The 74th session of the United Nations General Assembly opened on September 17, 2019 and will continue until the 30th. Following the first day of the high-level General Debate held on Tuesday, the 24th September 2019, some other high-level events have also started to take place in New York.

Without going into much detail of this years’ specific events, it is no doubt valid to elaborate upon the increasing loss of the UN’s global effectiveness and its purpose. As pointed out by some, the UN is losing its already limited global influence, in particular after the U.S. circumvented the global institution in order to conduct its war on Iraq in 2003.

Nevertheless, the gathering of the annual general assembly once again raises the long debated call for a reform of the United Nations Security Council, the UN’s most important organ.

The Security Council is charged with ensuring international peace and security, although this is hindered due to its complicated formation, the disagreements among its members, which consists of five permanent and ten non-permanent members, as well as the general lack of willingness particularly by the so-called “great powers” to fulfil their duties in a manner consistent with the demands of the General Assembly.

For approximately twenty-five years, an increasing number of countries such as Germany, Japan, South Africa, Canada, Brazil and Turkey, have insisted on a reform of the Security Council. Several movements were established for this, some called for the expansion of the permanent seats such as the G4 nations of which Germany and Japan are members. While the “Uniting for Consensus” (UfC) movement, of which countries such as Italy, Spain, Argentina and Turkey are members, oppose the call to expand the Security Council with new permanent seats, and instead suggest a principle of rotation for the Council’s membership and a rejection of the “veto” privilege of certain states.

Without a doubt, the permanent members of the UN Security Council are not willing to give up their veto rights and permanent seats.

It is important to highlight the main positions of some countries. Without a doubt, the permanent members of the Security Council, the U.S., France, Russia, China and the United Kingdom, are not willing to give up their veto rights and permanent seats in the Security Council. A privilege they were given due to their victory over the Nazi Germany and Japan in the Second World War.  

While countries such as France have been open to support the Germany’s call to expand the number of permanent seats, a position that Germany seeks for itself, it does not actually seem realistic to expect such a development. Furthermore, it is quite obvious that all of the permanent members act rather in terms of national interest instead prioritizing global security and peace.

If one looks at Germany’s position regarding Security Council reform, one notices an increasing insistence. As a country which was able to become a non-permanent Security Council member seven times—a huge success for a country considered a former “aggressor” prior to 1945— Germany is currently calling for a permanent seat, pointing to its global acceptance and successful economic performance. However, it is rather unlikely that an option for a  permanent seat will become true.

In comparison, Turkey calls for a comprehensive reform regarding the structure of the Security Council, stressing its fundamental statement that “the world is bigger than five”, as President Erdogan once again addressed during his speech at the 74th session of the UN General Assembly. As a member of the UfC movement, Turkey’s expectations of a new rotational format within the Security Council without increasing the numbers of permanent members, seems to be more realistic.

The current conditions within the UN demonstrate its gradual and unfortunate loss in its global significance, and it is seen instead as a dialog platform between world leaders. Countries seeking reform of the UN can use occasions such as the annual sessions of the UN General Assembly to make their call for a reform of the UN and specifically the Security Council. By this, closely allied countries such as Germany and Turkey should continue to stress their requests and perspectives on the UN reform, despite basic differences and expectations in how it should be done.

Germany became a member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the sixth time at the beginning of this year. While being a member for 2019-2020, Germany will also hold the UNSC’s presidency in April, which it took over from one of its closest partners, France, for the first time. The last time Germany acted as a non-permanent member of the UNSC had been in 2011-2012, when a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition was governing Germany and when the country faced harsh criticism by its Western allies due to abstaining from the UNSC vote on intervention in Libya (2011).

As a current non-permanent UNSC member, Germany’s main goals will be to concentrate on addressing ongoing crises and conflicts, where it will set its own priorities. By this, the country’s foreign ministry points to issues such as “women, peace and security” which “will play a key role, as will disarmament and arms control.”

Germany’s 2024 projections to increase its defense spending to 1.5% of gross domestic production will not meet NATO’s expectations of the 2% target.

During the same week that Germany took over the UNSC presidency, NATO commemorated its 70th anniversary in Washington, where alongside U.S. Vice President Mike Pence, several other think-tanks and platforms close to American lobbies criticized Germany’s unwillingness to increase its defense spending. Some commentators have even addressed a return of a so-called new “New German Question in Europe.”

In this sense, although it is known that Germany’s 2024 projections to increase its defense spending to 1.5% of gross domestic production will not meet NATO’s expectations of the 2% target, Germany has once again faced direct and indirect criticisms from various circles. But to be honest, both in Germany and abroad, expectations to meet the 1.5% target until 2024 is not perceived credible at all.

Therefore, Germany’s ambitions, particularly in the context of its UNSC membership for the next two years, will ultimately end the discourse of defense spending. However, the fact that Germany has the ambition to become a permanent UNSC member in the long run, which is unrealistic and unlikely to happen, will most likely not match the main expectations of the five permanent members of the UNC – who at the end of the day, have the power to veto any form of UNSC reform proposal.

Germany has found itself in an uncomfortable position: on the one hand, it wants to become a dominant power in global politics, but, on the other, it is constantly being criticized by the U.S. and NATO for not spending “enough” on defense.

Thus, Germany has found itself in a rather uncomfortable position, as while on the one hand it wants to become a more dominant power in global politics, on the other, it is constantly being criticized by the U.S. and NATO for not spending “enough” on defense. In order to circumvent and by-pass these accusations and challenges, Germany has been acting with France. But one should not disregard the crucial differences between these two leading EU countries. It is a fact that Germany will not become a permanent member of the UNSC in the foreseeable future and that France has been a permanent member since the establishment of the body in 1945. Moreover, while Germany has stressed its support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which aims to limit the global spread of nuclear weapons, there is less hope that P5 states will share similar positions.

Cooperating and acting closely with France and attempting to utilize the UNSC presidency that will last for a month alone are factors that underpin Germany’s global importance and ambitions of being a more active global actor. However, the reality – such as the false dream that Germany will become a permanent UNSC member and Germany’s unwillingness to increase its defense spending – will only cause limited local achievements.

Last week, German Foreign Minister (SPD) Heiko Maas first visited Israel, where he engaged in fixing out current Germany-Israel relations, and subsequently the United Nations in New York, for promoting Germany’s candidacy for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the 2019-2020 term. The UN’s highest council consists of 5 permanent members, which are the U.S., Russia, China, France and Great Britain and 10 non-permanent members elected by the UN General Assembly for two year terms. The next non-permanent members will be elected on June 8, and Germany will compete against Belgium and Israel for one of two open seats in the group of Western Europe.

In contrast to previous Foreign Minister Gabriel, Maas did not address controversial issues during his trip such as Israel’s illegal settlement policy or the unilateral recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital – even though German politicians were not shy to address these topics a couple of months ago. Ultimately, besides diplomatic gestures and balancing acts, Maas preferred not to mention current conflicts.

A couple of days later he visited New York to promote his country’s candidacy for a non-permanent seat on the UNSC. According to Maas, “Germany is ready and willing to shoulder greater responsibility.” It’s obvious that this approach has ultimately been a general trend of German foreign policy discourse for some time. Given the current transatlantic challenges since the Trump administration, it’s not the first time that a high-profile German politician stressed a so-called greater role and “responsibility” of Germany in global politics. Just to remember, during a speech in December 2017, former Foreign Minister Gabriel had stated that Germany is required to defend her own interests more self-confidently and that she has to take a more active role in global politics.

In May 2017, CDU leader and Chancellor Merkel had also argued that Germany needs a foreign policy less dependent on the U.S. Furthermore, the former non-partisan German President Gauck, former Foreign Minister from the SPD (and current President) Steinmeier and Defense Minister von der Leyen (CDU) also called for a more active Germany in world politics at the 2014 Munich Security Conference. Hence, from Germany’s point of view, a new non-permanent membership on the UNSC could be a convenient instrument for extending those ambitions.

However, while Germany aims to become a non-permanent member of the UNSC, Israel also does the same – though with one difference. While Germany was on the UNSC six times, last in the 2011/2012 term, Israel has never been on the council since 1948. Consequently, Israeli voices asked Germany to step aside for its “partner.” Some opinions even accuse Germany’s candidacy as “a shameless, clueless, cynical power play against the Jewish state.”

Germany though rejects these kinds of criticisms and any other potential deal. Even though Maas stressed, “Germany is not running against anyone; but for a seat,” it seems quite obvious that the Foreign Minister made some tactical moves during his Israel trip. Namely, in the form of not mentioning conflictual issues by expecting to prevent a possible public dispute focusing on both countries’ UNSC seat application.

Germany though rejects these kinds of criticisms and any other potential deal. Even though Maas stressed that “Germany is not running against anyone; but for a seat,” it seems quite obvious that the Foreign Minister made some tactical moves during his Israel trip. Namely, in the form of not mentioning bilateral conflict issues by expecting to prevent a possible public dispute focusing on both countries’ UNSC seat application.

It seems that Germany considers underscoring its current “active foreign policy” discourse through a UNSC seat. It’s obvious that this new and more global responsibility seeking German self-perception cannot be reduced to one specific political party, but rather a long-term state policy. As one of the major worldwide donors to the UN’s budget, Germany is currently closer for a new non-permanent UNSC membership than Israel. Arguments from pro-Israeli circles that seem surprised by Germany’s candidacy will most likely fail to convince Germans and the global audience. In addition, Germany wants to persuade the global audience by stressing its military engagement in various countries under the umbrella of NATO and the UN – despite the fact that the German army is currently insufficiently equipped.

The idea that this likely new term will help Germany to “be involved in tackling the biggest challenges to peace and security” is actually an exaggerated expectation. While it would be interesting, we are unlikely to witness a Germany that demands extending the veto right for new members at the UNSC, as had been the case in 2004 by the former German chancellor at that time.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has refrained from stepping back from the decision to hold a referendum on independence, where residents in KRG-controlled provinces are scheduled to vote on breaking from Baghdad on 25 September.

The oil rich province of Kirkuk is also among the contested areas where the vote is planned.

In spite of heightening tensions and calls from the US and Turkey to postpone the referendum, calls from Baghdad for further negotiations, the KRG President Masoud Barzani has not announced any cancellation of the referendum.

The statement provided by the Security Council added that the referendum risks detracting from the fight against Daesh, and that it could also disrupt efforts to ensure the safe return of over three million refugees and internally displaced persons to the country.

Council members “expressed their continuing respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Iraq,” urging all issues between the central Baghdad government and the Erbil administration to be resolved “through structured dialogue and compromise supported by the international community.”

International call for referendum to be cancelled

In addition to President Erdogan and the US President Trump who are both in agreement that the vote should not go ahead, French President Emmanuel Macron also stressed the importance of maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity.

During a phone call made with Barzani, Macron reportedly asked the KRG President to postpone the controversial referendum.

A statement issued by Barzani’s office stated that the two men discussed the “important role” played by the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in the ongoing fight against Daesh in Iraq.

Barzani nevertheless confirmed to Macron that the referendum would be held on schedule, while also stressing Erbil’s readiness to hold dialogue with Baghdad after the poll.

http://thenewturkey.org/the-kurdish-quest-for-independence-in-iraq-and-its-repercussions-for-turkey-and-the-region/

Turkey to debate military operation in Iraq and Syria

The ongoing developments in Iraq and Syria remain high on the political agenda.

In this regard, according to the Justice and Development (AK) Party’s parliamentary group deputy chairman, the parliament will hold an extraordinary session on Saturday to debate the extension of Turkish military operations in northern Iraq and Syria.

Mustafa Elitas stated that “the general assembly of the Turkish Parliament will hold an extraordinary session on Sept. 23 at 16.00 [4 p.m. local time] to debate the extension of the Prime Ministry’s motion that enables the government to conduct cross-border operations in northern Iraq and Syria.”

The motion had previously allowed the Turkish military to carry out cross-border operations from Oct. 2, 2016 until Oct. 31, 2017.

Compared to Russia and the US, Europe is effected more by the civil war in Syria in terms of a spill-over of terrorism, and major waves of refugees fleeing from Assad and DAESH brutality. The humanitarian crisis surrounding refugees created rifts between the member states and shook the foundations of the already reeling union. Agitation and fear-mongering through manipulation of the crisis gave rise to a far right, and created dynamics which might even cause the Schengen regime to collapse in the future. Despite the fact that the crisis has proved to be producing an existential threat to the EU, the union has not been able to show confidence and activity in the security affairs of the region, as other major players have. Then why has the EU – which is the strongest economy when its members’ resources are combined – been virtually absent from the debate? Why can’t Europe show strategic presence in the region when all other major players are busy trying to get a foothold in Mosul, or leave a more favourable administration there when the dust settles?The answer has less to do with the EU’s willingness than its ability to pool the military might of its members.

