterrorism operations, the organization, which has expanded its attack volume, will respond to the operations by activating organizational violence, especially in Iraq and Syria.

UAVs/UCAVs stand out in the transformation of counterterrorism activities

It is also important to mention the technological transformation and infrastructure that have facilitated the execution of operations against leadership and operative cadres. The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), the Ministry of Interior, and the MIT carry out such operations by maximizing their use of existing military technology and equipment, and minimizing the risks of field personnel. In fact, the defense industry’s domestic product range and R&D activities are diversifying thanks to user feedback activities.

The platform that has gained the most prominence in recent years is unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)/combat unmanned aerial vehicles (UCAVs). Considering the aerial imagery and visual data collection capabilities of domestically developed UAVs/UCAVs, their ability to provide intelligence feeds to the elements in the field, and even the use of their kinetic strike capabilities in neutralizing terrorist elements, UAVs/UCAVs are evolving into an important complimentary element for security forces in counterterrorism operations. In fact, the destruction capacity of security forces increases in operations that receive air support and UAV/UCAV support.

In the future, we will frequently hear statements from the PKK like that of Duran Kalkan. The PKK has been forced to retreat to its rear basing point by the TAF’s ground and air elements. Today, the PKK has been suppressed on the ground by the incessant counterterrorism operations of law enforcement and security forces, and its command-control and operative cadres have been gradually destroyed as a result of the operations carried out by the MIT both on its own and jointly with TAF elements. The future does not seem very promising to the terrorist group, one can say.

On August 29, 2021, Baykar Savunma delivered the first batch of Bayraktar Akinci (Raider) drones to the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). Designed and developed by Baykar Savunma, Akinci is the latest culmination of the company’s drone development projects. The introduction of Akinci into service is a major milestone in Turkey’s efforts to become a major drone power and leading defense and aerospace technologies developer.

In the past few years, Turkey’s drone industry, its products and their performance in various operations and conflicts have generated great interest. This is especially true in regard to the impact of Anka-S and Bayraktar TB2 armed drones on the Syrian regime forces during Operation Spring Shield in early 2020, which stimulated debates among scholars, observers, and professionals in defense and security circles regarding the future of drones and warfare in general.

As a direct result of their performance in various conflicts, Turkish drones have attracted the interest of numerous countries. Turkey has so far exported Bayraktar TB2 to Qatar, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Libya, Morocco, and Poland, while Turkish Aerospace Industries has sold Anka to Tunisia. Selçuk Bayraktar, the chief technology officer of Baykar Savunma, has recently stated that the company is in talks with ten countries for the export of Bayraktar TB2.

As a project, Akinci represents the opening of a new chapter for Turkey both in terms of its air power with its new capabilities, and with regard to its aerospace industry by virtue of its new technological competencies.

Akinci and its capabilities

The Bayraktar TB2 is a tactical armed drone, capable of flying at 18,000 feet altitude for up to 27 consecutive hours. The aircraft can carry two or four guided bombs, and is capable of executing a fully autonomous takeoff and landing. Serving the Turkish Armed Forces, the Bayraktar TB2 has fulfilled over 350,000 flight hours since 2014. Having a maximum takeoff weight of around 700 kg, Bayraktar TB2 carries a sophisticated electro-optical camera system to detect and track targets while collecting imagery intelligence (IMINT).

Akinci, on the other hand, is much bigger, heavier, and more sophisticated than Bayraktar TB2. According to the information on the company’s website, Akinci has a maximum takeoff weight of around 6,000 kg, making it the biggest aircraft designed and developed in Turkey. Akinci is powered by two turboprop engines provided by Ukrainian engine manufacturer Ivchenko-Progress. It can carry around 1,500 kg of guided bombs and missiles as well as an electro-optical camera, radar, and various electronic intelligence/signals intelligence (ELINT/SIGINT) sensors. Akinci can remain airborne for approximately 24 hours at 30,000 and 40,000 feet altitude.

Also, with the use of laser target designator systems, Akinci can illuminate a target, calculate guidance information for onboard precision weapon systems or pass along that target information to friendly units for strike. The TAF showed remarkable capabilities in executing such complex air-to-surface strike operations in Idlib, Syria and in Libya, and assisted Azerbaijan in achieving the same in Nagorno Karabakh. By virtue of its greater payload-carrying capacity both in terms of weapons and sensors, Akinci will boost the network-centric organization of the TAF.

