When the crisis in Syria began, Turkey was not prepared to absorb such a large number of refugees. The international community was also caught off guard, as there were not any physical presence of international aid organizations to help in providing the basic humanitarian needs for Syrians. But local response did come through; groups and members of the civil society that are not affiliated with formal humanitarian agencies took on the burden of assisting Syrian refugees in Turkey. The Turkish government was also involved through the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) in establishing refugee camps near the border that currently host around 250,000 people.

http://thenewturkey.org/distant-suffering-images-of-the-syrian-war/

However, the majority of Syrians reside outside camps, and they have been in urgent need for even the most essential elements for survival. Upon that, the primary focus of the local response in the beginning was on providing emergency shelter and supplies to families in need. As it became clearer that the war in Syria will not be short lived, local NGOs have recently started to shift their focus on initiating long-term projects that would contribute to the personal development of Syrians, most importantly providing education to children.

As time passed by, international NGOs initiated their own response and came forward to support Syrians in their struggle for survival, with the primary focus being on providing sanitation, shelter, and distributing aid. Unfortunately, this matter was still not sufficient. Attention was mostly given to primary survival needs, to a level where other social needs were often disregarded. Because of that, children became the main victims behind the lack of proper attention towards education.

The number of school-aged Syrians surpasses 800,000 children. Even after six years of hosting Syrians in Turkey, the fact that over 40% of these children still remain out of school proves that this matter was not properly addressed from the beginning. Temporary Education Centers (GEM) host the largest number of Syrian children, with over 300,000. This clearly sheds light upon how important these centers, initiated by local NGOs, are in providing even a basic form of education for children. Local Turkish and Syrian NGOs have clearly proven themselves to be successful in establishing GEMs. Without them, efforts of the UN and other major donors are destined to fail, as those NGOs are the ones in charge of implementing such projects in the field.

International donors from around the world often have different humanitarian priorities. These differences are clearly visible in the failure of the international community to properly address the unfortunate situation of Syrian refugees. The UN has been mainly occupied in administering the urgent needs of Syrians. However, the time has come to direct more attention towards long term sustainable development projects through empowerment, education, and providing economic opportunities for Syrians to strive.

Unfortunately, other problems persist with international agencies in general. Due to their strict conditions on direct cash assistance to local NGOs, aid and funding has been mainly going to where it is most easily provided and not where it is mostly needed. Western donors lack the necessary flexibility to adapt to changes that arise in the field. The field is in constant change, particular assessment upon which assistance was provided may strongly differ by the time the required procedure takes place and aid arrives. That is why it is crucial for donors to be more flexible in allowing local NGOs to provide assistance where they deem is most needed.

http://thenewturkey.org/securing-a-future-for-syrian-women-in-turkey/

Local NGOs and members of civil society have been by far more productive in achieving results than even the UN is capable of doing. Yet, governments and international organizations still find it hard to recognize the important role of NGOs, in a context of truly achieving a sustainable and adequate response to refugee problems. Collaboration ought to be enhanced on the national, as well as international level. This will facilitate coordination to anticipate any future refugee flow. To do so, Turkish NGOs need to work on establishing a refugee protection network to facilitate the exchange of information amongst themselves at the very least.

Turkey is a milestone within the global humanitarian system. The world could have certainly expended more effort to address the Syrian refugee crisis. Turkey has surely taken the initiative, except that it cannot face the challenge all by itself. An attempt ought to be made to put an end to the suffering of the most vulnerable. A global initiative under the name of “No Lost Generation” has already been launched to secure the future of Syrian children. The efforts of humanitarians and governments to strengthen the capacities and potential of young children is considered to be amongst the largest initiatives attempting to solve this situation. Yet more work needs to be done.

It is immoral to look upon the number of Syrian children as statistics – every child matters. Providing access to education ought to be the main target for international organizations, and that can only be achieved by enhancing and developing the capacity of local NGOs working in the field. Turkish NGOs are overwhelmed and much work has yet to be done. The fate of Syrian refugees rests on the shoulders of the international community.

There is an idiom in German, which says, “I think I am in the wrong movie” (Ich glaube ich bin im falschen Film) to describe a situation, which is totally incomprehensible and nonsensical. This idiom describes exactly the position of Europe, especially Germany, but also the position other pro-PKK European politicians and countries take currently on issues concerning Turkey.

Imagine there is a newspaper in your country (here the daily newspaper Cumhuriyet), which leaks official secrets on its front page. It is indeed an opposition media organization, but this does not matter in this case at all. Besides, the so-called leaked information is more a defamation against the state than representation of the truth. It was a story about trucks used by the MIT (National Intelligence Service of Turkey). The trucks were on a secret mission carrying humanitarian aid to displaced people in Syria.

