The collapse of the Soviet Union and the early years of the new Russian Federation were marked by the country leaving regions it was traditionally present. The leadership of the new “independent” Russia wrongly treated its rejection of the communist ideology and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact to be a necessary and sufficient condition to consider the Cold War to be over.

The logical consequence of this erroneous point of view, as well as the economic difficulties of the first year after the collapse of the USSR, was a destructive foreign policy that narrowed the sphere of Russia’s strategic interests in regards to its closest neighbors. As a result, the Russian military-political presence in the world decreased noticeably: in particular, the most important Russian military bases (as successors to the USSR) in Cuba and Vietnam were closed.

Under these conditions where Russia had temporarily lost its geopolitical view, the so-called “logistics point” in Syria’s Tartus (existing since 1971), remained, literally by miracle, as a Russian asset. The unrestrained expansion of NATO to the East towards the Russian borders, as well as the numerous conflicts unleashed by the U.S. and its allies across the world, led Russia to the need to return to a more active foreign policy position. As a result, the Russian administration initiated negotiations on the re-establishment of military bases in Cuba and Vietnam.

Russia’s participation in the civil war in Syria led to an increase of the role and strengthening of the Russian Mediterranean bases, including the Russian Navy base in Tartus and the aviation group at Hmeymim airport. It ought to be stated that the Russian presence in the E. Mediterranean will grow in the near future outside the conflict in Syria due to the energy wealth in the region, as well as the growth of terror. It is obvious that in addition to the terror threat, the new U.S. policy in the Middle East will have an influence on Russian plans.

An integral aspect of Russian foreign policy is energy diplomacy. At the heart of this is the need for Russia to ensure safe and reliable corridors for the delivery of its energy resources – oil and natural gas – to world markets. First of all, we are talking about the largest European market.

For the first time in the history, Turkey is becoming a transit country for the supply of Russian natural gas to Europe.

This is the reason for the new format of relations between Russia and Turkey in the framework of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline construction project, instead of gas transit through Ukraine. For the first time in the history of bilateral relations, Turkey is becoming a transit country for the supply of Russian natural gas to Europe.

The Mediterranean factor also arose in relations between Turkey and Russia. This is related to the construction and operation of the first Turkish nuclear power plant, Akkuyu, by Russia in the area of the Mediterranean city, Mersin. The strategic facility obviously requires special security measures. This not only means protection on the ground, air and sea of the perimeter of the nuclear power plant itself, but also the protection of routes for the delivery of nuclear fuel to Akkuyu and for the removal of waste.

Thus, the Akkuyu NPP creates another issue in the broad agenda of cooperation between Turkey and Russian in the military-political sphere. The basis of this cooperation – the Astana format – is also directly connected with the Mediterranean region.

The situation that is unfolding today around the gas fields of the Mediterranean cannot escape Russian attention, as the country is one of the leaders in gas production and gas trade. Up to now, in the confrontation between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the one hand, and Southern Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and Egypt (which are backed by the U.S., EU and global corporations), on the other, Russia has not yet said its word.

Russia has only two options for responding to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The first option is a policy of non-intervention, since Russia’s greatest strategic interest in the energy sector is directed towards the Arctic basin. And the possibility of obtaining access to the fields of the Eastern Mediterranean and its profitability for Russian mining companies is not obvious.

Thus, the active involvement of Russia in the confrontation around the disputed gas fields of Cyprus, without creating obvious economic benefits can cause unnecessary tension for Russia either in relations with Turkey, or in relations with a broad front of regional and Western countries. This includes the UK, which is expanding its air force on the island, as well as France, which recently signed an agreement with Southern Cyprus on the establishment of its naval base in the area of the village of Marie.

At the same time, the option of Russia’s support of Southern Cyprus, directly or indirectly, in a dispute with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is practically excluded. Not promising big benefits, the issue could cause a logistically unjustified crisis in relations between Moscow and Ankara. Needless to say, these days Moscow has high hopes for expanding its arms trade, as well as for further building up cooperation with Turkey on a whole.

So, as the second option for Russia, the administration could consider supporting Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the gas dispute in the E. Mediterranean.

Russia has only two options for responding to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. The first is by taking no sides and the second is considering to support Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. 

It should be noted that the format of the Astana process in Syria, no matter how hard it is implemented, is a Russian-Turkish success story. Another issue is that Astana is a “wartime” process and, of course, will cease to exist after the end of the active phase of the civil war in Syria. Such a stage, as of 2019, is just around the corner. And Russia is interested in creating long-term institutions of “peacetime” military-political cooperation with Ankara.

These institutions could link Russia and Turkey in exactly the same way that, in the economic sphere, the two countries are linked to each other by the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, the Turkish Stream gas pipeline, the S-400 deal, tourism, mutual investments, and much more.

Let us repeat this point: Russia and Turkey have strategic projects that serve as the foundation stone of bilateral relations in the economic sphere.