Akinci will also be equipped with an advanced radar system, under development by ASELSAN. Incorporating active electronically scanned array (AESA) technology, the radar will enable Akinci to detect aerial and ground targets over a long range irrespective of weather. The AESA radar is highly resistant to enemy electronic countermeasures and enables the platform to track several targets simultaneously. Akinci, through onboard air-to-air missiles, can engage with aerial threats on its own or pass along the target information to friendly units, contributing to the update of the strategic air threat scene.

Last but not least, Akinci will be equipped with various types of ELINT/SIGINT sensors, which are extremely crucial in executing strategic intelligence missions during both times of peace and conflict. With its capability of flying for long periods at high altitudes, Akinci will be able to cover large regions around Turkey, collecting intelligence over different segments of the electromagnetic spectrum.

All the aforementioned imagery, radar, and electronic intelligence data will be transmitted to the ground control system and other friendly assets through an onboard satellite communications (SATCOM) system developed by ASELSAN. With the help of the SATCOM and Türksat satellites, Akinci can be controlled over an extremely long range, receiving command signals, and sending back all intelligence data. In this way, the SATCOM-equipped Akinci will increase Turkey’s strategic intelligence and strike range.

The transformation of the Turkish aerospace industry

Akinci is the largest air platform to be designed, manufactured, tested, and flown by Turkey. Designing and manufacturing a six-ton drone that is equipped with various sensors and precision guided weapons as well as a ground control system to monitor and control all functions through direct line-of-sight and SATCOM communications data links require advanced skills and know-how in several engineering and project management skill sets.

To establish and maintain a supply chain to manufacture the aircraft and the incorporated ground systems, and deliver them on time to various customers, The Turkish Aerospace Industries and the entire ecosystem of subcontractors and suppliers needed to transform. In other words, Akinci, as well as other ambitious Turkish Aerospace Industries projects such as the TUSAŞ MMU (Milli Muharip Uçağı or National Fighter Jet), Hürjet, and T625 Gökbey, can be considered as catalysts of the transformation of the Turkish aerospace industry. Through the realization of these challenging projects, the Turkish aerospace sector build up the necessary experienced human resources and infrastructure to reinforce and develop its position in the global market.

Akinci epitomizes Turkey’s ambitions of becoming a drone power through indigenous development of advanced technologies and the possession of highly capable systems and platforms. The effectiveness and efficiency of armed drones in counterterrorism operations and in regional conflicts arguably provided enough motivation to decision-makers for devising, planning, and executing a national drone strategy. Starting with the Anka and Bayraktar projects, Akinci is the latest step in this strategy.

Akinci’s impact, both as an armed drone and as an aerospace industry product, for Turkey is worth monitoring. Without a doubt, it will act as a capability multiplier for the Turkish Armed Forces in the short term. Its export performance and role in Turkey’s regional security policies will likely be seen in the medium term.

Five years have passed since the coup attempt on July 15, 2016. The Turkish government has waged an effective fight against the Fetullah Gulen Terrorist Organization (FETO) which was nested in the state structure and orchestrated the coup attempt. Although critics argue that the fight is only on the judiciary’s shoulders, it has achieved a significant progress. As the July 15 coup attempt was in many ways different from the past coups and coup attempts in Turkish political life, a different assessment and long-term planning are required in the fight against the coup plotters.

Turkey’s coup history begins with the May 27, 1960 military coup, which was committed by a junta committee (National Unity Committee) nested in the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and supported by civilian elements, such as media, politics, and universities that were close to the committee. The March 12, 1971 military memorandum, the September 12, 1980 military coup, and the February 28, 1997 postmodern military coup were all carried out within the TSK hierarchy.

On the contrary, the military junta, composed of FETO members infiltrated the army in previous decades and carried out the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, was not only part of the TSK’s military hierarchy, but also they were in close collaboration with the civilian members the FETO working within and outside of the state institutions. Furthermore, it was executed by soldiers, who were in command of the civilian members of the organization. Such unique nature of the coup has been decisive for how the struggle is being carried out against the organization.