The state of course investigated the responsible people, especially the editor-in-chief of the newspaper, Can Dündar. However, foreign diplomats, the representatives of various nations in Turkey, attended the trial and took group selfies to show support for Dündar. This behaviour does not meet international standards of diplomacy. What is more, recently Germany gave him citizenship out of a clear blue sky. Since then, Can Dündar has been honoured with an award for freedom from the city government of Paris. It is also worth pointing out that he won a Freedom of Press Award.

If Dündar is a journalist, then, one wonders why Edward Snowden is charged with treason. Instead of being honoured with a German citizenship and awarded with a freedom of speech award, Snowden is imprisoned in an embassy for years without any attention from Western state leaders. Quite tragic. If Snowden could succeed at just being enough anti-Erdoğan and leaking things putting his personality or the Turkish government in a tight spot, he could have higher chances of being embraced by Germany. Pity for him.

Yet, what are we supposed to do with ethical journalism when it comes to leaking official secrets? Is the leaking of official secrets something that be considered part of the freedom of the press? It is doubtful. If the criminal act committed by Dündar is considered a matter of freedom of press, then, how should we evaluate Snowden’s case?

Germany, in fact, generally seems to have no problem receiving all kinds of people looking to thwart democratically elected governments, including coup plotters, with open arms.

Firstly, the man now referred to as President of Egypt, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has been welcomed as a “democrat.”  Sisi got no private lessons on democracy and human rights from top German officials, as it is often done enthusiastically with Turkish president Erdoğan. It seems like Germany has sometimes a problem with elected presidents when it comes to coup plotters. Besides, el-Sisi has been “democratized” with a magic wand, namely a newspaper article by Germany. The same magicians apparently work to make a dictator out of Erdoğan through media coverage. That is not how it should work with democracy and dictatorship.

Take for instance the case of FETO (Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization). Western countries again seem to be failing at taking the right position and supporting democracy, liberty, and freedom in Turkey. Germany opened its arms to the coup plotters, allowing them to remain in the country and seek political asylum. So, what was the fault of Syrian refugees? Was it that they were running for their lives and sought shelter in Europe?

The PKK and its affiliated terrorist organizations are responsible for at least 7 suicide attacks in the last two years in Turkey, and have killed more than 600 people, 377 of them from security forces. In the midst of intensified PKK violence, the HDP co-chair Figen Yüksekdağ said their party “leans on the PYD”, the Syrian branch of the PKK.  HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş openly praised an independent Kurdistan in Turkey and said, “There will be the reality of Kurdistan in the next century.”

HDP lawmakers also apparently never see any harm in attending PKK terrorists’ funerals. There is clear evidence that HDP MPs and municipalities backed PKK terrorists. Consequently, they lost their immunity and then now face legal prosecution.

Unsurprisingly, Germany was very reactionary, eager and supportive of the HDP politicians turning a deaf ear and blind eye to their ties to PKK.

Does it still make sense to re-emphasize that the PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by several states and organizations, including NATO, the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. A differentiation between “my terrorist” and “your terrorist” does not help to build world peace. Nor representing the operations against the PKK and its supporters as violations against the Kurdish people.

We believe we are in the wrong movie. The supposedly universal standards of democracy are upside down and hardly recognizable. A democratic state taking a hard line with terrorists and coup plotters is accused of being undemocratic, while criminals are welcomed and praised in Western democracies.

The Colombian Experience

The Colombian government and the FARC rebels struggled to reach a peace agreement for almost half a decade and recently came to the point of agreement to terminate the conflict that had been ongoing for more than 50 years. Colombia’s peace agreement between the government and the FARC rebels was overshadowed by the referendum on October 2, 2016. The referendum demonstrated the unwillingness of the majority of Colombians to accept the terms of the peace deal signed between the government and the leaders of FARC. The referendum does not mean the complete failure of the peace process but it does signify the failure of public diplomacy and leadership. A slight majority of Colombians disapproved of some of the measures in the peace accord. The most controversial part of the accord concerned the future of the FARC militants and the government’s security personnel who were involved in inhumane actions during the conflict. Those who had committed war crimes or atrocities during the conflict would have reduced sentences and the majority of FARC militants would be granted amnesty, if the accord was approved. President Juan Manuel Santos, who very recently won the Nobel Peace Prize of 2016, was unable to push the terms of the accord and he is likely to be criticized for the results of the referendum. There are many lessons to be learned and insights to be gained from Colombia’s experience in terms of maintaining a successful peace process.

Balancing the traumas and losses of the past and expectations for the future, balancing the concerns of the victims/victims’ families and the perpetrators, balancing the peace and justice components, and at the same time convincing the people of the necessity for change is a delicate task. There is a multiplicity of stakeholders, issues, thresholds, and critical moments. Handling a successful peace process necessitates well-balanced and well-managed relationships among all of these dynamics. For the decision makers, maintaining an effective peace process requires a wide range of skills. As can be seen in the Colombian case, public support for the peace process is critical and becomes more important in democratic countries.

