Culture Wars Archives - Politics Today https://politicstoday.org/tag/culture-wars/ Sat, 11 Nov 2023 06:20:50 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.4.8 The EU’s Two-Dimensional Thinking about Integration is Myopic: Interview with Hans Kundnani https://politicstoday.org/eu-integration-interview-hans-kundnani/ Sat, 11 Nov 2023 06:20:50 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/eu-integration-interview-hans-kundnani/

Eurowhiteness may come off as unpalatable to many pro-Europeans, but it raises valuable questions about the place of culture and race in the European project.

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n Eurowhiteness, Hans Kundnani, Associate Fellow in the Europe Programme at Chatham House, challenges a sanitized and linear history of the EU, prompting the reader to rethink Europe’s peaceful image against its imperial past. He goes on to tackle myopic assumptions about the European project throughout the book.

Kundnani argues that pro-Europeans, who cradled cosmopolitanism and renounced nationalism, have failed to perceive the reality of European regionalism. This provocative critique dissects both the civic and ethnic elements that shape European identity by highlighting Europe’s interaction with the “Other” and linking “Europeanness” and “whiteness.” 

Eurowhiteness may come off as unpalatable to many pro-Europeans, but it raises valuable questions against a backdrop of a rising far-right in Europe. Especially in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis, the complex relationship between European identity and race demands urgent reflection.

Q. What are some of the myths that cause blind spots in understanding the European identity?

I would mention two in particular. The first is the idea that the EU is a cosmopolitan project. Cosmopolitanism usually has something to do with the whole world, and Europe is not the whole world. There’s a tendency by pro-Europeans and the EU to mistake Europe for the world. For example, when they talk about European integration, they sometimes seem to think that they’re talking about global integration, but they’re not.

Similarly, when they say “I’m a European or I’m a European citizen,” they seem to think they’re saying I’m a citizen of the world, but they’re not; They’re saying I’m a citizen of this particular region that has a very particular history and relationship with the rest of the world.

This is what I call in Eurowhiteness “the of myth of cosmopolitanism in Europe”, and related to that is the idea to think European integration is good for the whole of the world, but that may not necessarily be the case; It may be good for Europeans or may not be good for Europeans, arguably. But even if it is good for Europeans, it’s not clear if it’s good for the whole world.

The second myth would be that the EU is a peace project, and that is not entirely wrong. However, the way that pro-Europeans talk about it is sometimes simplistic; that after 1945 Europeans rejected war, and since then Europeans stand for peace. In reality, Europeans did not reject war in general in 1945. They only rejected war with each other.

In 1950 as the Schuman Declaration, which can be seen as the beginning of the idea of the EU as a peace project, is made by France’s then-foreign minister Robert Schumann, France is simultaneously fighting a brutal colonial war in Indochina.

Similarly, seven years later, when the Treaty of Rome is signed, France fought a brutal colonial war in Algeria. This demonstrates that Europeans are continuing to fight colonial wars until they’re defeated or exhausted.

Europeans like to think of themselves as being uniquely peaceful. The real story is more complicated, and in particular, as I say, to the extent that Europeans have rejected military force, it is military force within what has become the European Union, not even within Europe at large, that is being rejected.

Read: Superstates: Empires of the Twenty-First Century

Q. Has the EU’s focus shifted from peace to power?

I wouldn’t say it has shifted from being about peace to being about power. I think it was always about power as well as peace. In particular, it gets to what I was just saying about the idea of the EU as a peace project.

If you go back to the interwar period pan-European movement, which is the inspiration for the post-War European integration project, it is very clear that at that time already that the European integration project is about power and the perception of European decline accelerated by fighting one other.

The idea is: If we want to maintain our position in the world – and at that time this is a position of colonial domination- we have to stop fighting with each other. Not so that we can end European colonialism, but so that we can continue it. So in other words, European integration would take the competitive element out of European colonialism, allowing its practice collectively.

Part of the point of European integration in 1950s was for France and Belgium to consolidate their colonies in Central and West Africa at a time when they were no longer able to on their own. In particular, they needed an injection of West German capital.

The idea of geopolitical Europe goes back to the 1920s. It only seems new because pro-Europeans like to tell a story of Europe through the aforementioned myths. It only seems like a shift because we’ve forgotten the real history of how European integration began.

