According to the Anadolu Agency, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad regime held talks with the PKK/PYD on Sunday in the regime-controlled Qamishli district of Hasakah province in northeastern Syria.

The Assad regime reportedly offered autonomy to the PKK/PYD terrorist group in return for withdrawal from areas under its control, but the organization has demanded a federation status instead.

Ali Mamlouk, the head of the country’s National Security Bureau, represented the Assad regime in the talks.

According to the sources, Mamlouk assured the PKK/PYD that the Syrian regime would recognize the terrorist organization’s authority in the region on condition that it withdraws from the lands it captured during the Syrian civil war.

However, it has been reported that the PKK/PYD rejected the offer and demanded the country’s constitutional system to be re-structured.

Though the two sides failed to reach an agreement, they agreed to hold further meetings in the future.

There has been no comment from either the Syrian regime of the PKK/PYD on this claim.

According to Anadolu Agency map measurements, the terrorist organization occupies about a quarter of Syrian territory, most of which is populated by Arabs and Turkmens.

Chemical weapons have been used 45 times in Syria since last year, according to the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which monitors the elimination of the toxic arms in order to ensure international security. The most recent chemical attack to draw world attention took place on April 4, 2017 in Khan Sheikhoun district, which is located in southern Idlib. The Khan Sheikhoun attack also prompted the fledgling Trump administration to carry out a cruise missile strike on a Syrian airbase allegedly used for the chemical attack, which targeted innocent civilians and children.

The Red Line in US Syria Policy

In response to the use of chemical weapons against innocent civilians, the root causes of the Trump authorization of a missile attack in Syria have been widely discussed at the international level. Trump’s missile strike could be interpreted as taking a stand against the use chemical weapons, which had been clearly marked as a ‘red line’ in Washington’s Syria policy by the previous administration. Back in 2013, President Obama had said any violation of the red line could lead to a possible change of US policy towards the Syrian civil war.

Apparently, Trump and his predecessor Obama are on the same page about what a red line in the Syrian civil war is. According to US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the top leadership of the Assad regime ordered the Khan Sheikhoun attack and decided to employ deadly chemicals including sarin gas to hit innocent people. Nevertheless, Syria and Russia are adamant that the recent sarin gas attack is a ‘false flag’ operation that Al-Qaeda or one of the Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist groups that controls the Idlib province set off in order to elicit an American intervention which put 20% of Assad’s air force out of action. However, if we take a look at the recent history of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, despite international condemnation, significant non-overlapping arguments were laid out by the Syrian government and even by the OPCW.

Even though Syria signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in October 2013 and OPCW reported Syria had removed all of its chemical arsenal in June 2014, the Syrian government went on to carry out chlorine gas attacks several times in Idlib. It is possible that Syria has used the Chemical Weapons Convention as a screen, so it can attribute future deadly chemical attacks on opposition groups fighting in Idlib.

Most probably, the Syrian government did not expect a sudden US attack that  would destroy one of their significant airfields. From now on, there is a possibility that Trump’s retaliatory attacks might stop Assad from using chemical weapons. Apparently Russia can quickly replace the lost aircraft at the destroyed airbase, so it is difficult to anticipate the future of Syria and how the recent US attacks might change the balance of power on the battlefield, specifically in Idlib province where the next “mother of all battles” is yet to come.

Trump’s Policy in the Middle East Will Not Be a Huge Departure from That of Obama’s

Following the chemical attack, the international community has renewed calls for supporting regime change and removing Assad from Syria, arguing that if this does not happen, Syria will stay vulnerable to further gross human rights violations. Even though the US has followed a pro-active policy in the region over the last 15 years, this time it seems that Trump’s policy in the Middle East would be “reactive.” So far, Trump’s policy has not offered any concrete solution to stop the humanitarian crisis except offering condemnation and carrying out some warning attacks. Most probably, Trump’s policy in the Middle East will not be a huge departure from that of Obama’s.

