When Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the Turkish Prime Minister in 2003, it was immediately clear that a new era had dawned in the country. Whilst Erdoğan’s AK Party had won a majority of Turkish votes, thus giving them a mandate to form a new government, many in Turkey remained sceptical as to whether Erdoğan would be able to deliver on the promises that he and his early political partner Abdullah Gül had pledged to deliver. Likewise, other Turks were skeptical over whether the social change that the new AK government would bring would be positive or negative.

Inversely, the rise of Erdoğan was widely praised throughout the west. Erdoğan’s pro-business, pro-economic growth, pro-trade and pro-enterprise stance was seen as a welcome development among western businessmen and financial markets who had long spoken of Turkey’s untapped economic potential but who could scarcely bring themselves to deal with the overly regulated and stagnating economy that unfortunately defined Turkey through much of the lattermost decades of the 20th century.

Erdoğan was likewise praised for injecting fresh energy into the overall democratic atmosphere in Turkey by challenging not just the electability of the legacy CHP, but in challenging the lethargy and complacency that often serves to define legacy parties long after such a party’s heroic founder had died.  

The rise of Erdoğan was widely praised throughout the west. His pro-business, trade, and pro-enterprise stance was seen as a welcome development among western businessmen and financial markets. 

In terms of his foreign policy, Erdoğan’s early years were defined by an enthusiasm to build on Turkey’s already strong relationship with the European Union with an aim to eventually join a bloc of nations which unlike today was defined by optimism and economic growth between the turn of the 21st century and 2008.

Finally, Erdoğan’s democratic credentials combined with his open embrace of Islam was often praised by western leaders looking for a major international figure to point to in order to illustrate that the increasingly widespread post-9/11 theory that Islam and democracy are uniquely mutually exclusive is false.

Whilst Erdoğan and the AK party have not changed in their ideology and overall mission for the country, western powers have changed both internally and in their perceptions of a remarkably consistent Turkish government and society.

Things began to change when Gülenist terrorists grew determined in their mission to overthrow the legitimate authorities in Turkey beginning in 2013. Because Gülen was able to use his wealth to influence liberal western mainstream media, the same Erdoğan hailed for being a pro-business Islamic democrat within the framework of an open and tolerant modern society was transformed into “the villain next door.”

For ordinary Turks the Gezi Park provocation was an event designed to sow social discord at the behest of foreign based actors including the U.S.-based Gülen and the infamous George Soros.

For ordinary Turks the Gezi Park provocation was an event designed to sow social discord at the behest of foreign based actors including the U.S. based Gülen and the infamous George Soros. However, rich and powerful western based individuals like Gülen and Soros were able to use their influence over the corporate western media to portray the Gezi Park provocateurs as “peaceful democrats” even though subsequent court records from Turkey have proved otherwise.

As the EU economy slowed down, Islamophobic sentiments continued to move from the periphery to the mainstream. As is often the case in times of economic downturn, the European extreme-left also became more emboldened in their calls for a new political consensus. In respect of how this effected Turkey, the otherwise opposed groups of the Islamophobic right, the Soros manipulated liberals and the extreme left, all ended up perversely agreeing on their hatred of Erdoğan’s Turkey. For the Islamophobic right, Erdoğan’s position as the world’s foremost political champion of the rights of Muslims throughout the world was seen as a threat to a worldview which seeks to portray Muslims as unilaterally wicked and Christians, secularists and Jews are uniformly innocent.

For the Soros style liberals, Erdoğan’s refusal to allow his nation’s internal affairs to be subject to malign foreign interference was a trigger for such groups to accuse Erdoğan of being some sort of anti-democratic human rights violator even though the terrorists he arrested threatened not just Turkey but the wider world. A strong argument can also be made that traditional free speech is much heathier in Turkey than in the increasingly censorship happy European Union. Finally, the European far-left that had always had a perverse soft spot for the PKK terror organisation found a strange comrade in the form of the U.S. military which, beginning under Barack Obama allied with the Syria branch of the PKK, the YPG in the Syrian conflict.

