East Africa has witnessed an unprecedented geopolitical shake-up since Abiy Ahmed ascended to power as Ethiopia’s first ethnically Oromo premier earlier this year. His foreign policies were so swift and drastic that it caught his doubters and supporters alike off-guard. However, the region observers and political analysts struggled to decipher the substantiality of his foreign policies vis-à-vis the current ethnic-based internal decadence Ethiopia is going through.

Since Abiy Ahmed came to power, Ethiopia and Eritrea have normalized relations – the two countries were technically at war since 1998. Eritrea and Djibouti also smoothed ties between themselves after Ethiopia and other gulf states played a critical placatory role. Then for the first time in history, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia signed a tripartite security agreement of which the details and specifics are unknown to the public even now. Unforeseen seismic changes were altering the region’s geopolitical landscape. Yet all this was occurring as Ethiopia was undergoing neutrotic ethnic violence where more than 2 million people were displaced and rendered homeless.

A keen observer in the region’s geopolitical shifts and vicissitude would not reconcile Abiy’s foreign policy ambitions to Ethiopia’s internal ethnic psychosis. There is a lingering question: Where is Abiy Ahmed’s foreign policy pace and hubris sprouting from while domestic issues glare at him?

The Horn of Africa: the new Sino-American geopolitical playground

A geopolitical policy shift was evident in the U.S. 2018 National Defense Strategy outline: In a speech he made earlier this year, Defense Secretary James Mattis posited that it will be “great power competition, and not terrorism the primary focus of national security.” This change in U.S. foreign and defense policy can be interpreted as the U.S. administration accepting that it needs to engage with other great powers geographically, and leverage its political alliances in Africa to its advantage. This includes engaging with China and Turkey in the context of Africa. Coincidentally, earlier this year, General Thomas Waldhauser, AFRICOM Commander, informed Congress of the geopolitical risk the U.S. faced in the Horn of Africa. Both Turkey and China have military installations in Somalia and Djibouti respectively. This was understood as a threat to U.S. global interests and in particular U.S. interests in the strategic Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

The U.S. is wary of the growing Chinese and Turkish soft power influence in Africa. Chinese investments and Turkish humanitarian efforts in the region have surpassed the U.S. in the last decade. African states had on their disposal alternative foreign policy interlocutors and hence new forms of cooperation were possible and forged to their advantages. The U.S. fell out of favor in the age of Donald Trump’s America-first policy. The U.S. had to engage with African nations on a geopolitical level ground; the notions of security and anti-terrorism were hallowed and unsustainable in the face of a multi-polar world system.

It is in this approach that the fast-changing geopolitical landscape of East Africa can be understood and comprehended. Ethiopia has been central to the U.S. fight against terrorism in East Africa – the Ethiopian army invaded Somalia to dismantle the Al-Qaeda affiliated Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006 with the backing of the U.S. Today they are part and parcel of AMISOM efforts to fight Al-Shabaab. Abiy Ahmed, a former member of the Ethiopian army and the founder of its Cyber-security intelligence department was elected by the ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF) to spear-head the country out of the three-year long protests and ethnic violence that engulfed the most populous nation in East Africa. To his credit, the new Prime Minister was cathartic to Ethiopia’s dire conditions, but his foreign policy forays captured global news head-lines.

Containing Turkish and Chinese influences in the Horn of Africa

Shortly after the unprecedented rapprochement with Eritrea, on 24 July this year, Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed alongside Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea were in the United Arab Emirates for a tripartite summit. They were received majestically. On 20 September this year, Afwerki was again in the UAE for diplomatic talks. Saudi Arabia and Gulf nations, with the exception of Qatar, were already wary of Turkish and Chinese diplomatic forays into the Horn of Africa: Somalia, a regional ally of Turkey just closed the Emirati embassy in Mogadishu and Djibouti– where China established its first military base– terminated all contracts of the UAE state-owned DP world contracts over operational disputes in the Port of Doraleh. The summit was recognized as a Saudi and UAE (inevitably and ultimately the U.S.) efforts to salvage their geopolitical influence in the face of a growing Turkish and Chinese influence in the region. In their visit, the UAE Crown Prince conferred both leaders with the UAE’s highest award. Shortly after the summit was concluded, Eritrea information minister tweeted that the summit fostered “a broader and robust regional cooperation and coordination.”