And in the military-political sphere, the Astana process is a good starting point in the absence of established institutions of Russian-Turkish cooperation in this field. The Russian leadership is fully aware of the fact that both the Astana process and the S-400 deal creates an opportunity for Russia to develop relations, for example, in terms of creating a framework of relations with Turkey in the military-political sphere in the long-run. The point of entry for this cooperation has already become the Mediterranean (Syria) and, in principle, it could be increased if certain conditions arose.

In Russia, there are often voices defending the point of view about special relations between Russia and Greece, which are implicated in the historical and religious community. However, fortunately for Russia, in Russian foreign policy there are hardly any so-called “brotherhood” factors (the most vivid example is the modern relations of Russia and Ukraine) but more sober political calculations based on real benefits and real interests.

Unlike Turkey, Russia’s relations with Greece have neither anchor projects, nor large common strategic interests, nor prospects for a cardinal increase in trade, economic & political ties.

Unlike Turkey, Russia’s relations with Greece have neither anchor projects, nor large common strategic interests, nor prospects for a cardinal increase in trade, economic and political ties. In figures, Russian exports to Turkey are approximately 7 times higher than Greece. Willing or unwillingly, Greece is a part of the anti-Russian EU economic sanctions. Therefore, it is unlikely that the factors of “fraternal” Greece and “fraternal” Cyprus will be considered as a deterrent for Russia to come forward on the Turkish side in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Another issue is that the only possibility of an Eastern Mediterranean deal between Turkey and Russia is an agreement that goes beyond energy cooperation itself. Only this will justify drawing Russia into the regional confrontation. Let us immediately make a reservation that, compared with the policy of neutrality in the gas dispute, the possibility set out below should be considered as markedly less likely.

Russia could side with Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus based on the strategic goal of building up its military and political presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. And also, based on the understanding of the historical chance to form a long-term military-political alliance with Turkey, which has risen possibly for the first time since the days of the founder and first president of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

If you go into theoretical reasoning, then such a long-term Russia-Turkey alliance would promise both sides immediate and numerous benefits far beyond the scope of the Mediterranean basin itself. For example, the joint contribution of the parties to ensuring security in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the security of the Black Sea basin, can be noted on the basis of the regime envisaged by the Montreux Convention, etc.

Russia and Turkey demonstrate a readiness, in spite of all differences, to hear and respect each other’s interests. This can be seen in Syria within the framework of the Astana process. However, whether the “21st Century Deal” in the military-political sphere will arise in relations between Turkey and Russia is a big question, considering Turkey’s NATO membership – which nobody doubts. But only such a Russian-Turkish deal, far beyond the scope of energy, can justify drawing Russia into an international confrontation developing around the gas fields of the Mediterranean Sea.

Countries that share maritime borders have to make agreements on the limits of their authorities to ensure that they can operate independently in naval spaces such as Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and continental shelves. Turkey is currently not a part of any delimitation agreements in the Eastern Mediterranean except one signed between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Due to this reason, in order to examine the legal position of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, the official opinion regarding the subject must be analyzed first.

Turkey’s diplomatic note

Turkey is not a part of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS). The country also does not have any national legislation regarding the determination of exclusive economic zones and continental shelves. The existing legislation regarding the subject of territorial waters is Act No. 2674 on Territorial Sea of the Republic of Turkey dated 1978. With the authority given by this law, the Council of Ministers has determined the extent of Turkey’s territorial waters in the Mediterranean as twelve nautical miles.

Turkey first expressed its concrete opinion on the subject with the diplomatic note published on March 2, 2004, following the delimitation agreement signed between the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) and Egypt in 2003. In this note, Turkey expresses that it has ab initio and ipso facto (existing from the beginning and do not need to be declared) rights in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially in the region west of the coordinates 32 degrees, 16 minutes and 18 seconds, and any delimitation agreements concerning this region cannot be made without the participation of all countries related to the region, and due to this it does not recognize the agreement signed between Egypt and the GCASC.

In addition, Turkey also expressed that the GCASC does not have the authority to represent Cyprus alone, and the TRNC must also be a part of all actions and processes regarding the island. Repeating similar opinions on January 30, 2007, following the delimitation agreement signed in 2007 between Lebanon and the GCASC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated concerns regarding the oil and natural gas exploration activities of GCASC in the Eastern Mediterranean with its statement published on August 5, 2011 and expressed that efforts of this kind were impediments to the progress of the peace talks in the Island. 

Graph 1: The Area Declared as Continental Shelf by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the Ministry, the area extends to the point where the Turkish-Greek continental shelf west of 28th meridian east reaches the Mediterranean.

The reason that the discussions regarding the maritime limits in the Eastern Mediterranean have heated up is that the GCASC has signed aggressive agreements with various countries starting from 2003. The important issue that directly effects the situation is that the GCASC is being treated as the sole representative of the Island of Cyprus with regards to international law. And due to this reason countries of the region only view the GCASC as their counterpart in these agreements. Turkey’s responses which have been limited to diplomatic notes and similar reactions over this process have not been sufficient. Because some countries in the region could also sign delimitation agreements with Turkey instead of GCASC, and even in this subject Turkey has remained somewhat passive.

Turkey has not published any official maps regarding its maritime area of jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean to date. There exists a map in the literature which shows the maritime areas of jurisdiction each country in the region has claim to with respect to the international law.