Trump’s reaction to the deadly chemical attack is rather symbolic and discursive, and does not change his stated aim that his top priority in Syria is to defeat DAESH. Syria urgently needs two rational solutions for two rising concerns which threaten the collective security of the region. One of them is to curtail the presence of terror organizations such as DAESH and PYD in the region. The other is to stop chemical attacks targeting civilian-inhabited areas and causing mass casualties. In this regard, Turkey could possibly get a leading role and step up for a pro-active policy in the region, especially after its Euphrates Shield Operation in Syria has been shown to be so successful.

Turkey Was Right to Consistently Call for Assad’s Ouster

After wide-spread chemical attacks in Syrian territory, the international community has been able to find the lowest common denominator and chanted “Assad must go” with one voice, however Turkey has known of the urgency of Assad’s ouster since the beginning of the war. After the chemical attack Turkey has renewed this call one more time.

The state apparatus in Syria has completely been destroyed and the legitimacy of the regime is highly questionable. More than 11 million people have been displaced (almost half of Syria’s population) and the economy has shrunk 65% since the start of the war. This is in addition to the situation even before the conflict began, when many Syrians were complaining about high unemployment rates, widespread and normalized corruption, and a lack of political freedoms.

Who Will Take the Lead in the Syrian Battleground?

The current situation in Syria is pathetic, as another deadly chemical attack was launched against innocent civilians, but no single institution or government seems sure of what the next step will be, and who is going to take the leading role. Moreover, there are communication problems between Moscow and the US, whose priorities are clashing against each other, with one side working for the “survival of the regime” and another for “fighting DAESH.” No one knows how Russia will take the facts of the recent chemical attack in discussions with their US counterparts, so the level of dialogue is very critical between the two powers and will determine the future of Syria under the Trump administration.

After a meeting with Putin on May 3, Erdoğan will meet with Trump on May 16. That meeting will turn out to be critical, as it will be the first “face to face” encounter between the two leaders. Additionally, two key NATO allies will have the chance to mend a relationship that was wounded by persistent US cooperation with PYD, the Syrian branch of the PKK.

Turkey should be neither too pessimist nor too optimist especially after Rex Tillerson’s statements on Syria, which were recently laid out after a joint press conference with Russian counter-part Lavrov. Tillerson underlined the urgency of Assad’s departure, however he added that the US is not going to lead it. His statement is a good summary of the American position, in that it is standing up for Syria.  The next step should be to realize that Turkey has a clear strategic advantage and can become that leading figure on the Syrian battleground needed to remove Assad.

Iranian troops have been deployed in rebel-held territory in Aleppo since 2015; Assad was ensured to win back Aleppo along with Syrian soldiers and Hezbollah militants. The truth is the Syrian army was neither qualified to handle the crisis in Aleppo in its own way, nor were they able to capture the divided city where all separate enclaves were being controlled by various groups comprising of Russian soldiers, Shiite fighters from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Afghanistan. Even though Assad had sent his most experienced forces to take part in operations; after more than five years of non-intrusive war; his forces have been debilitated while clinging to battle, which is being carried out under heavy attacks. With the fall of Aleppo, held by rebels since 2012, Assad has consolidated his power and polished himself by relying on foreign fighters to capture the city. Amid the diverse ethnic structure fighting for Assad, it is hard to turn a blind eye on the leading role played by Shiite-dominated “Quds Brigades” and “Hezbollah Brigades” to recapture the beleaguered city.

Revival of Shia Politics over Syria Civil War

The latent reality is liberation of Aleppo has been incited by the blessing of a Shia revival by the most powerful Shiite political figures such as Muqtada al-Sadr, a well-known anti-American Shiite cleric propping up Assad’s regime. Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah has portrayed the war in Syria as “the mother of all battles,” so the discourses that significant Shia political and religious figures are appealing to could be accepted as one of the most efficient tools mobilizing Shia militiamen to Syria as an active agent of the war.