Rashid Abdi, the International Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa Director emphasized the role of the U.S. in the tripartite summit and lifting of Eritrea’s sanctions. To counter Turkish and Chinese influence in the horn, a new ally in the name of Eritrea has to be saved first from the doldrums of international sanctions. It is in this consciousness that Abiy Ahmed prioritized normalization of relations with Eritrea. Eritrea was going the way of Iran, Syria, and Cuba and to save-guard U.S. regional interests and security, engaging the tiny nation was inevitable and necessary. Mehari Taddele Maru, a scholar of peace and security observed that the U.S. modus operandi in the Horn of Africa changed drastically: Eritrea has to be “fetched” from diplomatic isolation hence his notion of “Eritrea in, Djibouti out” of the U.S. strategic approach to the Horn of Africa. Somalia – a Turkish sphere of influence – and Djibouti – a Chinese sphere of influence – would be countered and checked with Ethiopia and diplomatically reinvigorated and exorcised Eritrea.

The U.S. is totally in support of the new axis of political alliance that has emerged at the ruins of the Qatari blockade: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Bahrain, and Jordan. This comes at the expense of Turkish and Qatari interest in the larger Muslim world and strategic Horn of Africa. A shift is already apparent in U.S. geopolitical strategy: strengthening regional allies geopolitically; propping-up new allies (in this case Eritrea) and other partners in the face of a growing global multi-polar new order. The geopolitical and foreign policy changes in the Horn of Africa ought to be seen in the underlying dynamics of U.S. foreign policy and its perceived threats from other spheres of influences. Abiy Ahmed’s foreign policy reforms and the peace breeze sweeping the Horn of Africa is commendable and long-waited but the deafening geopolitical changes’ raison d’etre definitely lie elsewhere: the U.S. Secretary of State.

During the last couple of months, the Horn of Africa has been witnessing landmark developments. As the most important actor in the region, Ethiopia has been making successful attempts to end the long-term regional conflicts. The leadership change in Ethiopia is the major dynamic that transformed Addis Ababa’s foreign policy behavior. The new Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, who took office last April, has been following a more active policy – both domestically and externally. Following his inauguration, Ahmed lifted the state of emergency, ordered the release of political prisoners, and called for exiled opposition figures to return to the country.

Ahmed has also pursued an active foreign policy agenda. Since April 2018, he has visited a number of countries, including Djibouti, Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. This showed his interest in becoming a more influential country in regional and global politics. Abiy Ahmed’s priority in regional politics is to end the political conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Firstly, Ethiopia has resolved its decade long conflict with Eritrea. Ahmed’s efforts then focused on reconciliation between Djibouti and Eritrea, which have been hostile neighbors due to the border dispute.

Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a bloody war between 1998 and 2000. The war led to the death of at least 100,000 people and thousands of displaced citizens of both countries. The peace agreement signed at the end of the war was never fully enacted and the crisis continued until this year. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s historic visit to Eritrea in July 2018 led to the end of the crisis. In the following period, relations between the two countries were normalized, and the two leaders signed a peace agreement in Saudi Arabia on September 16.

Ethiopia’s initiatives have also provided a solution for another long-standing crisis in the region. The conflict between Eritrea and Djibouti began in 2008 due to the border dispute, which caused the deaths of dozens of Djibouti soldiers. Throughout the years, the conflict between the two neighbors continued to deepen. The recent mediation efforts by Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia yielded results, and the leaders of Djibouti and Eritrea met in Jeddah on September 17, in a reconciliation meeting for the solution of the crisis.

A similar rapprochement in the region also took place between Somalia and Eritrea. The two countries had experienced hostility towards each other due to Eritrea’s support for militant groups in Somalia. These claims, however, gradually decreased. Following the efforts of Ethiopia, and support of the international community, Somalian President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed visited the Eritrean capital Asmara on July 30, 2018, and paved the way for reconciliation between the two countries. Both leaders agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations. In early September, the leaders of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia came together in Asmara and took important steps in deepening cooperation between countries in the region.

The main actor of the current developments in the Horn of Africa is obviously Ethiopia. Addis Ababa aims to become a new power base in regional politics. The country has been in competition for leadership with regional actors, particularly with Egypt. A recent example of this on-going competition is the tensions that arose over Ethiopia’s dam project, which is being built on the river Nile. With its proactive foreign policy, Ethiopia also aims to gain the support of other important regional actors such as Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Eritrea, and Djibouti.