Let’s have a look at the legal cases. According to the findings of the proceedings, Fetullah Gulen and the civilian imams under his command (Adil Oksuz, Kemal Batmaz, Nurettin Oruc, Harun Binis, and Hakan Cicek) were the masterminds behind the coup attempt that was conducted mainly by brigadier generals and lower rank military officials. From its planning to its execution, the above individuals were in contact with Gulen himself in every single phase orchestrating the process.

Considering FETO’s extensive human web that found its way into state institutions, its clandestine structure, incognito activities in the civilian sphere, fight against the coup plotters could not be confined to the coup perpetrators only. A dismissed police chief coming out of a tank and steering towards the Istanbul Police Department, and computer specialists accompanying soldiers heading to Türksat are striking examples. For this reason, a judicial process exclusively for the trial of the soldiers who participated in the coup attempt would not have been sufficient.

What is more, the investigations conducted following the coup attempt have revealed that FETO’s infiltration of the TSK had reached almost 80 percent of certain rankings. The ongoing operations against the organization confirm this. Another point is that members of the organization has been infiltrating the TSK for about 40 years through extremely insidious methods, and this infiltration has snowballed throughout the years.

While the fight against FETO continued, the organization did not hesitate to engage in acts of terror.

As a result, for the last five years in addition to the trials of those who joined the coup attempt, fighting this clandestine structure within the TSK along its civilian organization became necessary. While the fight against FETO continued, the organization did not hesitate to engage in acts of terror, such as the assassination of the Russian ambassador to Ankara Andrei Gennadyevich Karlov.

According to the latest data revealed by the Anatolian Agency at the time when this article was written, the courts of first instance reached a verdict in 288 of the 289 coup cases that were filed. A substantial part of these has been examined by regional courts of appeal and are at the phase of appeal at the Court of Cassation. The court, on the other hand, has already approved 79 cases finding them justifiable. It, therefore, becomes obvious that significant progress has been made in the coup cases.

The Latest Developments in the Two Main Cases

The two most important cases are the Akıncı Base Case and the General Staff Case. The Latter focuses on the members of the military wing of FETO, who planned and carried out the coup as well as the actions that took place at the General Staff. With the verdict announced in the General Staff Roof Case on June 20, 2019, the military executive staff of the coup was sentenced to multiple aggravated life imprisonment for the crimes of violating the constitution, and deliberate attempts to assassinate the president. During the appeal examination, the Ankara Regional Court of Justice reached the verdict that the decisions of the court of first instance were in accordance with the law. The file is currently pending at the Court of Cassation.

In order to obtain information about the defendants who were tried in the General Staff Case, the allegations, the evidence, the defense of the accused, and especially the TSK organization of FETO, one can refer to the detailed report by SETA.

In another cardinal case, the Akıncı Base Case, the first-degree phase was completed with the announcement of the verdict on November 26, 2020. This is considered the most critical case as it tackles the events that took place in the administration base of the attempted coup and the civilian imams who were the real plotters behind the attempt. At the end of the first-degree trial, the so-called civilian imams of the organization Kemal Batmaz, Hakan Çiçek, Harun Biniş, and Nurettin Oruç were each sentenced to 79 aggravated life sentences for “attempting to overthrow the constitutional order,” “assassination of the president,” and “premeditated murder.”

In addition, many defendants tried in this case were also sentenced to a total of 79 aggravated life sentences for the same crimes. Those convicted included İncirlik 10th Tanker Base commander, former brigadier general Bekir Ercan Van; former brigadier general Kemal Mutlum, who tried to seize the Air Force Operations Center; former brigadier general Aydemir Taşçı, who was the head of the Air Force Intelligence; former colonel Veysel Kavak, who was the secretary general of the Air Force Command; the 141st Fleet commander of the period, and the former four-star general and commander of the Turkish Air Force Akın Öztürk’s son-in-law former lieutenant colonel Hakan Karakuş; former pilot lieutenant colonel Hasan Hüsnü Balıkçı, who bombed the Turkish Grand National Assembly; former major Mehmet Fatih Çavur, who made the first flight in a F-16 over Ankara in the coup attempt; former pilot captain Hüseyin Türk who bombed the Turkish Parliament, TÜRKSAT, and the Police Special Operation Department; and former captains Mustafa Mete Kaygusuz and Ahmet Tosun, who sent the bombing instructions to the F-16s.

