After Turkey and the Syrian opposition launched Operation Peace Spring against the PKK/YPG terror group to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity and address Turkey’s national security concerns, many states have taken steps against Turkey. The main tool used was sanctions against the Turkish government. At the time of writing, Czechia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway have imposed arms embargoes on Turkey. Additionally, the Trump administration announced a set of sanctions against Turkey including new tariffs and the targeting of Turkish officials, with possible sanctions from the US Congress as well. The absurdity of all of these sanctions is that Turkey is ready to accept any kind of sanction as the cost of inaction would be of much higher. The sanctions only weaken NATO and pushes Turkey away from the western alliance.

Turkey did not start this operation hoping that the Trump administration would greenlight it. This operation was inevitable. Northeast Syria was heading towards becoming a PKK statelet and a long-term threat to Turkey’s national security and territorial integrity. Diplomatic attempts by Ankara to find a joint solution with Washington failed as the American side have not acknowledged the most important concerns of Turkey and CENTCOM torpedoed any agreements from happening.

For Turkey, the YPG presence in northeast Syria poses a threat to Turkey through their possible cross-border attacks. In this manner, the security mechanism as the US side called it could address these concerns but actually this was the less important concern of Turkey. The oft repeated sentence that the US side “understands Turkey’s legitimate security concerns” was just not true. The US has not understood its longtime ally at all. Turkey wants to prevent the establishment of a PKK communist state along its southern borders at all costs. Turkey looks to the situation in Syria from a geopolitical standpoint of view and knows that the situation in Syria would harm Syria’s territorial integrity and pose a serious threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity in the long run, opening the gates for endless wars and chaos in the already chaotic Middle East.

A second concern of Turkey is related to the situation of the Syrian refugees, which is heavily underestimated by the west. The rise in hate speech, social tensions, economic costs and the political environment in Turkey has meant that Turkey can no longer carry this burden anymore, but Turkey has found itself in a deadlock. Syrian refugees will not return to areas held by the regime or the YPG, the EU will not allow refugees to cross into Europe, and the international community is not providing enough support to Turkey for hosting such a large refugee population. Lastly, the situation in Idlib could generate a further two million more refugees. A new inflow of refugees into Turkey would destabilize one of the last islands of stability in the Middle East. Turkey had no other choice but to establish a safe-zone in Syria.

Many other costs could have emerged if Turkey would not have intervened. In order not to surpass the limits of this article, I will finish with a last danger. The PKK/YPG is  indoctrinating a new generation in northeast Syria with hatred against Turkey, and like Daesh (ISIS) indoctrination in the region, would create a long term security threat for Turkey as well. Seeing the costs that Turkey could face by not intervening in Syria, attempts by other states to impose sanctions against Turkey are useless and won’t change Turkish opinion at all. These same governments who have not imposed any sanctions against Saudi Arabia over Yemen are only satisfying themselves by doing so.

Today, in the eyes of U.S. and most European countries, Putin’s Russia is more interventionist, aggressive and expansionist which has allegedly been the case in Georgia, Crimea, Ukraine, Syria and once again Afghanistan. While the Russian presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and especially across Southeast Europe provoked the political and military concerns of western allies, Ankara’s decision to purchase Russian military technology triggered even greater pessimism and a new round of fears at NATO. However, despite Turkey being key to the defense of NATO’s southeastern flank, the same kind of fear and concerns have long existed in Ankara subjected to many negative experiences from its NATO allies.

Nevertheless, even though Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952 and has contributed to the NATO alliance in many respects, such as storing American nuclear weapons in its İncirlik Base for many years, as well as hosting NATO’s Missile Defense Radar at a military base in Kürecik, it is obvious that Ankara will be facing numerous challenges in the next few years as a result of the decision to procure S-400s.

On the other hand, Ankara was already aware of the likely scenarios and possible negative outcomes of its choice to purchase a strategic weapon system from Russia, even if it is for “defense purposes”. In this respect, the cost of Turkey’s preference to buy the “best all-around” missile defense system will include both “direct” and “indirect” sanctions. The probable costs that Ankara will bear from the acquisition of Russian advanced weapon capabilities can be classified under five headings:

1. Shift in Washington’s attitude towards Ankara

Whether implicitly or explicitly, the first type of sanction will presumably be the significant changes in Washington’s political, economic, military and diplomatic attitudes towards Turkey’s foreign, security and defense interests. The American stance might be more challenging for Ankara on a wide range of topics such as: the PKK/PYD/YPG, the Syrian Civil War, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean and Cyprus issue, Palestine, refugees, and the currency crisis among other topics. From Washington’s perspective, the purpose would be to show that anyone – even a NATO ally – who partners or cooperates with “America’s adversary” (namely a “strategic rival”) will have to pay the price. Therefore, the price expected to be paid by Turkey will not only be in military measures, rather it will be across a broad landscape of issues that may lead to serious consequences. Such as diminishing Ankara’s political and legal position in growing regional disputes. For example, the rising tension because of natural gas discoveries in the region.

2. Formal Sanctions

The second cost will appear after imposing sanctions on Turkey under Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) (Public Law 115-44). While Section 235 of CAATSA lists 12 sanctions, the President can impose five or more of the sanctions described in the section. Additionally, the president can delay the imposition of the sanctions up to 180 days. Accordingly, if Trump would like to take a softer approach on Turkey then he can select five sanctions from the list which are the least costly and least harmful ones. Trump can also ask for flexibility in order to suspend the imposition of sanctions for a couple of months.

3. Cancellation of the delivery of F-35 Fighters

The third sanction is canceling the delivery of 100 F-35 fighters to Turkey. Some allege that Turkey’s military strength would be severely weakened in the absence of a fifth-generation multirole fighter that provides a greater performance on today’s battlefields with its high levels of survivability, awareness, readiness and effectiveness. In other words, it is assumed that a Turkish Air Force without F-35s in its inventory will not be able to achieve full operational capability. Besides, there are also other probable negative scenarios, F-16s which are currently used by Turkish Air Forces might fail to show operational performance in the near future if the U.S. does not provide the equipment required to perform specified maintenance tasks.

4. De facto implementation of sanctions 

The fourth sanction might be a de facto implementation of sanctions by Washington through defense export and procurement processes. Even if Trump does not select to impose the “export sanction” (Section 235/2) or the “procurement sanction” (235/6) in CAATSA, Washington might implicitly apply these two types of sanctions in order to punish Ankara by its defense companies. In this regard, the U.S. would continue to apply two basic punishment methods: (i) not to procure or enter into any contract for the procurement of any goods or services from the sanctioned person”, (ii) not to issue any specific license and not to grant any other specific permission or authority to export any goods or technology to the sanctioned person.

5. Removing Turkey from the F-35 fighter program 

The fifth and last sanction is removing Turkey from the F-35 fighter program and so altering the program’s supply chain operations. The Pentagon has already called for the discontinuation of Turkey’s participation in the F-35 program on July 17, 2019. As a result, Lockheed Martin stopped exporting goods from the Turkish supply chain. It is a fact that Turkey’s removal from the F-35 project will not only bring military disadvantages but will also lead to economic, technical and intellectual losses. 

Calculating the costs to Turkey’s defence industry

First and foremost, it is not a correct approach to make a net analysis on profits and losses by comparing the money paid by Ankara for purchasing 100 F-35’s with the amount of money expected to be earned by Turkish defense companies contributing to the construction of F-35s. The first reason is the total cost of acquiring F-35s does not finish when Ankara pays for the selling price. On the contrary, the cost of the F-35 program gradually increases over time as Turkey keeps investing in them so that they remain in service for decades, starting from the “Concept Demonstration” till the end of “Disposal” phase. Thus, the total Life Cycle Cost (LLC, also called as Total Ownership Cost) of F-35s would be very high even when you think Turkey pays through the expected service life of more than 100 platforms. Clearly, whether a program partner or a customer, the sustainment costs of F-35s will be very expensive for any buyer.

Turkey’s preference of buying the “best all-around” missile defense system will include both “direct” and “indirect” sanctions.

On the other side of the coin, Turkish defense companies would benefit for several decades as contributors to the F-35 supply chain. However, the estimated “10 billion for both the direct and indirect costs of sanctions on the Turkish defense industry” is neither an accurate calculation nor a rational way to declare a prediction. Initially, how the shifts in the F-35 supply chain will affect small and medium-sized national companies is a more important problem than the impact on the main contractors involved in the project who are the big companies in which the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation is a shareholder. In this sense, it is necessary to take into account the domestic debt in the defense industry and its losses. Especially for these small and medium-sized firms which may not survive and will be forced to undergo a winding-up process.   In contrast, TAI, HAVELSAN, KALE Aerospace, ROKETSAN, TUBİTAK SAGE, TUSAŞ Engine, ALP Aviation, AYESAŞ and FOKKER ELMO which have been producing different parts of the F-35s are the big companies of Turkish defense industry and can survive either way.

Secondly, if U.S. or any other NATO country like the United Kingdom, Germany or Italy cancel future exports to Turkey such as for T129 attack helicopters, then Turkey might prefer another supplier outside the NATO market. In addition to this, the technical and intellectual costs would be higher than sanctions imposed through licenses and exports, since “know-how” and “expertise” remains as the most critical investment for the future of the Turkish defense industry. However, it is also an option for Turkey to join as a partner to acquisition programs as well as cooperate on joint production facilities with various countries from different continents. Keeping in mind that the global defense market is becoming aggressively competitive for the top arms exporter countries. That is to say, there is a wide spectrum of suppliers searching to cooperate with the Turkish defense industry.