Turkey’s Reconciliation Process

In the recent past, Turkey experienced the impacts of a failed peace initiative in Cyprus. Kofi Annan’s peace deal regarding Cyprus was rejected in the Greek Cypriots referendum in 2004, despite the Turkish Cypriots’ approval. The failure of the Annan Peace Plan halted Turkey’s EU membership process. A more dramatic example from Turkey are the failed peace initiatives relating to the Kurdish issue. The lack of public support for the Kurdish peace initiatives affected the AK Party government’s peace efforts twice in the last decade. Turkey’s earlier peace initiative, the “Kurdish Opening,” was overshadowed and halted after the ceremonial return of 34 PKK members from the Habur border gate in October 2009. More than 50,000 people celebrated the return of the PKK militants in the border town of Silopi. This event led to public outrage in the rest of the country and the government backed down from the process. This development signified the role of strong public support in Turkish government.

Elections are also important tests for leaders who take the burden of peace processes. A sharp decline in public approval during the peace process may constitute a serious set-back. A dramatic decline in votes for the governing AK party at the June 7, 2015, general election was a serious blow to the “Reconciliation Process.” Despite this, immediately after the elections, the “Reconciliation Process” came to an end due to the PKK’s attacks on Turkish security forces that were mostly related to the developments taking place in Syria and Iraq. The June 7 elections were, at the same time, a serious test for the Kurdish peace initiative, and strong support for the governing AK Party might have ensured that the process endured. Following the reign of PKK violence, the HDP, the Kurdish ethno-nationalist party represented in the assembly, was chastised by the public in the November 1 repeat elections. The HDP’s votes in the general election declined from 13.12% to 10.76%. The AK Party’s new anti-terror campaign boosted popular support for the party in a very short period of time. The AK Party increased its popular support from 40.87% to 49.5%. This dramatic change was not due solely to the peace process, but the process did play a significant role. It is always crucial for political leaders to retain public support and to boost approval. Leaders with weak public backing cannot hope to make peace in democratic countries.

Peace Processes and Public Opinion

The failure of the Colombian referendum to ratify the peace accord will not necessarily end the process. This failure may slow it down, but what has been achieved so far is an important accomplishment. If the parties are sincere and maintain their commitment to the process, the terms of the peace deal might be re-negotiated. The situation is bleaker for Turkey due to the level of violence caused by the PKK in the aftermath of the failure of the peace process in July 2015. What is promising for Turkey is the experience of rapid normalization during the peace process. Despite the uncertainties in Iraq and Syria, the public in Turkey may push the government for a new chance. Without a clear roadmap, guidelines, contingency planning, and a public diplomacy framework, the government is unlikely to meet the challenges and uncertainties of a revised peace process.

Fourth, there are two main options for Turkish-American relations going forward.  First, the United States may convincingly demonstrate that it will not employ the Gülenists, or any other similar instrument, to exert influence in the Turkish military, bureaucracy, judiciary, media, and politics-at-large. Exerting such influence through covert networks is against the spirit of a genuine “alliance” between two sovereign political entities. According to leading Turkish policy-makers, including President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Yıldırım, the minimum prerequisite for the pursuit of this option seems to be the extradition of Fethullah Gülen from the United States to Turkey, which would signal the willingness of the United States to recalibrate bilateral relations as a genuine alliance.

The second option is the breakup of the Turkish-American alliance, and Turkey’s realignment with one or several other great powers to balance against the United States, since the United States would then be reclassified as a hostile power for sheltering Gülen and the leading Gülenists, who are implicated in the failed coup plot. Moreover, the United States may even be designated as the foreign state sponsor of Gülenist terrorism against Turkey. Russia, Brazil, Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, Pakistan, and France are among the many middle or great powers with which Turkey has established amicable relations, at least for a limited time (in the case of Russia and Iran), under AK Party governments since 2002. Russia is the most likely and nearby great power with which Turkey may seek to build such a balancing coalition in the near future. Turkish Eurasianists, an ideologically pro-Russian group composed of Kemalists, Maoists, and other leftist nationalists, have advocated such a pro-Russian reorientation in Turkish foreign policy for almost the past two decades, as I argued and demonstrated in my articles in Turkish Studies(2015) and in Ab Imperio (2004). However, pro-Russian sympathies go far beyond this radical intellectual movement in Turkey after the failed military coup, for various reasons.

Russian President Putin was the first major world leader to call President Erdoğan on the day after the military coup attempt to state his support for the democratically elected government of Turkey, and Russia is the first country to which Erdoğan will be paying an official visit since the coup. These two observations alone are indicative of a palpable pro-Russian reorientation after the coup. There are even reports, emphatically accepted and circulated by some Turkish journalists, that Russian intelligence warned Erdoğan just hours before the impending coup, even though there is no official verification of these reports. Moreover, the Turkish pilots who shot down a Russian bomber aircraft in November 24, 2015, which brought Turkey and Russia to the brink of war, have been taken into custody as suspects in the Gülenist conspiracy. This incident is cited as evidence of Gülenists deliberately trying to instigate a military conflict between Russia and Turkey, in the service of US interests.