To put it more explicitly, the Aleppo battle is also a symbolic battle where the streets are surrounded by Shia iconography and Shia tones such that it is rather usual to see Shia militants carrying portraits of Shia clerics in the streets. Similar scenes unfolded in northern Aleppo Province in the last few months while Iraqi clerics were giving speeches to militiamen in fatigues stimulating their religious senses to fight in the name of the Shia faith and Islamic law. He praised his followers’ willingness to fight far from home and positioned their presence in Syria as a part of a master plan to defend the Shia faith.

Moreover, Shia clerics are also actively using social media accounts to make their strident sectarian voices heard to wide masses in the looming battle and justified martyrs who died in battleground while defending their faiths in Iraq and Syria. As reported by The Telegraph newspaper, almost 700 Iranian soldiers and militia members have died in Syria’s civil war to preserve Assad’s grip on power. For these fighters, defending their ideology, religion and holy places are their primary motivation to be on the battleground.

Damascus: Looming Starvation Crisis is at the Door

What’s happening in Syria today reveals Iran’s sectarian desires. As it is evident from Shia ideology, dedicated militiamen fighting fiercely, rooting out Syria from all Iranian supported militias will take time because they all adhere to Shia clerics’ priorities to propagate their faith both in Syria and Iraq. On the eve of the Russo-Turkish guarantee for a country wide-ceasefire in Syria on December 29, 2016, Hezbollah, a Lebanon based Iranian proxy group, jeopardized the fragile peace process by attacking the Wadi Barada village near the capital Damascus, where hundreds of families were trapped without any aid or medication support.

Amid the newly declared truce in Syria in December, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its mercenaries along with Hezbollah militants were storming over the Wadi Barada district of rural Damascus. Currently, as a retaliatory action various new agencies have reported that this time fighting has intensified after surprise attacks by opposition fighters in the Jobar district of Damascus located in the eastern part of the city. Reportedly, the Iranian backed Hezbollah al-Nujaba militia has announced its participation in the ongoing battle in Jobar and declared once more they are all in the battle with all their military means.

One of the most significant outcomes of the recent attacks have been air strikes by regime forces, which have caused an estimated 300,000 local residents to be cut off from any humanitarian assistance in Jobar. On top of that, some respectable international aid organizations such as Physicians for Human Rights are concerned about a looming starvation crisis is at the door. According to a recent UN report, approximately four million people located in Damascus have been deprived of safe drinking water and any medical aid support.

Ongoing Peace Talks Overshadowed Long-Awaited Peace in the Region

Opposition forces are justifying their attacks being intensified in the Jobar district of Damascus from their social media accounts based on the failure of UN sponsored peace talks, which resumed in Switzerland in February 2017. In addition as it can be remembered, opposition groups refused to talk directly with the regime as both sides accused each other of violating the cease-fire in the Wadi Barada area prior to Syria peace talks held in the Kazakhstan capital Astana in January 2017. The armed opposition forces, namely Jabhat Fath al-Sham (formerly known as al-Nusra Front) refused to leave the battleground and head to Idlib in previous months. Nevertheless, Turkey insisted on returning Hezbollah militants back to Lebanon ahead of the planned truce talks in Astana, but as Khamenei’s top advisor underlined, Hezbollah is planning to stay on Syrian soil even after the ceasefire.

Though the peace talks are not the first over the course of the war, they have been long awaited for those hoping for peace in the region, and the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition have confirmed their attendance at a meeting to be held in Geneva in March 2017. Nevertheless, even UN envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura has warned not to expect miracles from the new round of UN-backed talks while fierce fighting is in full flow across the country. As reported by Daily Sabah, tens of civilians including children were killed and around 50 wounded in a recent air strike launched by regime forces east of Damascus. Obviously, peace talks, whether held in Geneva or Astana, will bolster the truce in the near future, so in a way the talks lost the structural function in the battleground as an effective way of welcoming the truce. It seems that consecutive peace talks are being appealed to in order to cover the humanitarian tragedy especially apparent in Damascus.