Q. Does the EU still export the European social model and the general welfare state?

Social market economy and the welfare state are no longer what the EU can to claim export anymore. It may have done once, but even in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War we observe that this is not the case. In fact, the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe had much more generous welfare states when they were communist countries.

What happened as they joined the EU during the enlargement process is that those welfare states were dismantled as part of their transition to democracy. There are obviously lots of things that you can criticize about the communist systems in those countries, such as the lack of political freedom and so on, but they did have welfare states.

What has happened now is a further stage in which the EU is putting pressure on member states to dismantle the welfare state. For example, during the euro crisis, the austerity Germany imposed on Greece dismantled what was left of the Greek welfare state.

Read: The Resettlement of Refugees: A Test for European Values

Q. Your book suggests that civic ideas of Europe are being replaced by ethnic-cultural ones. What is the connection of the neoliberalization of Europe to identity politics?

What I try to show in the book is that there have always been both of the elements of civic and ethnic-cultural idea in the history of what I call European regionalism- which is similar to nationalism on a larger continental scale. I’m suggesting that we can think of the history of ideas of Europe in the way we think about the history of nations. Therefore, regionalism is like nationalism.

The earliest ideas of Europe are predominantly ethnic-cultural. For example, in the medieval period, Europeanness is synonymous with Christianity. From the modern period onwards, you begin to get civic ideas of Europe. Then, in the post war period is when the EU came closest to evolving into a purely civic regionalism. Particularly, in the period from the 60s to the 90s-2000s, there was an idea of Europe centered on the social market economy, the welfare state and depoliticized mode of governance which European integration had produced.

I think what’s happened is that the social market economy and the welfare state have been hollowed out by neoliberalism in the EU. Meanwhile, there has been a backlash against the depoliticised mode of governance where the older civic idea of Europe is no longer persuasive in the same way it was before.

The way I understand neoliberalism is not just financialization, but it’s also the depoliticization of economic policy. In other words, it’s taking economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation. Although, to some extent, this has happened in the whole world in the last 30-40 years through things like the World Trade Organisation rules, the EU has taken it further through the creation of the single market, and also the Eurozone and the fiscal rules. Therefore, it’s very difficult now to pursue a left wing economic policy in the Eurozone because the fiscal rules don’t allow you to do it.

My argument is basically that when you take economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation and no longer have big fights between left and right about economic policy, your democratic politics shifts to cultural questions.

The point of democratic politics is to reconcile different interests and to have fights about questions where people in your society have different ideas or different interests. I think a healthy democratic politics is one where you do that about economic issues because there are real differences between the interests and different ideas as well.

What has happened now is that the center left parties and the center right parties converged in the center around neoliberal economic policy, which the EU has constitutionalized. Therefore, the way parties can differentiate themselves from each other now is around cultural questions.

In terms of what Europe says to the rest of the world, there was a time it would say it stood for the social market economy and the welfare state and now it says it stands for European civilisation.

A good example of this is the phrase “the European way of life,” which used to be used by French socialists, specifically, to refer to the social market economy and the welfare state and the idea of solidarity that it was meant to embody, saying “that’s what we in Europe stand for as opposed to the United States.”

Now when you look at the way that the phrase is used, it is in more civilizational terms. In the current European Commission, the Commission of Ursula Von Der Leyen since 2019, a European Commissioner for promoting the European way of life and his job is to keep migrants out, which makes it very explicit that migrants- only migrants from the South, not migrants from the east- are a threat to the European way of life. That is a very explicit expression of civilizationalism where the European way of life is defined in terms of culture and civilisation, not in terms of the social market economy and the welfare state.

Read: The Fear of Decline: Cultural Pessimism in Europe

Q. In your book you imply that the center right is increasingly mimicking the far right. Is there a pro-European version of the great replacement theory, if so, what is it?

There is an idea that the EU represents a European civilisation which is being increasingly threatened. This is basically a far right idea that has now been taken on by the center right in Europe.

For example, a couple of weeks ago, Eric Zemmour was doing a rally in the South of France with the young far right leader Marion Maréchal, and the slogan on the lectern at which he was speaking was ‘Defend our civilization.’  The way the far right is thinking about Europe is there’s a European civilisation that is threatened right now. The far right tends to talk about this in the context of migration. That is, it’s the migration of non-white and non-Christian people that is threatening European civilisation.