At the same time as western powers became increasingly strained in their relations with Turkey, Turkey itself continued to make new partnerships abroad. Under Erdoğan, relations with neighbouring Iran and nearby Russia improved greatly in spite of external actors attempting to prevent both whilst under Erdoğan, Turkey signed up to the international game changing Belt and Road initiative which was introduced by China in 2013.

More recent years have seen Turkey expand its economic and cultural connectivity throughout Africa with investment projects and visits by major Turkish officials becoming ever more common from South Africa to Sudan. Turkey has also come to engage ever more with the dynamic and economically vibrant Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Relations with Pakistan likewise continue to remain strong and within this context Islamabad has formally invited Turkey to participate in projects related to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor which aims at expanding Pacific to Afro-Mediterranean trading routes.

For the Islamophobic right, Erdoğan’s position as the world’s foremost political champion of the rights of Muslims throughout the world was seen as a threat to a worldview which seeks to portray Muslims as unilaterally wicked and Christians, secularists and Jews are uniformly innocent.

This has further led to western antagonism against Turkey not because of any Turkish maleficence against the west, but because of America’s particular tendency to exert its economic authority in order to prevent other countries from developing a multilateral foreign policy. As Turkey is among the most prominent and strong nations seeking to balance relations between the major powers of the west and those of Eurasia, Ankara has been singled out for specific harassment, particularly when it comes to Turkey’s decision to buy S-400 missile defence systems from Russia. Thus, Erdoğan is now hated in certain western quarters not in spite of, but because of his consistency and his unwillingness to compromise from a position of weakness.

In this sense, the same qualities for which many western leaders and analysts once praised Erdoğan are those which now earn him excoriation from the west. Erdoğan’s willingness to emphasize Turkey’s democratic, Islamic and modern traditions simultaneously, his championing of a high growth strategy for the economy, his willingness to engage in unique win-win agreements with partners to the west, south and east and his ability to transform Turkey from a place where the world came to admire history to a place where the world now comes to admire the present and future, remain his defining characteristics.

One must remember though, just because western leaders and policy advocates have changed their mind on Erdoğan, for most of Asia, Africa and even Latin America, Erdoğan and Turkey’s star continues to rise whilst many are questioning whether the decline of the west is temporary or permanent. 

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared an expansion of Turkish military operations in Syria and pointed to the east of the Euphrates.

During his speech at the Turkish Defense Industry Summit yesterday, President Erdogan stated that a military operation will begin in the area controlled by the YPG in the west of the Euphrates River. Erdogan said: “While 80-85% of Manbij used to belong to the Arabs, at the moment there are terrorist groups there. In that case, we will take them out. It is our responsibility now.”

Further criticizing the U.S. administration, Erdogan stated, “We have not yet achieved any result in Manbij. Mr. President says that we will clear those (terrorist groups) in 30 days. We’ll see. We wish they would clear all the terrorists.”

“An undeniable diversion tactic has been carried out in Manbij. And at this moment it is still being carried out.”

Global media outlets have confirmed that the U.S. has taken a step to train 30,000 YPG terrorists in northern Syria. And President Erdogan asks the U.S. government “Is this true? Are you aware of what you are really doing?”

“The north of Syria is our south. They are trying to build a corridor there. We say ‘these are terrorists,’ but our strategic partners, especially the U.S., say that ‘they are not terrorists.’ These are (referring to the terrorist organizations) a branch of the PKK, and all the proof is exposed. Why don’t you act with us, but act with them?”

“While the Americans speak positively to our faces, they preferred to use elements of these terrorist groups on the ground. Recently, they have taken the step to train 30,000 terrorists in the area. They say ‘there is no such thing.’ However, the global media has confirmed this. They have this information. Is this true? Are you aware of what you are really doing?”

What will be the scope of Turkey’s operation to the east of the Euphrates?