The recent decision by the Manbij Military Council to hand over territories in western Manbij to the Assad regime to prevent attacks from Turkish-backed Syrian rebel brigades will have its long-term effects on the YPG dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. In the eyes of Kurdish opposition groups, Syrian Arab allies of the YPG and the Arab population in Syria the credibility of the YPG dominated SDF will be questioned.

Syrian rebel forces captured the strategically important city of al-Bab from DAESH with the essential support of Turkish Armed Forces. After capturing the city, the regime and allied militias captured the town of Tadif and some other villages to the east. By doing so, the regime blocked further attacks by Syrian rebel forces against DAESH. After Turkey and Russia reached a ceasefire agreement between the Assad regime and the Syrian rebels, the focus of the Euphrates Shield Operation shifted towards the YPG controlled city of Manbij. Facing this threat, the YPG has taken huge steps to avoid any offensive towards Manbij.

Firstly the YPG tried to gain US-protection against any military attack on Manbij. They threatened that they would retreat from front lines in Raqqa against DAESH to defend Manbij against Euphrates Shield forces. Knowing the strategic importance of the city for the new US administration, they thought this would convince Washington to protect their presence in Manbij despite the US’s promise of a withdrawal of YPG forces from that city. These threats may have some effects on the US’s trust in the YPG, but their partnership stays strong.

For a long time it seems that the US would protect the YPG from any attacks by Euphrates Shield forces on Manbij. The US sent new batches of armored vehicles to the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. It didn’t take long to see these new vehicles being used by YPG fighters. The military training of Manbij Military Council forces, which are also dominated by YPG fighters, also continued by the US. The CENTCOM Twitter account even cheered newly trained female fighters. YPG affiliated websites and sources started to publish visual confirmation of US troop’s presence in the area around Manbij. It seemed that the US would protect the YPG from any attack on Manbij despite its promise to Turkey, which designates the YPG as a terrorist organization because of its structural affinity with the internationally designated terrorist organization known as the PKK.

On 2 March 2017 the Military Council of Manbij published an official statement claiming they will hand areas west of Manbij over to the Assad regime and allied forces to prevent Turkish-backed rebel forces from taking the area, which means that the US’s ally on the ground is handing over territories to the Assad regime. This statement shows something important and will have many negative long-term effects for the YPG in Syria.

It firstly shows that the US didn’t agree to protect the YPG against Turkish-backed Syrian rebel forces. Despite a media campaign, which assumed US-protection for the YPG in Manbij, the Turkish and Syrian resolve to conquer Manbij prevented such protection for the YPG. US officials want to avoid an open escalation with its NATO ally, especially before the planned Raqqa operation. Therefore, the US will most likely pressure the YPG to withdraw and focus on Raqqa when the Manbij operation starts fully, to avoid a decrease in the fighting capability of the YPG and to secure the Raqqa operation.

The first soft attack of the Syrian rebels near Arima ended with the capture of three villages from the YPG. The videos of the battle clearly shows YPG fighters at the frontlines, showing that the area is dominated by the YPG as local sources claimed. The effectiveness of a possible Assad regime protection as border guards against Euphrates Shield forces is also very doubtful.

In addition, this might cause many problems for the YPG, and internal discussions are taking place over how they can hand over territories captured with the blood of their own fighters. The Kurdish National Council (ENKS) who are oppressed by the YPG started to question the goals of the YPG and how could they hand over areas to the Assad regime. The ENKS has traditionally strongly opposed the Assad regime, and they have good ties with mainstream Syrian rebels, the Turkish government and especially with the Barzani-government of the Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq.

In the same day of this statement, the Syrian Rojava Peshmarga that operates in Iraqi exile started an operation in the Sinjar Mountain to push the PKK and allied forces out of the area in cooperation with the Barzani-government and Turkey. The PKK refused to withdraw from the area. Supporters of the ENKS are questioning the reasons behind the YPG handover of territories to the Assad regime and not to the legitimate government of Kurdistan in Iraq. The YPG’s credibility among the Kurdish population will suffer with this agreement with the Assad regime. Tensions between the pro-Barzani and pro-PKK Kurds are rising. These tensions could also cross over to the Kurdish areas in Syria.