In brief, Turkey’s choice to acquire S-400s was not an instant and reactionary decision. As a matter of fact, Ankara’s decisiveness has long been recognized by its western allies. For this reason, the Ankara government had already foreseen the possible reactions given by its western allies. Thus, the possible sanctions were already voiced in official circles in Washington. Since the possible U.S. sanctions are not surprising, the likely scenarios such as the loss assessments and probable negative outcomes, have already been discussed within the Turkish defence bureaucracy. Now all eyes are on Washington which is still weighing the implementation of penalties and security measures against Turkey, and on Ankara’s response with a roadmap based on possible options varying from reconciliation through diplomacy to the use of counter-measures. Preparing for the worst, the Turkish defense industry might have to bear the burden of losses from being removed from the F-35 program and supply chain, but it should continue prioritizing the intellectual investment in the defence industry and learn how to become a “competitive supplier” rather than a “contributing customer”.

On August 1, 2018, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) under the Department of the Treasury  announced that two high-level government officials of Turkey, namely Minister of Justice Abdulhamit Gul and Minister of Interior Suleyman Soylu were sanctioned. The main motivation of taking the measure was the detention of Pastor Brunson.

The OFAC relied on an Executive Order which was signed by President Trump to mainly target individuals from different countries, such as Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Serbia and so on. The President finds his authority to issue this Executive Order in widely different laws. For instance, the first one was the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which was the one of the charges brought against Hakan Atilla. The second law was the National Emergencies Act (NEA) that was enacted in 1976 and gives the President the authority to declare “national emergency” under certain circumstances. The third law mentioned in the Executive Order was the notorious Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Magnitsky Act) which was enacted in 2012 to target certain Russian officials who were responsible for the loss of Sergei Magnitsky’s life in a prison under serious human rights violations. While the target was initially Russian individuals, Congress invented this legal tool, giving it to the executive power to target other foreign individuals as well. The final legal text was the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which is related to the immigration and citizenship law in the domestic law of the U.S.

The recent action taken by OFAC raises a question as to how the Executive Authority chooses this legal basis. Although OFAC mentioned the Magnitsky Act specifically in its announcement, it is not precise whether the Magnitsky Act was the only legal basis of this decision. In other words, OFAC explained that the action taken “pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, “Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption,” which builds upon Treasury’s Global Magnitsky Act authorities, albeit it did not specify whether the Magnitsky Act was the only basis. Therefore, it was unclear whether the other abovementioned laws, such as IEEPA or NEA, were at issue when deciding to impose sanctions. These laws require the President to determine whether the situation in Turkey constitutes a national emergency or unusual or extraordinary threat for the U.S.

Since OFAC frequently mentions “serious human rights abuses” in their claim, it is implied the only legal basis relied on was the Magnitsky Act. The OFAC’s allegations against two ministers raise several doubts whether OFAC interpreted the text of the Magnitsky Act properly. Section 1263 of the Magnitsky Act requires two different things for the president to determine. First, the president needs to determine the violation of human rights occurred, and second, the targeted individual is responsible for this violation. According to this one page explanation, these determinations hardly appear. The responsibility was understood by OFAC as a mere political responsibility which does not necessitate any concrete evidence to show why these people officials bear responsibility.

The other problematic aspect of the interpretation of the Magnitsky Act is related to the level of seriousness of the abuse of human rights. The text of the law specifies this level as “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” It also gave examples of internationally recognized human rights as torture and extrajudicial killings. However, OFAC left no detailed analysis of what level of human rights abuses in Turkey attained to qualify the situation in Turkey as “serious human rights abuses.” It is difficult to declare Turkey as a country of “serious human rights abuses” based on the alleged violation of rights of one individual. Nevertheless, in the case of Brunson it is not plausible to claim that the principles of due process and fair trial are seriously violated by the Turkish authorities.

The future of the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey is difficult to predict because of the unexpected and unclear scope of the sanctions. At first glance, claiming the responsibility of these two individuals implies that OFAC put the responsibility on the two government officials exclusively. However, then it is reported that the scope of sanctions against Turkish officials may broaden, including many more individuals and entities. It is fair to conclude that these legal tools were used to gain a leverage in U.S. domestic and foreign policy.

The United States President Donald Trump recently announced that Washington has withdrawn from the nuclear deal that was signed between Iran and the international community. The announcement did not cause a serious reaction in Tehran. The main reason behind this unresponsive attitude is the fact that Iranian decision makers have been well experienced to the similar political decisions of the United States. This decision has also allowed Iranian political elites to instrumentalize their strategy of “U.S. antagonism” on which Tehran has based its policies towards the U.S. The U.S.’s decision also led Iranian people, who had to endure U.S. sanctions for years, to grow a deep sense of insecurity towards Washington.