According to Abdullah Agar, terror and security expert, the operation will involve an area of 20 thousand square kilometers and this time Sinjar – an area in the west of Iraq – will also be included.

Turkey’s new military operation to the east of the Euphrates will involve an area of 20 thousand square kilometers and this time Sinjar – an area in the west of Iraq – will also be included.

Regarding the possibility of Turkish and U.S. forces crossing each other, Agar highlighted the possibility of this risk but stated, “If the risk is big for Turkish soldiers, it is bigger for American soldiers. The U.S. has made a huge mistake by taking a path with terrorists.”

Confirming the importance of President Erdogan’s speech for reflecting the will of Turkey, Agar said, “An operation that will be executed in stages is ahead. We are talking about a process of 550 kilometers along the border and 40 kilometer square in depth. This means that the Turkish Armed Forces will conduct an operation in an area of 20 thousand kilometer square.”

The operation, announced yesterday by Erdogan could further damage the already tense relations between Turkey and the United States.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

Within the past two weeks, Turkey’s governing AK Party revealed a significant number of mayor candidates for the upcoming local elections. After negotiations between the AK Party and the MHP on forming an alliance again, both parties have accelerated their preparations for the elections. As these elections are a crucial turning point for the AK Party and the consolidation of the new political system, the candidate selection process was important to establish a successful election strategy.

President Erdogan’s three-term rule, which limits running for office for a maximum of three terms, with the purpose of providing dynamism and rejuvenation in party cadres has been implemented for the first time in local elections. Due to this reason, 91 mayors of provinces and counties currently serving could not be re-nominated. The first round of candidates were announced by President Erdogan on 24 November. These included the candidates of 40 provinces, consisting of politicians, NGO leaders, governors, and former ministers. President Erdogan underlined again that competency and the merit of the candidate compose the criteria that the AK Party has used in the candidate selection process.

As the upcoming local elections are a crucial turning point for the AK Party and the consolidation of the new political system, the candidate selection process was important to establish a successful election strategy.

The second round of candidates were announced soon after, on 27 November. The most striking names in this second group were the candidates of Ankara and Izmir. The deputy chair of the AK Party, Mehmet Ozhaseki, was nominated for Ankara, while the former Minister of Economy Nihat Zeybekci became the mayoral candidate for Izmir. Ozhaseki and Zeybekci are well-known politicians throughout the country and their nomination was a sign that the AK Party is paying more attention to these metropolitan cities. Nevertheless, even if the candidacy of Binali Yildirim for Istanbul is almost certain, it is yet to be announced to the public.

The candidates for Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir form the cornerstones of the AK Party’s election strategy. As Bahceli announced, the MHP will not nominate candidates in provinces that the AK Party has, and will support the AK Party’s candidate in order to maintain the solidarity of the coalition formed during the June 24 elections. As a result of this, the People’s Alliance has already significantly gone ahead of the game. The AK Party nominated three high-profile politicians to attract the voters in these electoral districts, and these candidates have been welcomed by the MHP. Thus, the candidate selection strategy of the AK Party in these provinces received successful reflections by both parties.

President Erdogan’s three-term rule, which limits running for office for a maximum of three terms, with the purpose of providing dynamism and rejuvenation in party cadres has been implemented for the first time in local elections.

Nonetheless, the AK Party is aware of the rejuvenation demands among the masses. In accordance with this purpose, the party has made significant changes in its candidate profiles. For instance, only 10 out of 40 among the first group of candidates are currently serving mayors of their electoral districts. This shows that the AK Party is paying attention to the mobilization in local administration.

The rest of the AK Party’s candidates will be announced throughout December along with the party’s election manifesto. It is possible to see some joint candidates as part of a cooperation between the AK Party and the MHP. Negotiations on the possibilities and limitations of the alliance are being conducted precisely. The concrete results of these negotiations will be seen in the following days as the rest of the candidates are announced.

Speaking at the 34th Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (COMCEC) in Istanbul, President Erdogan gave important messages from regional unity in the Muslim word to reform in the United Nations.