Hemin Hawrami , a senior adviser and assistant to President Barzani, and member of the KDP Leadership Council has officially asked the question of why the PKK handed over territories to the Assad regime, but not left Sinjar.

Another long-term effect for the YPG will be its relationship with Arab forces in the Syrian Democratic Forces who mainly oppose the Assad regime. The Arab allies of the YPG in the SDF will surely question the future of the organization and it will damage the credibility of the SDF. This action will be seen as proof of its collaborating with the regime.

The weakening of the alliance between the YPG and the Arab forces inside SDF could lead them to some kind of negotiations with Turkey and rebel forces who work with Turkey. Or at least, rebel forces who attack areas controlled by the SDF could argue that it would just be turned over to the regime later. Therefore, the SDF/YPG might have prevented an attack this time, but it has done more damage over the long run. The population in areas controlled by the YPG-dominated SDF could fear that their villages will be handed over to the regime in the future, so they could work with the Syrian rebels. In reality, this already happened in some areas which supposedly should be handed over to the Assad regime.

This latest action of the YPG dominated and controlled Manbij Military Council of the SDF will probably not prevent an attack on Manbij. Turkish authorities and Syrian rebels signaled that they will go for the city and it is not for sure if the Assad regime and Russia will risk an escalation with Turkey or if they would give up the YPG-control over Manbij like the US. But it is certain that the YPG lost credibility among the Kurdish population and its opponents in the ENKS. They have also lost credibility with their Arab allies in Syria.

Ahrar al-Sham’s presence and power in Northern Syria will be tested. The rivalry among high level Ahrar al-Sham commanders, between those who opposed a merger with Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS) and those who are pro-merger, led to the announcement of a splinter group called Jaish al-Ahrar. If this process leads Ahrar al-Sham to further disintegration, JFS will be the winner of this split and probably become the strongest power in Idlib. A JFS dominated Idlib will be problematic for Turkey’s moderate Syrian opposition discourse and might weaken Turkey’s influence in Idlib and its surroundings. Ankara would prefer a well-supplied united Syrian armed opposition over today’s chaos. But if some merger will lead the Syrian opposition to a political position close to JFS, then Turkey will face a situation that could end with a loss of its influence on the main actor in Idlib.

A direct confrontation between the Turkish Army or Turkey’s Syrian allies with JFS should not be expected. Despite their extremist discourse and al-Qaeda-linked background, JFS enjoys support in the Syrian opposition and society because of their policies and their fight against Assad, DAESH and the YPG. Thus a fierce conflict between rebel factions won’t be tolerated nor find support among the Syrian pro-revolution public. But a fight against a common enemy would be a better cover for Turkey’s efforts among the Syrian opposition.There is reason to believe Turkey may get more directly involved in Idlib. Turkish President Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu have repeatedly stated that the target after al-Bab city will be Manbij, which is under YPG control. If the Euphrates Shield operation is extended not only to Manbij but also to Afrin, Turkey will prefer to surround the YPG from the south of Afrin too. In this case it would not be surprising if Euphrates Shield expands to include the Idlib northern countryside. This strategy may create the possibility of a direct Turkish confrontation with Assad and Russia, because a Turkish military presence in Idlib, on top of their presence in the Azaz-Jarablus-al-Bab corridor, may be a potential threat for Assad’s forces in Aleppo.But this strategy has the potential to increase Turkey’s influence over the Syrian opposition. Turkey has ties with mainstream opposition groups, in particular Ahrar al-Sham, Faylaq al-Sham, Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki and various FSA brigades. With the possible intervention of Turkey in Idlib, relations between Turkey and the mainstream opposition can move to a new phase with a high level of cooperation.

In brief, the civil war will not end in Syria after the fall of Aleppo, but the relationship between local actors (the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition) and external actors (backers of Assad and the Syrian opposition) will determine the fate of the war at least in North Western Syria. While the Syrian opposition lacks unity and a supply of heavy weapons, the Assad regime also lacks manpower to launch a successful offensive without effective support from its allies.