The Akıncı Base Case is currently before the Ankara Regional Court of Justice for appeal review. It is expected that the appeal phase will be completed and a decision will be made within this year.

As can be seen, it is possible to say that the proceedings of the coup cases that have been taking place in the last five years are approaching an end. In this process, the judiciary had to decontaminate itself, continue its routine judicial activities, and conduct FETO coup cases. Despite all these difficulties, it succeeded in overcoming complex and difficult litigation processes with multiple defendants.

It is necessary to wait a while for the completion of the legal processes. After verdicts are reached in the cases at the first instance courts and even in the appellate and appeal stages, the process will continue with individual applications to the Constitutional Court and finally to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The judicial processes will continue for a long time and should be undertaken with decisiveness and sheltered from languor. Unfortunately, after the July 15 coup attempt, the interest and support toward the start of the trials faded. The fight against FETO is not a fight of the judiciary alone, all state institutions and the entire society should be involved to ensure achieving successful results.

Sour candy is a joy that creates two different sensations in the mouth: the mini explosion of the sourness is one, but so is the expectation of sweetness. The multiple layers of flavors and conflicting tastes, in other words, can either challenge or encourage one’s sensory experience and appetite.

It occurred to me that this was a great analogy for the current relations between Turkey and the United States, two countries with a complex political history and whose relations are replete with contradictions. The latest CAATSA decision by the U.S. government became another sensory explosion in the mouth – it is still hard to decide whether to consume such a candy or reject it altogether.

The U.S.-Turkey relations have deep roots. History indicates continuous fluctuations, ups and downs which are not peculiar to recent times. Decisions such as the CAATSA sanctions cannot be judged in a vacuum but must be incorporated into a post-structural reading of the U.S.-Turkey relations.

It is for certain that the Turkish image in U.S. thinking, and vice versa, is an accumulation of prejudices, narratives, and the influence third parties. Hence, this article will take these three dynamics as parameters to delve into the issue in question.

The U.S.-Turkey relations go back to the Ottoman era; the foundation of the Turkish Republic can be taken as the datum point. World War I seems to be the initial departure with with Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points and their impact on the fate of the Ottoman Empire and the new republic.

The interwar period saw the restructuring and rehabilitation that levelled Turkey up to a Western-type nation-state. The disinterest of the U.S. in global politics, the Great Depression, and World War II were concurrent factors, the natural outcome of which was for Turkey to fight against Germany and on the side of the Allies.

The Cold War, on the other hand, achieved what could not be achieved during World War II and up to its end in 1945. Turkey joined the Western world, become a member of NATO, and contributed to the containment of the Eastern Bloc.

The intense U.S. political, economic, and military presence in Turkey challenged the USSR with an outcome of asymmetric warfare inside Turkey in the form of political polarization. Meanwhile, the problems, not addressed properly after two world wars, pushed Turkey to express demands using a low profile so as not to damage the spirit of friendship during the Cold War years.

The Turkish expectation was for the alliance to observe Turkey’s sovereign rights over the islands not delegated to Greece by the treaties, and to recognize the Turkish Cypriots as a community with equal rights to Greek Cypriots. The U.S. attempted to balance the challenges of the alliance at the expense of Turkish demands and interests through silencing both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.

As the attacks of Greek nationalist networks targeted the Turkish community in Cyprus, resulting in massacres, Turkey started a peace enforcement operation but found itself faced with U.S. sanctions, similar to today’s CAATSA sanctions.

If Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus is taken as a case study, the parameters identified above can be used to portray the scope of the U.S.-Turkey relations. The objective of the United States was to stick to the status quo and not to disrupt the rivalry with the USSR – in so doing, it refused to relinquish its set ideas and prejudices regarding Turkey.

If Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus is taken as a case study, the parameters identified above can be used to portray the scope of the U.S.-Turkey relations.

Turkey, with a poor economy and no military strength, could be a pivot against the Eastern Bloc but could not move in a direction on its own. The political narratives of the time envisioned Turkey with its geostrategic prominence as the cornerstone of the fight against any communist expansionism.