Emphasizing the importance of cooperation, Erdogan highlighted the importance of regional unity among Muslim countries and stated, “The more we boost our trade among COMCEC members, the stronger we will be.”

More, President Erdogan touched upon the current protectionist policies pursued by government leaders, which can eventually push forward global trade wars. In an extraordinary comment reflecting on the U.S.-imposed trade war and the hegemony of the U.S. dollar in the global economy, Erdogan stated, “In order to break the shackles of imperialism, it is of critical importance to use local currencies in trade amongst ourselves.” This remark is expected to have a triggering effect on trade relations among countries that have suffered from the hegemony of the U.S. dollar in the global market.

In addition to hegemony in global trade, Erdogan also touched upon the “dirty games” pursued by some in the international system in order to set Muslims against each other. He also added, “We should no longer fall into the traps set up by those who act with the logic that a drop of petrol is more valuable than a drop of blood.”

Reforming the UN and war in the Middle East

Before commenting on the current humanitarian situations in Palestine, Syria, and Yemen, President Erdogan re-emphasized his call that urgent reform is required in the United Nations. Known for his motto “the world is bigger than five,” Erdogan called for all members of the UN to have a seat on the Security Council by stating, “All members of the UN must be entitled to be permanent members.”

Moving on to the Middle East, Erdogan argued that the scheme of ‘Great War’ is the reason behind the civil wars, crises, and conflicts in the Muslim world. Criticizing U.S. policies, President Erdogan added that “We will oppose the creation of any new “terror states” in our region by the pretext of Daesh.”

Commenting on terror in the global sense and the unresolved conflict in Syria, President Erdogan said, “We will put things in order in the Syrian conflict, not others. From Berlin to Paris and Brussels to Moscow, we will oppose the murder of innocents by terrorists. We will encourage our citizens to visit Jerusalem and prevent occupiers to turn off the candles of Jerusalem. We will be the first ones to say no to terrorist organizations like FETO, the PKK, and Al-Qaeda, and will not allow them to darken our future. We will increase our voice against oppression and injustice before anyone else.”

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi 

The Student Oath that was mandatorily recited in primary schools at the beginning of every school day for 76 years was abolished in 2013. Then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reminded Turkey of the situation in Europe at the time that inspired the Oath: “During the 1930s, such practices such as Hitler’s and Stalin’s were common to shape society. You can’t see any of these practices in developed countries, which muster children to recite a text containing racist slogans.”

This oath, which reads: “I am a Turk, honest and hardworking. My principle is to protect the younger, to respect the elder, to love my homeland and my nation more than myself. My ideal is to rise, to progress. My existence shall be dedicated to the Turkish existence,” was written in 1932 by then National Education Minister Resit Galip, who was referred to as a close friend by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

Recited in schools as of 1933, the oath prescribed the model citizen of the Turkish Republic. With this prescription and other additional measures in the Republic of Turkey, which was established on the renunciation of a heritage, Turkey’s 1000 years of history and identity were downplayed by disregarding that the country is the remnant of a great empire that encompassed Kurds, Circassians, Abkhasians, Muslims and non-Muslims. Excluding all the other identities, only a constructed idea of “Turkishness” was recognized as part of the efforts to establish an ethnicity-based nation state.

Following the memorandum released in 1971 by the military, the guard of the country back then, two prayer-like phrases were added to the oath. “O Great Atatürk, who had created our life of today; on the path that you have paved, in the country that you established, I swear to walk incessantly with the purposes that you have set. How happy is the one who says “I am a Turk.”

During the term of the government that was founded after the post-modern military coup on February 28, 1997, it was ordered that the oath would be recited at the beginning of every school day instead of only the first day of the week. In fact, schoolchildren were not the only group forced to recite the oath, adults imprisoned during the military junta periods were also forced to recite it for numerous times until they screamed and cried. This was done in almost every prison, including the Diyarbakir and Mamak Prison – the latter being one where most of the prisoners supported Turkist ideology.