There are two questions that will apparently be decisive in the near future: how far will Russia continue to back the Assad regime, and when and where will Turkey further its intervention in Syria against the YPG?

The Syrian crisis is in its fifth year and there is still no workable solution in sight. On the contrary the recent developments especially the Russian military involvement in support of the Assad regime will only escalate the gravity of the situation.

From the outset, Russia, along with China and Iran, sided with the Assad regime. Yet, the alliance has a relatively long history. It dates back to the beginning of the 1960s when the socialist secular Ba’ath party took over power in Syria (1963). Russians opened a military base in Tartus, on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. This collaboration hit its peak after the death of Jamal Abdel Nasser, with his successors leaping into the arms of the USA. In the 1970s, Hafez Assad as a “secular Baathist,” after taking power in Syria, searched for a cover for his sectarian rule and legitimized it by lending his support to the Palestinian cause. Hafez Assad started to fight against the USA, Israel’s main sponsor, and thus befriended Russia, the enemy of imperialism and supporter of the “struggle of people.” Russians continued to support Hafez for years in various fields: military, economic – the Euphrates dam project for instance – and in many scientific missions. Syrian political propaganda about steadfastness and confrontation always included the readiness of Moscow to build an air defence bridge in case of a war with Israel.

Relations started to weaken in 1986, during the Perestroïka years, when the issue of the Syrian debt to Moscow (13.4 billion USD) was highlighted. Having problems with Russians, Hafez Assad turned to the USA and adopted a more friendly approach towards it. Assad’s troops participated to the international coalition led by the United States during the Second Gulf War against his old enemy, the Baathist Saddam Hussein. In time, relations between Russia and Syria strengthened again starting in 2001 when Russia wrote off the parts of the Syrian debt and lowered it to 3.6 billion USD; the pace of rapprochement and cooperation has been increasing since.

In the last five years Russia has been a keen supporter of Bashar Assad and eventually, decided to intervene militarily in Syria and as it claimed to fight terrorism and takfirist groups. But why did the Kremlin actually intervene? What is the truth about its intentions? And most importantly, how should we read this intervention?

http://thenewturkey.org/rebalancing-turkey%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy/

It is clear that the USA’s role as sole superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union has been seriously challenged with Putin’s coming to power. It is also clear that Putin, with his upbringing and military intelligence mentality, wants to restore Russia’s old glory and perhaps even fulfill the country’s most important strategic dream of gaining a foothold in the Mediterranean Sea.

Such an ecclesiastic welcoming by the Russian Orthodox Church will fuel religious sentiments and can create an explosive ground reaction  and resistance in Muslim streets. Confirming this understanding, the first heralds of what will follow came in the Islamic fatwas released by Saudi Arabian religious authorities to fight Russians in Syria

First, there is no doubt that the Russian intervention in Syria is a wrong decision. Putin was and is still supporting Assad, in his war against his own people. Yet the error does not lie in this only – at the end of the day nobody cares about civilians. The error is that Russia will probably sink in the Syrian quagmire just as the United States sank in Iraq, and the elimination of “extremist takfiris groups” will take a very long time. Russia doesn’t seem disturbed by this factor, as it announced lately the expansion of its military base in Latakia to accommodate 200 additional aircrafts, as well as the expansion of the port of Latakiato, a harbor which can host an aircraft carrier and more than 12 battleships. It thus becomes clear that the Russians have come to stay and that they have tied up their survival in the region with Assad’s survival.

It wouldn’t be irrelevant to say that Russian intervention will turn the war more destructive, more destabilizing and more catastrophic for everybody with higher levels of damage and losses. Due to the Russian viewpoint on military action and its definition of success for military campaigns – Russian intervention in Chechnya is the best example- this intervention will force more Syrians to flee from conflict areas, meaning more refugees knocking on Europe’s doors. Furthermore, it gives Assad more power and strength to continue his political actions and course.

