With the shifting geopolitical factors in the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East, Russia and Turkey assumed new geopolitical positions.
President Erdoğan was able to strengthen both Turkey’s effectiveness and diplomatic power in many regional issues such as northern Syria, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Southern Caucasus.
The transfer of Israeli natural gas to Europe via Turkey could be the backbone of a solid partnership.
Eastern Europe is the most dependent on Russian gas, whereas Germany imports the most Russian gas by far.
More specifically the tensions in Libya, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean, where the concerned parties are in direct confrontation, are likely to remain.
ince Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine began on February 24, the eastern European country has experienced death, destruction, and trauma.
A Saudi-Turkish political alignment has a potential to give Ankara considerable regional weight in settling three hotspot files: Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Egypt.
-led NATO bloc against Russia’s recent assertiveness in and around Eastern Europe.
ver since the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) signed an agreement with Egypt in 2003 on the delimitation of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean and declared concession areas for the purpose of oil and gas exploration in 2007, a high tension has grown over the possible maritime boundaries and related activities.
Amidst rising tensions with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece and France made steps to improve political and military cooperation further in order to form an alliance against Turkey.
The close rhetoric between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood for almost ten years, pushed Emirati decision-makers to adopt adverse policies towards Turkey in various regional crises like the Syrian Civil War and the Eastern Mediterranean until the visit of Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MBZ), the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and de facto ruler of the Emirates, to Turkey in November 2021.
Read: France-Greece-Saudi Arabia Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean Initiatives for internal balancing Following the Kardak (Imia) crisis with Turkey in 1996, Greece launched an armament program as part of an internal balancing against Turkey and came a long way towards this purpose.
With this investment, the company planned to increase further its market presence in southeastern Europe.
was able to embark on its Middle Eastern policy vis-à-vis its European partners, but strategic gains that directly hinder EU profitability will cause certain fractions in this practice.
In the aftermath, Turkish-Israeli relations followed a tense course, culminating in Israel’s aggression over Jerusalem and the Israeli-Greek rapprochement in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Read: Turkey's Drilling Ships to Respond to Injustice in the Eastern MediterraneanAlthough submarines are traditionally attributed sea-denial roles, which aim to undermine adversary trade in maritime lines or prevent naval forces from reaching friendly shores, the current geopolitics and technological leaps may dictate varying uses.
It was reported that Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani, a good friend of both Erdoğan and MBZ, helped facilitate the rapprochement between Turkey and the UAE – two countries that confronted on almost all regional issues concerning Libya, Egypt, the Horn of Africa, Yemen, and the Eastern Mediterranean throughout the past decade.
he Eastern Mediterranean is a relatively narrow strip in the Mediterranean Sea surrounded by the coasts of ten different states, making coastal relations between these countries a technically complex issue.