July 15 Archives - Politics Today https://politicstoday.org/tag/july-15/ Wed, 05 Aug 2026 09:09:52 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.4.8 Türkiye’s Middle East Policy Following July 15 https://politicstoday.org/turkiyes-middle-east-policy-following-july-15/ Wed, 05 Aug 2026 09:09:52 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/?p=30532

Although the July 15 coup attempt appears to be an intervention in the political mechanism due to its direct targeting of President Erdoğan and his administration, it is clear that this failed attempt was actually the result of a will to eliminate Türkiye's subjectivity in the global arena

The post Türkiye’s Middle East Policy Following July 15 appeared first on Politics Today.

]]>

O

ne of the most significant turning points in Turkish political life undoubtedly took place on the night of July 15, 2016. The coup attempt, which arose from a mutiny by a group within the military affiliated with the FETÖ organization, was thwarted thanks to the resolute stance demonstrated by the public and the strong political will displayed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This event not only directly influenced political processes but also served as a catalyst for a profound transformation in Turkish political culture. On the night of July 15, whilst the public’s silence in the face of the military largely came to an end, a clear tendency to embrace the political mechanism emerging from the manifestation of civilian will also became evident.

Following the failed coup attempt on July 15, social and political codes in Türkiye began to be restructured within a new paradigm. By opening the door to an understanding of the risks posed by—or that could be created by—movements characterized by external dependencies and a high degree of esotericism, July 15 brought about a historic turning point in terms of redefining the perception of security in Türkiye and reorganizing the relationship between the military and politics from the ground up.

The radical changes in these two areas have not only had a clear impact on domestic politics and the structuring of institutions, but have also been felt just as distinctly in Türkiye’s approach to international politics and its foreign policy practices. In this new reality, where the approach to countering external threats has shifted, Ankara’s strategic choices—particularly regarding the Middle East—exhibited a striking parallelism with both the region’s own conditions and the domestic transformation taking place within the country.

Read: The New World Order Following July 15 and President Erdoğan’s Leadership

The strategy to contain Türkiye in the run-up to July 15

The foreign policy vision set out and the policies implemented following the 3 November 2002 elections, which brought the Justice and Development Party to power, enabled Türkiye to reposition itself in global politics and, in particular, to become a founding actor in the Middle East. In particular, the status quo that emerged as a result of the popular revolutions in the region during the 2011 Arab Spring bore the hallmarks of Ankara’s new global political vision. However, in the strategic transformations in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya, the significant electoral success of Islamist and conservative parties—which reflected broader societal trends rather than those of groups aligned with the West—completely altered the perspective of the US and other Western actors on the region.

Furthermore, with the open support provided by Russia and Iran to prop up Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, a serious attempt was made to put a brake on the Middle East’s drive towards independence. During this process, in which Ankara’s relations with the region were taken to a new level, the unease arising amongst global and regional actors evolved into a situation characterized by a succession of initiatives aimed at restricting Turkey’s room for maneuver. The sudden emergence in 2013 of events in Türkiye, Egypt and Bangladesh—which shared similar backgrounds, support bases and rhetoric—constituted steps taken to stem the new momentum within the Muslim world. Alongside the violent protests at Gezi Park in Türkiye, the Tamarod protests in Egypt and the Shahbag protests in Bangladesh were a reflection of a coordinated strategy.

Following the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt on July 3, 2013, through a coup, Ankara’s stance on this event led to the emergence of a new dynamic in the region. Alongside the deepening crisis in Syria, the efforts of certain regional actors to bring the popular revolutions to an end and restore the authoritarian status quo led to a narrowing of Türkiye’s foreign policy parameters, driven by both external and internal factors.

During this period, the terrorist organizations that emerged in northern Syria (ISIS and the YPG), alongside the PKK’s tendencies to undermine stability within the country, constituted attempts to erode the government in power before July 15 and, consequently, the legitimate and civilian political will. In particular, the deliberate efforts by members of FETÖ, who had infiltrated the security bureaucracy to a significant extent, to slow down decision-making and implementation processes and to prevent the government from exercising its proper authority through the dissemination of manipulative information, formed part of a plan to undermine Türkiye’s distinctive and independent character in global politics and reduce it to the status of an ineffective actor.

Against a backdrop of growing threats to Türkiye’s border security from Syria, the aircraft crisis with Russia has gone down in history as one of the profound challenges Ankara has faced. The tension that arose between Moscow and Ankara following the downing of a Russian SU-24 aircraft that had violated Turkish airspace caused serious difficulties for Türkiye, a country that was becoming increasingly isolated in the region and whose security concerns were being disregarded by the Western world.

However, under the leadership of President Erdoğan, and following the decision-making elite’s prudent management of the situation, the crisis between Ankara and Moscow was largely resolved, whilst at the same time Türkiye began to adopt a more resilient stance in the face of regional and global challenges. The fact that the collapse anticipated by FETÖ members and their external supporters did not materialize – due to Ankara’s protection of the country’s security and stability through alternative strategies and its continued resolute policy in the face of all threats – led to the attempt on the night of July 15 to overthrow the government by coup and eliminate Türkiye’s sovereignty.

Recommended

Post-July 15 purge and Türkiye’s new Middle East policy

Following July 15—one of the longest nights in the history of the Republic—and the failure of FETÖ members’ attempts to eliminate the country’s political autonomy and restrict its capacity for action, Ankara began to pursue an action-oriented policy within a new paradigm. During this process, in which security and the perception of threat were formulated in a manner consistent with the reality on the ground, the security bureaucracy took steps—particularly through the purging of harmful elements within the military—within the framework of the hierarchical relationship that should exist between the government and the military.