The recital was defended by contending that the oath strengthened the younger generations’ sense of belonging to Turkish citizenship on a constitutional ground and secured administrative stability, adding that objecting to the mandatory recital in schools is not based on any scientific ground. This is what the Council of State has said in a nutshell, who issued a verdict on the application filed by the Education and Science Workers’ Union (Eğitim-Sen) five years ago for the annulment of the provision that abolished the mandatory recital of the oath.

Following the State of Council’s verdict, Pandora’s box has been opened again. Everyone has voiced their own opinion on the Student Oath according to their political affiliations. As a requirement of his party’s historical mission, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) Deputy Chair Faik Oztrak said: “As the Council of State reminded us once again, our Student Oath, which is based on Atatürk nationalism, does neither exclude any ethnicity nor aim any polarization. The oath represents the ideals of the nation and the Republic within the country’s integrity while internalizing the notions of love and respect. It symbolizes the aim of development. If there is a legal order, then the oath will be recited in schools again.”

The Parliamentary Constitution Committee Chairman and former Justice Minister Bekir Bozdag, on the other hand, responded by hinting at the tutelage regime of the old Turkey that used to be ruled by the military and the judiciary: “With the Student Oath verdict, the Council of State overstepped its limits of governing compliance with the laws, attempted to assume the position of the executive body and disregarded the discretionary power of the executive body. In brief, it avowedly violated the Constitution and the relevant law.”

Meanwhile, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli did not only side with the Council of State’s decision, but also targeted Bozdag in a way that evokes the 76 years of collective memory: “Mr. Bozdag can say that he is Kurdish and he is free to do so. There is no one attempting to silence him. So, he is entitled to evaluate the situation according to his own temper and disposition. The Turkish nation bestowed him a senior position. So, he cannot think of denigrating the Turkish nation.”

A journalist friend of mine once said: “Nationalism is anteroom to racism.” This disease was inflicted on our territory by the West in the guise of nationalism some 200 years ago and in the form of racism during the 1930s. The Republic of Turkey paid heavy costs for the efforts to build an ethnicity-based nation that ignores multiculturalism and diversity although it was the remnant of a grand empire.

The old Turkey was a period when the nation was reduced to only one ethnicity as prescribed in the Student Oath, multiculturalism was disregarded, and the ones not conforming to this model were not even considered proper citizens. Of course, the present situation of the country is not flawless, but the old Turkey is already left behind.

In today’s Turkey, in which 4 million Syrian refugees are hosted and more than 600 thousand Syrians are to receive education, this oath does not have any relevance or validity. In this sense, President Erdogan announced in a determined demeanor that he will not condone the practices reminiscent of the single-party period’s CHP: “Does the recital of a uniformist text by our children every morning have any sense? What is the point of criticizing our Constitution Committee Chairman through his ethnicity and disposition? You claim that you are not segregationist, but you are insulting and threatening the Constitution Committee Chairman who has been a parliamentary member and a minister. We are standing behind him.”

Since 2013, Turkey has been experiencing deeply traumatic events one after the other. The country has chosen to deal with these events with a new constitution and elections, preferring something new rather than old in order to address the trauma. We are now in the final stretch of a marathon of elections that have been going on for the last two years.

After the local elections in March 2019, we will enter a 3-year period without elections, which will last until 2022. Considering the fact that we’ve continuously been under an atmosphere of elections since March 2014, which have been pretty fierce, this 3-year period will certainly feel different for the country.

Since the previous local elections held in March 2014, the nature of politics, political sociology, and voting behavior in Turkey have changed significantly.

What makes the upcoming local elections more important than a simple vote to determine local administrators is the fact that the opposition is trying to make it ‘a referendum vote’ for the Turkish government. And this effort may lead to the most critical stage of a struggle in voter sociology, which has been long ongoing.

I will attempt to explain the reasons for this.

