Since the announcement of the inconclusive national election results, events in Iraq have been sliding towards a civil war. In addition to this, the U.S. and Iran race for influence and hegemony in the country has speeded up the deterioration of conditions in Iraq. This piece seeks to discuss the latest developments regarding this issue in the light of the decision of the Iraqi parliament, which was issued on June 6, and which called for the sorting and manual re-count of all votes and the abolition of thousands of ballot boxes. This matter puts Iraq into a path of uncertainty during a very critical period.

The political situation has become a bottleneck that may be difficult to get out of, and it is being followed with series of destabilizing events. Unless these issues are being checked upon, Iraq will witness a civil war in a manner very similar to what is going on in Syria and Yemen. An Iraqi political analyst, writing for the daily Baghdad Post (May 23, 2018), stated that: “Iran ignites fire of “civil war” in Iraq… Iran is trying through Qassem Soleimani’s efforts, which is in Iraq now, to ruin all efforts to form a government that would not be totally loyal to her…”

Nouri al-Maliki, ex-premier and the leader of the State of Law election bloc, has joined with Hadi al-Amir’s Naser bloc in a single sectarian bloc, and has declared their hostility to the Moqatada Sadr bloc, which won the most seats in the recent election. The Sadrist project, which has been viewed by many as an Iraqi project, stands against the pro-Iranian Maliki project. The former wants to disband and demobilize the Shiite militia, known as Hashed, improve relations with Iraq’s Arab neighbors, and wants to take a neutral stand in the ongoing U.S. and Iranian rivalry in the Middle East.

Iranians have been involved in many political games such as eliciting dozens of deputies in the coalition of Naser, led by Prime Minister Haidar Abadi, in order to join pro-Iranian political blocs. According to some sources in Baghdad, the pro-Iranian circles have recently inaugurated a series of assassinations in Baghdad in order to fuel the fire of civil war. The explosion in Sadr City, which killed and wounded tens of people in Baghdad on the night of June 7, and the subsequent burning of the election ballot boxes housed in the Independent Electoral High Commission storage in Baghdad are designs of the people that want to push the Sadr group into retaliation and want to create a political rapture in Iraq. If history is any guide to us, Mr. Sadr will not be silent on all these events, even if this requires a full-fledged civil war.

It is noteworthy that al-Maliki made numerous statements in the week leading to the election in which he threatened with civil war if the election results were rigged. Many believe that this was an expression of prior knowledge on his part that he will lose the elections. Those threats “are not new to him, especially since his record is full of manipulating sectarian violence during the past years. It is not unlikely for him to re-start it again, if the course of the events were to his dislike,” wrote an expert on Iraq affairs. After the elections, al-Maliki repeated the same threat through the statement made by an MP from his bloc – Mohamed Sahiod – who told the press on May 17 that, “We demand the abolition of the election results and the extension of the work of parliament and to make the current government of Abadi a Caretaker Government due to the wide scale of fraud which took place in the electoral process.”

Iraq’s parliament passed a law on June 6 ordering a nationwide manual recount of votes in the May 12 parliamentary elections. This was a day after the prime minister had stated that there had been serious violations. This move could hinder the delicate process of forming a new government and raising the prospect of further uncertainty in Iraq. This law has also added further fuel to the fire of crisis and was received with mixed and opposing statements. It appears that Abadi’s bloc, which trailed in third place, has some information suggesting that a manual recount will increase their seats.

The pro-Iranian camp wanted the parliament to go further than by just declaring the election results null and void in order to deny Sadr any opportunity to form the government. The National Coalition of Iyad Allawi, which did not perform well either, has also supported the idea of re-holding the election. Allawi stated that, “the declared results of the elections, as it stands now and without taking into consideration numerous appeals against abuse and large-scale fraud, especially after the United Nations confirmed the existence of fraud and manipulation of votes, will lead to producing a parliament challenged by its legitimacy and an illegitimate government.

Hassan Jihad, a leader in the Coalition of Justice and Democracy in Northern Iraq (Kurdistan), led by Barham Sali, said on June 7 that the decisions of the parliament on the elections restored confidence in the elections and institutions: “The re-counting and manual counting and the application of recent measures will change the number of seats and the results of opposition parties.” He added that, “the ruling parties in the KRG should accept the fact that recounting electoral votes will change the number of seats and it should respect the domestic experience.”

The new election has suspended the work of the Independent Electoral Commission and authorized a Commission made of nine judges to carry out the re-count of votes throughout Iraq. Should this law be applied, it may lead to a series of new crises and complicate the political situation in Iraq in order to reach a state of suffocation. On June 21, the Supreme Court passed a decree, which approved the June 6 law passed by the Iraqi Parliament regarding the manual recount of votes in Iraq as constitutional. This will halt all attempts to form the government and will open hell’s door and further complicate the situation.

It appears that the “biggest beneficiaries of this process are parliamentarian Salim al-Jubouri and the government of Haider al-Abadi.” Al-Jubouri, who failed to regain his seat, believes that he has been done a great deal of injustice in this election. Hassan Turan, a Turkmen MP, was quoted stating, “The high attendance rate during the parliamentary session confirmed beyond doubt that all political blocs, including the winner, wants to distance themselves from the forgers.”

While it may seem that both Iran and the U.S. are distancing themselves from all these rapid transformations that are taking place in Iraq, behind the scenes both governments are moving all the threads of the game. It is noteworthy that both governments have welcomed the results of the election declared by electronic counting. However, it seems that the frantic frenzy behind the scene of both the U.S. and Iran is to influence the process of government formation.

It could be stated that the election results are only a symptom of a larger crisis. The 2003 Iraq invasion not only destroyed the existing state machinery but failed to replace it with a sound and effective one. As the Iraqi Vice President Ayad Allawi told The National during his visit to Dubai on April 9: “Elections will not solve the crises Iraq faces unless it maintains an inclusive political process, overcomes sectarian divisions and rids itself of foreign interference.

The African proverb goes to say that when two elephants wrestle, it is only the grass on which the wrestle taking place will be harmed. Iraq looks like it has become the grass affected by the two fighting elephants: Iran and the U.S. Turkey should support Abadi or Sadr in order to form a coalition government as only a moderate Shiite group could help prevent a civil war. As with the Syrian Civil War, a civil war in Iraq will have adverse effects on Turkey.

Despite criticisms from local groups and regional governments, on September 25, residents in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq will vote in a referendum on whether they want to completely separate from the Republic of Iraq. While the region has enjoyed autonomy for decades, if the referendum approves the secession, an independent state will be born with a distinctly Kurdish identity, a long held aspiration for the ethnic group. But questions linger about the timing of the referendum, and how the new state will deal with the ethnic and sectarian schisms that are tearing apart the region.

Serif Dilek and Hazal Duran spoke with Hemin Hawrami, senior assistant to President Masoud Barzani, and the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

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Did you negotiate with Baghdad about the independence referendum? How does Baghdad approach this process? How do you expect Baghdad’s position to be after the referendum?