Graph 2: Maritime Areas of Jurisdiction In Eastern Mediterranean According to International Law

 As stated before, the main determinant of Turkey’s policies in Eastern Mediterranean is the idea that “maritime limits should be determined via international agreements.”

The reason why the Eastern Mediterranean has become a heated topic for both Turkey and the Turkish Republic of N. Cyprus is that the administration of Southern Cyprus is taken as the only legitimate actor under international law.

Unjust acquisitions

The delimitation agreements GCASC has signed with the countries of the region are far from being fair and are against the principle of delimitation proportional to coastal length. Upon examination of the agreements the GCASC has signed with Syria, Israel and Lebanon, it can be seen that the capes of Zafer and Baf are recognized as coastal lines and despite these three countries having 1.8 times more coastal length than GCASC the extents of their areas of maritime jurisdiction are more or less equal. GCASC has illegally acquired 3957 square kilometers of area that should be under Lebanon’s jurisdiction and 4600 square kilometers of area that should be under Israel’s jurisdiction.

There exists a similar situation in the delimitation agreements signed between Egypt and GCASC, which were later annulled by the Egyptian parliament. If the coastal length of GCASC is determined based on the capes of Zafer and Arnauti the size of the area under the GCASC’s jurisdiction should roughly be half of Egypt’s, but instead the area given by the agreement to GCASC is 21 thousand 500 square kilometers larger.

It cannot be said that nothing can be done against these unjust acquisitions of the GCASC. The countries that have signed these agreements can annul them through their legislative organs due to this situation against their interests. The annulment of the agreement between Egypt and GCASC during the presidency of Mohamed Morsi by the legislative organ is such an example. The nullification of the agreement on the delimitation of continental shelf and other maritime areas signed between Albania and Greece by the Albanian Constitutional Court is another event that provides an example.

The rights of Turkey and Turkish Republic of N. Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean are unalienable rights.

The rights of Turkey and TRNC, which is an integral element in the representation of the Island of Cyprus, in the Eastern Mediterranean are unalienable rights. Along with the fact that the TRNC undoubtedly has claim to the EEZ rights claimed by the GCASC, Turkey also has rights regarding the south of the Island stemming from international law. While TRNC is only officially recognized by Turkey, it is a party in the Cyprus talks and is with its own independent territory and government, a country that has declared independence. Even though the GCASC, by ignoring this status of the TRNC, has conducted the measurements determining the extent of its EEZ by basing them on the Cape of Karpaz, which is part of the TRNC’s territory, as an independent state the TRNC must make its own delimitation agreements with Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. While the existing regional political conjuncture does not make this possible, TRNC must shape its future policy via this perspective.

Turkey’s legal arguments

Considering the situation that exists today, it can be seen that many of the countries in the Eastern Mediterranean are signatories of the 1982 UNCLOS agreement but Turkey is not a part of this agreement. Due to this, in the solution of the problem of the delimitation of continental shelves and exclusive economic zones in the Eastern Mediterranean, international customary laws rather than the written rules of international law must be employed.

As it is expressed in the aforementioned agreements, when the relevant rules of the customary laws are examined it is understood that a solution must be created within the framework of the principles of fairness through taking all dynamics in the region into consideration. Looking at the geography of the region, it is understood that a solution can only be created and the issues of exclusive economic zones, territorial waters and continental shelves can only be resolved through the establishment of delimitation agreements between countries sharing maritime borders.

The legal arguments Turkey can bring forward on the subject of continental shelves and exclusive economic zones in Eastern Mediterranean can be listed as follows:

The primary argument of Turkey should be that no unilateral actions can be taken regarding the delimitation of maritime boundaries, and that the problem must be resolved through bilateral or multilateral agreements which take customary international law into account.

The continental shelf of each country must be a natural extension of that country’s territory and should not be a part of any other country’s natural extensions. Turkey must also take this argument that has been adopted by international law into account.

Another argument Turkey must bring forward in the delimitation processes is that solutions must be based on the principles of fairness. Meaning that the solutions regarding these subjects must be fair and must protect the rights of all parties. Because in the event that islands such as Kastellorizo and Rhodes in the region are recognized as continental shelves by themselves, the rights of Turkey in the region will be limited in a way that is against the principles of fairness.

Turkey must prevent unlawful activities from being conducted in the region by voicing its rights before international authorities more often.

The Eastern Mediterranean being a semi-enclosed sea gives Turkey the right to claim that the delimitation of boundaries in this sea must be done according to special principles, meaning within the characteristics of concrete delimitation.

Ultimately when the latest events in the Eastern Mediterranean are examined, it can be seen that certain steps are being attempted to be taken via bypassing Turkey and the TRNC. GCASC claiming territory in TRNC’s regions of Maraş and Güzelyurt to use the energy reserves in the region drives the problem away from a solution. It is not difficult to guess, especially in light of the recent events, that Egypt, Israel and Greece are meeting frequently to focus on partitioning the Eastern Mediterranean without Turkey.

On the other hand, Turkey is increasing its active position in the region day-by-day. The Turkish drilling ship Fatih began seismic exploration and drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean on October 29, 2018, and the “Mavi Vatan” drill conducted last month undoubtedly has the purpose of signaling to other countries in the region that no plans ignoring Turkey and the TRNC will be allowed. In this way Turkey, an important actor with rightful claims in the region according to international law, must prevent unlawful activities from being conducted in the region by voicing its rights before international authorities more often.

Shortly after the statement from U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo that “the Mediterranean is a strategic front for Washington,” Democratic Party New Jersey Senator Bob Menendez and Republican Party Florida Senator Marco Rubio introduced a new bill named “Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019” to the U.S. Senate. The bill is considered a bipartisan legislation due to being introduced by both Democratic and Republican representatives.

Looking at the content of the bill reminds one of the phrase, “nothing new on the Western front.” This legislation is a part of the steps that have been taken until today to ensure the creation of a new front that prioritizes the security of Israel within the framework of a new Cold War that has been initiated in the Eastern Mediterranean by the U.S. The most important point that raises attention here is that with this bill, Washington encourages the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), Greece and Israel to cooperate more heavily in the fields of energy and military. While the only consideration for Turkey is the suggestion that F-35s should not be delivered if Turkey goes through with the purchase of S-400s. Upon a closer examination, the important headings included in the Menendez-Rubio bill can be summarized as follows:

The bill suggests lifting the prohibition of arms sales to GCASC that has been in place since 1987. The reasoning for this suggestion is that the existing Turkish forces in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) already carry weapons of U.S. origin and due to this reason, GCASC had to buy weapons from Russia. The rationality behind this reasoning can be questioned, or one can wonder the size of the weapons market in GCASC for Russia since seemingly it is prompting the U.S. to approach the situation with a perspective that is very biased towards the GCASC. Beyond all these ironic questions, Menendez and Rubio suggest that the U.S. provides two million dollars to GCASC for military education and training.

As it is known, the U.S. since 1987 has prohibited arms sales to the Greek Cypriot Administration in order to not impede on the unification efforts ongoing in the island. Since the existing talks overseen by the UN have not concluded, when the U.S. accepts this bill, the talks between the two populations in Cyprus will face a new and serious obstacle. Thus, aside from the stance of Ankara on the issue, which should not be hard to predict, the reactions to the bill that will be displayed by the international community and the United Kingdom, which is another guarantor in the island, are exceedingly important. This situation will show the sincerity of all parties on the subject of a solution in Cyprus. But after the Annan referendum, one might question the necessity of more tests of sincerity.

The Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 reminds a well-known phrase: “nothing new on the Western front.”

Another matter in the bill that is a cause of concern for Turkey is that the U.S. continues its attitude of ignoring Turkey’s and TRNC’s all maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean, and in referring to the natural gas reserves around the island supports the seismic surveys and drilling activities that GCASC has until now conducted through international hydrocarbon companies in the so-called exclusive economic zone (EEZ) declared by the GCASC. The proposal also highlights the importance of the East-Med Natural Gas Pipeline Project that is planned to be passed through Turkey’s territorial waters without permission from Ankara. It also encourages Greece on the subject of the Gas Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB) project, which is planned to be built between Greece and Bulgaria with the purpose of transferring Eastern Mediterranean natural gas to Europe through the Balkans.

In short, the bill proposes the creation of a new Eastern Mediterranean energy center in the region by the U.S. It is a fact that this center relies on the trilateral cooperation between Israel, Greece and GCASC, which have been declared as Washington’s essential allies in the Eastern Mediterranean within the context of energy and security. Another article in the bill proposes that the U.S. provides Greece with 3 million dollars of assistance through the trilateral axis of Israel-Greece-GCASC. The same bill does not refrain from expressing that the U.S. could immediately sanction Turkey within the framework of CAASTA due to Ankara’s purchase of S-400s.

The Menendez-Rubio bill does not only target Turkey’s and TRNC’s legitimate rights in the Eastern Mediterranean but also targets Russia.

The Menendez-Rubio bill does not only target Turkey’s and TRNC’s legitimate rights in the Eastern Mediterranean but also targets Russia. The purpose is the creation of a new and reinforced U.S. Mediterranean Strategy that will detect and report all attempts and activities against the interests of the U.S. in the Mediterranean that might be conducted by Russia or other potential actors, and the presentation of this strategy to the congress. If this bill is accepted, and Greece together with the GCASC agree to play the role bestowed on them by this proposal, the iron curtain of our time will descend on the Mediterranean.

The U.S. strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean

Russia, taking advantage of the power vacuum created in Syria by the Obama administration, began its military intervention in Syria in 2015 following a request from the Damascus regime. It soon became clear that the preservation of the Damascus regime was not the only purpose of Russia in Syria, and Kremlin had strengthened the military presence of the Russian military in the Eastern Mediterranean via new area denial capabilities (A2/AD). The U.S. also soon determined that Russian presence in the Eastern Mediterranean could pose a threat to the energy and security belt Washington intended to create in the region. Moscow brought the balances against the U.S. interests in the region into equilibrium through two main foundations by playing its cards right and at the same time avoiding excessive actions that may prompt the U.S. to increase its presence in the region: The first of these has been the Astana cooperation process between Iran, Turkey and Russia concerning Syria. And the second is the continuation of good relationships with countries such as Egypt and Israel that lie in the new Washington-supported Mediterranean belt.