Fifth, any new alliance that Turkey may form with another great power, including Russia, is unlikely to be as asymmetric and as exclusive as the Turkish-American alliance has been since Turkey’s entry into NATO in 1952. There is at least one objective and one subjective/attitudinal reason for this. Objectively, there is no other great power whose military economic capabilities would massively overshadow Turkey’s capabilities as do those of the United States. Thus, if a Turkish-Russian alliance was to be established, for example, the difference in bilateral military economic capabilities would not be as incomparable or as asymmetric as the difference in bilateral capabilities in the Turkish-American alliance. I have argued elsewhere that the military economic capability gap between Russia and Turkey closed considerably with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, only to widen somewhat with the rise in oil prices in the early 2000s. Subjectively, if Turkish-American alliance breaks up precisely because of the anti-American public opinion that the asymmetry of this alliance engendered over time, it is unlikely that the Turkish public opinion would be convinced to be part of another asymmetric alliance.

Finally, despite all of the above, it is still more likely, for structural reasons and simple path dependence, that the Turkish-American alliance will persist after a lengthy and tortuous renegotiation, in which significant political capital will have to be spent on both sides of the Atlantic. If such a renegotiation of the alliance succeeds, in the end, Turkey will continue to be a key US ally as it has been since 1952, but Turkey’s status within the Western alliance might then resemble that of France, a country that has been a US ally but with a set of preferences and priorities that differ significantly from the United States in certain important respects.

It suffices to remember that, as late as 2003, France led the opposition to the Iraq War within NATO, and Turkey surprised the world, including many Turks themselves, by refusing to participate in the US-led invasion of Iraq (although French foreign policy in general changed significantly during Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency). These kinds of disagreements are to be expected and should be respected and tolerated in a genuinely multilateral alliance. The American-British initiative to invade Iraq, executed with a “coalition of the willing,” and its disastrous consequences for millions of Iraqis and the wider Middle East, including Turkey, provides a tragic cautionary tale against the dangers of asymmetric alliances with unilateral decision making.

Coming to the other part of your question as to why there is a more critical view on the Turkish government: simply, the reason is mainly that Turkey has become more independent, more powerful and more incisive.

With regard to the religious or conservative values of the Turkish people, I think, yes, this is very important: one should not forget that everything that president Erdoğan did when he was a prime minister was on the basis of the secular constitution from 1982. Even though, Erdoğan is very unfairly portrayed as a “Sultan” or an “Islamist,” he clearly followed secular politics. There is neither an Islamic constitution in Turkey nor even is it likely one will come soon. So the constant mentioning of Islam and of the Muslim identity of the Turkish people does not reflect the true course of things. Commentators and journalists in Germany should know this fact well but just prefer to ignore it. I definitely agree with you that for a section of our media landscape there is a radicalization and polarization.

So, do you think the reason behind negative attitude is bad journalism or deliberate manipulation? Are we talking about ideologically charged and detached quarters, commentators or journalists?

I think we have both. We have definitely a dissolving and a lowering of journalist professional standards and equally an economic pressure in the production of media. This is definitely one reason and I think this an important one. But not all media is under financial pressure. Money is not always the chief reason. It also has something to do with the domestic politics of Germany as well as with ideological motives. There are ideologically driven people who color or taint the coverage of Turkish issues in accordance with their ideology. That is definitely true.

I think when people write about Turkey, they are actually writing about themselves.

I might be wrong but I think that when people write about Turkey, they are actually writing about themselves. You know the famous legal axiom that “the enemy is one owns’ question as ‘Gestalt’”. That means, when we deal with issues regarding Turkish politics, we put Islam and Muslims into the same package. Of course, these questions are not irrelevant for European and German identity. Since German society is in an identity crisis, it is easier to deal with this crises by reflecting it on the other.

And yes, we have ideologically charged and entangled writers, commentators and journalists. I don’t want to list them one by one, but we certainly have them. They have been to Turkey, they wrote and commented about it. Reasons and intentions are mixed. Some of those people come from the former conservative right. Maybe the background of their negative handling of Turkey is also related to the issue pertaining to Islam, to Muslims, to immigration. So it is a kind of proxy war. You see? We have people, who come from a left wing background. For them it is easier to relate the issue to “international solidarity” and supposed “human rights.” We should also keep in mind that some people just report what you perceive negative or critical because that is the truth as they perceive it.

When it comes to making news about foreign countries, do you think German media prefers to act in unison with the German government? Or how frequently do they diverge? As far as I remember there were plenty of negative news and comments about the Iranian government when economic sanctions were applied to Iran just couple of years ago. It was a habit, in this regard, to lift up the voices of Iranian opposition vis-à-vis the Iranian government officials. But now Germany is trying to establish a good relationship with the Iranian government and German officials and private companies are signing economic agreements during their visits to Iran. Did the perspective of the German mainstream media changed accordingly with the change of the government policy towards Iran? And importantly, can you compare reflections of the former Iranian and current Turkish cases on German mainstream media?