For example, Valérie Pécresse, the Republican candidate in the French Presidential election in 2022, was talking about white replacement theory or alluding to it in terms of migration. However, in addition, what the centre right tends to do is not talk so much about migration as a racial threat, but more in foreign policy terms as a threat to European civilisation. Macron has given speeches where he’s quite explicit about this.

In other words, international politics is a clash of civilizations, like how Samuel Huntington argues, and Europe is a distinct civilization. Moreover, for someone like Macron, the West is not one civilization, which is what Huntington thought but that Europe is a distinct civilisation, separate from the United States as well.

Where I see a connection with great replacement theory is that this is almost the international political equivalent of the great replacement theory. It’s not about migration but it’s that if Europe does not unite and defend itself, it will be also replaced by other civilizations. Macron has basically said that.

Q. What are some key takeaways from history regarding Europe’s interaction with those who it sees as the “Other”?

I try to show in Eurowhiteness that there’s a long history of defining Europe against various different “Others” at various different times and it’s constantly shifting. But roughly, I would say, in the medieval period when Europe is pretty much synonymous with Christianity, Jews are defined as the primary internal other and Muslims as the primary external other, excluding the divide between Western Christendom and Eastern Christendom.

Then, in the modern period, I try to show how there is a new complex modern idea of Europe, which is partly to do with the European enlightenment and the scientific revolution. It is a rationalist, secular idea of Europe rather than a religious one. At the same time, the idea of Europe also emerges in the context of the encounter of Europeans with the populations of Africa and Asia, and especially the Americas, and that’s the context in which the idea of whiteness emerges.

So, the modern idea of Europe is not just a rationalist one as opposed to a religious one, it’s also a more racialized idea of Europe that is closely connected to the idea of whiteness. What I think happens in that context is that non-white people around the world are the “Others” against which Europeans define themselves.

In the 20th century and particularly after World War I, you have the new idea of Europe as a geopolitical bloc, which I mentioned earlier. European civilisation or the European spirit, as they talked about it at that time, is being threatened by the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other hand. In that context, Russia and also the United States are respectively an “Other.” What I think we’re seeing today is a mixture of all of those “Others.”

Read: The Future of Far-Right Parties in Europe

Q. In the context of the current European enlargement talks, how does Eurowhiteness influence the accession process for Eastern European countries and Turkey?

Enlargement is back and it has very quickly become the central priority for the EU, including the question of how to reform the EU in order to get it ready for enlargement. But it is quite extraordinary that there’s all these discussions regarding enlargement and the topics surrounding it such as reform and the countries awaiting membership, namely Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and even the Western Balkans, and Turkey has never been mentioned at all.

I was watching a discussion online that the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), a foreign policy think tank, was having- a 90-minute long discussion about exactly these questions and Turkey was never mentioned. Nobody thought to even bring it up. This is an answer to your question of how eurowhiteness plays into the EU enlargement.

It’s apparent that this time is very different from the “big bang” enlargement in the 2000s. Enlargement is now thought about in a much more civilizational way. Ukraine is in and Turkey is out.

When it comes to the Western Balkans the situation is complex, given not just their histories but also the different populations that they have.

The way I’ve described it in the book is that there’s a contrast between Europe’s borders to the east and Europe’s borders to the South. Europe enlarges to the East, but not to the South. And I think for Turkey and the Western Balkan countries, located in South East of Europe, they’re geographically somewhat in the middle, and so, it gets quite complicated.

I think we can see quite clearly how that plays out with Turkey in the way that I just described, which has largely to do with the fact that even if it’s a secular country, it’s seen as a Muslim country. The countries of the Western Balkans are even more complicated in that respect, because additionally there is the Russia factor, which is also to some extent an “Other.” In short, for the Western Balkans, I think, it’s gonna be a long, complicated process.

Read: Brexit and Re-discussing European Democracy

Q. How could the EU stop thinking in terms of less integration or more integration, which is a criticism you make in your book?

That question goes way beyond my book and is something I thought for a long time about, which is that so many of these discussions about European integration, especially as they take place in Brussels and among pro Europeans, are entirely through the prism of “do we have more integration or less integration.”