On 24 August 2016, to send a message to the entire world and to demonstrate in concrete terms that it would combat all forms of terrorism without making any categorical distinctions, Ankara launched Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Syria, with the support of the Free Syrian Army. As part of this operation, which resulted in a crushing victory over ISIS elements, Ankara made a highly strategic move aimed at eliminating threats to its borders originating from Syrian territory and establishing a safe zone for Syrians in the north of the country.

By demonstrating a radical model of alignment between theory and practice through Operation Euphrates Shield, Türkiye not only altered the balance of power on the ground through its military activism but also assumed both an independent and a founding role in initiating a new process regarding Syria’s future. The fact that, for many years, US and European actors refrained from taking constructive and realistic steps to end the civil war in Syria and ensure the safe return of Syrians led Ankara, following July 15, to adopt a stance that engaged Russia more closely under a new framework.

The establishment of a Syria-focused dialogue framework involving Türkiye, Russia and Iran, and the Astana Talks, which represented an alternative initiative to resolve the crisis in the country, went down in the records as a concrete positive contribution of the July 15 events. Alongside its fight against Daesh, Türkiye—which is determined to prevent the PKK/YPG structure in Syria from undermining Syria’s territorial integrity in any way—carried out the Olive Branch and Peace Spring operations in line with its concept of strategic autonomy, despite reactions from the Western world, thereby consolidating its position as a game-changer in the region.

Having swiftly observed the outcomes of its post-July 15 purification efforts in Syria, Ankara adopted a more active strategy to escape the atmosphere of constriction and isolation that had emerged following the reversal of the post-Arab Spring process. During this period, the transformation of the domestic political system also facilitated Türkiye’s ability to pursue independent foreign policy practices.

The establishment of a new model, in which the executive branch has been strengthened and communication between institutions has been accelerated under the Presidential System of Government, played a decisive role in minimizing the negative effects of the July 15 coup attempt and in enhancing Ankara’s global standing. As a reflection of this, Türkiye demonstrated its influence in the region to all parties by openly supporting Doha against the blockade imposed by the Gulf Cooperation Council countries aimed at disciplining Qatar. Furthermore, following the purge within the country’s civil and security bureaucracy, the acceleration of developments in the defense industry and Türkiye’s transformation into a major security producer have enabled Ankara to reposition itself in global politics. This situation has undoubtedly led to a reassessment of ties with Ankara among regional actors and the reactivation of previously frozen relations.

Although the July 15 coup attempt appears to be an intervention in the political mechanism due to its direct targeting of President Erdoğan and his administration, it is clear that this failed attempt was actually the result of a will to eliminate Türkiye’s subjectivity in the global arena. Considering that a significant portion of classical or postmodern coups in Turkish political life have occurred as a result of Ankara establishing contact with alternative actors or presenting a new global political vision, it is evident that the FETÖ mechanism was activated to undermine the effects of President Erdoğan’s new perspective on the international stage and to transform Türkiye back into a secondary actor.

Having overcome this organized threat against the country’s sovereignty and independence, Türkiye, having largely purged harmful elements from its ranks, has begun to develop more original strategies in the global arena. The most concrete manifestation of this is Türkiye’s founding and decisive role in the Middle East. Changing the status quo in the region and successfully balancing regional actors, Ankara has become one of the most effective actors in both Middle Eastern and global politics over the past decade.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

The post Türkiye’s Middle East Policy Following July 15 appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> July 15 Revisited: Institutional Fragility, Public Defiance, and Political Leadership https://politicstoday.org/july-15-revisited-institutional-fragility-public-defiance-and-political-leadership/ Tue, 15 Jul 2025 14:09:19 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/?p=29345

On July 15, 2016, Turkey experienced an attempted military coup that seemed, by all conventional measures, destined for success. And yet, within a matter of hours, it collapsed. How did this happen?

The post July 15 Revisited: Institutional Fragility, Public Defiance, and Political Leadership appeared first on Politics Today.

]]>

On July 15, 2016, Turkey experienced an attempted military coup that seemed, by all conventional measures, destined for success. Backed by significant segments of the armed forces, including elements of the air force and navy, the coup appeared technically unassailable. And yet, within a matter of hours, it collapsed. Understanding how this happened requires us to look well beyond the military dimension and into the political, sociological, and organizational fabric of contemporary Turkey.

One of the most compelling analyses of this failure comes from Prof. Dr. Cemil Koçak, a leading historian of 20th-century Turkish history. Drawing on decades of research on the early republican period, authoritarianism, and Turkish civil-military relations, Koçak, in his recent talk at the Institute Social, a newly founded think-tank in Istanbul, frames the July 15 coup as a singular event, one that both fits within and dramatically departs from Turkey’s long history of military interventions.

Prof. Koçak lays out a multilayered analysis that reveals the sociopolitical complexity behind the failure. He places the July 15 coup attempt outside of conventional categories. His analysis is crucial to understanding how the FETÖ (Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organization) emerged as an “exceptional” example of clandestine state infiltration – and how, despite its reach, the coup unraveled.

Read: When Ideology Overwhelms Reason: Messianic Aspects of Gülenism, An Interview with Professor Ahmet Yaşar Ocak

In Koçak’s view, FETÖ’s organizational structure occupies a highly unusual place in Turkey’s history of covert movements. On one hand, it found support, at times tacit, at times explicit, from different layers of the state and successive political governments. On the other hand, it built a vast educational and financial network within a legal framework, while simultaneously developing international alliances. Through institutions like schools and media outlets, the group maintained a public-facing, legitimate image while quietly capturing key positions within the state and pursuing covert infiltration of the judiciary, bureaucracy, and the armed forces. This dual structure, namely legal visibility and covert penetration, gave the organization a kind of institutional flexibility and strength unseen in prior examples.