It is thus clear that the Horn of Africa has been witnessing rapid political transformation in the recent period. It can be stated that the driving actors of this transformation are regional governments, particularly Ethiopia. However, global actors such as the U.S., China, and Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are very interested in the transformation process in the region. On the other hand, while having great interest in the Horn of Africa region, Turkey and Qatar have followed a relatively calm attitude vis-à-vis the current developments in the region. Both countries have been focusing on their domestic issues and paying less attention to developments in the Horn of Africa. Having said that, with its strategic position for international trade and African politics, the Horn of Africa will continue to remain on the radar of these regional and global actors.

The Horn of Africa region has recently been the stage for a number of international actors that aim to expand their foreign policy reach. This can be seen from Turkey’s increasing relations with Somalia, China and Russia’s decision to establish military bases and the United Arab Emirates’ economic and military activities taking place particularly in Somalia and Djibouti.

These activities, however, receive different reactions by the countries of the region. While humanitarian and development-oriented activities of Turkey have received appreciation by Somalia and Djibouti, the UAE’s aspirations to influence these countries’ political life have faced cold reaction. The Somalia government allowed Turkey to establish its largest military bases in the country and the Djibouti government allocated a vast plot of land close to the Doraleh seaport in order for Turkey to establish a “Free Economic Zone.” On the other hand, both countries soured relations with the UAE, criticising Abu Dhabi for pursuing an interventionist policy. Examples of these strained relations can be seen in the recent political crisis between the Emirates and two important countries of the region, Somalia and Djibouti.

Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi enjoyed close relations during the presidency of Hasan Sheikh Mahmoud of Somalia. However, relations deteriorated in 2017 following the election of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, known as Fermacu, who was supported by Turkey and Qatar, countries that also have tense relations with the UAE. Following his election to presidency, Abdullahi criticized the Emirati activities in the region and argued that the UAE does not respect the national sovereignty of Somalia. In the following period, Abdulahi took a firm stance against the UAE and prevented some of its activities taking place in the country.

One of the activities of the UAE was the establishment of military bases in Somalia’s semi-autonomous regions, Somaliland and Puntland. President Abdullahi criticized these activities and argued that they were against Somalia’s national sovereignty. The UAE, on the other hand, intensified its activities in these regions and had taken a more aggressive stance against Mogadishu by supporting political actors in Somaliland and Puntland. It was even argued that the UAE encouraged these regions for independence from Somalia. The tension between Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi further deteriorated when the parliament of Somalia passed a bill in March 2018, preventing the UAE’s economic and military activities in the country.

The crisis between the two countries reached its peak in April 2018, when Somalian security forces seized a UAE-owned plane illegally carrying 9 million U.S. dollars in cash to the country. The allegations that the money in the plane was planned to be given to the anti-government groups in the country caused the Somali government to take a harder stance against the Emirates.

In response to a harsh stance from the Mogadishu leadership, the UAE announced that it halted all military co-operations with Somalia and shut down the Sheikh Zayed hospital that was built by the Emirates. It is expected that the UAE will further retaliate to Somalia with a number of new measures that are to be seen in the coming period.

Another country recently experiencing tension with the UAE is Djibouti. The relations between these two countries soured in February 2018 with Djibouti’s decision to nationalize the Doraleh Port, which was run by the UAE-based company DP World since 2009. Following a 30-year agreement in 2006 between Djibouti and DP World, the company was supposed to operate the port at a maximum capacity. However, the Djibouti administration realized that the Doraleh Port has been operating with less than %50 of its full capacity. The Djibouti government thus argued that DP World’s main motivation to keep Doraleh port at the lowest capacity was to sustain the maximum level of activity at the Dubai port, the leading location of maritime transport in the region.

The Djibouti government also claimed that the deal with DP World in 2006 was in contrast with the national interests due to malpractices of Djiboutian officials involved at that time, and this was the main reason for the cancellation of the agreement. In the aftermath of the decision, Djibouti forces seized the Doraleh Port and suspended the activities of DP World.

It is clear that there are deepening tensions between the UAE and two strategic players in the Horn of Africa, namely Somalia and Djbouti. It can be said that there are three major reasons for that. First of all, the UAE does not respect the national sovereignty of these countries and prioritizes its interests even if they contradict with these countries’ national sovereignty. The second reason is related to the nature of the UAE activities in the region. The Somalia and Djibouti governments are not comfortable with the UAE-sponsored ports and military bases, mainly because of their long-term negative impacts on these countries. The final reason is that there are a number of emerging international actors such as Turkey, Russia and China, which have developed good relations with Somalia and Djibouti. This has caused them to reconsider their relations with aggressive actors in the region such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia.