Nowadays, European politicians continue to stress the importance of Turkey’s economic stability for their states, while urging their governments to find ways to support Turkey – in any case if Turkey needs to seek financial support from Europe. But more interestingly, the current leader of the Social Democrats in Germany (SPD), Andrea Nahles, who is not an MP in the German Bundestag, recently pointed to this issue, while many major German politicians and circles made it clear that they do not consider any current proposals with regard to Turkey. Subsequent to statements made by Nahles, interestingly, the former chairman of the SPD and Germany’s former Foreign Minister (2017-2018), Sigmar Gabriel, supported Nahles by stating, “Turkey is our NATO partner. It is within our own interest to have an economically stable Turkey without monetary turbulence.”

The main point about Gabriel’s interview, though, was about a strange prophecy. By warning that Europe would pay the price if Turkey was to become destabilized by sanctions imposed by the Trump administration, Gabriel also added that if Europe does not do everything to keep Turkey a part of the West, “nationalistic forces” in Turkey could “reach for the atom bomb, as in Iran and North Korea, to make themselves unassailable.”

Well, first of all, it has to be mentioned that even though Gabriel acted as the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs for approximately 14 months, it was ultimately a good choice not to allow Gabriel to continue his job as foreign minister – not only because of his statements regarding the party’s previous Chancellor candidate and SPD chairman Martin Schulz, whom he attacked with harsh and personal words, but also because of his strange elaborations and positions regarding Turkey’s alleged ambitions.

As one remembers, when Gabriel was in office not so long ago, relations between Turkey and Germany had reached a historical low point. Today it seems that Gabriel is still continuing to make meaningless – and even populist – comparisons by using improper words, similar to previous statements made in the past.

However, foreign policy requires a thoughtful preference of words and a fair-minded vision regarding the continuation of long-lasting relations. Unfortunately, relations between Turkey and Germany suffered heavy turbulences due to several stances and statements during Gabriel’s era as minister – even though some mutual steps aimed to deescalate relations had been initiated towards the end of his period. Nevertheless, it was obvious that during that period the German minister personalized most disagreements between the two countries by making use of non-acceptable statements; which were particularly non-compliant from a social-democratic point of view.

But to come back to his recent prediction or “prophecy” that Turkey’s “nationalistic forces” will reach for a nuclear weapon unless Europeans don’t keep Turkey close to themselves. It’s interesting that Gabriel does not explain who he refers to when he says “nationalistic forces.” It would be quite interesting to know whether he’s addressing the current government or other – maybe Kemalist, secularist or alleged social-democratic/leftist – circles? Despite this vagueness, Gabriel made a fatal mistake by comparing a democratic state, which became a NATO member in 1952 – even before Germany – with non-democratic and dictatorial regimes. More, Gabriel’s words resemble some biased German media outlets, which brought the topic of Turkey’s alleged “nuclear weapon ambitions” four years ago with baseless arguments.

Some conservative foreign policy politicians recently played down Gabriel’s accusations. According to them, while Gabriel exaggerated the situation, he was only emphasizing “Turkey’s importance for Europe.” In addition, some media commentators implied that even if experienced politicians such as Gabriel state such extreme prophecies or speculations, these would not be that wrong. Thus, Gabriel’s comments unfortunately show what unreasonable statements might cause in politics.

The former foreign minister made these statements at a time when some German media outlets and conservative – and nationalist – circles are biased to promote a potential German-made nuclear weapon. Only a couple of weeks ago, some circles close to the current CDU/CSU-SPD coalition addressed this issue by supporting the idea of a “German nuclear weapon.” No leading political figure has given a stance or statement in regards to this proposal. However, now, Gabriel indirectly accuses Turkey of wanting to allegedly reach a nuclear weapon – even though there has not been any discourse in Turkey regarding this topic.

It has to be addressed once again that Turkey is a country that attaches great important to the issue of arms control and disarmament. It is also party to all relevant international treaties and conventions, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – which Germany is also party to. However, as addressed previously, some German voices have recently been trying step-by-step to persuade the public towards a likely dangerous direction. Thus, it is irrational to claim that Turkey is going towards this direction, without any mention of the actual real discussions that are occurring in Germany.

Turkey will most likely appreciate Gabriel’s intention to stand on Turkey’s side in the current dispute with the U.S. However, he should definitely correct his considerations and “prophecies” in terms of Turkey’s alleged future nuclear ambitions. Nevertheless, the decision made by SPD leaders, who did not select Gabriel as the current foreign minister in March of this year, seems to be a wise one.

One of Germany’s largest Sunday newspapers, Welt am Sonntag, preferred a very controversial front-page headline on Sunday, July 29. With the question “Do We Need the Bomb?” it kick-started a topic which is actually on the agenda of the country’s strategic circles. The main argument in those circles, which are in favor of a rather independent foreign and security policy from its long-lasting transatlantic ally, the United States, addresses President Donald Trump’s aggressive rhetoric regarding Berlin’s foreign policy establishment and NATO in general. This perception argues that the American stance represents a shift in transatlantic relations. Thus, according to some respected voices who are close to the German government, new German nuclear options may be taken into consideration.

As the front page of the Welt newspaper reveals, the deliberately preferred language and the intimation in favor of a nuclear German military support this perception. With no surprise, there is no outrage in German media –despite some leftist voices who reject the nuclear option– or a reaction similar to the one in 2014, when the same newspaper published an article accusing Turkey. That time, Die Welt daily had claimed that Turkey is seeking to acquire enriched uranium and that Turks are working to build a nuclear weapon with instruction from President Erdogan.

Subsequent to this, Turkey denied the accusation by stressing that it doesn’t have the intention or technology, such as a nuclear research reactor or a uranium enrichment program, for the production of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the Turkish government had stressed that the country attaches great importance to issues of arms control and disarmament by stating that the country is a party to all relevant international treaties and conventions including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Without going into detail of the Welt newspaper’s hypocritical attitude in regards to Turkey (2014) compared to Germany (recently, 2018), by taking a neutral or even supporting position with regard to the latter’s potential nuclear objectives, it has to be mentioned that it’s quite striking that some German media and academic circles have the intention to persuade the German public for the need of a potential “German nuclear weapon” – which is, according to the NPT, actually forbidden.

It’s known that the first German Chancellor following World War II, Christian Democrat (CDU) Konrad Adenauer, had made some efforts to make Germany a nuclear power (I>;II). However, he had not been successful due to the rejection by France’s Charles de Gaulle, who wanted –and was successful– to develop a French atomic bomb on its own. Following this period, Germany became part of the NPT in 1968 and started being protected under the so-called U.S.’ nuclear umbrella. It’s also known that in this context Germany even received American nuclear weapons on German soil.

However, some circles recently started a debate about whether Germany should be a nuclear power on its own. For instance, Professor Hacke emphasizes that “Germany, as a new democratic nuclear power, would strengthen the security of the West” by stating that “National defense on the basis of a nuclear deterrent must be given priority in light of new transatlantic uncertainties and potential confrontations.” He also adds that to count on a European solution to materialize is “illusory” due to the fact that “national interests are too different.” On the other hand, the former German ambassador to the U.S., Wolfgang Ischinger, stated in response to Hacke’s controversial article that “If Germany was to relinquish its status as a non-nuclear power, what would prevent Turkey or Poland, for example, from following suit?” Well, according to Ischinger’s statement, it seems that it would not be a problem if Germany would get the status as a nuclear power unless countries like Turkey or Poland would also prefer the same potential national path as Germany would.

That the debate about Germany’s potential aim to have its own nuclear weapon coincides with the nationalist trend in the country’s political discourse also points out an interesting and deteriorating path. At a time where the far-right AfD has become the second strongest party according to recent polls, both discussions about Germany’s potential nuclear ambitions and proposals by CDU circles to think about the re-establishment of the national military service/conscription, may underpin the already nationalist discourse and play into the hands of the AfD.