Koçak draws a stark comparison between the 1960 military coup and that of 2016. The former was executed with just 12 tanks; a 13th couldn’t be found. In contrast, the July 15 plotters commanded enormous force, especially from the air forces, substantial portions of which were under FETÖ’s influence. The fact that dismissals are still ongoing years later illustrates the scale of infiltration. For Koçak, this means the July 15 coup was, technically, an operation with a high likelihood of success. So why did it fail?

Read: Who are the Gülenists?

The Night the Military Lost Control–and the People Took Over

Koçak points first to weaknesses internal to the organization. One key issue was the degradation of merit within military recruitment and promotion. Military entrance exams became formalities; loyalty to the movement, not professional competence, became the primary criterion. This created a cadre of officers who, during moments of crisis, lacked the initiative and flexibility required to act decisively. The leadership deficit was further compounded by mistrust within the organization itself. Officers were often subordinated not to military superiors, but to “imams” appointed by the organization’s internal, non-military hierarchy. In one telling example, Koçak notes that coup plans sent to the U.S. were reviewed not by strategic experts but by a theology-trained imam, a sign of the movement’s internal insecurity and preference for tighter control over “professional” insight.

These structural flaws played out in operational decisions. The most obvious was the last-minute decision to launch the coup earlier than planned. Originally set for 3:00 a.m., the operation was abruptly moved to 8:00 p.m. due to fear of exposure. This shift disrupted the previously coordinated plans, triggered panic, and paralyzed the command structure. Orders did not flow properly, and the chain of command disintegrated. According to Koçak, this failure of coordination, rooted in organizational dysfunction, was a decisive factor in the coup’s collapse.

Recommended

Yet, Koçak argues that the most critical failure was not organizational, but societal. Unlike in previous military coups, there was no meaningful support from political parties, the media, or large segments of society. The opposition’s support and approval of the coup attempt were tacit and silent. In 1960 and 1971, however, larger parts of the public and political class supported the military, either actively or passively. This time, both the press and the public at large resisted. People took to the streets in unprecedented numbers. Koçak suggests the coup plotters failed to account for this possibility. Without historical precedent, they assumed no such resistance would occur. “They could not imagine that something which had never happened before might actually happen,” he notes.

This shift in civic behavior, Koçak emphasizes, is deeply tied to changing political reflexes. Since the 2000s, and especially following the 2007 e-memorandum, the AK Party government and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in particular began to push back against military tutelage. The firm stance taken during that period, Koçak argues, instilled new confidence in society. A collective awareness emerged: that military interventions were neither inevitable nor unstoppable.

In this regard, Koçak underlines Erdoğan’s leadership on July 15 as a decisive factor. The refusal to flee, the direct appeal to the public, and the call for resistance all contributed to a new political dynamic. “Give Caesar what belongs to Caesar,” Koçak says. In all previous coups, civilian leaders had capitulated. This time, they did not. Nor did the public. Nor the media. July 15, then, marks not only the failure of a coup but the collapse of long-standing expectations about how such events unfold and how institutions respond.

Read: Why should the West not love the Gülenists?

Koçak’s thesis also delivers a decisive rebuttal to a claim voiced by some of Turkey’s opposition figures that July 15 was a “controlled coup” orchestrated or deliberately allowed by the government. Far from suggesting manipulation from above, Prof. Koçak’s analysis underscores how deeply FETÖ had penetrated state structures and how real the threat to civilian rule actually was. The scale of the military mobilization, the chain-of-command disruptions, and the internal dysfunctions within the putschist ranks all point to a genuine and autonomous coup attempt, one that ultimately collapsed not because it was staged, but because it was systemically unsustainable and unable to overcome the joint political and public will. In my opinion, framing such an event as a government conspiracy is not only analytically weak but also historically irresponsible.

To understand July 15, we must examine it not just as a failed military operation, but as a moment of historical transition. As Prof. Dr. Cemil Koçak’s analysis makes clear, it was a test of institutional culture, political will, and collective memory. And in each of those areas, something had quietly but decisively changed.

The post July 15 Revisited: Institutional Fragility, Public Defiance, and Political Leadership appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> Turkey’s Intelligence Security https://politicstoday.org/turkeys-intelligence-security/ Wed, 17 Jul 2019 09:00:50 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/turkeys-intelligence-security/

Lessons ought to be taken from failures and intelligence needs to be developed with a proper management policy. Turkey has the relevant manpower, organizational capacity, tools and technology, and political will in order to realize a transformation in intelligence.

The post Turkey’s Intelligence Security appeared first on Politics Today.

]]>

Intelligence is a field that is really problematic with its own confidentiality to be investigated, understood and made sense of. Academic studies in the field are mostly the product of former intelligence sector employees or those individuals who have the “curiosity.” In addition, those who write dissertations in the field of intelligence tend to do more literature search than investigation.

Intelligence studies conducted on specific countries are unfortunately insufficient for reasons such as difficulty in accessing intelligence activities, which are confidential, law enforcement and drowning in the line between conducting an academic study and creating conspiracy theories. However, it is necessary to conduct relevant studies and make intelligence a field in academia in order to understand the scope and method of the area.