The third-party inputs were designed to perpetuate the status quo in the alliance. For instance, the lobbying efforts of the Jewish community aimed to balance the Greeks and Armenians against Turkey. The Israeli-Arab Wars required a passively positioned Turkey in the Middle East for the safety of Israel, which enjoyed the support of the U.S. Senate.

The 9/11 attacks and their aftermath quintessentially reflect the described feeling of sour candies with devastating challenges that have led to the current status of the relations. Turkey has actually long been a country sternly fighting radicalism inside and outside of its borders.

Turkey was – and still is – supportive of the US in its quest to defeat terrorism; a struggle that Turkey has been experiencing for decades.

For instance, the Iranian Revolution, with its quest to spread the teachings of Khomeini, was perceived as a threat only in Turkey as opposed to the other members of the NATO alliance. Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks shook the Western world while igniting the processes of Islamophobia, the hawkish transformation of conflict conceptualizations, and the solidified interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Turkey was – and still is – supportive of the U.S. in its quest to defeat terrorism; a struggle that Turkey has been experiencing for decades. But the intervention in Iraq was a challenge to the relations on the government level in so far as the Turkish parliament denied the United States Army access to Turkish territory and bases for the purpose of invading Iraq.

The 9/11 attacks and their aftermath quintessentially reflect the described feeling of sour candies with devastating challenges that have led to the current status of the relations. Turkey has actually long been a country sternly fighting radicalism inside and outside of its borders.

For instance, the Iranian Revolution, with its quest to spread the teachings of Khomeini, was perceived as a threat only in Turkey as opposed to the other members of the NATO alliance. Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks shook the Western world while igniting the processes of Islamophobia, the hawkish transformation of conflict conceptualizations, and the solidified interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Turkey was – and still is – supportive of the U.S. in its quest to defeat terrorism; a struggle that Turkey has been experiencing for decades. But the intervention in Iraq was a challenge to the relations on the government level in so far as the Turkish parliament denied the United States Army access to Turkish territory and bases for the purpose of invading Iraq.

After the March 1 Resolution of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the U.S.-Turkey relations steadily worsened. Meanwhile, there is an interesting aspect of the voting in the assembly that deserves attention. Those who voted against the U.S. plan to use Turkish territory to invade Iraq are now on the same side of the U.S. and the Turkey’s political parties then voted against the proposed plan.

This break soured the bilateral relations in Iraq and Syria in the long term while the joy of cooperation and partnership remained steady in terms of strategic communications. The straw that broke the camel’s back came after and ultimately devastated the long history of the U.S.-Turkey relations.

The common perception in Turkey is that the U.S. encouraged the July 15 military coup attempt by FETO in 2016, and that the U.S. collaborates with the PKK-affiliated terror networks in Syria at the expense of the integrity and security of its ally, Turkey.

Turkey’s reaction to the concrete and hostile U.S. acts was to mend relations with Russia since Russia has become part of the reality of the Syrian theater after the U.S. directed its efforts to the PKK/PYD to counter DAESH rather than the Turkish- (and once U.S.-) backed Free Syrian Army. Hence, the polarization of the allies in Syria is an outcome of the U.S. policies that are in conflict with Turkish interests.

This discourse led to the re-assessment of the relations based on the attitudes of both parties and resulted in an embargo of arms sales to Turkey in order to limit Turkish military operations. Nevertheless, Turkey’s attempt to procure advanced weapon systems, with technology transfers, was not met with any responses by the NATO allies and concluded with the S-400 purchase from Russia.

Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 defense missile systems cannot be viewed as an isolated issue but must be understood as a part of Turkey’s overall defense objectives. So far, embargoes have encouraged Turkey to produce domestic weapon systems with complex technologies.

Turkey’s decreasing dependency on Western defense companies is creating a concern among its NATO allies. The primary objective  of Turkey’s NATO allies seems to be to slow down Turkey’s military activism and its independent policy-making by harming its defense industries. Another issue is the Turkish defense industry’s competitive capacity in the global arms market since Turkey does not condition any weapons sale and offers competitive pricing.

The U.S. decision to implement CAATSA measures against Turkey serve to deter Turkey and other countries with similar intentions from entering the arms market or procuring Russian weapons.