Nevertheless, it’s still a positive aspect that no political party –officially– advocates establishing a German nuclear weapon. Due to this fact, there are also no surveys concerning the German citizens’ actual positions with regard to “nationalizing Germany’s nuclear deterrence power.” However, on social media, some users stress the need to talk about at least other options other than being dependent on the U.S. And on the other hand, some people address the fact that even under President Trump, Germany will remain under the nuclear umbrella. Furthermore, the discussion is described as “needlessly alarmist” which underpins the fact that destroying the NPT would bring nothing. Interestingly, particularly non-Germans also stressed the potential danger in the long-run if Germany acquires an atomic bomb on its own.

What does the recent atomic bomb debate in Germany show us?

First, it’s very striking that some German media outlets and conservative –and nationalist– circles are biased to promote a German-made nuclear weapon. Although a study by the research department of the German parliament, Bundestag, stated that it would not be legally possible to build their own nuclear weapons, it also stressed that there wouldn’t be any legal obstacles to co-finance another country’s, for instance, France’s, nuclear weapons in exchange of their protection. But despite this legal-based and political discourse, it seems a bit hypocritical how some media and political circles address this issue while preferring completely different attitudes and –very aggressive– double standards regarding other country’s potential and less-likely preferences.

Second, some militarist circles in Germany –even outside the AfD– utilize President Trump’s so-called aggressive rhetoric and stance towards Germany in order to legitimize some disputed topics, which have been a taboo in German society. This striking bias will most likely include even other controversial issues in the near future.

Lastly, even though there is a lack of surveys concerning a national nuclear option for Germany’s military, one might guess that the majority of German society would continue to reject this kind of nuclear ambition. In addition, it’s obvious that similar to the rejection of increasing military spending, most Germans would stand against a German-made or funded nuclear weapon, too. But this does not change the fact that there are some circles in the direction of legitimizing this kind of a dangerous aspiration.

President Trump delivered a major campaign promise by pulling out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and left everyone wondering what the new Iran policy would be. Last week, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo attempted to answer that question with a major policy speech at the Heritage Foundation. Pompeo criticized the JCPOA for its “fatal flaws,” including the sunset provisions, weak inspection and verification mechanisms, failure to address Iran’s ballistic and cruise missiles, and inadvertently providing finance for Iran’s destabilizing activities in the Middle East.

The new Iran strategy, he announced, would impose “unprecedented financial pressure,” deter “Iranian aggression” in the region, and advocate for the Iranian people by standing with them against the regime. The administration, he declared, would be open to a completely new deal that would definitively guarantee Iran not to have nuclear weapons and gives up on its “malign” activities in the Middle East.

The newly announced policy, which at times came quite close to calling for a regime change in Tehran, essentially promises a return to a policy of pressure and isolation of Iran. The kind of sweeping change in behavior it asks of Tehran is almost impossible for it would essentially require the regime to drop its main claims to legitimacy in the region. This is why those who argue that Pompeo’s speech essentially calls for a regime change have a point.

Regardless, we are entering a period of heightened tensions in the region especially if the U.S. does not contend itself with sanctions alone but undertakes a serious effort to push back against Iranian proxies throughout the region. In all likelihood, Iran would try to play the long game by resisting the financial pressures while trying to create frictions between the U.S. and its European and regional allies.

The new Iran strategy seeks to mount an unprecedented pressure campaign to bring the regime to its knees. It does point to a way out but it sounds a lot like the U.S. is seeking the regime’s total surrender or economic collapse. The U.S. will need both its European and regional allies to implement the kind of overwhelming pressure it promises. The Europeans will be a lot less willing than the last time in coordinating a new round of sanctions. Regional allies the U.S. is counting on will be either ineffective or unwilling to confront Iran and its proxies in the region.

Furthermore, it is highly doubtful whether the U.S. can bring Russia and China on board, as their cooperation in the JCPOA was crucially important. The administration’s unilateral declaration of a new Iran policy carries all the risks and deficiencies associated with acting alone and without a strategy to bring about an international coalition supporting it. Non-European powers will be less than willing to isolate Iran or requiring a high price tag to cooperate with the U.S., which will be hard pressed to convince others that it will stick to its word this time round.

If the Trump administration does not succeed in forging a broad coalition willing to isolate Iran, a handful of European allies and Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt in the region, as part of an anti-Iran front, will only support its new Iran strategy. Each of these allies will have a different priority vis-a-vis Iran, which will be difficult to reconcile and produce an effective policy.

Part of the problem with Obama’s Iran policy was that it lacked a buy in from “traditional” regional allies and failed to assuage their concerns. Now, the Trump administration seems to side with them in a big way, but without a comprehensive policy that addresses their concerns and brings Iran to the negotiating table. The Trump administration’s new Iran strategy promises to bring the regime to its knees through sanctions and isolation but lacks a broad international coalition determined to achieve it. 

President Trump announced the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Iran Nuclear Deal. This brief will shed light on several legal implications arising from this historic decision by the Trump administration. First, while the Iran Nuclear Deal connotes an international agreement signed by six states and the Islamic Republic Iran, it does not have the same legal features as an international agreement does under international law. It is a mere political commitment, as opposed to a legally binding international agreement. Former President Barack Obama made considerable efforts to strike this deal. However, he followed the procedure to adopt the deal as an executive agreement, rather than a treaty passed by the Senate. Therefore, this facilitated his successor to withdraw from the agreement, specifically at the international level. Nevertheless, the Trump administration would not have been legally bound to continue with the deal, even if it had been adopted as a treaty.

So, how does the current legislation define the scope of the sanctions regime? Section 3 of the presidential memorandum signed on May 8 provides a to-do-list for the State Department and Treasury Department. According to this section, several executive orders will be “re-issued,” and individuals on the sanction lists will be “re-listed.” The government will re-register more persons and entities on the list of Specifically Designated Nationals (SDN), and this will require more enforcement effort. It will be more likely that a company, whether in the U.S. or overseas, appears on the radar unless they cut their commercial relations with Iran. These increased enforcement efforts can result in more cases that are brought against entities, banks, and companies.

The direct effect against Iranian nationals and entities in the U.S. is not anticipated to be much, since the withdrawal decision was not a surprise for them. They can move all of their assets from U.S. jurisdiction, limiting the territorial effect of the decision. However, the adverse effect will be dramatic for Europe, since U.S. enforcement authorities are not reluctant to exercise their jurisdiction over individuals and entities overseas. The withdrawal decision allows them no option but to cut off their commercial relations with Iran. The memorandum issued on May 8 explicitly instructed the State and Treasury Department “to [prepare the] guidance necessary to educate United States and non-United States business communities on the scope of the prohibited and sanctionable activity.” Hence, the government will make additional efforts to assist business communities around the world to adapt to the changes.

While U.S. authorities will attempt to implement a detailed plan to revive the sanctions against Iran, it is not clear how this will produce far-reaching effects on non-U.S. business. For instance, the high amount of fines will not only jeopardize business, but also create additional political conflict between European countries and the U.S. One notable example was the fine imposed against BNP Paribas in 2014. The amount of the fine did not only harm the French financial system, it caused tension between former presidents Obama and François Hollande. If the scope of the sanctions will be wide, there is much more possibility that this kind of conflict will occur again between Europe and the U.S. If individuals attempt to circumvent the sanction rules by committing other ‘crimes’ under U.S. law, such as conspiring to defraud the U.S., or bank fraud, they are likely to sit as defendants in a criminal trial.

The Iran Deal plays a particular role for Europe, and the trade between Iran and the EU considerably increased after signing the deal in 2015. The efforts made by European leaders, namely President Emmanuel Macron and Chancellor Angela Merkel, stem from interest in their commercial ties with Iran. These efforts include the meetings held in Washington D.C. to convince President Trump to save the deal. On 8 May 2018, European leaders promptly reacted to the decision made by President Trump. President Macron underlined the significant interest in preserving the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In a similar vein, German Foreign Minister pointed out the risk of jeopardizing the long-term relations between Europe and the U.S. Foreign Minister of the U.K., Boris Johnson, expressed his regrets of this decision. A week after the decision of May 8, several European politicians met the Foreign Minister of Iran in order to devise an effective plan. For instance, Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the EU, expressed their willingness to carry out determined work to keep the commitments of the deal.

From a legal point of view, the withdrawal decision does not force any other parties to quit, but the abovementioned extraterritoriality will hamper the ability of others to comply with the deal in practice. For this reason, the European Union plans to use other means to keep the deal alive. For instance, the EU might impose the notorious “blocking regulations.” These regulations, which were adopted in 1996, are intended to protect European companies from the “extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country.” In the past, it was considered effective against the extraterritorial sanctions imposed against Cuba by the U.S.

Another option could be the change of currency. EU members could carry on their trade with Iran by using the Euro, so that U.S. authorities will be less likely to exercise their jurisdiction over these transactions. The rationale behind the extraterritorial application of the sanction regime is that U.S. authorities need to establish the link between an extraterritorial transaction and territory of the U.S., and, once a transaction is made in U.S. dollars, it is sufficient for the U.S. government to exercise its jurisdiction based on this link. The single fact that a bank processes U.S. dollar transactions means that this bank is on the radar of U.S. enforcement authorities, as observed in the case of PNB Paribas. If this bank fails to comply with the sanction regime as part of the domestic law of the U.S., authorities will impose a fine on this bank. In order to mitigate the loss and escape from U.S. jurisdiction, the change of currency offers a useful alternative for the EU, albeit the business between these countries is unlikely to take any legal or financial risk. Similarly, the EU can take the Indian investments in Iran, which are made in the currency of Indian rupee.

Moreover, as the spokesman of the French government suggested, the EU could challenge this withdrawal decision at the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Unit by arguing it would adversely affect the trade between WTO members. In this case, the EU could attempt to resolve this issue as a trade dispute. Although they could make reasonable arguments before the WTO, a ruling from a panel may not produce an effect powerful enough to force the Trump administration to reconsider the future of the Iran deal.

The U.S. decision will undoubtedly affect Turkey as a major trade partner of Iran. Similar to the EU, this decision can decrease the trade volume between the two countries. Turkish politicians read the situation from the same page, and Turkey is likely to join the resistance against the U.S. decision. From a legal point of view, due to the uncertainty of a criminal trial brought against two Turkish citizens, namely Reza Zarrab and Hakan Atilla, Turkey will act cautiously in their commercial ties with Iran, at least in the early stage of re-instituting sanctions against Iran.

It is most likely that these possible actions within international law are largely ignored by the Trump administration. In his speech, he did not explicitly refer to any issues arising from international law. For example, the future of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 remained unaddressed. While the Trump administration’s decision may cause increased conflict with Europe, the disregard for the international community’s interests and laws was not a complete surprise for the international community, and neither was the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal.

President Trump is widely expected to walk away from the Iran nuclear deal by refusing to issue a sanctions waiver this week. One of Trump’s central attacks on the Obama administration has been the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) itself on grounds that it gave Iran billions of dollars that failed to prevent Iran from going down the nuclear path. Undoing the most important foreign policy piece of the Obama legacy is obviously irresistible for President Trump, who has had to begrudgingly certify that Iran was in compliance with the agreement. The President’s strong critique of the nuclear deal is now coupled with the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s “intelligence coup” last week that seems to give Trump further political cover, though it is doubtful he really needed it. Should the President pull the U.S. out of the nuclear deal, it is unclear what will replace it, and perhaps more importantly, what U.S. policy towards Iran will be.

Candidate Obama had made the headlines when he suggested he would talk to Iran without preconditions in the 2008 presidential campaign. He sought a nuclear agreement with Iran that would ultimately lead to a historic rapprochement with the U.S. Obama suggested that Iran had a rightful place in the region and would need to “share” the region with Saudi Arabia among others, signaling the regional accommodation of Iran.

Although the Obama administration constantly argued that they were focused only on the nuclear deal, it was clear to everyone that it would have broader strategic and political implications. Nevertheless, Obama insisted on the narrow focus of the nuclear deal in an effort to avoid confronting Iran in the region, which could ultimately jeopardize the deal. The regional accommodation in return for the nuke deal policy has been partly responsible for the expansion of Iran’s strategic influence in the region. At the same time, the deal arguably prevented a potential military operation against Iran’s nuclear facilities, which could have led to a regional confrontation.