Turkey is being pressured into abandoning its military and trade cooperation with Moscow through economic and military threats and via a psychological war.

Facing this new strategy focused on the Eastern Mediterranean developed by Moscow, Washington brought a series of military measures into action to avoid the erosion of U.S. hegemony in the Mediterranean. Through strengthening the sixth fleet, the U.S. increased the presence of its navy in the Mediterranean and led military exercises in the region via NATO. It also supported GCASC and Greece to conduct a series of commercial and military actions infringing on Turkey’s and TRNC’s legitimate rights in the Mediterranean. Ultimately the U.S. conducts its strategy of pressuring Russia, which it recognizes as a rival in the Mediterranean basin, through a plan which prioritizes pressuring countries in the region that cooperate with Moscow. As it is known, pressure is being applied on Iran through direct sanctions and by taking away the benefits of the 2015 nuclear agreement (if there were any) from Tehran. Turkey on the other hand is being pressured into abandoning its military and trade cooperation with Moscow through economic and military threats and via a psychological war conducted through supporting other countries and actors in the region.

The storm raging over the S-400s

But there are other reasons behind the pressure applied on Iran and Turkey by the U.S. that in the end have to do with the rivalry between Washington and Moscow. Iran is being pressured because its asymmetric power is a cause of concern for Israel and because of the obviousness of its powerless state. And if Turkey defends its territory with an air defense system such as the S-400, meaning that by becoming capable of defending its seas and airspace from potential attacks, the country will become powerful enough to prevent all developments infringing on the rights of Turkey and TRNC in the region. This in turn means that the cost-increasing effects of Turkey’s capabilities are the weak point of the United States’ three-legged anti-Russia new cold war strategy that relies on the Gulf-Europe-Eastern Mediterranean (Greece-Egypt-Libya-GCASC-Israel) trilateral cooperation. In short, Washington is applying pressure on Ankara due to the power the latter has and can have, and to prevent the geo-strategic weakness of its strategy from becoming evident.

Ankara has been providing the necessary responses to the technical reasons brought forward by the U.S. to stop the purchase of S-400’s for a long time. Within this context, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlut Cavusoglu has expressed many times that Turkey is not obtaining the S-400 air defense systems against its allies in NATO, but the purpose of Ankara is to address the country’s existing deficiencies in the matter of air defense, and that the concerns of NATO are being taken into account. Ankara has already brought forward many solution proposals within this framework. For example, one alternative suggests that Turkey deploy the S-400 missile defense systems only for the protection of Ankara and Istanbul, and deploy F-35s in the south, addressing Washington’s concerns of Russian systems gathering information on the F-35s. And in fact, this allegation of data gathering by the U.S. has already been refuted by Turkey.

The truth is that if Turkey does go through with the purchase of the S-400’s and deploys the missile defense systems in its territory, Turkey  will obtain an advantageous position with regards to the power balance in the Eastern Mediterranean.

As it will be remembered, Cavusoglu has already shared with the public the information that the F-35 flights conducted over Syria by Israel and the U.S. were not affected by the S-300 and S-400 systems deployed in Syria. Another proposal brought forward by Ankara suggests the creation of a joint research committee to address Washington’s worries concerning the S-400 systems. Similarly, Ankara informed Washington that the software to be used by the missile defense systems were to be developed by Turks. The truth is that if Turkey does go through with the purchase of the S-400’s and deploys the missile defense systems in its territory, the A2/AD area denial capabilities of Ankara will increase by orders of magnitude, leading to Turkey obtaining an advantageous position with regards to TRNC and the power balances in the Mediterranean. As it has been expressed in the German magazine Stern, as a result of the deployment of S-400’s on Turkish territory, the approval of Ankara will become a necessity for any activities conducted in the Eastern Mediterranean. And this is precisely the weak point of the United States’ Mediterranean strategy.

The US risking Turkey?

Washington has long dreamed of a belt that extends from the Gulf to the Mediterranean, and from there to Greece and Southern Europe. The support given to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, U.S. recognition of the annexation of the Golan Heights from Syria by Israel, the negative developments in Libya, the unconditional support given to the East-Med cooperation, expression of wishes towards the inclusion of GCASC in NATO, and lastly the introduction of the bill named “Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019” proposing to lift the prohibition of arms sales to GCASC to the U.S. Senate by U.S. senators Rubio and Menendez. All these recent developments indicate that the rivalry between the U.S. and Russia has reached a very serious dimension. The problem is that the U.S. is aware of the weaknesses of this belt, which it has worked loudly to build and support. While it trusts Israel fully, Egypt and Greece are not only comparatively weak actors but also very eager to develop their relationships with Russia economically. Lebanon and Libya are not fully won, and Qatar never forgot the embargo of the “glowing orb.” GCASC is not an actor that carries much weight militarily, and the only area it particularly shines in is raising tensions.