The EU wants to become a more robust, more influential strategic player, as is clearly stated in the European Security Strategy. It was also pointed out in High Representative Federica Mogherini’s statement on the aim of the EU Global Strategy, which included “making full use of our potential”. As Mogherini indicated, it has always been about putting a strong will in front of the huge potential of the EU. Yet, that is exactly where the problem begins. That sort of a pooling of resources for military optimization and strategic single-mindedness requires a full-fledged strategic body with actual authority to make decisions and implement them. The EU wants to go beyond the civilian role it has in every crisis, yet it is constrained by the typical structural limits imposed on any international institution: the diverse interests of member states. It has a weak decision-making mechanism and even weaker enforcement powers. The EU is not a state, it is only a framework organization where members push their interests and drag their feet when the matter is not their primary concern. In such a situation, power projection seems but a dream for the EU. It can only hold on to its normative-civilian power and make a presence in secondary issues.

The EU wants to go beyond the civilian role it has in every crisis, yet it is constrained by the typical structural limits.

The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the EU, which was formulated after the Saint-Malo conference in 1998, gradually grew through a series of declarations and took its final shape with the Lisbon Treaty. CSDP was designed as a response to the new security outlook emerging after the Cold War and to a (perceived) loss of necessity and influence of NATO. From 1999 onwards there have been many summits attended by high-level officials from member countries, and many common security programs were formulated, along with their monitoring bodies, but the payoff has been too little. Notwithstanding the remarkable bureaucratic effort poured in, the result has been frustrating. So far, member states have not been willing to commit fully to the means for achieving a global role for the EU. Perpetual meetings, documents produced and agreements on paper serve to develop the EU’s strategic identity in declaratory terms, but its insufficient implementation reveals the immaturity and improbability of the project.

The EU’s method of trying to develop into a strategic actor has been to build certain consultation and cooperation mechanisms. Yet, these measures ensure neither developing a strategic vision, nor being able to implement it. It is true that the EU has the material capacity to become a strategic actor, but capacity alone does not guarantee strategic actorship. Without political will, strategy cannot be determined and pursued. Then again, ontological problems surrounding an international institution such as the EU would not allow it to harmonize the strategic behavior of its constituting member states, which have different levels of interest on any given issue.

The Libya crisis in 2011 was a typical example where interests and attention of member states did not overlap, and where they produced conflicting responses. As a European diplomat has put it “CFSP died in Libya- we just have to pick a sand dune under which we can bury it”. Take Berlusconi’s statement that he did not call Gaddafi during the revolt for he did not want to disturb him. This was clearly at odds with the harsh diplomatic wording agreed upon by European institutions, but he as a national leader had to take Italian economic relations with Libya into consideration. German abstention from vote on Libya in the UNSC (probably because of the upcoming election) was another incident where the EU’s powerlessness was revealed. It was demonstrated that the concerns of the EU do not trump national concerns and national interests. A weak commitment to joint decision-making kept member nations from binding together, to put their differences aside, and act in concert.

In every major crisis the EU has aspired to intervene in, there have been multidimensional disagreements among the member states, which paralyzed the organization.

The EU has always been very vocal about DAESH activity in Syria and Iraq in terms of condemnation of terror. Moreover, member states, unilaterally or with NATO, conduct operations against the terror group. Yet, a serious evaluation of the strategic aspect of the issue, let alone an operation orchestrated under the umbrella of the EU, has always been unthinkable. In every major crisis the EU has aspired to intervene in, there have been multidimensional disagreements among the member states, which paralyzed the organization. Thus, using coercive diplomacy and demonstrations of military muscle have been more difficult for the EU than soft measures such as providing humanitarian aid or imposing travel bans. This indicates a fundamental trend in efforts to create a common foreign and security policy for Europe: being able to agree only on the lowest common denominator.

States still are the highest authority in international affairs. And their main concern is always security. This is one area where they would not lend their sovereignty to another body without putting up a fight. This is exactly why states would go to war in the past, and why they would do the same now.  They might choose to seek temporary alliances against common threats, yet they should be able to feel that they are still in control. Delegating their existential function willingly is not an option. This can only be done by an imperial expansion. The EU, as we know it, is not that sort of an imperial project. If it wants to become an empire, it should better be ready to get its hands dirty and conquer European capitals one by one. The question is: with which army?

Since the 2000s, Turkey has been one of the vocal advocates of UN Security Council reform, focusing on representativeness, effectiveness and the accountability issues. One should note here that Turkey’s criticism towards the UN system and calls for reform is hardly new; Turkey began to express its discontent with the workings of the UN right after its establishment in 1945. Accordingly, Turkish authorities did not hesitate to express the need for an urgent UN reform during and after the Cold War era. However, since the 2000s, Ankara has been more willing to take an active role in the UN in general and the UNSC in particular. Accordingly, Turkish authorities voice loudly in many platforms that the UN system is outmoded, while a profound change is under way in world politics.In parallel with their predecessors, the AK Party rulers raise, on every possible occasion, the demand for a more representative UN Security Council. They target not only the issue of representativeness, but also the Security Council’s failure to respond effectively to humanitarian crises like the recent debacle in Syria. Ankara’s criticism towards the current UN order is best symbolized in Turkish President Erdoğan’s statement: “the world is bigger than five.” Ankara has been critical of the UN also for its inability to adequately support the developmental needs of impoverished nations. In particular, Turkey has asked the UN to concentrate more on all issues related to human rights and development.

Turkey’s criticism towards the UN system has evolved into concrete reform suggestions in the last decade.

Turkey’s criticism towards the UN system has evolved into concrete reform suggestions in the last decade. Two documents are worth mentioning in terms of Turkey’s posture towards the reform debate. Firstly, on 26 July, 2005, Turkey co-sponsored the Uniting for Consensus plan in the UN General Assembly, together with eleven other members. The plan suggested a reformed Security Council which would consist of 20 elected members, serving for a two-year term, in addition to the five permanent members. According to Turkey’s reform proposal, the General Assembly would elect twenty other members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, based on, in the first instance, their contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security as well as to the other purposes of the Organization with an equitable geographical distribution. The Uniting for Consensus plan also called for improving the Council’s working methods in a transparent, inclusive, and accountable manner, including restraint on the use of the veto; procedures to ensure transparency in decision-making; accountability in performance and access to information.

Secondly, The Turkish Foreign Ministry’s 2007 report, called “Turkey’s Priorities for the 62th Session of UN General Assembly,” was remarkable in terms of documenting Turkey’s priorities and expectations from the UN across a broad spectrum. For Ankara, a comprehensive reform of the UN System cannot be completed without a reform of the Security Council. This document also reconfirmed that an expansion of the non-permanent members of the Security Council would better reflect the principle of sovereign equality. More importantly, Ankara made it clear that “Turkey attaches utmost importance to the effective functioning of the United Nations.”

Turkey’s current challenge to the international order is reform-oriented, rather than anti-systemic.

Thus Turkey’s current challenge to the international order is reform-oriented, rather than anti-systemic. From the political cosmopolitan point of view, the UN is definitely not the best, but the only available global platform that approximates the universality of norms and values. The first decade of the 2000s illustrated that Turkey has significant potential to play a bigger role in the UN platform by combining its new foreign policy vision with its long-lasting commitment to the founding principles of the United Nations, as well as its traditional foreign policy principle of “peace at home and peace in the world.”

Turkish rulers should critically and comparatively access the prospects and the limitations of the Turkish foreign policy at the United Nations during the first decade of the 2000s with that of the second one, in which Ankara lost the UN Security Council non-permanent membership for the 2015-2016 period. Turkey is one of the few states with both the potential and the vision to extend the global order that represents the vast majority of the nations. In a world that is increasingly shaped by fragmentation, it has become much more critical for states like Turkey to be more “cautious” in terms of foreign policy choices towards issues on both the regional and global scale. As one of the founding members of the UN, Turkey will continue to keep the UN at the center of its increasing efforts in search for an effective, accountable, representative and legitimate international order.