That might have been the case in the fifties and sixties when we still had remnants of old German authoritarianism in the German society during the post war period. But nowadays, I don’t see it. I think it is rather the other way around. I think rather the politicians are interested in finding a public mood. To find it, they go to the media. And they diverge quite often. German media has its blind spots.

We all know the situation in Turkey over the past decade. I cannot remember in the nineties and eighties that the issue of human rights or even the issues of Kurdish minority was a big subject for the German policy, not at all. They didn’t care about it. Turkey was a NATO member, Turkey was a foreign state, Turkey was important for defense of the southern NATO front and we didn’t care about the rest. I find it quite hypocritical that suddenly they are interested in human rights in Turkey. It is very hypocritical.

Now suddenly the Saudis are becoming the bad guys. Two or three years ago, Saudi Arabia was the best friend but suddenly they’re vilified.

You’re giving the Iranian example. It is actually a very interesting one. I realize when I speak to people from the region that the change of the perception of Iran is not something exclusively German. This process is initiated by American foreign policy. The Obama government pushed the lifting of sanctions. They want to draw back from the Gulf. They want to engage now their limited forces in East Asia. The Americans accepted Iran as being a limited hegemon in the Persian Gulf region and this is an overall Western thing and nowadays I think with some unjustification, now suddenly the Saudis are becoming the bad guys. Two or three years ago, Saudi Arabia was the best friend but suddenly they’re vilified.

I think the case is more representative. Let’s say for modern media or western media, then of international media because that’s actually the position of the Russian and Chinese media too. That would be my comment of it. But also it does not necessarily mean that they embrace Iran or the Iranian policy. They just shift their positions in a way so Teheran could be a partner of interest because Iran is a big market. Some people say that it could become the biggest steel producer in the world. Everybody is waiting that the doors are opening so they can invest and make a lot of money while the Saudi market is saturated and also the Saudis now announce a reform program that they want to produce more and more of their own stuff.

After the nuclear deal, Germany was one of the first countries to sign economic agreements with Iran, which shows where their concerns lie. Right?

Ethical foreign policy only applies to weak governments. Our president, for example, was in Myanmar and didn’t mention the treatment of the Muslim minority in Myanmar with a single word.

It’s one of the arguments to show that the so called ethical foreign policy which was initiated by Joschka Fischer only applies to weak governments. You cannot or do not apply it to places like China, or to any country where you have strategic and economic interests. I mean for example the behavior of the German foreign policy towards Uzbekistan, which is a dreadful government. It is a case in point. Or Myanmar, our president was in Myanmar and didn’t mention the treatment of the Muslim minority in Myanmar with a single word. The German foreign, let’s say, the human rights oriented German foreign policy is quite selective.

There is a recent debate on the Böhmermann affair and this happened after you submitted your very article about the same subject for Insight Turkey. Would you like to comment on that? None talked about what he said. Do you think the press freedom can be debated separately from the content of the news itself?

This case needs a bit of clear thinking. Let’s take politics and diplomacy out and try to consider the issue only from a legal perspective. The offended party is the Turkish president Tayyip Erdoğan. According to law he has the right to go to trial himself. None can do it for him. I think the president has very good cause and reason to do it. And that’s it. I think that would have been the best situation. I don’t want to comment on the content of what he said. Because it leads to a kind of interpretation. Some people say no, it was just a media comment. Imagine what would happen, if the same thing would have happened with Benyamin Netanyahu!

Imagine what would happen, if the Böhmermann affair would have happened with Benyamin Netanyahu!

In Germany, normally – except some rare cases – politicians don’t go to trial with satirists. Helmut Kohl, for instance, had a lot of enemies and for sixteen years he was viciously attacked. But he never put someone to trial. Bringing the issue to the court was an option as much as keeping silent. Because what these satirists cannot stand is silence. You just don’t mention or comment on them. Just silence. Alternatively it would have also been an option to bring issue to the court and then remain silent. No statements to press, no comment, just say – this is a legal case. In German inner politics it would have functioned like this.

Do you think press freedom can be debated separately from the content of the news?

I am very much in favor of press freedom. But I like to see strong libel laws. It’s basically the old British model that they had for more than a century or two. They have total press freedom, but they also have libel laws, which means if a person was libeled s/he could go to court with quite tough sanctions like money and prison sentences. On the other hand, if we do not separate it, then the law could become subjective. Then one can make rules arbitrarily. This is a dangerous road. I am speaking as a German Muslim, because there are attempts to silence us and to limit our freedom of speech. And I don’t want my freedom of speech limited. So I have to give the same freedom to the opponent. In Germany, when Muslims speak freely, they are not put on to trial, but there is a media campaign against them. But there is nothing to do against such media campaigns. I think it is good as it is. One can and should stand it.