The independence referendum is not a new issue. We have discussed it with Prime Minister Abadi three times. And also, when President Barzani led a large Kurdistan delegation in September 2016, he discussed the forthcoming referendum for independence. But its date had not been fixed. In Baghdad, definitely there has not been that much negative reaction. The major concern of Baghdad is the continuation of dialogue. Of course, they prefer us to stay in Iraq. But we argue that a federal, an inclusive Iraq is over. The federal system has failed in Iraq. Because Iraq has not adhered in practice to a federal state structure although it is written in the constitution. This referendum in fact comes after a long process of dialogue with Baghdad. So, we hope that this positive atmosphere built on the cooperation against DAESH in Mosul and also on the cooperation that the Kurdistan region hosts nearly 1.8 million internally displaced Iraqi people (IDP) will help us to find new formulas in establishing bilateral relationships.

Does the referendum for the Kurdistan region indicate independence? If so, what kind of process does Iraqi Kurdistan expect after the referendum?

Yeah. The referendum is for independence and the referendum has one question: Are we with an independent Kurdistan, yes or no? So, there is no third question or a third option. After the referendum, there will definitely be a long process with Baghdad. The Kurdistan delegation, from representing all the political parties, all the components, including Christians and Turkmen; they will talk to Baghdad about for example how we can establish a healthy economic interdependence between Baghdad and Kurdistan in the post-referendum process; how we can continue on a joint military defense strategy built on what we did in Mosul together; how we can use, for example, pipelines between Iraq and Kurdistan; and how not to have visas; how to have one market for both sides and some kind of other further economic interdependency. So, these are the details that we will be taking in the post-referendum period.

Some Kurdish parties (Gorran, for example) harshly criticized the decision of the referendum. Was the referendum decision a result of general compromise between the Kurdish parties or just a decision of President Masood Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)?

I cannot speak on behalf of Gorran. But, in principle, Gorran is not against independence. The charter of Gorran stipulates that they support self-determination and the independence of Kurdistan. Maybe they have concerns about the mechanism of the referendum. Well, President Barzani has communicated with all the political parties, including Gorran and we sent invitations to them for a meeting on the  7^th of June. There are eleven blocks represented in the parliament and Gorran is one of them. Except Gorran and the Islamic Group of Kurdistan, the other nine blocks came to the meeting with President Barzani. The referendum issue was discussed and put to unanimous vote with the participation of the nine blocks. So, the decision was taken unanimously by all the political parties attending the meeting. It was not a unilateral decision made by President Barzani.

http://thenewturkey.org/intra-kurdish-approaches-to-the-independence-referendum-in-northern-iraq/

It is stated that the referendum will also be held in the disputed territories. According to Article 140 of the Constitution, it was specified that the people living in these regions would be connected to the Central Government of Iraq or Iraqi Kurdistan through a referendum, but the mentioned referendum did not happen. Will it mean that these regions will be a part of Iraqi Kurdistan if the result will be “yes” in the referendum?

The referendum decision was made unanimously by all the parties and with President Barzani. This referendum is for Iraqi Kurdistan. Disputed territories mean that both the Iraqi government and Kurdish regional government have a right in administration. In fact, we have been waiting for 10 years for Article 140 to be implemented, however, it was not. If the people of this region participate in the referendum and if they vote ‘yes’, it means that they want to be part of independent Kurdistan.

Of course, Kirkuk has a special state in Kurdistan. We believe that the Turkmen, right now, enjoy much more rights and freedom than they enjoy in other parts of Iraq. The Turkmen will be the second largest ethnic group and they will be true partners in governing the Kurdistan region. If you look at the election results in 2005 in the disputed territories, the majority voted for the Kurdistani list, which included the Kurds, the Turkmen and others. And the fight against ISIS… If it was not for the Peshmerga and KRG, this area would have been controlled by ISIS like Mosul. So, although right now we have the full military, administrative and political control of the area, we don’t want to impose anything.

In addition to this, the disputed territories have been historically and geographically parts of Kurdistan as it has faced Arabization. But we don’t want to impose a de facto situation and asked them whether you want to have a Kurdish ethnic state. It’s a Kurdistani state based on partnership.

The regional and international actors’ approach to the referendum is not positive. How accurate is it to take a decision on independence at a time where international support is weak? In addition to this, is it possible that there will be any breaks in the relations between the Iraqi Kurdistan and some international actors after the referendum?

First of all, this is a domestic issue between Kurdistan, us and Baghdad. Secondly, the international community is more interested in whether this referendum might affect the fight against ISIS negatively. Well, long before the referendum in 2014, we had nothing but we fought against ISIS. We reassure the regional and international community that an independent Kurdistan will be much stronger in fighting terrorism. Thirdly, when the Iraqi government violated the constitution and the Iraqi army melted down against Daesh, was there really an international community to stand against the chaotic situation?

Please look at the last 26 years and make an analogy. Kurdistan’s contribution to Iraq’s security and stability is immense. Take Turkey, for example. Kurdistan contributes to Turkish national security by acting like a buffer zone between the unstable part of Iraq and the Turkish southern borders. It also makes a positive contribution to the trade relationship with Turkey and the other countries. It provides energy security. In terms of governance, despite a small region with only 5 million people, we are hosting 1.8 million IDP’s and refugees. So, if we were not a functioning political entity, all these people would flee to Turkey or Europe.

Of course, we don’t except the international community to say “okay, we are officially supporting the breakup of Iraq.” But our message for the international and regional community is that the current status quo cannot continue; that Iraq is already divided on sectarian and ethnic lines between the Shiites and Sunnis, between the Arabs and the Kurds. I recently have heard from the head of a Shiite endowment, who said that “there is no room for Christians to stay in Iraq anymore.” Even if you take Kurdistan out, the remainder of Iraq is divided. It is a failed state and we need to prevent the Iraqification of the Kurdistan region.

As you know, the economy of Iraqi Kurdistan is largely dependent on oil revenues and also the budget of the region is dependent on Baghdad. How can a politically independent Kurdistan survive in economic terms? What kind of policies are you going to implement to ensure economic independence?

First, I don’t agree with the term “economic independence.” Now, all economies are interdependent and there is no independent economy. Secondly, we have survived two sets of sanctions in the past: UN sanctions on Iraq and Iraqi sanctions on Kurdistan. Third, Iraqi Kurdistan – here I should underline that I did my masters on the political economy of Kurdistan, on the rentier state – primarily wants political independence, because we want to get rid of the understanding of a frontier mentality we inherited from Baghdad. We want to diversify our economy by not relying only on oil.