One of the most prominent manifestations of destabilizing the relative stability of the region was Turkey’s harsh response to the Russian aircraft violation of its airspace. It is known that the United States and Russia have reached a memorandum of understanding regarding flying over Syrian skies and that Israelis guaranteed the safety of their skies during Netanyahu’s visit to Moscow only a day after the Russians declared their intentions to conduct air strikes in Syria. Yet due to the fact that NATO has long borders with Syria and with the “Islamic State” (via Turkey) the possibility of an accident between the two powers remains as a threat to global security for the indefinite future.

On the other hand, Russian intervention will increase the indignation among Arab countries, particularly the ones who were and still are continuing to support the revolution of Syrian people against Assad and insist on his departure as a precondition for negotiations to build the Syria of tomorrow. It is possible that Saudi Arabia may become keener to supply Syrian opposition with more money and weapons to reinforce its statute and strengthen its position vis-à-vis the Russian-Iranian Shiite alliance with which Saudi Arabia is in open war on the Yemen front.

Moreover, to Muslim discontent Russia is no longer a communist atheist state, but a growing Christian power. Communist Russia was never really welcomed in the Muslim world and will not be welcomed now as it debuts its military intervention in an Arab Muslim country from a religious standpoint. The Russian Orthodox Church has blessed the military intervention, calling it a “holy war.” Such an ecclesiastic welcoming by the Russian Orthodox Church will fuel religious sentiments and can create an explosive ground reaction  and resistance in Muslim streets. Confirming this understanding, the first heralds of what will follow came in the Islamic fatwas released by Saudi Arabian religious authorities to fight Russians in Syria. Sunni Islamic extremism will inevitably be pushed further, an extremism that has become the focus of the Russian Christian-Iranian Shiite-Assad axis. Again, this will not result in anything but more extremism and more bloodshed.

The sad reality is that the Russian mistakes of today are only paid for by unarmed Syrian civilians who have seen their country torn to pieces by war for the last five years.

By intervening in Syria Russia has stopped any incentive for dialogue between parties. The rebels have declared their rejection of the United Nations’ mediation which they had previously accepted. The Assad regime, on the other hand, never displayed any real intentions to partake in dialogue and does not seem to hesitate in escalating the destruction of the country in order to keep its position.

It is evident that after the launching of bombings on the “terrorists,” Russia seems to desire to deprive the West of any partnership in a future political solution, by targeting not only ISIS troops, but also striking the moderate factions close to Washington, and all the forces opposed to the Assad regime. Russian aircrafts are reportedly avoiding bombing ISIS sites in addition to the fact that ISIS and Russians are concurrently trying to destroy Syrian opposition, in accordance with their own ambitions: Russians for the reasons mentioned above and ISIS in order to establish itself as the sole Sunni power keeping back the Shiite tide.

Most probably even if Russia has enjoyed some success in the first phase of its plan, the next stage will not be an easy one. The Russian military air force and artillery are empowering the Syrian regime where it already has a formidable superiority over the insurgents, namely firepower, yet leaving Assad’s key problem, manpower, unaddressed. It should be noted that many local sources confirm that defections from the Syrian army are still continuing to this moment.

More Islamic extremism won’t please the West, will bring more conflicts in Syria, and reshuffle the cards. The United States and Europe will not be in favor of standing idly in front of a new escalation of extremist forces – the world has not yet finished with the monstrosity called ISIS. United States jets have already bombed a mortar factory belonging to the non-jihadi Jaysh al-Sunna rebels, who were preparing to hit the Alawite Mountains.

In the end, we must not forget the fundamental fact that Bashar Assad did not earn his presidency by elections, as his father, and his regime is accepted as a repressive and dictatorial regime. Putin is also far from being perceived as a democratic leader; he is pretending to seek a “political solution” that comes on the back of soldiers, aircrafts and advanced missiles in Syria. Napoleon once said “Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.” The sad reality is that the Russian mistakes of today are only paid for by unarmed Syrian civilians who have seen their country torn to pieces by war for the last five years.