The scope of intelligence

Identification is the most difficult part of intelligence. When considering its general practice, it is the curing of information gaps for national security by making sense of intelligence data, providing early warnings and presenting the “picture” that is conceived through foresight to decision makers and institutions. So, there is no discrimination such as peace-crisis-war in the production of intelligence. In a systematic way, the following tasks are expected from intelligence employees:

  • To present prioritized intelligence to decision-makers
  • To make intelligence planning
  • To profess information activities
  • To analyze and synthesize the obtained data
  • To increase action by drawing to a conclusion

If we were to classify intelligence, which is generally the organ of security operations, it can be arranged as the following: state intelligence, police force intelligence, military intelligence, functional intelligence on the level of ministries and institutions, and “private” intelligence, which consists of the business world and individuals trying to perform in a semi-professional manner. Different classifications can be made for the preferred methods in the production of intelligence, different disciplines, or the times that intelligence is used. Without disregarding this classification, the following should be considered:

A classification considering the institutions mediated to produce intelligence can make research easy. In the evaluations made on the basis of the institution, the academic opinion that intelligence is an art because it requires science and foresight is based on tangible findings such as a “multi-disciplinary” field.

Turkey’s intelligence institutions

The president of the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) is responsible for intelligence activities in Turkey and is responsible for the coordination of all intelligence activities among different institutions. In this framework, according to No. 2937 of the State Intelligence Services and National Intelligence Organization law, MIT is liable and authorized to enforce the activities of all intelligence for Turkey’s internal or external security, intelligence gathering management, execution of analysis and synthesis process, conducting early warning processes for the development of necessary measures, and conducting intelligence activities on an operational level when necessary. In other words, the “National Intelligence Agency is the first actor responsible for both the success and failure of the national security of Turkey.”

The activities of law enforcement intelligence include to prevent crime, the pursuance of duties and to commerce the legal procedure by the General Directorate of Security, the Gendarmerie General Command and the Coast Guard Command. This branch of intelligence is essentially under the responsibility of the Interior Ministry. This branch of intelligence is necessary to produce the intelligence required for the duties stated in the laws and regulations that regulate the activities of relevant institutions.

Recommended

Military intelligence accounts to the production of military information needed for conditions of war and crisis and for military tasks specified under the law. It is professed under the responsibility of the Ministry of National Defense in order to fill the “information gap related to threats from air and land,” which is a cliché in military literature. Military intelligence activities that begin during times of war and crisis should also be enforced during periods of peace due to the possibility of being late in terms of timing. Thus, military intelligence is expected to examine the capacity of a nation’s military capacities or the military capacities of actors that may be threatened during times of crisis.

The private intelligence activities of individuals and the business world are limited due to legal regulations in Turkey. However, the business world can examine data that belongs to other companies they compete with within the framework of their own agenda and by using legal means available to the public during this period. On the other hand, it does not seem possible for individuals to conduct intelligence activities for the privacy of personal data and the protection of private life.

Intelligence and July 15

The issue of how effective Turkish intelligence is currently and how effective it was before the July 15 coup attempt is still a question that is being discussed. Effectiveness in this regard can be measured in two ways:

  • The measurement of intelligence services in different duty areas
  • Examining the success or failure of the results achieved from tasks performed

The first can be done separately by the evaluation and assessment bodies within intelligence organizations. Parameters such as personal management, organizational rhythm and activity, operational capacity and capability, access and use of intelligence technologies, reporting and feedback system can be taken into consideration when measuring the task effectiveness of intelligence organizations. It is not possible to make any judgement at the moment due to the fact that all this data belongs to the internal functioning and supervision of the relevant organizations and are not shared with the public.

A second method of measuring success or failure is evaluating the results desired on the national agenda or observing the management of events in the direction of national interests. In the evaluation of MIT, which is the dominant coordinator of intelligence and the sole responsible organization in ensuring the security of Turkey, taking preventative measures against the re-occurrence of an event such as July 15 can be considered as a success criteria in the struggle with such a terrorist organization. It is now well accepted that MIT was too late in preventing the July 15 coup attempt. However, following the coup, efforts to clear FETO staff in government institutions and taking proactive intelligence measures in the developments on the southern border are positive signs.

The intelligence structure of the police and gendarmerie was abused by FETO prior to the July 15 coup attempt. This illustrates a failure in the fulfillment of evaluating the effectiveness of intelligence efforts of law enforcement officers. In the aftermath however, with the fight against FETO, efforts in the field of crime and counter-terrorism, in parallel with the success achieved in domestic counter-terrorism are clear. In the context of military intelligence, the weakness of exposing FETO members before July 15 is a weak point. Again however, in the aftermath of the coup attempt, while carrying out successful land and air operations, counter-terrorism measures taken by the Special Forces promise hope for the activity of military intelligence in Turkey.

Intelligence is a function that states perform in both full productivity and privacy. When the general norms for intelligence and its organization in practice – starting from the definition and scope of intelligence – are analyzed, it can be stated that Turkey took measures in the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt, and is continuing to take measures for a concrete intelligence structure that will bring positive change. In this context, lessons ought to be taken from failures, and intelligence needs to be developed with a proper management policy that includes science and arts, with reference to duties stated in the law. Turkey has the relevant manpower, organizational capacity, tools and technology, and political will in order to realize the relevant transformation.

The post Turkey’s Intelligence Security appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> The Tiananmens Ignored by the Western Media https://politicstoday.org/the-tiananmens-ignored-by-the-western-media/ Mon, 15 Jul 2019 11:46:32 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-tiananmens-ignored-by-the-western-media/

The night of July 15 in Turkey illustrated that the strong relationship between the media and democracy can thwart a coup attempt. Even if Western media outlets continue to ignore the heroism displayed that night.

The post The Tiananmens Ignored by the Western Media appeared first on Politics Today.

]]>

When discussing the media’s strong links to democracy in the literature of democracy, it is problematic that large media organizations that have a global network make a choice between two images that represent similar concepts. Although their time, space, causes and social dynamics are different, the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey and the incidents in China’s Tiananmen Square, which occurred in 1989, have a common point. On both occasions, civilians united to resist tanks. The image of a civilian standing before the tanks at Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989 is used as one of the symbols of the pro-democracy stance in Western media, as the image is definitely a strong symbol for that.

On the other hand, many similar images were captured on the night of the July 15 coup attempt in 2016. Many photos and other kinds of images that showed great instances of heroism were released to the public. However, over the course of the three years since the coup attempt, the global media has not approached these images with similar enthusiasm. I will elaborate on this factor in terms of media-democracy relations, but firstly, I would like to briefly mention the coup attempt in Turkey.

While global media outlets served justice to the civilian who stood against tanks in China’s Tiananmen Square in 1989, it refused to pay attention to the acts of heroism displayed by the Turkish people on the night of the July 15 coup attempt. 

MSNBC did not apologize for its fake news

Three years has passed since the military coup attempt orchestrated by the Fetullah Terror Organization (FETO). The Turkish nation has the justified proud of repelling this attempt under the leadership of President Erdogan. The night of July 15 witnessed an epic, in which civilians resisted heavy weapons with their bare hands – a phenomenon that is not very common in the history of modern nation states. Organized by FETO militants infiltrated in the Turkish military, the coup attempt aimed to overthrow Turkey’s democratically elected president and the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, which had won the general election by receiving 49 percent of the vote share only 7 months before the coup attempt.

On the night of July 15, the political will, patriotic military officers, police officers and media, acted together in order to repel the coup. They all became heroes of the night. Democracy won that night, whereas the pro-coup mindset suffered a huge blow. The other two defeated groups of that night include the global political actors who kept their silence and hesitated to support democracy against the coup attempt for a long time, and media organs with global networks who did not take a stance against the coup attempt. The Turkish media united and stood up against the atrocity and played a key role in the fight for democracy.

A number of global media outlets, which are supposed to display a similar approach against the coup attempt according to media theory, reported fake news through the U.S.-based MSNBC. While reporting the news, the correspondent said that Erdogan’s plan that was supposed to land in Istanbul was banned and that he was trying to seek refuge in Germany.

Since it is obvious that such a thing never occurred, we would like to remind MSNBC that the Turkish public is still expecting an apology from them. According to professional principles of journalism, they are required to apologize and issue a correction notice by acknowledging that the news was false. From the U.S. to the UK, Germany and France, the Western media tried to legitimize the coup attempt with news reports asserting that the coup was organized against an “authoritarian, dictator, anti-democrat and fundamentalist Erdogan.” They also seemed regretful while discussing how the coup attempt was defeated. FETO leader Fetullah Gulen’s first statement on July 15 was published by the Wall Street Journal on July 17. In the answers he gave to the questions relayed to him via email, Gulen acted as if he was the victim, and released the expression, “this is a plot,” into circulation.

We would like to remind MSNBC that the Turkish public is still expecting an apology for the fake news during the July 15 coup attempt.

Remembering how the Western media approached the coup attempt is important in terms of making sense of today. Although Turkey has so far concrete evidence proving that FETO members organized the coup attempt, Western politicians and media outlets still display the same cynical approach. The exclusivist and obsessive language used in news reports and opinion articles throughout the coup attempt process still frames the current approach to the incident.

Had they approached the event through a lens of universal achievements of democracy, they would have made news about people who stopped tanks with their bare hands, who stood up against bullets, and who suffered severe injuries due to the bombs dropped by fighter jets. Such news stories would set an example to the peoples of the world and make a great contribution to the collective memory of humanity. However, these media outlets chose to ignore these stories.

Recommended

The power of bare hands against tanks

As stressed above, a comparison based on a single photograph will help us remember the double standards applied by media organizations. There is a striking resemblance between the image from Tiananmen Square, which is imprinted on the memories and images reflected from the July 15 resistance in terms of manifesting the civilian will against tyranny.

Western media outlets still serve the image of the Chinese civilian who stood up against tanks during the Tiananmen incidents in 1989 as an example of resistance. This is exactly how it should be. Those who resisted must be given credit for their heroism.

On the other hand, Western journalists do not seem to remember or simply ignore the heroic resistance of the Turkish people on the night of July 15, 2016, although that night witnessed many similar moments of heroism. This is undoubtedly ignored on purpose. Even though some of the images that portray the resistance in the best way are owned by Reuters, AP and AFP, the general trend of ignorance still continues. This shows the absence of an unbiased attitude that is needed in democracy-media relations.

There is a striking resemblance between the image from Tiananmen Square, which is imprinted on the memories and images reflected from the July 15 resistance in terms of manifesting the civilian will against tyranny.

For instance, the striking photo of Metin Dogan, a citizen who laid in front of a tank to stop it at Ataturk Airport on the night of July 15, did not circulate among the global media as a symbol of civilian resistance defending democracy against coup plotters.

Similarly, the courage displayed by a citizen named Sabri Unal, who tried to stop the tanks in Uskudar, was astounding. Unal stood up against a tank and laid in front of it when it did not stop. When the tank ran him over, Unal miraculously survived and leaped back to his feet again. Then he moved on to stop the second tank advancing him. He lay down once again but the second tank left him injured. The footage showing such stories of heroism were recorded by security cameras that night and are available on the internet. These instances of defending democracy against coups and civilian politics against authoritarianism can barely be found in history.