It’s a very linear way of thinking and the assumption is: more integration is good, disintegration is bad. Therefore, Brexit is bad, obviously. Whereas, I’ve always thought, long before I came to write this book, “well, maybe some integration is bad and some disintegration is good?”

In terms of what I mentioned earlier on the depoliticization of economic policy, if you constitutionalize right wing economic preferences, then from a left perspective that’s bad European integration.

I think fundamentally what the problem with the EU is around democracy, and in particular, the way in which it depoliticizes economic policy. So, I think the crucial question for the EU is not, “Do you have more Europe or less Europe? Do you integrate or do you disintegrate?” It’s how you deepen democracy in Europe, period. Therefore, the key question about policy should be: “Is it making Europe more democratic or not?”

Q. As a person who formerly identified as a pro-European, would you like to share your story of how your perception of the EU changed?

I think part of my perceptions of and interest in some of these questions has to do with my own background. I was born and grew up in Britain, which has a famously semi-detached relationship with Europe. On top of that, I have two parents who are immigrants to Britain. My father was Indian and my mother was Dutch. So in other words, I have one parent from a EU member state, which in some ways I think made me feel more European than a lot of Brits who just have two British parents, and one from a country outside of Europe. I felt a certain sense of being European, but not quite.

It started with looking at Europe from a slightly peripheral perspective, and then emerged when I was working at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), a pro-European foreign policy think tank, from about 2009 to 2015. When I first started working there, I was kind of a pro-European and I thought I understood the EU. In retrospect, I didn’t.

It was while I worked there that I learned more about the EU and I began to conclude that a lot of what I thought I knew about it, especially about its history, was actually myth created by the EU about itself. For example, the story I told you earlier about the colonial history has been completely written out of the story that pro-Europeans tell about themselves. My former colleagues at ECFR have no clue about any of this history until I tell them- and these are people who are experts on the EU.

I wrote an essay in the New Statesman, a British magazine, two years ago which Eurowhiteness expands upon. What inspired me write the book was the reactions to this essay. My former boss at the ECFR, Mark Leonard, wrote a response to the essay claiming that the EU is a post-colonial project.  At ECFR, they didn’t know this is the real history; which shows, as I say, how successful the EU is in mythologizing itself.

The more conversations I have about the book and I realize that a lot of what I write in the book is much clearer to people outside of Europe than it is to people within Europe. For example, if I say that Europeanness has something to do with whiteness, I think, to most people outside of Europe it is kind of obvious, but it’s horrifying to a lot of people within Europe. They’re outraged when you even try to connect the two things.

Hence, the title of the book angers a lot of people. A part of the reason I insisted on that title was exactly to say that there is a connection between Europeanness and whiteness, and I want us to talk about it. Most people don’t want to do that, at least within the pro-European bubble in Europe.

Q. Do you think that the EU is still on a civilizing mission?

A Polish academic, Jan Zielonka, who was at Oxford for many years, has an analysis of the civilizing mission of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe as part of the enlargement process, which he calls a ‘post-modern civilizing mission’, and I think he’s absolutely right.

But I remember, for example, having that discussion with my former boss at the ECFR when I was working on Eurowhiteness a couple of years ago, and he said that when pro-Europeans refer to a civilizing mission, it’s ironically. Well, it’s not. It’s an actual civilizing mission.

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]]> Insurgency Warfare: A Global History to the Present https://politicstoday.org/insurgency-warfare-global-history/ Thu, 03 Aug 2023 15:46:18 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/insurgency-warfare-global-history/

Insurgency Warfare provides a global perspective and shows how conflicts influence contemporary military strategies.

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Insurgency and counterinsurgency are two interconnected and age-old facets of warfare that have shaped the course of history in numerous regions around the world. Rooted in the struggle for power, resources, or ideological dominance, insurgencies represent the defiant uprisings of dissatisfied groups or individuals against established authority.

In response, counterinsurgency emerges as the strategic and tactical efforts of governments or ruling entities to quell these revolts and maintain control. Throughout history, we have witnessed the emergence of countless insurgencies and the subsequent attempts to suppress them. The complexities and challenges inherent in addressing insurgencies underscore the importance of understanding the historical, political, and socio-cultural factors that drive these movements.