Now that Turkey has fully transitioned to the presidential system, the government is stable and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will rule the country until June 2022. However, the situation is not the same in Parliament. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AK Party) does not hold the majority. Thus, the AK Party needs to maintain good relations with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) – its electoral ally during the 2018 elections. (The opposite also holds here, meaning that the MHP needs the AK Party as well).

The continuation of the alliance that was established prior to the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2018 had become a political necessity. Leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahceli, was the first to state this, arguing that for a presidential system to be truly established, the success of the People’s Alliance must continue in the local elections, since the opposition would rekindle discussions regarding the presidential system in case of a decrease in votes.

Bahceli was not wrong with this opinion. Similar to the efforts between the AK Party and MHP, the Nation Alliance, which was first established for the 2018 elections, between the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Iyi Party and Felicity Party also seems interested in employing a strategy of cooperation and alliance for the local elections.

While the Felicity Party does not yet appear to be a part of this equation, CHP and Iyi Party have begun flirting with the idea of an alliance. In my opinion, Bahceli’s analysis still carries its validity. However, the dynamics have significantly changed when the AK Party and MHP publicly declared following the Student Oath debate that they will not form an alliance in the local elections.

Political scene after the parliamentary elections in July 2015

To recall the last parliamentary elections, Turkish voters were roughly divided into two major blocs. The first and majority bloc represented by the People’s Alliance consists of 54% of the voter base. The Nation Alliance received 34% of the vote. The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), which entered the elections outside of any alliance, fortified its position in the Turkish political landscape with 12% of the vote.

When examining these results, we see that the percentage of votes received by the AK Party has decreased to the levels obtained during the 2015 July elections. This is when the party failed to receive a majority in Parliament for the first time (since coming to power in 2002). The only consolation for this was that President Erdogan was selected as the first president of the presidential system in the first round, with 52.6% of the vote. The AK Party now cooperates with the MHP in order to achieve a majority in the parliament, meaning this is a de facto legislative coalition.

MHP’s key position

In comparison to the number of votes it received, this situation gives the MHP disproportionate influence. This is how, despite being the fourth largest party in Parliament, with only 50 members, the MHP could suggest for a general pardon for prisoners convicted of certain crimes.

MHP is evidently trying to use this position as a “leverage.” The last of such cases is the recent Student Oath debate, which has been the last the straw that broke the camel’s back causing the two parties to break up and follow their own ways during the local elections of 2019.

Likewise, the slowdown of the Turkish economy, along with the rising levels of inflation and unemployment, seems to have increased public discontent regarding the AK Party prior to the election. The general election held in June 2018 has shown that while the MHP lost a significant amount of votes to the newly formed nationalist Iyi Party, it has retained its significance by drawing a similar amount of votes from the AK Party. MHP now intends to recapture the nationalist vote it lost by employing its public perception.

Some recent polls reveal a remarkable trend among voters: voters continue to switch from the AK Party to the MHP. Some studies even conclude that this dynamic may have led to the MHP gaining 20% of the total votes. These studies and polls may be the reason behind the increased confidence Bahceli has shown in his relations with the AK Party and with Erdogan.

In both the constitutional referendum and the June 2018 elections we saw that with respect to opposing FETO and defending the country from future threats of terrorism, voters tend to hold the AK Party and MHP, Erdogan and Bahceli, in the same regard. The voter base of both parties constitute a “common pool” of 53% of the total vote, and the transition of voter preferences between the two parties takes place only in that pool.

The ongoing economic turbulence in Turkey gives a golden chance to the opposition parties at capturing votes from the 53% “common pool.” The CHP and Iyi Party are working hard to claim symbolically important victories against the AK Party.

Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality undoubtedly carries the utmost significance for the AK Party in the local elections. Recalling that the elected mayor of Istanbul, Kadir Topbas, was made to resign by the AK Party and President Erdogan, Istanbul emerges as a possibly problematic area for the AK Party. Formerly to negotiate with the AK Party, MHP had suggested that it would act in favor of the AK Party and not nominate a candidate in Istanbul, expecting a similar act in a different place for their benefit. However, there was not much that the AK Party could gain from the MHP in Istanbul; for the AK Party to win Istanbul, instead of MHP, the party should have focused more on the Kurdish electorate. The same is also happening between the Iyi Party and CHP, in the lines of “We should give Istanbul to them and they should give us Ankara.”