The two images I mentioned above are only two instances of the resistance that we witnessed on the night of July 15. Every moment of the civilian resistance against F-16 jets, tanks, and other armed vehicles is a testament to the heroism and courage displayed that night. They constitute the most striking examples of fighting for freedom, democracy, and popular will.

Undoubtedly, the global media does not only refuse to see the facts on the subject, but also creates a perspective that rebuts the reality and meaning of that night.

FETO is a genuine threat

Had the Western media outlets approached the subject in the framework of democratic standards instead of accusing Turkey within the three years since the coup attempt, they would have realized the serious threat posed by FETO in their own countries. Surely, it is not too late to realize this. They still have a chance and can present the democracy heroes they have so far ignored to the global public. On the night of July 15, civilians and journalists in Turkey demonstrated the strong ties between media and democracy. The country showed the world that military junta attempts do not have a chance as long as these two structures support each other without hesitation. The solidarity we sought was practiced that night for the first time in Turkey. Acting against the democracy-media theory in such a positive context also indicates that Western media outlets yield to biases and black propaganda.

The post The Tiananmens Ignored by the Western Media appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> Remembering the July 15 Coup Attempt After Three Years https://politicstoday.org/remembering-the-july-15-coup-attempt-after-three-years/ Mon, 15 Jul 2019 11:03:25 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/remembering-the-july-15-coup-attempt-after-three-years/

Turkey has faced three problems since the July 15 coup attempt. The first was the cleansing of state institutions in the fight against FETO, the second was related to the legal procedure in the post-coup period and the third was related to the fight against FETO in the international arena.

The post Remembering the July 15 Coup Attempt After Three Years appeared first on Politics Today.

]]>

Three years ago, the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) initiated a coup attempt in Turkey to overthrow the government and seize power. People poured to the streets to defend Turkish democracy against the coup plotters. 251 people were killed and over 2,000 were injured.

After the failed coup attempt, Turkey faced some serious problems. The first was the issue of cleansing state institutions in the fight against FETO. In accordance with this aim, comprehensive investigations were conducted in every state institution in order to identify people affiliated with FETO. Until today, approximately 120,000 people have been dismissed from state institutions. Nonetheless, after in-depth investigations, some of them managed to return to their jobs. This problem became one of the most difficult and complicated issues in the aftermath of the coup attempt.

Until today, approximately 120,000 people have been dismissed from their positions in state institutions due to their affiliation with FETO, which orchestrated the July 15 failed coup. 

The second critical problem was related to the legal procedure in the post-coup period. Since many high-rank officials in the military were directly involved in the coup attempt, there was a need of holding fair trials in order to punish the coup plotters. 263 out of 289 trials have now been completed. Nevertheless, the whole judicial process will be completed after the applications of higher courts – the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Due to this reason, it is possible for the whole judicial process to last almost 10 years.

Recommended

The third problem was related to the fight against FETO in the international arena. While the national struggle against FETO requires mostly short-term strategies, there is a need of long-term strategies on an international level. While FETO had been infiltrating state institutions since the 1970s, it had also been organizing abroad. FETO had approximately 800 schools and over 1,000 foundations in 160 countries. After the coup attempt, Turkey made official applications to end FETO activities in these countries. In total, 22 countries, including Russia, Jordan, and Serbia, closed FETO-affiliated schools and NGOs after responding positively to Turkey’s official application. However, FETO maintains its activities in numerous countries. Thus, Turkey needs a better long-term strategy and back-channel diplomacy to deal with this issue.

In total, 22 countries, including Russia, Jordan, and Serbia, have closed FETO-affiliated schools and NGOs after responding positively to Turkey’s official application.

All these problems illustrate that Turkey has shown success in dealing with FETO after the July 15 coup attempt. Compared to other countries after such experiences, Turkish democracy still functions, and judicial independence has not been deteriorated. Nonetheless, it is also obvious that there is still a lot of work to be done in the fight against FETO. Turkey especially needs a renewed perspective in the fight on an international level. At this stage, it is crucial to find a sophisticated way of explaining how FETO is not only a serious problem for Turkey but is also of critical danger for other countries. Since the international audience is not aware of the FETO issue, it is a necessity to find a new discourse in order to establish this awareness. This responsibility falls on the government, universities, and NGOs.

The post Remembering the July 15 Coup Attempt After Three Years appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> “Artists Should Firmly Stand Against Neighborhood Pressure in Turkey”: An Interview with Kutlug Ataman https://politicstoday.org/artists-should-firmly-stand-against-neighborhood-pressure-in-turkey-an-interview-with-kutlug-ataman/ Tue, 11 Sep 2018 01:16:13 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/artists-should-firmly-stand-against-neighborhood-pressure-in-turkey-an-interview-with-kutlug-ataman/

During an interview with Isa Tatlican from Sabah, Kutlug Ataman emphasized that artists should not bow down to neighborhood pressure in Turkey.

The post “Artists Should Firmly Stand Against Neighborhood Pressure in Turkey”: An Interview with Kutlug Ataman appeared first on Politics Today.

]]>

Director and screenwriter Kutlug Ataman, who was subjected to a lynch campaign by those hegemonizing the cultural industry during the Gezi Park provocations, gives some advice to the artists blacklisted by the left-wing only because they expressed hope about the future of the country, respect to the country’s values and lift the morale of the ones ruling the country: “They should stand up without minding the lynch attempts and be thankful for that they will see their true friends at the end of it. In a nutshell, I suggest all the artists subjected to lynching to trust “Ayse Teyze” (Aunt Ayse), for she knows and understands everything the best.”