Read: African Politics, Tribal Violence, and Socio-Economic Rivalry in Africa

In Insurgency Warfare: A Global History to the Present, military historian, thinker and strategist Jeremy Black presents a comprehensive historical account of insurgencies and counterinsurgency warfare worldwide. Departing from the typical focus on Western perspectives, the book emphasizes the significance of situating the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq within a broader global context. Rather than following the conventional route that centers on the American and French revolutions, the author delves back into ancient times to trace the origins of pre-modern warfare.

By skillfully weaving together both thematic and chronological narratives, Black thoroughly explores the enduring correlations between beliefs, events, and individuals, juxtaposed against the evolutionary changes that have occurred over time. Throughout the book, he delves into the evolution of politics, technologies, and ideologies, giving rise to new parameters and paradigms that have profoundly influenced both governmental and public viewpoints on warfare.

Tracing insurgencies across diverse regions from China to Africa to Latin America, Black illuminates the varying military and political dimensions inherent in each conflict. He adeptly assesses the reasons behind the acquisition of lessons in insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare, meticulously examining how these lessons were not merely learned but actively asserted. At every stage, the book delves into the emergence of norms within militaries and societies, exploring their impact on doctrine and policy.

Read: Will Sudan Become a “New Libya”?

This sweeping study of insurrectionary warfare and its counterpart, counterinsurgency, proves indispensable for anyone with an interest in military history. By shedding light on the lessons learned by contemporaries and the development of norms within different contexts, the book enriches our understanding of the intricate dynamics of warfare across time and regions.

Black’s approach transcends traditional military history, incorporating a global perspective that sets this book apart. Its meticulous analysis of various insurgencies and counterinsurgency campaigns adds depth to the comprehension of how these conflicts have shaped the world and continue to influence contemporary military strategies and policies.

Overall, Insurgency Warfare: A Global History to the Present stands as a comprehensive and thought-provoking exploration of the complex relationship between insurgency and counterinsurgency, providing readers with a profound appreciation for the multifaceted aspects of warfare throughout human history.

Jeremy Black, Insurgency Warfare: A Global History to the Present (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2023) ISBN: 978-1-5381-7941-3, 338 pages

Written by Dilara Özer

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]]> Kingdoms of Fire: The Political Backstage (Part I) https://politicstoday.org/kingdoms-of-fire-the-political-backstage-part-i/ Mon, 26 Oct 2020 13:57:28 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/kingdoms-of-fire-the-political-backstage-part-i/

Kingdoms of Fire is funded by the UAE, directed by a British, and the satellite channel is owned by Saudi Arabia. It is more than just an art that has attracted so much attention due to its funders, timing, and giving a completely different narrative of history. In this video, three experts Dr. Heba Raouf Ezzat, Dr. Vehbi Baysan and Dr. Yenal Göksun explain the political background of this TV drama.

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]]> Art, Artists and Politics: No Limits for Transgression? https://politicstoday.org/art-artists-and-politics-no-limits-for-transgression/ Tue, 06 Mar 2018 07:28:13 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/art-artists-and-politics-no-limits-for-transgression/

It is impossible to think of artists as beings without political thoughts but when they cross the thin line between being political and being an artist, the value of art diminishes.

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Be it Susan Sarandon’s tacit support for the Trump administration following his presidential inauguration in February 2017, or Meltem Cumbul’s unprecedented discourtesy to Semih Kaplanoğlu, one of Turkey’s well known contemporary film directors, during the 24th Adana Film Festival award ceremony held in September 2017… There are countless examples that illustrate how artists intervene in the socio-political field, not particularly with their artistic production but their words and opinions, which are occasionally blended with clear-cut political positions, worldviews, or ideologies. No doubt, few can argue against the involvement of art in politics. However, the focus here is on the artist and the issue, being styles, kinds, and limits of artistic expression in engaging with politics.

In today’s world, power is not only about political power or governmental authority. There are centers of authority that simultaneously operate in society such as local, regional and global actors, pressure groups, lobbies, research centers, think tanks, foundations, trade associations, the media and academics that are all actively involved in the socio-political field. In other words, power is not composed of a single, political center alone. Every center of authority is in competition to produce, re-shape, or influence the perception of reality. Whether or not the scale of influence affects large masses is a separate matter.

Artists constitute one of these centers of power. Leaving aside debates surrounding the value of art in regards to the genre or convention to which artistic productions belong, individuals who are recognized as “artist” have partial influence not only on people who recognize them but also on those who do not. This is the point: an artist has potential to transfer the prestige and authority well deserved in the field of arts to the political arena but this transfer of authority might be problematic since the contents of arts and politics may intersect, their nature is different.

Like other citizens, artists can feel a responsibility to support or criticize political decisions and they are, in no way, expected to turn a deaf ear to socio-political or environmental issues. Moreover, for art to be counted as art, it does not have to be disconnected from life, the realities of time, society or politics. For example, a work of art, with its contemporary relevance, can, on a universal level, illustrate how a social or political status can open doors to character defects by negatively changing one’s self-perception. When this occurs in an artwork, the audience – whether a viewer or reader – is free in contextualizing the episode with contemporary circumstances. However, if and when this message is linked with contemporary affairs with vulgarity and asperity, the audience is ripped from the freedom of choice and is fiercely imposed with a particular perspective. When the message wanting to be displayed in the artwork is turned into countenance, defense or opposition to a political party, it becomes difficult to convince the audience that the work is not a form of political propaganda.

For instance, drawing analogies between the political affairs of contemporary Turkey and former European dictatorships through theater plays written during the communist regime in the Balkans, the fascist era of Germany, or dictatorial regimes in Italy and Spain, with apparently no contextual concern, merely reduces art to an instrument of opposition. This is evidently one of the aspects of social polarization in Turkey. Political charges made in theatre halls, in an exhibition, during an awards speech or in literary work, cause social polarization on the level of arts and culture. Transgressing the reasonable limits of criticism, by creating an “other” of its respondent, the “artistic” opposition diminishes any opportunity for communication on a common ground.

It is highly problematic if artists perceive themselves to be guiding society in the right direction through some sort of cultural and artistic elitism without questioning the position that they possess and acknowledge as a natural right. This is an example of the democratization of culture approach, well known in cultural policy research, but this time not coming from state officials but cultural elites, who hide their political ideology under the “unquestionable” narrative of art while speaking in the name of their own truth, however.

In fact, when talking politics bare and naked with vulgarity and asperity, an artist does not say anything about the art that he/she knows best and which brought him/her fame. The thoughts and opinions expressed by an artist in regards to the political agenda do not require them to be fed with the provincial authority of the arts. Just like other people, an artist has a political position that is shaped by a particular social background, an outlook on life, individual needs, expectations and preferences. If they do not have a unique experience, understanding or ability in politics, their political positions or arguments cannot directly be privileged. Of course, the particular circle one belongs to, their manners and proximity to certain networks will widen their possibility of producing more qualified evaluations and analyses. It must be noted however that a person who performs extraordinary works in the field of art can manifest extremely flawed ideas in politics. It is an open illusion to render authoritarian comments of an artist about political affairs justifiable merely due to a discursive authority driven by artistic capabilities. Therefore, a distinction ought to be made between the artist’s political statements and his/her artistic production.

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The reason for this is because art and politics are separated from each other in many ways. This includes their ways of thinking, modes of production, sources of information and social responses. Politics is, to some extent, more practical and concerned with the current. While taking care of issues that appear on the forefront, a politician has to decide on incomplete procedures on what can be described as a slippery and changeable platform, thus, governing in a form that includes quick thinking and practical action. In addition to burdens faced by politicians such as time constraints and social responsibilities, they also occupy seats in which they can be taken to account.

However, in comparison to a politician, an artist, or an artistic production, is derived from the individual to the social, carries aesthetic concerns in one form or another, is not under time constraint, has the opportunity to evaluate issues in depth, can appeal to the common feeling and finally, is a contestant in universal validity and durability.

On the other hand, despite all its meaning and vitality, political perspectives are often not of the nature to surround the aesthetic value and expressions of artistic reality. Positions in everyday politics are built on limited information, produced on certain alignments and shaped through various channels led by effective rhetoric. A good artwork is, however, long-lasting; its value exists independent of political perspectives and the uproars of everyday life, and it carries continuity within its own field. Therefore, in terms of nature and quality, art and politics are separated from each other.