We don’t have a taxation system in Kurdistan because of the central budget law. We need sovereignty first in order to go through a systematic reform to change the equation from a public-oriented economy to a private-oriented one and to help the private sector to grow. So, the Kurdistan region can survive. And Kurdistan has the 9th largest oil reserves in the world and has 8 trillion cubic meters of proven natural gas. The world economy needs that. Turkey needs that. You need our resources; we need your pipelines and your transportation. So, it’s a win-win situation. We do believe an independent Iraqi Kurdistan will be a more strategic economic partner for Turkey.

Do you have another option to export your natural gas or oil to other countries?

Turkey is our strategic partner but we will also be looking forward to have a strong partnership with Baghdad so that our economic interdependence would allow us to export our natural gas and oil through Baghdad.

We just want to get back to the point we have discussed earlier. There is ongoing regional instability in the Middle East. In addition to the chaotic situation of Iraq and Syria, there are millions of people who have either been displaced or became refugees because of DAESH. Today Iraqi Kurdistan is home to about 1.9 million refugees. How suitable is it to take a decision of referendum in such kind a complicated environment?

My question to you: when will there be a perfect environment? Those who criticize and say that it’s not perfect timing, our question to them is “just tell us two or three perfect times in the next ten years?” When is the ideal timing? There is no ideal and perfect timing. If we keep the current status quo, we can’t be sure of our future.

I am asking myself, “have we been part of the problem or have we been part of the solution?” It was not us who created DAESH but it was us who broke the myth of DAESH. In terms of the Shiite-Sunni sectarian fight, we are not taking a side. The Kurds are Sunnis, we say. We don’t care about Shiite-Sunni division because we are Sunnis.

Look, we’ve been providing support to the IDPs regardless of their sectarian affiliation. In terms of the economic stability, we were the second largest market for Turkey after Germany. Out of $12 billion trade with other parts of Iraq, why is there $9 billion with Kurdistan region? Because we’ve been part of that solution for Turkey. So, when some argue about the instability, we have not been the factor behind it. Actually, the instability in the Middle East is the result of post-colonial failed state systems, Sykes-Picot more precisely. The borders are not reflecting the true realities of the people in the region.

What do you think the referendum will result in?

In 2005, we did an informal referendum and 96% of the people voted ‘yes.’ So, this time, I believe that the landslide majority of people, including the Turkmen, Christians, and Arabs living in the disputed areas, will vote “yes” and prefer to live in a stable Kurdistan rather than for an unknown future.

How about your personal expectation about the forthcoming elections in Iraq, the general and provincial elections?

Are you sure that there will be elections? Because we aren’t. If the Iraqi parliament is going to be elected according to the current election law, which gives Shiites majority, no matter how many Kurds or Sunnis participated, we, as the Kurds, are not going to participate in the next Iraqi parliament election. Because we are giving legitimacy to an illegitimate situation. For example, if all Kurds participate in the upcoming election, we will have only 60-65 seats. That’s why we want this election law to be amended from 18 constituencies to make all of Iraq one constituency.

How will an independent Kurdistan deal with minorities such as the Turkmen, as they are opposing the independence referendum at some point, and some minor groups also oppose this idea. Which rights and guarantees will they have?

We don’t call them minorities. That’s the first guarantee. Irrelevant of their number, we will accept them as ethnic groups. Secondly, they have 5 members in the current parliament. They have the right to have education in their native language from kindergarten to university.

We don’t call it a Kurdish state; we call it Kurdistan state. Because, Kurdistan, like Turkey, is the homeland for the Kurdistani citizens. You don’t call everyone who lives in Turkey a Turk. Right? Because Turkey is home to citizens with Circassian, Armenian, Kurdish, Turk, and Arab background. So, Kurdistan is also home for whoever lives there and that’s another guarantee.

Absolutely, we will need international support for it. I mean how we can draft the constitution before the declaration by law. The rights of different ethnic groups must be guaranteed and what kind of mechanism could be established to assure their participation? I can assure you the oppressed people are not going to oppress others.

http://thenewturkey.org/mosul-in-ruins-kirkuk-awaits-a-similar-destiny-what-can-turkey-do/

What are your ideas about the PYD in Syria? Commonly, you know that there is a major dispute between them and PDKS (Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê li Sûriyê – Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria).

PYD is the PKK. There is no difference between them. We have supported the Kurdish uprising and Syrian opposition since the beginning. We wished and supported them to have a kind of Supreme Council through the first Erbil Agreement in 2012, Second Erbil Agreement 2013 and then the Duhok Agreement in 2014 to help them to have a kind of shared and common administration. But unfortunately, the PYD did not have a clear vision for the future of the Rojava. They’ve been collaborating one time with the Syrian regime and with others without having a political future. And the PYD has been oppressing non-PYD political parties like closing their offices by not allowing them to have any political activities, or by arresting them. Because of that we’ve been against such actions of the PYD.

Do you have any ideas of a population exchange?

No. I want to make it clear. This independence referendum is for Iraqi Kurdistan and it is not going to change the current Iraqi international border, which will be the official border of Kurdistan with Turkey, Iran, and Syria. This is a propaganda by some PKK circles, who argue that there will be a connection between Rojava and Kurdistan. That’s not true. That’s not going to happen.

Our last question is about the name of the state. How will it be named if the referendum results in “yes”? Kurdistan or the Republic of Kurdistan?

Definitely, it will be a liberal republic. But the name, I can’t tell. It has something related to Iraqi Kurdistan. Honestly, I have no idea. You should ask that question after the referendum either to the referendum committee or to the founding fathers.

Iranian troops have been deployed in rebel-held territory in Aleppo since 2015; Assad was ensured to win back Aleppo along with Syrian soldiers and Hezbollah militants. The truth is the Syrian army was neither qualified to handle the crisis in Aleppo in its own way, nor were they able to capture the divided city where all separate enclaves were being controlled by various groups comprising of Russian soldiers, Shiite fighters from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Afghanistan. Even though Assad had sent his most experienced forces to take part in operations; after more than five years of non-intrusive war; his forces have been debilitated while clinging to battle, which is being carried out under heavy attacks. With the fall of Aleppo, held by rebels since 2012, Assad has consolidated his power and polished himself by relying on foreign fighters to capture the city. Amid the diverse ethnic structure fighting for Assad, it is hard to turn a blind eye on the leading role played by Shiite-dominated “Quds Brigades” and “Hezbollah Brigades” to recapture the beleaguered city.

Revival of Shia Politics over Syria Civil War

The latent reality is liberation of Aleppo has been incited by the blessing of a Shia revival by the most powerful Shiite political figures such as Muqtada al-Sadr, a well-known anti-American Shiite cleric propping up Assad’s regime. Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah has portrayed the war in Syria as “the mother of all battles,” so the discourses that significant Shia political and religious figures are appealing to could be accepted as one of the most efficient tools mobilizing Shia militiamen to Syria as an active agent of the war.

To put it more explicitly, the Aleppo battle is also a symbolic battle where the streets are surrounded by Shia iconography and Shia tones such that it is rather usual to see Shia militants carrying portraits of Shia clerics in the streets. Similar scenes unfolded in northern Aleppo Province in the last few months while Iraqi clerics were giving speeches to militiamen in fatigues stimulating their religious senses to fight in the name of the Shia faith and Islamic law. He praised his followers’ willingness to fight far from home and positioned their presence in Syria as a part of a master plan to defend the Shia faith.

Moreover, Shia clerics are also actively using social media accounts to make their strident sectarian voices heard to wide masses in the looming battle and justified martyrs who died in battleground while defending their faiths in Iraq and Syria. As reported by The Telegraph newspaper, almost 700 Iranian soldiers and militia members have died in Syria’s civil war to preserve Assad’s grip on power. For these fighters, defending their ideology, religion and holy places are their primary motivation to be on the battleground.

Damascus: Looming Starvation Crisis is at the Door

What’s happening in Syria today reveals Iran’s sectarian desires. As it is evident from Shia ideology, dedicated militiamen fighting fiercely, rooting out Syria from all Iranian supported militias will take time because they all adhere to Shia clerics’ priorities to propagate their faith both in Syria and Iraq. On the eve of the Russo-Turkish guarantee for a country wide-ceasefire in Syria on December 29, 2016, Hezbollah, a Lebanon based Iranian proxy group, jeopardized the fragile peace process by attacking the Wadi Barada village near the capital Damascus, where hundreds of families were trapped without any aid or medication support.

Amid the newly declared truce in Syria in December, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its mercenaries along with Hezbollah militants were storming over the Wadi Barada district of rural Damascus. Currently, as a retaliatory action various new agencies have reported that this time fighting has intensified after surprise attacks by opposition fighters in the Jobar district of Damascus located in the eastern part of the city. Reportedly, the Iranian backed Hezbollah al-Nujaba militia has announced its participation in the ongoing battle in Jobar and declared once more they are all in the battle with all their military means.

One of the most significant outcomes of the recent attacks have been air strikes by regime forces, which have caused an estimated 300,000 local residents to be cut off from any humanitarian assistance in Jobar. On top of that, some respectable international aid organizations such as Physicians for Human Rights are concerned about a looming starvation crisis is at the door. According to a recent UN report, approximately four million people located in Damascus have been deprived of safe drinking water and any medical aid support.

Ongoing Peace Talks Overshadowed Long-Awaited Peace in the Region

Opposition forces are justifying their attacks being intensified in the Jobar district of Damascus from their social media accounts based on the failure of UN sponsored peace talks, which resumed in Switzerland in February 2017. In addition as it can be remembered, opposition groups refused to talk directly with the regime as both sides accused each other of violating the cease-fire in the Wadi Barada area prior to Syria peace talks held in the Kazakhstan capital Astana in January 2017. The armed opposition forces, namely Jabhat Fath al-Sham (formerly known as al-Nusra Front) refused to leave the battleground and head to Idlib in previous months. Nevertheless, Turkey insisted on returning Hezbollah militants back to Lebanon ahead of the planned truce talks in Astana, but as Khamenei’s top advisor underlined, Hezbollah is planning to stay on Syrian soil even after the ceasefire.

Though the peace talks are not the first over the course of the war, they have been long awaited for those hoping for peace in the region, and the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition have confirmed their attendance at a meeting to be held in Geneva in March 2017. Nevertheless, even UN envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura has warned not to expect miracles from the new round of UN-backed talks while fierce fighting is in full flow across the country. As reported by Daily Sabah, tens of civilians including children were killed and around 50 wounded in a recent air strike launched by regime forces east of Damascus. Obviously, peace talks, whether held in Geneva or Astana, will bolster the truce in the near future, so in a way the talks lost the structural function in the battleground as an effective way of welcoming the truce. It seems that consecutive peace talks are being appealed to in order to cover the humanitarian tragedy especially apparent in Damascus.

On Oct. 31, 2015 the Iraqi National Alliance, a front of Shiite political groups, announced that they are in the process of drafting an important document called the “Historical Settlement.” On February 6, 2017, Ammar al–Hakeem, the leader of the Alliance, stated that the project is the result of intensive and constructive talks with all Iraqi groups and has the backing of regional stakeholder governments. Moreover, the United States and the UN will have a role in it too, and it will be announced after the end of the war against DAESH. Thus, the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) will draft the final version of the Historical Settlement after the document is approved by both the parliament and the Cabinet and Iraqi parties agree to abide by it. UNAMI will try to convince regional institutions, namely the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to support the project. The document is to addresses key issues, including power and wealth distribution between the Federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the grievances of Sunni Arab provinces. The implementation of the Historical Settlement has many opportunities as well as insurmountable challenges, and to succeed Iraq needs to avail itself from the experience of other countries who have dealt with the same kind of divisions.

Road to Historical Settlement

Iraq, like other countries which have witnessed dictatorship and civil war, is in need of a national reconciliation. Though Iraqi governments in the past have officially committed themselves to the achievement of national reconciliation, very few tangible steps have been taken so far. In 2003, the government of Ayah al-Alawi, the leader of Iraqiyah Bloc, and Nouri al-Maliki, who would serve as Prime Minister, officially committed their governments to the process, but no concrete steps were taken. As Prime Minister, Al-Maliki pursued sectarian and authoritarian policies which resulted in alienating Sunni Arabs and Kurds, and led DAESH to try championing the Sunni cause.

In July 2014, Haider al-Abadi came to power as prime minister with a promise to curb corruption and broker national reconciliation. However, his efforts were hindered by the pro-al-Maliki group and the rising power of al-Hashd Shaabi, Shiite militias which have Iranian backing. Those Shiite militias have taken very uncompromising steps. Besides, pro-Iranian political circles used their best to prevent the formation of a National Guard in Sunni Arab majority provinces, and they made the long awaited Amnesty Law, which was passed in the parliament on August 2016, toothless and too late. For these reasons, even if DAESH were to be expelled from the cities, the grievances of Sunni Arabs will continue.

Opportunities

Through Iraq’s distant and modern history, it is evident that its diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural communities have succeeded in peaceful coexistence and intermixing. Unlike many other countries, where Shiites and Sunnis live apart, before the effects of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Shiite and Sunni Iraqis lived in integrated communities in many mixed regions, especially in Baghdad. There are several powerful tribal confederations which have a mixed Shiite and Sunni membership. These are potential resources, which need to be tapped in for reconciliation. For example, in 2007 a group of facilitators from the US Institute of Peace (USIP) in the district of Mahmoudiyah, an area south of Baghdad which was known as the “Triangle of Death,” helped to broker a reconciliation pact through tribal chieftains from Sunnis and Shiites that still endures. This experience needs to be generalized to other regions in Iraq. Besides, the implementation of the stated policies of US president Donald Trump with regard to the curbing of Iran’s undue influence in Iraq and al-Abadi’s imminent victory against DAESH will have a combined impact of weakening the al-Maliki camp and pro-Iranian Shiite militias. These will give national reconciliation internally a great momentum.

Challenges

The most serious challenges to national reconciliation are the lack of trust among various Iraqi groups, the exclusiveness in the nature of some influential elements on both sides, structural flaws in the post-2003 government, Iranian interference in Iraq, and the lack of a determined will to have reconciliation. After the US invasion, Iraqis agreed to form governments of communities, instead of government of citizens, as a power-sharing formula. Since 2014, al-Maliki’s group, supported by Iran, has been calling for the formation of a government of a “political majority.” In reality, al-Maliki is trying to use democracy to establish the government of a Shiite majority to the exclusion of Sunnis (Arabs and Kurds). In addition, al-Abadi’s inability to live up to his government program with regard to the Kurds has forced the Kurds to distrust Shiite politicians in Baghdad. During the first week of February, al-Hakeem visited the KRG to sound them out on his project. He received a cold response from their leaders, who have mostly opted for separation from Iraq and waiting to see what Trump’s future policy on Iraq will be.

These and other challenges have been spelled out in a well-written piece by Nazli Tarzi in the Middle East Eye. Tarzi rightly points that there is a lot of vagueness in the project and it has been drafted in the dark unilaterally by Shiite groups. It is not so inclusive either. But all these challenges could be overcome, if al-Hakeem’s proposed document was to be discussed openly with prominent Sunni groups and the international community lends its support to it.

Turkey and Iran have many stakes in its success and they should and could play an important role in this regard. Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group in a 2007 report, and more recently the al-Bayan Center for Study and Planning, an Iraqi think tank based in Baghdad, have prepared projects for national reconciliation which reiterate the same points: the complex nature of the conflict in Iraq has reached a point where an international and regional intervention is necessary. Iraq needs to upgrade the role of Jan Kubis, the head of UNAMI, from that of good will ambassador to that of an arbiter. The US also needs to use its influence and leverage among all communities in Iraq for this purpose. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan must put pressure on Sunnis (Arabs and Kurds) to show a readiness for a historical compromise to achieve a durable and lasting peace. Iran has to be pressured to exercise a positive influence on Iraq’s Shiites. Except for a few extremist groups, the war-weary majority of Iraqi groups are now ready to accept this.

And the Iraqis need to benefit from other countries which had experienced civil wars. The formation of a body in Iraq similar to the Committee of Truth and Reconciliation, which was established in 1990 in South Africa, for example, is noteworthy. This Committee addressed the needs of the victims of the Apartheid regime by recognition and remedies instead of revenge and punishment. It convinced the perpetuators of the crimes to admit and apologize for their deeds. The new constitution of 1996 guaranteed the rights of black majorities and safeguarded that of white Afrikaners.

Traditional and tribal institutions were utilized to bring harmony to the conflict-torn country. The hastily drawn Iraqi constitution of 2005 needs to be amended to address the needs of Sunni Arabs. The controversial practice of de-Baathification should be reversed and de-politicized and be left to the judicial authorities. The controversial current Iraqi laws and regulations on terrorism have to be either eliminated or amended to exclude its future abuse. The high-ranking Iraqi religious authorities among Sunnis and Shiites need to act as peace-makers similar to the role South-African Archbishop Desmond Tutu played. Furthermore, the issue of disputed territories and control over oil and gas revenues with the KRG needs to be addressed by resorting to a third-party for mediation, as well as the Supreme Court of Iraq.

Iraq has a chance to achieve a much needed national reconciliation, if political groups exhibit a true will to do so and receive the needed external support.

In the biggest battle of the ongoing Syrian war for Aleppo since July 2012, the Assad regime and its Russian and Iranian allies benefited from the international community’s discord to corner the rebels into a small area of the city. By knowing the military and political importance of Aleppo, the regime and its allies targeted civilians to force the city’s surrender. Only in the last week, nearly a thousand civilians lost their lives, and thousands more were wounded.

The type of operations by the regime resemble the Russian strategy of “scorched earth” already used in Chechnya. Among the prominent tactics being used are the use of barrel bombs, which goes back to the notorious General Suheil Hassan from the pro-regime “Tiger Forces”. Hassan argued that a normal life in Aleppo must become impossible. Only that circumstance could lead to loyalists regaining a foothold in eastern Aleppo. Specifically infrastructure like markets, schools, electric stations, and hospitals were targeted by the regime. This shows the long-term strategy for Aleppo.

It is a broadly used strategy by the regime to force civilians out of cities that the regime could not take back by conventional force. Therefore it decided to seize by bombs emptied cities. This has been witnessed also in Homs, Ghouta and now in Aleppo. With the Russian intervention, the “scorched earth” strategy became more violent. Besides barrel bombs, phosphorous, napalm, and cluster munitions have also been dropped. As a result barely any humanitarian infrastructure has been left standing. There are no longer any hospitals in the besieged rebel-held districts of Aleppo. One of the fatal results of this strategy is the huge amount of civilian causalities. Since the beginning of the battle in Aleppo, civilians lost their lives or had to migrate out of the city.

The two steps of besieging Aleppo

The capture of rebel-held Aleppo would not have been possible without Russian air support, and simultaneous offensives by the PKK-affiliated YPG and DAESH that forced rebels to fight on multiple fronts.

In February 2016, the regime and its allies started an offensive from Bashkoy and were able to reach Nubbol and Zahra. The three year old partial siege of Nubbol and Zahra could only be broken with massive Russian close air support for Syrian Arab Army (SAA) troops on the ground. Nubbol and Zahra was besieged from three sides by rebel forces and the other side bordered the YPG-held territory of Efrin. With this move the partial siege was broken and the main supply road of the rebels from Azaz to Aleppo was cut. After this the Kurdish YPG invaded Tal Rifaat, fighting the FSA-rebels there with massive Russian air-support too. The YPG created a buffer zone between rebels in the north and regime forces and its allies. During the YPG assault on Tal Rifaat, DAESH also attacked Marea, which seriously put pressure on the rebel forces. It should be noted that the capture of the infantry school in Aleppo by DAESH from rebel forces helped the regime advance towards Bashkoy.

After this, the regime started its second step of the offensive in June 2016. It imposed its own siege on rebel-held territories in Aleppo. The Russian and regime air forces systematically bombed the last supply-road – the Castello Road – to the eastern parts of Aleppo, which runs through northwest Aleppo. The Castello Road became unpassable after regime forces and their allies advanced from Handarat towards the Mallah farms and constantly bombed the road from the north, while YPG forces attacked the last supply-road from the south. This situation led to the de-facto siege of Aleppo. The rebels started an offensive against the YPG forces in Sheykh Maqsoud but they failed. The regime and its allies, who captured the Mallah farms, started a joint operation with the YPG and seized the Castello Road. The siege of Aleppo started in July 2016.

The counteroffensives of the rebels

To break the siege the two major rebel umbrella organizations, Aleppo Jaysh al-Fath and the Fatah Aleppo Operation Room, started a joint operation from the south of Aleppo. After a week the rebels took the 1070 settlement complex, the Artillery School, Ramousah and Musherfah, which again led to the break of the siege. The operation from inside and outside the siege was both successful. But in the following days the rebels weren’t able to widen the area by capturing the 3000 complex and the cement factory from the SAA. The rebels weren’t able to open the new supply route through Ramousah to be wide enough. The regime artillery and the Russian and regime airstrikes imposed a de-facto siege on Aleppo once again. On the ground the regime started a counteroffensive with a huge amount of foreign Shiite fighters. In this offensive the Iranian strategy of “human waves”, which proved itself in the Iraq-Iran war, were used by the foreign Shiite forces fighting for the regime. It also demonstrated how heavily the regime relies on foreign fighters. Rebels lost Ramousah, Musherfah, the Artillery School and half of the 1070 complex. Aleppo was besieged again.

At the end of October, Jaysh al-Fath and the Fatah Aleppo Operations Room tried another joint operation to break the siege. By taking into account the weaker effectiveness of airstrikes in urban areas, the rebels didn’t attack from the area around the Artillery School. They attacked the Dhahiyat al-Assad region further to the southwest of Aleppo’s center. Dhahiyat al-Assad and Minyan was captured in the operation by rebels. They made some gains in the 1070 complex, but the SAA and its allies repelled attacks on the 3.000 complex and the New Aleppo district. An offensive launched on the Zahra district produced some gains, but again all of them were reversed the same day. During this operation it was seen that Jaysh al-Fath began relying heavily on VBIEDs, also known as car bombs.

A total of 17 VBIEDs were used. Six of them were used at the 3000 complex, three VBIEDs in New Aleppo and the same amount in the 1070 complex, two in Dhahiyat al-Assad, two in Minyan and one at the Zahra district. Three of the VBIEDs were remote controlled VBIEDs. They belonged to Ahrar al-Sham. Eight VBIEDs were from Turkistan Islamic Party and six VBIEDs from Jabhat Fath Sham. Rebels tried to compensate for their lack of air superiority by using VBIEDs. This tactic was not significant enough to change the fate of rebels in eastern Aleppo.

After the failed rebel attempt, the regime began its own large scale attack from the air and ground. The eastern parts of Aleppo were attacked with intensive firepower, which led to a step by step withdrawal of rebels. Besides the regime forces, Russian Special Forces, Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Shia militias and the Lebanese Hezbollah participated in the offensive. The PKK-affiliated YPG forces joined the al-Assad side from Sheykh Maqsoud. The Kurdish organization attacked the rebels and cooperated with the regime. Rebels and civilians started to withdraw to the southern parts of besieged eastern Aleppo and were squeezed into an area less than 30 km². As a result they gradually lost other parts of the last remaining rebel-held areas as well.

There are reports that the regime and its allies have begun arrests of opposition figures, while some rebels have started to negotiate with Russia for an evacuation route from Aleppo under Turkish mediation.

Behind the bombardment by the regime and its allies, which has not distinguished between fighters and civilians, is the idea that a full capture of Aleppo could break the willpower of rebels to win this war.

After the fall of Aleppo the regime will try to eliminate the rebels in south Syria and Idlib militarily or they will try to force them to surrender. Or at least they will try to impose a political solution on the negotiation table against rebels who have lost the war.

It no longer seems possible to change the military fate of Aleppo. After this it seems more logical to try to find a solution on the negotiation table and try to avoid more civilian causalities, which is the current strategy of Turkey.

It is not possible to say positive things about the fate of the Syrian Revolution if there isn’t a major change in the field soon. If the rebels don’t unite under a unified leadership they will go on to lose step by step.

While Turkey was West-oriented, the Iranian revolution of 1979 created tension with Ankara, as Turkey’s ruling secular elite viewed Iran’s new regime as a threat. This perception was in part fuelled by the belief that Tehran had been the main sponsor of terrorist groups in Turkey with the intention of exporting its particular brand of Islamism to neighboring countries. In turn, Iran’s new regime viewed Turkey as a threat to its revolutionary objectives, given Turkey’s secular ideology and its membership of NATO.

During the Iran-Iraq war, as Sunni Arab states and Western powers united behind the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, Turkey maintained a neutral position.

However, disregarding such differences, during the Iran-Iraq war, as Sunni Arab states and Western powers united behind the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, Turkey maintained a neutral position and Ankara viewed the Saddam Regime as a more ominous threat. Consequently, Iran did not pursue a confrontational policy toward Turkey, which enabled both countries to preserve the status quo between one another. Relations between the two countries began to improve following the Gulf War as they pursued cooperative measures to address issues that threatened the territorial integrity of both states, particularly the ‘Kurdish question’.

Following the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in Turkey in November 2002, Ankara-Tehran bilateral relations blossomed. Although the leading figures in the AK Party called their political vision ‘conservative democracy’, the Iranians perceived the new government as being formed of those with an Islamic agenda and welcomed this government in their immediate neighboring country, which stressed the importance of improving relations with regional countries in almost all aspects.

During the past decade, a number of factors have motivated the two states to enhance their bilateral economic relations: Tehran’s desire for a reliable trading partner; Iran’s struggle under the crippling economic sanctions imposed by Western countries; and Ankara’s demand for Iran’s energy resources. Within the period of 2000 to 2011, reportedly, bilateral trade between the two partners increased from $1 billion to $16 billion, and the number of Turkey-based Iranian companies increased from 300 to more than 2,000 firms. Within Turkey’s framework of ‘zero problems’, ongoing relations between both countries have been based on ‘mutual pragmatism’, rather than competition, due to the mutual understanding that both parties will benefit more and preserve their interests by doing so.

Following the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in Turkey in November 2002, Ankara-Tehran bilateral relations blossomed.

Against the background of such friendly exchanges between the two neighbors, however, relations have been strained due to the fact that both countries have been at odds on a number of issues in the Middle East, namely Iran’s support for the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, Iran’s only ally in the Middle East, who could seriously endanger Turkey’s influence in the region. Iraq has also been a field of growing competition between Turkey and Iran, as Iran has been trying to fill the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.

Additionally, the Sunni-Shiite sectarian conflict fuelled by Iran has drawn both countries into the conflict in Iraq on opposing sides. Turkish leaders always warned of such a threat and sought to reduce sectarian tensions; in view of this, Turkey’s diplomatic missions to Iraq have always included visits not only to the Sunni but also to the Shiite leading figures of the country. In contrast, Shiite Iran, which competes (with Saudi Arabia) for the leadership of Islam, has used the sectarian divide to further its ambitions.

Other sources of tension between Iran and Turkey have been the Kurdish and the Palestinian issues. Iran’s attempt to support Palestine (and oppose Israel) has been used as a way to enhance its popularity in the Arab world, while Turkey’s assertive support for Palestinians has been an important factor contributing to the deterioration of Iran’s popularity in the Arab world. This particular policy of Turkey has been translated by Tehran as a threat to Iran’s role as the main state sponsor of anti-Israel movements.

 Turkish leaders always warned of and sought to reduce sectarian tensions; in view of this, Turkey’s diplomatic missions to Iraq have always included visits not only to the Sunni but also to the Shia leading figures of the country.

Turkey and Iran have clashed over other issues as well. Turkey views itself as a regional leading power. Many Arab countries also regard Turkey, with its relatively democratic political system and high economic growth rate, as a model for their own political development.

Although these are major divergences and challenges, Ankara and Iran have more shared objectives, which could push them closer rather than break them apart. Both countries have many common interests that could enable them to overcome their differences. After the comprehensive nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), between Iran and world powers was reached, Turkey could once more play a major role as a gateway between Iran and the West. This is particularly important as Western countries try to find ways to reach Iran and tap into its $500 billion economy.

Furthermore, Iran is still an important partner for Turkey in other areas. For example, tourism has intensified as a trade activity between both countries in recent years, which could bring vitality to commercial activities in Turkey if given the chance to increase. According to reports from Turkey’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 1.7 million Iranians visited Turkey in 2015, ranking Iran as the sixth leading source of visitors to Turkey from among 90 countries.

The foreign policy agenda of the Rouhani administration known as ‘prudence and moderation’ aims at ending Iran’s isolation on the global stage. Since Turkey is a NATO member, Iran needs Turkey’s cooperation to send constructive signals when approaching the West. From the perspective of geopolitics and the regional balance of power, Iranian leaders should view their Turkish counterparts as key regional geopolitical, strategic and economic partners due to the fact that the Arab Gulf countries have been Iran’s competitors and rivals rather that its natural allies.

Even after the JCPOA was reached, Turkey was among the nations that welcomed the deal and lifted sanctions on Iran regardless of the fact that some of its allies had opposed the plan.

Due to all of these landscapes as well as common interests and objectives, the leaderships of both Iran and Turkey must come to realize that they need each other’s cooperation now more than at any other time in the past. Iranian policy makers should understand that Turkey can play an important role in building bridges between the West and Tehran. It has been proven to Iran that Turkey is a reliable and trusted partner. Turkey faithfully sided with Iran, supporting its neighbor at a most vulnerable time, when tensions reached their height over Iran’s controversial nuclear program.

President Erdoğan repeatedly vouched for Iran’s compliance and peaceful intentions with its nuclear program at a time when there was growing alarm regarding the threat of Iran developing a nuclear arsenal. This was a significant psychological boost for the Iranians as the key question was Iran’s lack of compliance with IAEA safeguards. Even after the JCPOA was reached, Turkey was among the nations that welcomed the deal and lifted sanctions on Iran regardless of the fact that some of its allies had opposed the plan.

Strengthening the economic partnership between the two countries may reduce the sense of vulnerability each has toward the other. Both partners should increase the level of bilateral direct investment as an option to soften the impact of possible tensions emanating from political differences in the future. The leaderships of the two countries are well aware that having a strong economy and forming mutual dependencies through establishing economic partnerships with neighbors are prerequisites of achieving the status of a strong regional power. In this context, it would be beneficial for both nations to pursue pragmatic bilateral trade policies and concentrate on lessening political tensions, factors that would enable them to gain more than they would lose.

Considering the advanced age, 76 years, and the poor health of Khamenei, there is a possibility that the newly elected Assembly will be charged with electing Iran’s third Supreme Leader. Secondly, the elections, especially for the parliament, came at a critical time with advantages for the non-conservative fronts. The nuclear deal reached between Iran and the P5+1 countries which consists of US, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany and the consequent lifting of longstanding and burdensome sanctions on the former came shortly before the elections for which the Rouhani government was given credit. Rouhani demonstrated his intention to carry a similar dialogue process to solve some of the pressing domestic problems such as restoring the freedom of the two reformist leaders, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohsen Karoubi, who have been sentenced to house arrest because of their involvement in the Green Movement in 2009. Thus, conservative power holders, most notably the Supreme Leader, used every opportunity, during and after the nuclear talks, to denounce the Americans and warn Iranians of the malevolent enemy, closing the door on such expectations.

Considering the advanced age, 76 years, and the poor health of Khamenei, there is a possibility that the newly elected Assembly will be charged with electing Iran’s third Supreme Leader.

With a slightly over 60 percent voter turnout, 68 of the 290 seats in parliament had remained empty on February 26 when no clear winner emerged; according to the Iranian laws, a candidate must win at least 25 percent of votes cast in an electoral district to qualify as a deputy. These 69 deputies have been elected in the runoff election held on April 29, 2016. A number of distinctively Iranian features – some essential, others conjectural- make a comprehensive appraisal of the election results challenging. For instance, no political parties as such exist in Iran and the seats of the deputies are determined by drawing lots every six months. Besides, only about half of those who registered to run for parliament, 6,229 out of 12,000, were approved by the Council of Guardians. So, many notable reformists were disqualified by the Council and Iran experienced yet another conservatively well-engineered pre-election process. Further, the right–left political spectrum as it exists in Iran hardly makes any sense in other contexts. Therefore, one should not overstate the results in favor of the vaguely defined reformists.

Yet, certainly the results were utterly disheartening for the conservatives who lost all of the capital’s 30 parliamentary seats to the “List of Hope” of the reformist-moderate fronts. For instance, while Mohammad-Reza Aref, the former presidential candidate and a professed reformist, was among the thirty elected deputies from Tehran, Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, the principal candidate of the conservative camp, was denied a seat in parliament. A similar result came out of the Assembly of Experts’ elections. While Rouhani and former President Hashemi Rafsanjani were elected to the Assembly such principle conservative figures as Muhammad Yazdi, the current ultraconservative Chairman of the Assembly, and Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, one of the protagonists of conservative thinking, could not make their way to the new Assembly.

Elections and Domestic Politics

For a long time, Iran’s Middle East policies have turned attention away from its domestic developments and towards its foreign policies. The country seemed to many a monolithic body which, say, pursued harmonious policies to preserve its strongholds in Iraq or Syria or conducted painstaking talks over its nuclear question. Yet, major disagreements between conservatives and non-conservatives have existed throughout; disagreements which surfaced again during the last weeks. Now that the next presidential elections are only a year and a half away Iran has a lot to debate at home. Above all there are economic issues which are among the direst problems for most Iranians. Inflation is still high, the number of the unemployed is on the rise, income inequality is becoming greater and even the essentials are getting harder for low income groups to afford. The nuclear deal has not yet produced the expected outcomes for the Iranian economy. The economic problems are and will continue to be amongst the most challenging for the Rouhani government.

It is safe to suggest that the gap between the conservative and reformist policies will continue to widen in the newly elected 10th Parliament.

There is also the current government’s reformist agenda. Although Rouhani and other prominent moderates and reformists are among the outspoken supporters of the Revolution and the Islamic Republic regime they differ from the conservatives on some crucial points. They see the future of the regime in being willing and able to meet the plausible popular demands which can fill the growing gap between the state and society. Economically speaking, they favor, in the words of Rouhani, a ‘competitive economy’ which will attract foreign capital into the country, while the conservatives see, what Khamenei calls, a ‘defensive economy,’ which basically refers to the promotion of home industries that will remove the need for foreign imports, as the only viable policy.

The favorable election results will bring a challenge on a macro level since the frustrated conservatives will probably follow more aggressive policies against the government. Therefore, it is safe to suggest that the gap between the conservative and reformist policies will continue to widen in the newly elected 10th Parliament. Also, disheartened by the long list of disqualified candidates many pro-reform voters boycotted the elections. Rouhani needs to convince them to vote for the next presidential elections in 2017 for which his economy performance, but not only, will play the determining role. Yet, considering the many inexperienced deputies and the numerous moderates who have been elected from the ‘List of Hope’ and the approximately 80 independent deputies as potentially key groups in parliamentary politics, it is not clear to what extent they will be able to back the Rouhani government and act harmoniously. On his Labor Day speech, Rouhani commented on the results and said that, “people chose the best people in the elections, and we are happy that the next parliament will be more coordinated with the government.” This, more than anything else, remains to be seen.

Iran and its Neighbors

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent a clear message to friends and foes alike that Turkey is strictly against sectarian policies and denounced any attempts at deepening the divide between Sunnis and Shiites.

Having lifted the Western-imposed isolation by the nuclear deal, Iran is on the edge of a new isolation, this time by its Sunni neighbors which have been disillusioned by the former’s regional policies, as reflected in the Final Communique of the 13th Session of the Islamic Summit Conference held in Istanbul in mid-May 2016. In that, Iran was deliberately criticized for supporting terrorism and interfering in the affairs of Middle Eastern countries including Syria and Yemen. Further, in his speech during the Summit, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent a clear message to friends and foes alike that Turkey is strictly against sectarian policies and denounced any attempts at deepening the divide between Sunnis and Shiites.

It would be an overestimation to suppose that the Rouhani government is necessarily at odds with the conservative establishment on such critical foreign policy issues as Iraq, Syria and Yemen but it certainly supports more friendly relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors, primarily Turkey. Rouhani declared, in his visit to Ankara following the Summit, his intention to improve relations with Turkey and added that the post-sanctions era brought about a suitable environment for such a development. The new parliament provides a good opportunity for both Rouhani and Iran’s neighbors, primarily Turkey, to build mutually beneficial and reciprocal relationships. This can also help solve some of the region’s chronic problems.

The way out from such a subjective evaluation is to expose, on the ground of minority rights, whether or not such interventionist actors act solely or primarily in their own interests, or truly in the interest of the sectarian groups with whom they share similar sectarian sensitivities.If a policy specifically focuses on the rights of only a certain minority sect, rather than being a general policy or approach to minority rights, then it is possible to claim that such an attitude signals sectarian politics.The answer to the second question is easier. That is to say, if states or non-state actors take advantage of the same or similar sectarian identities of others in different countries to serve their interests only, then such states or non-state actors are definitely engaged in sectarian politics.

The aim of a state in such a case is not to, in essence, protect the aforementioned minorities, but to use sectarian ties with the minorities as a means to accomplish their own foreign policy objectives.

The answer to the question of why some states generally use minorities, who share common sectarian identities with them, in ways that harm them, is hidden in the nature of international affairs.

States competing with each other for superiority not only use military, economic and diplomatic instruments in their struggles; they also use peoples (often by leveraging their ethnic, sectarian and/or class identities) as tools in these struggles.

From this perspective, the identities of the (minority) people that differ from those in their home countries, but overlap with those of the other (interfering) countries may become part of the “soft power” of the latter.

Today, such politics are drawing not only the Middle East, but also other territories of Islam into conflicts, due to the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia in sectarian politics.

However, if these like-identities (sectarian similarities in particular) are used as a means to gain advantage in power politics, they inflict almost unhealable wounds in the Middle East. The sectarian dimensions of clashes to which some regional countries were drawn during the Arab Revolutions clearly attest to this problem.

The answer to the third question signals sectarian politics also. In other words, the activities of regional countries to spread their own sectarian values in other Muslim countries (Shi’ization, Salafization, or Sunnization) represent another aspect of sectarian politics.

Why some countries follow such sectarian politics boils down to two answers – one theological, the other political. From a theological perspective, the propensity to be intolerant of anothers’ religion, to staunchly defend (or impose) one’s own religious perspective over those of others, has always been a fact of social groups. In this perspective, the Shi’ization, Salafization, or Sunnization efforts of radical groups may be interpreted as a kind of missionary activity.

From a political perspective, a state may seek to increase the number of communities with common sectarian features in other countries in order to increase its soft power.

Such sectarian activities, instigated by many Middle Eastern countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia in particular, increase the feeling of insecurity in the region. States that view sectarian activities as a threat to their security describe other actors involved in such activities as enemies, and initiate similar counter activities themselves.

In light of the above determinations, it is possible to identify sectarian politics as follows:

If a state or a non-state actor follows a policy to take advantage of the common sectarian identities of peoples in other countries for self-gain, or if it is involved in similar sectarian activities in other countries to increase the number of such communities in other territories to use them for its own interests, or if it interferes in the internal affairs of other countries with the excuse of protecting the rights of minority sects, then that country follows sectarian foreign politics.

However, it is important not to be satisfied with such a definition while answering the question of “What is sectarian politics?” as the consequences of sectarian politics must also be analyzed. In every period of history, policies which place sectarian identities at center stage, and use them as a means for political gains, have resulted in disasters for the targeted peoples.

Pro-sectarian politics is one of the most important obstacles to the development of a politics of cooperation in the Middle East based on a win-win scenario. Today, such politics are drawing not only the Middle East, but also other territories of Islam into conflicts, due to the competition particularly between Iran and Saudi Arabia in sectarian politics. For example, Salafi organizations supported by Saudi Arabia and radical Shiite groups backed by Iran play a pivotal role in sectarian clashes in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

If the actors behind sectarian conflicts in the region recognize the damage they inflict and understand that such conflicts do more harm to themselves than good, such awareness will be the way out of the regional conflicts caused by sectarian politics.

Having respect for the sectarian identity of the other party, abstaining from involvement in missionary activities among peoples of other countries, and not turning sectarian identities in other lands into tools for power politics, will eliminate the possible damages incurred by the sectarian frame of mind.