And how about the question from where one has to draw limit or how to limit power of journalist?

We really wish financially powerful Individuals or companies in the Muslim world like Turkey or Malaysia would invest in genuine European Muslim projects.

In Europe, there are certain tendencies in the legal system. For example, there were, as far as I know, between seventeen and twenty cases who went to the European court in Strasbourg concerning the competing rights of religious and press freedom. And in every case, press and media freedom won. This is almost a tradition. Even if the lower echelons of the law might give you positive decisions, the upper one will not. Because that is how it is. I think at the end, the only way to do it is by hard work – and by good PR work. Even by buying a newspaper. There are some newspapers on sale in Germany. Buy a newspaper and turn it slowly into the direction you want! That is a legitimate thing. There is nothing illegal. Just make your own media presence. We really wish financially powerful Individuals or companies in the Muslim world like Turkey or Malaysia would realize this and invest seriously in genuine European Muslim projects.

And coming to our last question, what is your prospect for future where the position of “oppositional” German media is in sharp contrast to Turkish government or critical and revisionist outlook is predominating?

It depends on certain issues like the outcome of the Syrian refugee crises or the handling of the EU-Turkish accord. How it is handled, how it is dealt with, how it is practiced. I think Turkey is successful. And success is itself always a good argument. If the economic policies continue and the numbers remain positive, the Turkish government can make the use of it.

When people speak about the government of president Erdogan, they never mention his quite successful fight against inflation, which is the biggest killer of the small people, of the poor.

Say whatever you think about us, in fourteen years Ankara created a far more adjusted society compared to the decades before of corruption and mistreatment of resources and politics, and inflation.

I mean one interesting thing is, when people speak about the government of president Erdogan, and then prime minister, they never mention his quite successful fight against inflation, which is the biggest killer of the small people, of the poor. Likewise, they won’t mention a large chunk of the foreign debts, which is in fact a huge success and should be promoted for a greater public. I mean look where Turkey is and where Greece is. You have to understand that media is not a global vending machine, where you go and want something. If you want something, you need to get it done yourself.

The devastation of an historic city with an unplanned urban landscape and uncontrolled growth, including poor and non-developed urban slums, has brought with it new challenges as well as opportunities. Europe saw a great renewal and reconstruction of its historic cities after World War II. It supplied the builders with ample chances for creating cities equipped with modern streets, sanitation systems and innovative lodging. City planners, composed of miscellaneous scholarly disciplines like social and urban history, geography, architecture and town planning and political science, created functionally differentiated separate zones of housing, industry, culture, government and recreation. This way of reimagining Europe’s cities was common to both fascist and democratic countries.

Needless to say, urban reconstruction is a complex task with enormous potential for conflict that policy-makers have to tackle.

Needless to say, urban reconstruction is a complex task with enormous potential for conflict that policy-makers have to tackle: the clearance of the rubble and debris, financing the renewal project, the allocation of building material and labor, the extent of the possibility of historic cities being amenable to urban renewal during reconstruction, the creation of new streets and social amenities, the possibility of planning the city with functionally distinct zones in order to keep housing, commerce, industry and culture separate, deciding about the population density, the dilemma of building historic cities with a modern conception while keeping its traditional fabric intact, and the like. On top of all, there are two crucial questions: Who will make decisions for the city? The central government, the local town authorities, or private individuals? And how will priorities be determined vis-a-vis urban needs?

All of the queries listed above inform the debate sparked by the Sur Renewal Project (Sur İhya Projesi) initiated by the AK Party government. The Council of Ministers took the decision of  “urgent expropriation” of 6,300 parcels scattered along 15 neighborhoods of Sur, which included the building of the Sur Municipality, some hotels, and the Cemil Pasha Mansion in March 2016. This decision was contested by the Diyarbakır Bar Association before the Higher Administrative Court (Danıştay) and is still awaiting a final decision. Former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu had announced the Sur Renewal Project in Diyarbakır on April 1, 2016. According to what Davutoğlu said, the project will be based on the consent of, and reconciliation with, the local residents. The starting point of the project is UNESCO’s 2015 decision, which placed the city within the scope of World Heritage Sites, and the 2012  Reconstruction Plan for Conservation that involved both the central government and the Diyarbakır Greater Municipality as its executive partners.

Rebuilding Sur while retaining its traditional fabric is an indispensable element of the project. The participation of Sur residents in the relevant decisions throughout the process would be taken as a must, and their ownership rights would be protected. Inner Sur would be restored in accordance with its multi-faith and multicultural character, and be organized as a tourist attraction. The facade of houses in Gazi Street, the main street of Sur, will be renovated by using Diyarbakır’s local and historic basalt stones. “We’ll rebuild Sur so that it’s like (Spain’s) Toledo: everyone will want to come and appreciate its architectural texture” said Davutoğlu. However, the pro-PKK Diyarbakır Municipality and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) argued against the governmental discourse of “renewal of the city by keeping its history intact.” Let’s go over these arguments and to which degree they can be substantiated.