So, where can one draw the line for a sound ground on which artists can talk politics? There is no doubt that “we” are all political entities. Artists might talk politics through their arts by focusing on universal humanitarian aspects of things, as otherwise instrumentalizing arts for the sake of political pragmatism not only belittles the artist but also diminishes the value of art. The reduction of art and culture to a tool of political opposition carries two dangers for all segments of society. First, impeding the prospect to form a common public, and secondly, deceasing the overall quality of the arts or debates around artistic production due to the political color they carry.

When viewed from a managerial and administrative point of view, extreme polarization and alienation between artistic and cultural sectors, like the present situation in South Korea, precludes communication and interaction between various actors operating in the cultural sector and thus restricts the opportunities for collaboration for new regulations to be made in the field. This dynamic works for everyone and makes it more complicated to keep governance and administrative mechanisms more transparent. Moving away from polarizing attitudes that lead to artistic infertility and narrow the sphere of the common public to a more moderate standpoint, while also ensuring that artistic production is not damaged for mere political interest, will be in the good for all the segments of our society.

This article has first appeared in Daily Sabah on March 4, 2018.

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]]> Social Polarisation in Turkey: Myth or Reality? https://politicstoday.org/social-polarisation-in-turkey-myth-or-reality/ Thu, 21 Apr 2016 11:42:22 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/social-polarisation-in-turkey-myth-or-reality/

Whatever the current tensions in the political sphere are, Turkish society is not being torn apart on the basis of religion nor its politics.

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A brief look into the international and domestic media coverage on Turkey, as well as the academic debate, in recent years reveals a rather bleak picture of a country divided along several fault lines, namely the seculars vs. the conservatives, Turks vs. Kurds, and the Sunni vs. the Alawites. Among these, most of the attention has been given to the divide between the conservatives and the seculars although the recent terror attacks has brought the Kurdish issue to the forefront.

Many claim that the policies of the current governing party, the Justice and Development Party (JDP), and especially the rhetoric and style of its founder and the current president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has divided the country into two camps: the conservatives who support him on one side and the seculars who oppose him on the other. The polarisation of Turkish society between these two camps is treated almost as a given both inside and outside the country.

The polarisation of Turkish society between these two camps is treated almost as a given both inside and outside the country.

Claims regarding the division of the Turkish society on the basis of adherence to Islamic values and practices are nothing new. Religion and its role in society and politics has always been a contested issue in Turkey. In the early years of the Republic, the westernisation process, especially some of the reforms initiated by the founding cadre, was met with a degree of societal backlash, which often drew harsh reactions from the state. Although the tension of those early days has subsided, the supporters of the founding ideology have always carried deep suspicions about religion and the conservative elements in Turkish society. When expounding on his ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis, Samuel P. Huntington claimed that Turkey has an internal clash of civilizations, and it is a ‘country torn’ between Western civilization and its rival Islamic civilization.

However, the rise to power of the JDP in 2002 and its continuing dominance in Turkish politics gave rise to more intense claims regarding the polarisation of Turkish society. In 2007, millions of secular Turks took to the streets to prevent the election of a conservative president, a position that was first held by the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and that was regarded as nearly sacred by many secular Turks. Again in 2010, during the constitutional amendment referendum, there was significant mobilisation and political tension between the secular opposition and the Government. Finally, in May and June 2013, the Gezi Park protests turned into a showdown between the government and the secular opposition. These protests received widespread attention outside the country and further inflamed the claims regarding the polarisation in society.

We previously assessed this claim, regarding whether social and political attitudes have become polarised in Turkish society.

We previously assessed this claim, regarding whether social and political attitudes have become polarised in Turkish society, in a study that analysed data from the period of 1990-2011, when conservative politics became more prevalent and the political scene was dominated by what we label as ‘the religiously-oriented political parties’. In this study, we used data from the World Value Surveys (1990, 2001, 2007 and 2011) and the European Value Surveys (2001 and 2009). The results of this analysis have been published in the journal Social Currents.