Civil and political actors in Iran have accepted the fact that they have to accustom themselves to the international sanctions against their country, which have been applied since 1979. Because of these sanctions, Iran has limited integration to the international economic system. As a result, sanctions have been accepted as part of daily life and politics in Iran. For this reason, Iranians who have endured U.S. sanctions for many years do not have much concern about the new sanctions that can be applied in the near future.

This is the impression I have observed during my one-week long visit to Iran last week. Throughout the years, Iranians have obviously adapted themselves to life with international sanctions. This is observed from the fact that despite heavy sanctions for years, Iran has a vibrant economic, cultural and social life. The country is perceived as an outsider to the global system, but in reality, it perfectly functions without international connectivity. From municipal services to infrastructure, from cultural life to economic activities, Iran is drawing a more successful picture than most countries in its neighborhood. The vibrant economic life, human mobility and the presence of a dynamic population in all big cities of the country, ensure that Iran is self-reliant despite the years-long sanctions.

On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that Iran is far below its capacity due to the sanctions imposed by the United States and the international community. With its great potential in natural resources such as oil and gas, Iran would have been a regional power if the country had not faced international sanctions for many years. Therefore, it can be argued that the main reason for the U.S.’s insistence on the sanctions imposed on Iran was to keep Tehran at a limited capacity in regional and global politics.

A crucial question here is how Iran’s integration to the international system would transform the country and regional politics. It is obvious that if Iran achieves to integrate itself into the international community, the country would become the key actor in regional politics. Iran’s exclusion from sanctions and achievement of economic growth would allow Tehran to increase its influence in its neighborhood. Despite the sanctions, Iran has followed a strategy of regional expansionism successfully. Without sanctions, Tehran would follow a more aggressive strategy of regional expansionism. In such a scenario, countries like Turkey, Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia would feel the pressure that may be caused from Iran’s expansionist policies. On the other hand, Iran’s increasing economic and military capacities would become a source of concern for regional actors such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Therefore, it’s of great importance for these countries that Iran is kept at a limited level both economically and militarily.

On the other hand, international actors such as the U.S. and Russia object to Iran’s transformation into a regional power. Together with other major Western players, these countries have contributed to keep Tehran’s capacities at a limited level. The main aim of these actors was to prevent Iran from becoming a stronger actor that can influence the policies of the global powers towards the Middle East. These global actors have also taken into consideration the interests of their regional allies such as Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Due to the demands from these countries, the U.S. has continued its sanctions on Iran.

It can be said that the sanctions imposed on Iran by Western countries have aimed to prevent Tehran from becoming a more powerful regional player. In addition to that, these sanctions protected both the interests of the West and their allies in the region. They also functioned as an instrument for the U.S. to secure the loyalty of its regional allies. Finally, it can be stated that despite the sanctions, Iran will continue to be one of the most important countries of the Middle East with its dynamic and vibrant population as well as significant energy resources.

Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) is set to hold an independence referendum next week, which has drawn severe criticism from both Turkey and the US.

Residents in provinces controlled by the KRG are due to vote on September 25 on independence from Baghdad.

The oil-rich province of Kirkuk is among the contested areas where the vote is planned.

Regardless of calls for negotiations before the referendum, Barzani has announced that he will not be able to agree terms with Baghdad.

The KRG President continuously called for Baghdad to provide an alternative to the referendum if the Iraqi government wanted to see the referendum postponed. However, recent announcements are in directions that suggest the two parties will only sit together after the referendum has occurred.

Barzani stated that “Baghdad has failed to provide alternative solutions,” so therefore “we will sit at a negotiating table after the referendum.”

He also added that becoming a full autonomous state “can take up to two years.”

The central government of Iraq is opposed to the poll, claiming that it would affect the war against Daesh, cause instability and violate the Iraqi Constitution.

The referendum was also on the agenda during the 72^nd session of the UN General Assembly. During his speech, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called on northern Iraq’s KRG to suspend its referendum for independence, stating that it would further engender instability in the region.

Baghdad and the regional government need to achieve compromises “on the basis of territorial integrity and the realization of the ideals to build a common future,” Erdogan told UN members.

“Steps such as demands for independence that can cause new crises and conflicts in the region must be avoided,” he said.

Potential sanctions

Following his speech at the UN, talking to reporters, Erdogan also warned of sanctions against the KRG if they intend to proceed with the planned referendum.

“We have always supported” the KRG, Erdogan told reporters. “We think this approach of theirs amounts to ignoring the Republic of Turkey, which has stood by them and counted them as a close ally.”

“The cabinet will undoubtedly evaluate this situation and assess possible sanctions, which will not be ordinary,” he warned.