During the period of multi-party democracy, no democratic government resorted to the forced deportation of the Kurdish people. Democracy is not amenable to forced social engineering. The forced displacement in the 90s, and other forced settlement policies were all enacted under military rules. Therefore, the argument that the rebuilding project for Sur envisions a change to its demographic structure by allowing and encouraging non-Kurds, especially Arabs, (possibly Syrian emigrants) politically unsympathetic to Kurdish nationalists  to occupy the district has no relevance whatsoever. Most of the refugee camps established for the Syrians are not situated inside the Kurdish majority areas, and not all of the refugees are Arab. Therefore, the claim that through various bureaucratic and financial means, the poor Kurdish residents who fled the city will be prevented from coming back has not materialized and has proven to be merely ideological propaganda. The government’s concern is to create public places to comfortably live, not to unman the district and turn it into a well-protected high security place, a sort of open prison, as has been suggested. Pushing poor people from where they live and replacing them with more affluent people may indeed be one of the most common way to develop desirable urban areas. However, the government’s declaration that no right-holder in Sur will be pressured to agree to an option that they do not want has publicly falsified this assertion.

The government’s concern is to create public places to comfortably live, not to unman the district and turn it into a well-protected high security place.

Similarly, the claim that the Project will ruin the historical-cultural texture of the city and its collective memory has no relevance, given the political and civilizational imagination inspired by the “Toledo model.” Sur was already the commercial heart of the city and there is no sense in arguing that “more trade and less housing” is something undesirable. The fact that TOKİ, the government’s housing and reconstruction agency, was declared not to be a constituent of the rebuilding in Sur, and that every building will be treated on a case by case basis, both in terms of ownership rights and architectural features, refute the allegations of “gentrification by military force” and “economic opportunism.”

To be sure, the rebuilding process will be based on an urban plan more amenable to state security control, and this is legitimate to the full. The Toledo model seems to well reflect the multicultural character of the city while paying attention the Seljuki-Ottoman cultural imprint, aiming not to conceal but to expose the Muslim heritage, in contrast to the HDP municipality which pushed this legacy to the back under the pretext of “multiculturalism.”

It is obvious that the rebuilding process secures a fresh opportunity for the AK Party government to reinforce its political legitimacy. The declaration of the region as “a risky area,” and accordingly, taking the decision of “urgent expropriation” indicate the government’s intention not to make Sur a habitat for the rich but to create a safe haven both for the state and for Sur dwellers in commercial, cultural and security terms.

All of the arguments against the project have proven to be groundless, given Davutoğlu’s statements regarding Sur, with the declared model for the renewal being the city of Toledo, an ancient multicultural city rebuilt after the Spanish Civil War. The non-involvement of TOKİ in the reconstruction process, the adoption of the pillars of the UNESCO World Heritage Site and the 2012 Reconstruction Plan for Conservation as the obligatory framework for the renewal, the participatory character of the process and the declared sensitivity of the government for the retention of the historic city while paying enough attention to modern technical facilities, the involvement of not only architects and engineers but also art historians, anthropologists, sociologists, urban designers and social policy experts, all combine to create hopes for the rebirth of a devastated city out of love and respect for historicity, multiculturalism, democratic participation and, without a doubt, a reemergence of the feeling of security for life, liberty and property.

The Visa Waiver Program

There are three ways to make sure that the visa process is no longer a problem between the EU and Turkey.

There are three ways to make sure that the visa process is no longer a problem between the EU and Turkey. The first solution would be to abolish the visa requirement and allow Turkish people to travel into the Schengen Area with their national identity cards. The second solution involves streamlining the process of obtaining a visa. The application process could be accelerated by exempting some segments of the population from visa requirements. The third and most reasonable solution may be to ask the Turks to have their passports with them when they want to enter the EU, but to give them total visa exemption. Turkey is asking the EU to allow Turkish nationals the right to enter the Schengen Area with their passports, but without a visa, and the right for them to stay there for up to three months without needing a residence permit.

The Problem’s Background

The visa issue has been put back on the table because of the migrant crisis that erupted as a side effect of the Syrian Civil War. Honestly, the EU didn’t lift a finger when millions have poured into Turkey. They noticed the problem only when these people began crossing the Turkish border toward the West.

The EU didn’t want to receive all these people who came to Europe as illegal migrants or as refugees, and Brussels understood there would be no solution without Turkey’s cooperation. So the EU asked for Turkey’s help.

In the early days of these negotiations, the EU asked Turkey to treat the refugees well, to offer them all opportunities so they wouldn’t think about immigrating to Europe, and to try to stop those who wish to do so. It wasn’t clear what Europe would do for Turkey in exchange.