In doing so, we drew extensively from the ‘the culture wars’ debate in the US because of the similarity between the claims and the rigorousness of the methodology used by American social scientists to assess these claims. In the 1990s, some in the public debate claimed that American society was polarised between liberals and conservatives, which was akin to a ‘culture war’. In the early 1990s, political scientist James D. Hunter (1991) claimed that American society was divided between the ‘orthodox’ and ‘progressive’ camps, which rallied around issues such as abortion, gun control, and gay rights. During his famous speech in the 1992 Republican National Convention, presidential candidate Pat Buchanan declared that there was an ongoing war for the soul of America.

In the early 1990s, political scientist James D. Hunter (1991) claimed that American society was divided between the ‘orthodox’ and ‘progressive’ camps, which rallied around issues such as abortion, gun control, and gay rights.

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In line with the empirical tradition in the American social sciences, academics approached the issue by developing measures of polarisation and testing their hypotheses with survey data rather than reaching conclusions based on circumstantial evidence, which was what was happening in the public debate in the US at the time, as well as what is happening in Turkey today.

In their seminal study, sociologist Paul DiMaggio and his colleagues defined polarisation in four dimensions: (1) if attitudes were becoming more dispersed than concentrated (the dispersion principle); (2) if attitudes were moving to separate modes (bimodality principle); (3) the extent to which opinions in one domain were dependent on opinions in other domains (the constraint principle); and (4) the extent to which individual characteristics and identities determined attitudes (the consolidation principle). When they explored these dimensions with survey data, they found no evidence of widespread polarisation between 1972 and 1994 except for views on the issue of abortion. Remarkably, they found increasing agreement on the issues of crime, racial integration, and women’s rights.

Although their methodology and findings drew some criticism, the academic research into the ‘culture wars’ debate showed that polarisation was limited to specific issues and debunked the myth of increasing division of American society into two camps based on religious conservatism. Similar claims still resurface from time to time in the popular discourse, but American sociologists seem confident that no such polarisation exists in the US.

There was some evidence that the differences increased in 2007, when political tensions were high, but these differences disappeared later.

Following this debate, we assessed the differences between the people who reported that they would vote for the religiously-oriented political parties (ROP) and those who reported a preference for secular-oriented political parties (SOP) between 1990 and 2011 in Turkey. The ROP category consisted of the three political parties established by Necmettin Erbakan, the father of conservative politics in Turkey, and his followers. We also included the current governing party JDP and the Grand Unity Party, which subscribes to what is known in Turkey as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, to this category. The SOP category included all other political parties, including those of the center-right and the center-left, as well as the far-left and nationalist parties.

We assessed polarisation in four areas: family and sexuality, gender roles, economic and social justice, and democracy. Regarding family and sexuality, we assessed attitudes towards abortion, divorce, and homosexuality. With regard to gender roles, we assessed attitudes towards women’s participation in the labor force and working mothers. When assessing the issues of economic and social justice, we analysed attitudes towards income inequality and individual vs. government responsibility. Finally, we assessed people’s perceptions of military rule and democratic political rule.

Any polarisation that was caused by those events did not have any lasting impact. Extrapolating from this finding, we expect that the Gezi Park protests will also not have a long-lasting effect.

The results of our analyses revealed that people who voted for ROP differed only slightly in terms of their attitudes towards family and sexuality and gender roles. However, this difference in attitudes with regards to gender roles was not a pronounced difference, and there were no significant differences in attitudes towards democracy, nor in attitudes towards economic and social justice. Furthermore, there was no evidence of a steady increase in differences over time between the two groups. In fact, attitudes towards family and sexuality and gender roles moved in the same direction in both of the groups. There was some evidence that the differences increased in 2007, when political tensions were high, but these differences disappeared later.

To sum up, whatever the current tensions in the political sphere are, Turkish society is not being torn apart on the basis of religion nor its politics. As in the case of the ‘culture wars’ debate in the US, the popular claims based on circumstantial evidence cannot and should not be used to make overreaching claims about society. Some may argue that the Gezi Park protests of 2013 changed the societal dynamics significantly and created polarisation that has not been seen before. Unfortunately, our analyses did not cover the most recent period, as the relevant data are not available. However, similar claims were made during and after the 2007 protests. Any polarisation that was caused by those events did not have any lasting impact. Extrapolating from this finding, we expect that the Gezi Park protests will also not have a long-lasting effect. Also, we are in the process of planning for a data collection effort of our own in order to assess the current situation. We will be happy to utilise any secondary data that becomes available as well.

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