You have been away from Istanbul for a while. How does Istanbul look when viewed from Anatolia? What are you doing lately?

Anadolu was once so far away from Istanbul. When I was a child, we used to have 2-3 days of train travels to Anatolia. Then buses came up and the travel time went down to 16 hours. Now, Istanbul is only 2 hours away. I still imagine a Turkey that will necessitate the formulation of this question differently. In other words, I imagine an order in which there is no difference between Istanbul and the rest of Turkey. Big cities have so far survived and made progress thanks to the labor of the locals of Anatolia. And now, the tendency to continue this progress in the east is manifesting itself. Before the FETO (Gulenist Terror Group) insurrection, the idea of Anatolian Tigers sounded very exciting to me.

What has changed with the FETO atrocity?

As already known, even though there has been a decline in the bourgeoisie of other cities with FETO, we are currently in a recovery process and thankfully the threat has been eliminated to a great extent although not yet eradicated completely. Another problem, particularly in the eastern cities, was that they could not develop due to terror and therefore the liberalization seen in big cities was not experienced by them.

What has changed in the east in the recent period?

With the elimination of the FETO threat, it became more evident that a great deal of progress has been achieved in the fight against terror. But it is not yet possible to see a full recovery. The most challenging task of the following period might be instilling the dynamism of big cities to the eastern cities and enabling this dynamism to flourish in an organic way rather than imposing it. In the east, the state is considered the most important locomotive of this change. But I do not think that the state has such a mission. The most important locomotive in this context will be businesspeople with entrepreneurial spirit, whereas the state should function as a regulating and facilitating body.

You moved to Erzincan, but you are still quite active in shooting and producing films. Will you promote any new work in the coming days?

I shot a feature film “Hilal, Feza ve Diğer Gezegenler” (New Moon, Space and Other Planets), which depicts my personal experience throughout the February 28 process, but it is not completed yet. It is a project that seeks to fathom our culture of polarization that is stuck in-between and aligns itself with neither the West nor the East.  Since we did not curry anybody’s favor, we shot it with mobile phones without receiving support from anyone. It was a very demanding process, but the final product is very genuine and exciting. Me and my collaborator Sercan Tevs are now endeavoring to remunerate this support given by our crew. Aside from that, we are making a documentary named “Wild New World,” which is an essay film depicting the neoliberal world and scrutinizing how we ended up with Trump’s America and rising racism in Europe.

You were subject to oppression in Turkey way before February 28, which dates back to the 1980 coup d’etat. Can you talk about those times?

I was not an artist, but a student at the time. On September 12, 1980, fascists staged a military coup controlled by the imperialists, which made everyone’s life miserable, including both nationalists and socialists. Of course, the period leading up to the coup was also very chaotic, but fascism and coup were not the right solution to that. Only imperialists could defend the mindset “set a thief to catch a thief” and Turkey was subjected to a great injustice because of the conniving Turkish oligarchy and the foreign-dependent state. Had the country looked at the past with courage as from the first coup that shook the spirit of the constituent assembly of the Republic, the July 15 coup attempt might have never happened.

I always saw you hopeful in the difficult period between Gezi Park protests and the July 15 attempted coup.

This difficult period will hopefully come to an end. I am hopeful and keep believing despite all the ups and downs. After all, we are all on the same boat. And this situation is not peculiar to our county. All countries face ups and downs through their history. We must stay calm and proceed on our way.

While mainstream political tendencies were in a different direction, you supported students wearing headscarf during the Feb. 28 process. What was your motivation in your support?

It is always prescribed that an artist must be dissident. First of all, I do not act with ready-made prescriptions. My outlook on life does not necessitate being dissident only for the sake of being dissident. I have my own conscience, beliefs and stance. That’s it.

So, what is your stance?

What are my principles? Don’t be a hypocrite, be honest. You must have the courage to frankly express what is right and what is wrong to you. If there is a prerequisite for being an artist, it is nothing but honesty. You do not have to be an artist to be honest, being a decent human being is enough. During the February 28 process, I just spoke out what I believed in and what I found wrong. As I was in Galatasaray High School, I resisted getting my hair cut and I insisted on wearing my colored trousers despite being beaten up for this reason. There was already no difference between my own experience and the people whose futures were darkened due to their headscarf or religious beliefs. Others were being subjected to what I went through at the time. I did not care whether they would jail me, I stood up.

We know your opinion on coups. What do you think about the July 15 coup attempt?

Every cloud has a silver lining. So, we must also be grateful for the bad things happening to us. The biggest difference of the July 15 from the previous coup attempts was that the source of the danger was outside the country, which was quickly grasped by the people and the enemies could be thwarted thanks to that. I must admit that I also suspected the military in the first place due to our past experiences since the military has always been the first institution that comes to mind in Turkey if a coup is in question. But it turned out in a short while that it was a terrorist insurrection organized against and despite the military.

What would have happened had FETO achieved to stage a coup?

If we could not have repelled the July 15 attempt, we might not be here today. Turkey would either be in a deep and desperate darkness or had already been dissolved. But we have overcome the threat by growing stronger. Thank goodness! Today, every segment of society including pro-government and dissident groups are explicitly using the word FETO. Of course, a complete purge could not be achieved yet whereas many people were subject to unjust treatment. But since 250 people were killed in the incident, I do not want to underline the unjust treatments I have been subject to.

Recommended

After July 15, the U.S. and the EU abruptly changed their approach to Turkey? What do you think about the motivation behind this sudden change of behavior in the West?