Turkey quickly noticed that Europe was asking for unilateral sacrifices.

Turkey quickly noticed that Europe was asking for unilateral sacrifices, so it asked them, “Why would I do all this?” Only then did the EU admit that it has to do something for Turkey as well. Ankara, however, continued questioning the EU’s intentions: “Are we considered a candidate country or just a regular neighbor country?” The EU officials insisted Turkey was seen as a future member country, so Turkey asked them, “If this is the case, why aren’t the negotiations advancing?” The EU couldn’t find a reasonable answer, so along with the refugee action plan, Brussels presented a plan to revitalize the accession talks. Then Turkey accepted the EU’s request to cooperate on the refugee crisis.

In regard to the migrants, the EU asked Turkey to reinforce its border controls, and to cooperate with Frontex; in the meantime, it brought to the table two separate, critical matters: the readmission agreement and the visa waiver program. These two matters are in fact part of the accession talks and one is not directly linked to the other. But unfortunately, the EU has said that lifting the visa requirements will necessitate the adoption of the readmission agreement, so now both issues have been linked to stopping the refugee flow. As a side note, the EU agreed to give Turkey 3 billion Euros per year to help it cope with the pressing needs of the millions of refugees.

As a symbol that negotiations are back on track, Turkey asked for the opening of new negotiation chapters. The EU promised to take the necessary steps until the end of the 2016.

In brief, the EU was supposed to lift visa requirements for Turkish nationals, give Turkey 3 billion euros, and open at least one accession negotiation chapter. In exchange, Turkey would ratify the readmission agreement, stop the refugee flow by all means necessary, reinforce border and custom controls, and do all this before Europe fulfills its part of the deal. In other words, Turkey had to do its homework first, and if Europe is satisfied, it would do its part.

From Problem to Crisis

Turkey didn’t refuse the principle to act first, but it did ask, at least, for a number of good will gestures, such as being invited to the EU Summits. The EU agreed to open the Economic and Monetary Policy chapter which was once blocked by Sarkozy’s France, because Sarkozy believed that once this chapter is closed, Turkey’s full membership would be unstoppable. The EU did not agree to include Turkey in the EU summits, on the grounds that no candidate country is being invited anymore, but they did promise to hold regular EU-Turkey summits instead.

Turkey didn’t refuse the principle to act first, but it did ask, at least, for a number of good will gestures, such as being invited to the EU Summits.

Turkey was of course not pleased, but preferred to see the glass as half full. The readmission agreement was ratified; border controls beefed up; cooperation with Frontex began, in the struggle against human traffickers in the Aegean Sea. The EU, on the other hand, never transferred the promised sums, as it didn’t have that kind of money at the ready. Member states started discussing how to find it, then the EU came up with the idea to give the money progressively, on a project basis. The delay has raised a few eyebrows in Turkey, especially when the EU said that these projects should be carried out by European firms. So the given money would end in European pockets, after all. Turkey has opposed this.

This is when the visa issue became a real crisis. The EU hasn’t stopped asking for new criteria; in the beginning it was only about issuing biometric passports and tighter border controls, suddenly it has become about Turkey’s terror legislation. In total, the EU has identified 72 criteria that Turkey should fulfill, including changing the definition of “terrorist” in the Turkish legislation.

Turkey’s definition of terrorist and terrorism is indeed much more comprehensive than in Europe; but it is also a fact that the terror atmosphere in Turkey is much different than in Europe. Besides, Turkey can’t change its terror legislation in the middle an over-all struggle.

The EU was of course aware of what is going on in Turkey and they have asked Ankara to do something it can’t, on purpose. They could, instead, open the 23rd and the 24th chapters of the negotiations, which would require progressive modification of Turkish legislation, without causing a crisis.

The main obstacle, of course, is the deep-rooted distrust between Turkey and the EU.

These particular chapters are about basic rights and freedoms, an area about which Turkey is under heavy criticism. During their negotiation, Turkey would have to transfer the EU acquits into its national legislation, which would be part of a more rational and solid process. The reality is, Cyprus is blocking the opening of these two chapters and the entire EU is hiding behind the Mediterranean island’s veto to gain time.

The Near Future

The main obstacle, of course, is the deep-rooted distrust between Turkey and the EU. It is not easy to be sure whether Europe sincerely believes all Turks will abandon their country and become illegal migrants if they no longer need visas to travel to Europe. Let’s imagine for a moment that because of the current terror legislation in Turkey, many people would indeed demand political asylum in Europe. It is still not easy to understand why that would disturb the Europeans, as those asking for asylum will be the “victimized” Kurds, the very people whose rights Europe seems to cherish.

The migrant crisis could have been an instrument for further rapprochement; instead, it has turned into a new excuse to stay away from one another. It is not easy to have big hopes when the Turkish people have serious doubts about the EU’s real intentions, and when the players involved prefer to fight with one and other through press releases.