Just like the Rubio-Menendez proposals, the new doctrines of Trump may lead to Turkey behaving in the exact opposite of the desired manner due to their exclusionary nature. The U.S. has now put on its intimidating face and is acting as if it maintains a strategy lacking any weaknesses. But this mask failed to fully scare even Egypt. Egypt has already declared that it will not be a part of the “Arab NATO” that is of U.S. design. Greece, which is a member of the Mediterranean Natural Gas Forum, has already expressed that the position of Turkey in the Mediterranean cannot be ignored, albeit in a muted manner. In the end, Greece has other economic opportunities beyond East-Med which only stands to benefit Israel, and most of them go through Turkey.

Washington sees only Moscow when it looks at the Eastern Mediterranean and suffers from a strategic blindness.

When considered rationally, Turkey, which has a perfect geographical position, should not be ignored to ensure that the Mediterranean Gas Forum, which aims for European energy cooperation and security in the Mediterranean, can successfully be brought into life. The fact that the most advantageous paths for alternative natural gas pipelines going from the Mediterranean to Europe pass through Turkey cannot be denied. But the calculations of the U.S. regarding the geopolitics of the Mediterranean occur entirely in the political dimension, and due to this reason Washington only sees Moscow when it looks at the Eastern Mediterranean and suffers from a strategic blindness concerning any other matter.

For peace and stability in the Mediterranean, the knot in the Ankara-Washington relationship must be resolved, at least to some degree. The method with which this knot will be undone will undoubtedly affect not only U.S.-Turkey relationships but also relationships on the strategic level in the entire Eastern Mediterranean region and even beyond. Ultimately, the decision to solve this knot whether by postponing the purchase of the S-400s or going through with the purchase will be made by Ankara. And while this decision will be made by Ankara, Washington will also have to decide on whether it’s willing to risk losing Turkey or not, because the ones that are willing to descend the iron curtain on the Mediterranean are not only determining their allies and rivals but are also attempting to set the rules of the game. And after bringing the region into disarray and hurting regional actors economically, they distribute a few million dollars via divisive proposals. Turkey will not allow this new iron curtain to descend on itself, and will not be a part of the belt of weakness created by the U.S.

A new cold war was not a development Ankara wished for, nor did Ankara wish for one to begin in the Mediterranean, but if there must be one Turkey will define its own role: the stabilizer of balances. Ankara will build the necessary capabilities for this on its own. And in this process whoever loses Ankara politically will start this struggle on the Mediterranean front with a great handicap no matter how much noise they may make.

Regional and international actors have anxiously and cautiously followed Turkey’s increasing activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. More recently, the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus is particularly disturbed by the recent actions of Turkey in the region. Nicosia has made strong criticism towards Turkey and has threatened Ankara with freezing funds from the European Union. The Greek side has also called for regional and international alliances to put pressure on Turkey in order for the country to stop its activities in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The comments came after Turkey’s first oil-drilling vessel, Fatih, launched its deep-sea operations in the Eastern Mediterranean earlier this week. The Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus harshly criticized the move. The Greek Cypriot foreign ministry argued that Turkey’s drilling actions have been taking place in waters where Nicosia claims to have exclusive economic rights. The Greek Cypriot side also claims that Turkey’s activities are undermining the sovereignty of the country under international law. However, Turkey stresses that it has the right to search for natural gas in this area, as Turkey’s rights in these waters was accepted by a UN resolution. Turkey also argues that all its activities have been taking place in its exclusive economic zone.

Following the launch of Turkey’s drilling vessel activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Greek Cypriot administration tried to increase pressure by threatening to arrest the crew of Turkey’s drillship, Fatih. In response to the Greek Cypriot claims, the Turkish foreign ministry stated, “We will continue to protect our own rights and interests within our continental shelf, as well as those of the Turkish Cypriots.” Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu also stated, “We have already finished exploration activities and now Fatih will start drilling operations. We will soon send our second ship to the region.” These announcements prove that Turkey’s right in the Eastern Mediterranean is a red-line for Ankara and that the Turkish government will not retreat from its planned activities in the region, despite pressure from regional and international actors.

Turkey’s right in the Eastern Mediterranean is a red-line for Ankara and the Turkish government will not retreat from its planned activities in the region.

There are four main reasons why the Eastern Mediterranean is vital for Turkey. First of all, Turkey is a giant energy importer state and is dependent on other countries such as Russia and Iran in order to fulfill its energy needs. Ankara’s hydrocarbon imports reached to 45 billion USD in 2018, which is a serious pressure on the budget, as the Lira has weakened in comparison to last year. For this reason, it is crucial for Turkey to find its own natural resources in order to reduce dependency on foreign markets. With its huge proven reserves by other countries, the Eastern Mediterranean is a vital area for Turkey to explore oil and natural gas resources. Any discovery of these resources by Turkey will significantly contribute to Ankara’s future development plans. As the Turkish economy will continue to grow, the need for energy will also increase. Therefore, natural gas and oil resources in the Eastern Mediterranean are vital for Turkey’s growing population and energy demands.  

The second reason amounts to Turkey’s aspiration to become a major hub for energy transfer from the East to the West. With a number of completed projects in this sector, Turkey serves as a key transit route for hydrocarbon resources from the Middle Eastern and Asian markets to Europe. Most analysts argue that Turkey is the best option to transport oil and gas resources from the Eastern Mediterranean to European markets. However, geopolitical rivals such as Egypt, Israel, and Greece, are trying to undermine Turkey’s role in this sector. Therefore, it is Ankara’s aim to become the major actor for transporting energy resources from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe. While such developments will increase Turkey’s geo-strategic importance, it will also contribute to the growth of the Turkish economy.

Another reason why the Eastern Mediterranean is of significant importance to Turkey is related to its regional political rivals. Turkey’s policies in the Middle East have been facing confrontation from two significant actors in the region, namely Israel and Egypt. Both countries have been in competition with Turkey in various policy fields. The Eastern Mediterranean is among such venues where Turkey and its regional competitors have differing strategic calculations. Egypt and Israel, together with Greece and the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus, have been trying to isolate Turkey from political and economic developments in the Eastern Mediterranean by forming alliances and establishing formal institutions. In response to these activities, Turkey has been defiantly continuing its efforts to take part in the Eastern Mediterranean power struggle. While criticizing regional rivals diplomatically and emphasizing its determination to energy politics in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey is also engaging actively in exploration and military activities in the region.

Turkey is considering the Eastern Mediterranean not only in terms of hydrocarbon resources, but also as a strategic area, which can serve Ankara’s national security needs.

Finally, the Eastern Mediterranean is a region vitally important for Turkey in terms of national security. It has been the scene of military activities of many countries in the past years, particularly military exercises led by Egypt supported by countries such as Greece, the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus and Israel. On the other hand, it is observed that global political actors such as the U.S., France, Russia and China have increased their presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, Turkey is not only considering the E. Mediterranean in terms of hydrocarbon resources, but as a strategic area, which can serve Ankara’s national security needs. Turkey’s military activities in the Eastern Mediterranean is another proof of Ankara’s consideration of the region as a line of defense in the face of threats that may come from the south.

Turkey places strategic importance on the Eastern Mediterranean and considers the region as a red line in its foreign policy. Therefore, Ankara will not deter from its activities because of the threats and calls from the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus. Ankara will continue its exploration and drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean while fighting against regional and international actors that would hinder its interests in the region. Regional and international actors must remember the fact that the Eastern Mediterranean has been a Turkish inland sea for centuries and this historical fact will be at the center of Ankara’s future strategies towards the region.

The discovery of hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean during the last couple of years has reshuffled regional balances and rendered the region one of the critical centers for the world’s leading oil and gas companies. This new dynamic introduced many issues of debate among regional actors, including the limitation of maritime jurisdiction, and the extraction, processing and transportation of resources. While the majority of these issues are of particular concern to Turkey, a part of them directly target Turkey’s interests in the region. Therefore, it is not possible to consider Turkey’s regional activities without looking at these debates.

Shifting balances in the Eastern Mediterranean

The energy discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean kicked off with the Tamar gas field in Israel’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in 2009. The region gave the first big signals of its potential with the Leviathan field in 2010. This development was followed by the discoveries of the Aphrodite gas field of the southern coast of Cyprus in 2011 and the Zohr field in Egypt’s EEZ –the biggest gas field of the region– in 2015. The latest discovery in the region has been the hydrocarbon reserves found in February 2019 in Block 10 by the ExxonMobil and Qatar Petroleum partnership authorized by the Greek Cypriot Administration.

The maritime jurisdiction issue, which has been a serious matter of debate since the times before the discovery of reserves in the region, is still among the top agenda topics of the relevant countries. The first step in this respect was taken with the agreement signed by the Greek Cypriot Administration and Egypt for the limitation of maritime jurisdiction in 2003. This agreement was followed by the Greek Cyprus-Lebanon agreement in 2007 and the Greek Cyprus-Israel agreement in 2010. Turkey, however, refused to accept all these agreements due to its arguments based on international law.

According to Articles No 59 and 83 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in cases where a conflict arises in jurisdiction, the delimitation of the continental shelf between states is required to be determined by agreements based on equity. But, in the present situation, Turkey is not allowed to have a say in agreements despite being an actor affected by them. Consequently, for Turkey, this issue preserves its priority among the problems to be resolved.

The East-Med Project corresponds only to 2 percent of the annual gas consumption in Europe. Thus, the project will not have a significant role in meeting the gas need of Europe.