CHP’s HDP deadlock

CHP wants to gain the majority in Istanbul but whether the Iyi Party alone would achieve this is uncertain. Thus, the CHP needs to attract HDP voters as the HDP does not have a meaningful chance of winning the city. However, getting closer to the Kurds has become the biggest taboo of Turkish politics in recent years. If CHP were to name a candidate that would draw the support of Kurdish voters, they would distance themselves from Turkish nationalist Iyi Party voters. But without the support of Kurdish voters, it is highly unlikely for the CHP to win.

AK Party and MHP have both been accusing CHP of “allying with terrorists” and saying that HDP is a direct extension of the terrorist organization, the PKK. This discourse is very effective among voters. Non-Kurdish voters, regardless of which party they vote for, do not have any doubt regarding the HDP’s close relationship with the PKK. All research confirms this striking political reality. Now, seeing that the People’s Alliance is in some kind of coma, will there be a change in this discourse? Will the AK Party adopt a more soft approach to Kurdish politics? We’ll see.

While search for an alliance during the local elections has ended for the AK Party and the MHP, these efforts are likely to continue between the Iyi Party and the CHP. If the opposition parties, including the HDP, manage to form a block despite their substantial differences in micro and macro policies and gain vote from the ruling bloc of the AK Party and MHP in the elections, for example reducing the 53% total vote of the two parties to around 45-47%, Turkey might enter a discussion of legitimacy that might last until 2022. The opposition may claim that President Erdogan and the AK Party-MHP majority in the Parliament have lost their legitimacy on the following morning of the elections.

Scramble for symbolically important municipalities

The fact that the MHP and AK Party will not form an alliance in the local elections will prevent others from calculating the votes of the two parties and saying “look, this is the state of the People’s Alliance.”

On the other hand, due to the complex system of local elections in Turkey, it is hard to determine the percentage of votes a given party has received nationwide. Therefore, the real result of the election will not be determined by vote percentages but by which parties win the symbolically important municipalities and which party wins the most municipalities in total. This is why the AK Party losing metropolitan areas such as Istanbul and Ankara means a lot to the opposition.

In previous elections, the AK Party used to run a serious election campaign in Izmir, which traditionally strongly votes for CHP, but in this election it seems like the AK Party will act more defensively and prefer to focus on retaining its previous majorities. It will be interesting to watch the AK Party’s efforts to retain its popularity not only in Istanbul and Ankara but also in cities such as Antalya, Bursa, and Balıkesir.

All these constitute the reasons why this election will be decisive for AK Party’s future. If the party shows that it has retained its influence and popularity, it will prove that it has successfully emerged from the dangerous turbulence Turkey has experienced since the last months of 2013 as the “founding” party, and will continue to carry Turkey to its future. If it experiences a significant decrease in votes and fails to rejuvenate after such a loss, it will enter a period of very hard days.

In 2013, the Ministry of National Education abolished the administrative regulation that ordered the recital of the Student Oath, an oath that begins by stating “I am a Turk, honest, and hardworking,” which used to be recited in schools at the beginning of each day. A teacher’s union known for being close to the MHP had opened a case in the Administrative Court regarding this decision made by the ministry. During the time in which the oath had been abolished, Turkey was conducting a series of talks with the outlawed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in order to resolve the Kurdish question.

MHP was strongly opposed to this process calling it “Dissolution Process” that was indeed called by the government as “Reconciliation Process.” The Oath was considered racist by non-Turkish groups living in Turkey and MHP saw its abolition as a concession made to the PKK.