President Trump has repeatedly attacked the Iran deal as an “insane” one and suggested its renegotiation but the outlines of a new approach are missing. The Obama administration had spent months to bring Europeans, Russia and China on board for imposing sanctions on Iran but the Trump administration has so far contended itself with strong rhetorical attacks on the deal without providing a roadmap or explaining its goals. Trump has indicated he might be open to a “better deal” under pressure from European allies but there is no serious diplomatic effort to build a front against Iran. Undermining the deal seems to be the sole focus at the moment. Ripping up the nuclear deal may not lead to an immediate military confrontation given President Trump’s non-interventionist streak despite his harsh rhetoric and threats.

The U.S. pullout of the nuclear deal will certainly introduce tensions into a region that is already a sea of uncertainty and unpredictability. Trump’s domestic agenda’s nationalist and isolationist tendency would probably preclude a regime change policy toward Iran. Trump is unlikely to seek regime change and will be unwilling to push back against the Iran militarily to avoid yet another costly war in the region. The president may contend himself with undoing the nuclear deal without replacing it with another deal or another comprehensive Iran policy.

A new Iran policy would need to have a theory of the case addressing Iran’s regional role and its relations with the U.S. Obama’s Iran policy saw a legitimate role for Iran in the region and used the nuke deal for a future normalization of ties. It is not clear if Trump has such a theory of the case and whether he wants to devise a new Iran policy beyond undoing the nuclear deal. Reversing the deal may well result in catastrophe but it will more likely lead to a tit-for-tat in the region where the administration will be able to claim that it is rolling back Iran. That may prove to be the new status quo.

During her time at the UN General Assembly, British Prime Minister Theresa May urged for UN reform.

The Prime Minister threatened to hold back 30 percent of her country’s UN contributions unless the world body undertakes relevant reform.

“If this system that we have created is found to no longer be capable of meeting the challenges of our time, then there will be a crisis of faith in multilateralism and global cooperation that will damage the interests of our peoples,” May said before the General Assembly in New York.

The UK is the second largest UN funder and May stated that the withheld funds will be dispersed “only to those parts of the UN that achieve sufficient results.”

“Despite our best efforts, we are not succeeding. We must do more,” she said, urging for reform.

May praised the UN-centric international system, calling it “the amplifying force that allows countries to cooperate and live up to these standards in words, spirit and deed.”

However, in pointing out its shortcomings, May pointed her finger to Russia when she called out a Security Council member who she said has used its veto power as many times in the past five years as during the second half of the Cold War.

“In so doing, they have prevented action against a despicable regime that has murdered its people with chemical weapons,” she said. “As a result, in Syria, the United Nations has been blocked.”

No, Theresa

During her stay at New York, Theresa May also raised the issue of Iran’s nuclear weapon program with President Trump.

The US President refused to share with world leaders his final decision on whether to scrap an international agreement made with Iran on its nuclear program, Rex Tillerson told reporters on Wednesday.

When asked by British PM to share his decision on the deal with Tehran, the US President accordingly “said no.”

Secretary Tillerson looked surprised when a reporter informed him that the President had already told the press that he had arrived at a final decision, signaling the disconnect between the head of state and a top diplomat – a problem the Trump administration has faced since the beginning of the President’s tenure.

“I didn’t know he was going to say he made a decision,” Tillerson said. “I knew he had, but I didn’t known he was going to say he had.”

Tillerson held the press briefing following a meeting with the parties to the deal, known officially as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Secretary Tillerson further conceded that reports from the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “continue to confirm that Iran is in technical compliance with the agreement.”

He added that however in the broader context, “the aspirations” of the deal had not been met.

During his first UN address as President, Trump unleashed a stern rebuke of Iran, calling it a “rogue regime” and that the nuclear deal was “an embarrassment to the United States.”

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani retaliated during his address at the General Assembly on Wednesday by calling Trump a “rogue newcomer to the world of politics,” without naming him.