Another subject that is on the agenda for the region is the issue of transporting the gas extracted in the region. So far, many alternatives to transport the extracted gas have been tabled. Regional states including Greece, the Greek Cypriot Administration, Israel, Egypt and Lebanon signed various symbolic pipeline agreements. Eventually, the East-Med Pipeline Project, which includes Israel, the Greek Cypriot Administration, Greece and Italy, has been opted for. This pipeline will start from Israel and connect resources to Europe via Greek Cyprus, Greece and Italy. The project is estimated to cost 7 billion dollars; but since the details of the project have not been announced, it is thought that these numbers are too optimistic and unrealistic. With this project, it is planned to transport 10 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe annually. This amount only corresponds to 2 percent of the annual gas consumption in Europe. So, unlike the claims, the East-Med Project will not have such a significant role in meeting the gas need of Europe. On the other hand, the route that aims to transport Israeli gas via Turkey is much more advantageous in terms of reliability and cost-effectiveness. But the attempts to exclude Turkey from this equation boosts support for the East-Med Project.

Another issue that is highly discussed in the context of the energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean is the cooperation attempts for the processing of the reserves in the region. The most notable attempt in this regard has been the meeting held in Cairo in January 2019. With the agreement signed during this meeting, the Greek Cypriot Administration, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Palestine and Egypt established the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. The parties argue that the forum was formed to share and benefit the Eastern Mediterranean gas and oil reserves in the best possible way. It is also claimed that the forum aims to establish a regional gas market that will serve the interests of its members by enabling the supply-demand balance and security. But the absence of Turkey, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Lebanon and Libya despite being among the leading actors of the region shows that the forum is not an inclusive cooperation initiative. Considered with all the other developments, this initiative appears as the latest version of the attempts to hamper Turkey being an active player in the region.

Turkey’s exploration efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean

Turkey took its first major step to join the energy search in the region in 2007, when the General Directorate of Petroleum Affairs authorized the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) in four fields by giving a favorable opinion on its authorization and exploration requests. This development is of critical importance since it rendered Turkey an active agent in the field. Also, the fact that these fields contain a part of the space claimed by the Greek Cypriot Administration demonstrates that Turkey de-facto started drawing the borders of its own continental shelf and exclusive economic zone.

Despite being leading actors of the region, the absence of Turkey, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Lebanon and Libya from the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, shows that it is not an inclusive cooperation initiative.

Another significant step by Turkey came in 2011. On 21 September 2011, Turkey and the TRNC signed an agreement on continental shelf limitation, which has been the first official agreement for the determination of maritime jurisdiction. With this agreement, the TRNC also authorized TPAO to search and extract oil in the fields stated in the agreement annex. Following this development, Turkish flagged Piri Reis exploration vessel kicked off its oil and gas search efforts in the authorized fields.

After this, Turkey maintained its energy quest by protecting its rights in the Eastern Mediterranean and entered a critical period that witnessed a series of important developments in 2018. In February 2018, Italian company Eni attempted to conduct exploration works in Block 3, one of the blocks where TPAO is authorized by the TRNC. Upon that, Turkey declared that it did not recognize these initiatives. But as the opposite side did not step back, Turkey prevented the advance of the Saipem 2000 vessel owned by Eni in the region as a continuation of its policy on the grounds that the vessel’s exploration activities in the field violate international law.

Turkey continues to prevent initiatives violating international law and maintains its energy quest by protecting its rights in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Turkey is preventing the initiatives that it argues to violate international law in the Eastern Mediterranean while continuing its endeavors to demand its rights in the region. One of the most apparent signs of this endeavor is the start of seismic exploration vessel Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa’s exploration works in the Güzelyurt Research Coast in the Eastern Mediterranean in October 2018. However, Turkey confronted yet another hampering attempt in the region when the vessel was harassed by a Greek frigate. Displaying a determined attitude against this move, Turkey expressed that it does not wish to see or cause any tension in the region but such initiatives will not refrain the country from using its rights based on international law.

Turkey has consolidated this rhetoric with its new and considerable steps. A short while after this incident, in late October, Turkey’s first drill ship Fatih kicked off its drilling works in Alanya-1 well, bringing Turkey one step closer to the energy hydrocarbon reserves in the region. More, in order to receive support over the course of these initiatives, TPAO made agreements with U.S.-based Schlumberger, one of the world’s biggest oil field service companies, and the U.S.-based Rowan Companies for platform support. In doing so, the first step was taken in paving the way for international cooperation in Turkey’s activities.

Turkey’s Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa vessel was attacked by a Greek frigate. Turkey expressed that it does not want to cause any tension in the region, but stated that such initiatives will not refrain the country from using its rights based on international law.

And lately, Turkey has announced that its new drill ship Yavuz will soon start operating in order to carry the country’s determined exploration activities one step further. This announcement came shortly after ExxonMobil announced that it discovered natural gas in Block 10 offshore Cyprus, which shows that the country will continue demanding its rights and assert its presence in the region despite all the efforts to undermine it.

The Eastern Mediterranean equation

Since the early 2000s, Turkey has experienced many ups and downs in its energy fight in the Eastern Mediterranean. Despite all, Turkey has always acted in accordance with its legal and de-facto rights throughout the process. As the present situation is viewed in light of the latest developments, Turkey is expressing at every opportunity that it will not allow the usurpation of its rights in the region by predicating its arguments on legal grounds. Meanwhile, with its fast-paced drilling activities, the country continues to show its presence in the region despite all hampering attempts.