The Student Oath Case, which was opened in 2013, was concluded in October 2018 by the 8th chamber of the Council of State. The decision ruled that the Ministry of National Education cannot abolish its own administrative regulations.

This is a problematic decision for a number of reasons. First, the ministry abolishing an administrative regulation does not create a new legal situation, meaning that the Council of State has no ground for a decision concerning it. Second, the Council of State goes beyond matters of law in its decision by stating, “Sufficient scientific ground supporting the Ministry of National Education’s decision to abolish the oath does not exist,” meaning that the court is arguing whether such a decision is right on grounds of pedagogical science rather than legality. However, the Council of State does not have the authority to conduct examinations regarding the aptness of administrative decisions. Its authority is limited to examining and supervising legal matters.

In the “Old Turkey,” to use the term coined by the AK Party, courts often examined the “aptness” of government decisions and acted as if they were opposition parties, banning certain behavior. It has been a long time since this situation was named “judicial tutelage” and many efforts were made to end it.

The government has tried to change judicial cadres in order to end this practice by Kemalist and statist groups. However, these changes led to the rise of FETO in the judicial system, and this terrorist organization tried to establish its own practice of “tutelage.”

Following FETO’s bloody coup attempt on July 15, 2016, extensive crackdowns occurred in the judicial system in order to eliminate FETO members and prevent such attempts of establishing a “tutelage” from occurring again. More than half of the judges and prosecutors working at the time were dismissed. While all this was happening, the greatest supporter of President Erdogan and the AK Party was MHP and its leader Devlet Bahceli.

The Council of State’s decision discussed above thus raises questions as to whether or not those close the MHP among the judiciary came to power after the FETO crackdowns and whether they are prominent enough to show such strength against the government.

The strong open support Bahceli displayed for the Student Oath and his criticisms targeting AK Party’s former Minister of Justice Bekir Bozdag, who comes from an ethnic Kurdish background, makes the MHP’s stance on the subject very clear. MHP wants the oath back in schools.

All these together are issues that made it difficult to continue with the People’s Alliance during the local elections. Unlike MHP leader Bahceli, President Erdogan never brought these issues to the agenda until 23 October. However, the general atmosphere from Erdogan’s surroundings was that MHP’s demands in regards to the pardon of prisoners and the Student Oath was not going to be accepted.

When Devlet Bahceli was at the lectern to speak before his party’s group meeting on October 23, as always, he looked angry and stiff. In this speech, Bahceli announced that the MHP had stopped looking for ways to form an alliance with the AK Party during the local elections. He also used ambiguous language about the future of the People’s Alliance. Due to the questions launched at him after he finished his speech, Bahceli stated that the “People’s Alliance is continuing.” However, it’s not difficult to suggest that the alliance had cracked.

President Erdogan spoke after Bahceli’s speech and his decision to end the alliance possibility during local elections and bluntly stated, “Everyone can go their own ways.” While Erdogan had stated this in regards to the local elections, I think the most important part of his speech was when he defended Bekir Bozdag against Devlet Bahceli and said that “We have no other oath apart from our National Anthem.” Erdogan’s disapproval of this type of Turkish nationalism was also an illustration that the President wanted to highlight the difference between the AK Party and MHP.

Now, it’s possible to see the People’s Alliance in some kind of coma or in the fridge. Although both sides suggest that the alliance is continuing, we’ll only see the reality of this when the MHP votes either in favor or against the 2019 budget formation, which is still being discussed in Parliament. If the MHP votes against the budget then not only will the People’s Alliance die, but the newly established presidential system will also enter a serious crisis due to its failure in processing its first budget. If MHP votes in favor of the budget, this will show that the People’s Alliance will continue.

Of course, the MHP can choose to abstain from voting. In this case, the budget will pass with AK Party votes. However, the People’s Alliance will maintain to sleep in a coma.

It’s highly likely that we’ll see whether this alliance will continue and what the new rules for the two parties will be after the local elections. After observing their votes, the AK Party and MHP will do a cost-benefit analysis in order to observe how the alliance suits them best.