The word “West” is actually self-explanatory. The “West” according to whom? No matter whether they are right-wing, left-wing, or liberal, the Western people have a perspective in their cultural codes that distinguishes the “West” from the rest. This perspective is deliberately not scrutinized even by their “intellectuals” since they like to use it to their advantage. As a person who has lived in Europe and America for 30 years, I even felt this cultural code in my own case.

Can you open this up a bit more?

This is the first group. And now place the identity of a Turkish intellectual who imagines him/herself as a component of the West for years but could not achieve it, who is not wanted by the West and therefore does not feel comfortable. This segment, which is local but still domineering the country, has always looked down on their own people due to a serious inferiority complex caused by this feeling of incompetence against the West. How could the relation between the West and this segment be?

Who is this intellectual segment?

I am afraid the “enlightenment” who domineered the country for years was actually pitch-black darkness. Of course, this is a rough generalization. There have always been exceptions, but some of these exceptions were not considered “intellectual” enough as they even attempted to lynch a Nobel laurate. This segment’s relation to the West consists of unquestioning submission. This country may be the only one in the world unquestioningly assuming that what comes from the West is always right. Are they any different from those thinking that everything about the West is wrong? I do not think so. This is a serious inferiority complex, and their approach turned into a “complaint industry” in time due to the coups and other kinds of oppressive practices in the country. Complaining has been regarded as an art form. Everyone touching on any other theme was blacklisted and played down for “making art for art’s sake.”

Isn’t it problematic to narrate the unjust suffering of only one side while complaining about the country to the West?

Does Turkey not have problems to complain about? Of course, it does. But in the context of unjust suffering, they were always asked to tell only one side’s suffering and experience. For some reason, Western liberal values like questioning, discussing and being impartial only applied to the West as they turned a deaf ear to one side in our country. Opposing every discourse that criticizes the West was prescribed as a duty of our intellectuals and artists.

And those not conforming to that were blacklisted.

Exactly. Those who did not conform to that were blacklisted as “libos” (a Turkish slang word used for liberals in a derogatory way), “pro-government” and “nationalist.” As of late, even foreign funders started saying that they would support us only if we make a film against the government in Turkey. They recklessly ordered me to do this. What they mean is: Either you become our supporter, or we do not make any co-production. Of course, we refused to obey this and shot our film with mobile phones. But there is also the other side of the coin. From right-wing to left-wing groups and the state, this is the fault of everyone making us need the West. Hopefully, we will turn into a society that respects and supports artists of every opinion and bring an end to this vicious circle. In short, the approach of the West did not change after the July 15 attempt, they only started to speak more frankly.

You were stigmatized for various reasons in Turkey. In that sense, you are among the first victims of peer pressure. How did this pressure affect you?

In fact, I did not understand much when the lynch campaign started. I love working and sometimes I scarcely have time to breathe. And that incident coincided with such a period. During the Gezi Park protests, some names who acted as mouthpieces of certain groups tried to defame me by claiming that I opposed to the protests since I could not sell my art. The institution I spoke about threatened to sue me, but of course they couldn’t since I kept the e-mails they formerly sent me about their “prescriptions”. They tried to denigrate me but ended up being the losing party. During that period, some professional jealousies that I had not noticed before started to surface to my surprise. The next thing I remember was everyone’s organizing petitions against me. I must admit that I had not known they cared so much about me until then.

What did you do against this lynch campaign?

You must above all protect your self-esteem. I openly express what I believe in and no one can intimidate me. They tried to beat me up but failed. The “dissident” artists who received multi-million TL worth funds from ministries tried to label me as “pro-government,” and they failed too. But I am still here, working both in the East and the West even more than before while these people are either hiding or ashamed of their actions. It was like a flood that hit me. I could not understand what exactly was happening at that moment. But it had a good side since it cleared away the useless and insincere burdens in my life and when it was over, only real friends standing beside me were there. I have to say that I was distressed a little, but this is how a flood comes. What doesn’t kill you makes you stronger. And what if it killed me? I would only say that my time has come.

Recently, some others have also been subjected to peer pressure. What do you suggest to them?

There is a saying I like very much: If you can’t stand the heat get out of the kitchen. Our country is undergoing a series of radical changes. If you are an artist in such a country, being confronted with such things is unavoidable. Of course, peer pressure, exclusion and lynching are fascistic practices. It will be more relevant to call them pathological conditions. Can you imagine what would happen if these people come to power?

Why did they grow so aggressive?

These fascists formed a republic of fear in their own power domain, which is on the wane. As their power domain declines, they get more aggressive against the “other” while making life unbearable for one another. I prefer to stay calm by trying to be sympathetic because I learned to be unperturbed since I am afraid of my own anger. So, I just say that we must look at them from the perspectives offered by sociology. A segment who thought themselves as ruling power came to lose their grip as they started to see that their self-perception was not accurate, and they did not actually have a function in society. The West also does not support their attitude any longer. They utter threats like leaving the country, but no one cares, and European countries they want to go to don’t grant them visas. The political party who organized the lynch campaign is about to dissolve.

What do you think a person subjected to lynch should do in the first place?

They should stand up without minding the lynch attempts and be thankful for that they will see their true friends at the end of it. In a nutshell, I suggest all the artists subjected to lynching to trust “Ayse Teyze” (Aunt Ayse), for she knows and understands everything the best.

The post “Artists Should Firmly Stand Against Neighborhood Pressure in Turkey”: An Interview with Kutlug Ataman appeared first on Politics Today.

]]>