The Civil War in Washington: The Rising New Right in the U.S. and the Future of the Atlantic
The effects of the New Right movement may not be limited to U.S. domestic politics alone.
House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY) speaks on the steps of the U.S. House of Representatives with other House Democrats on government funding in Washington, DC on March 18, 2026. Photo by Anadolu Images.
T
he JD Vance generation, rising from the political rift opened by Trump, is challenging the Evangelical-Zionist foreign policy tradition and Washington’s established power centers. This struggle could shape the future decades of the Atlantic world—from U.S.-Israel relations to Iran, from NATO to Europe’s shift to the right.
To continue interpreting the struggle unfolding in Washington today—which began quite faintly and feebly during President Trump’s first term but reached its peak during his second—through the lens of the classic power struggle between Democrats and Republicans would be to underestimate the “civil war” escalating in the U.S. capital.
The interesting thing is that perhaps the deepest reckoning in American politics is taking place not in the classic rivalry between the two parties, but within the Republican Party and the American right itself. The political earthquake Donald Trump set off in 2016 has, within a decade, transcended the boundaries of a leadership movement and transformed into an intellectual movement seeking to redefine the understanding of the state, society, the economy, and foreign policy. Vice President J.D. Vance stands at the political center of this new movement.
To view Vance merely as Trump’s likely political heir would be an incomplete assessment. Having converted to Catholicism in 2019 and identifying himself as part of the “post-liberal right,” Vance is in touch with the intellectual climate shaped by thinkers such as Patrick Deneen, Adrian Vermeule, and Sohrab Ahmari. While this circle is not homogeneous, it converges on a crucial point: the need to reexamine the American liberal order of the past half-century, the assumption that the free market will automatically generate social welfare, and the severe damage that globalization has inflicted on American society.
Vance’s integration of social conservatism with discussions of the economic order and the “common good” represents a significant break from the old Republican playbook. Therefore, it would be misleading to characterize the movement known as the “Catholic New Right” as merely a religious grouping. We need to clearly recognize that what we are facing is a broader political quest aimed at transforming the American right’s understanding of power, capital, the state, and foreign policy.
Reagan’s Republican Party is unraveling
The “Republican Formula” established during the Ronald Reagan era had quite distinct characteristics: low taxes, deregulation, free trade, a strong Wall Street, a strong Pentagon, and the preservation of American military superiority on a global scale. After the Cold War, particularly in the second half of the 1990s, neo-conservative interventionism was added to this framework. Evangelical Christianity, however, provided the Republican Party with much of its social mobilization power. Fueled by this theological ideology, church membership skyrocketed overnight. As a consequence of this process, Israel’s security gradually transcended the bounds of a strategic partnership and, in some Evangelical circles, was transformed into a foreign policy issue imbued with theological significance.
Today, the rising New Right in the U.S. is seriously questioning this synthesis—which has long held Washington captive and has, to some extent, deviant aspects. Furthermore, alongside the “Globalization 2.0” touted to the skies by neoliberals and their allies—the neocons and Evangelicals—since the late 1990s, factories relocated to China, deindustrialized American cities, the erosion of the working middle class, the opioid crisis, excessive financialization, irregular migration, and the breakdown of the family institution and its values—these were not viewed by the rising New Right in the U.S. as independent problems, but rather as the consequences of the economic-political order that was heavily promoted between 1995 and 2015.
For this reason, the Vance generation’s understanding of the economy diverges from classical Reagan-era conservatism. A return to a strong government industrial policy, the relocation of critical production to the U.S., a reduction in dependence on China, the curbing of excessive dominance by major technology and financial companies when necessary, and the redirection of American capital toward American production capacity emerge as the primary principles being advocated and encouraged. Moreover, the foreign policy counterpart to this approach is equally significant: “American power cannot be deployed everywhere. Washington must set priorities.”
To characterize this approach as “Monroe 2.0,” or in its caricatured form, the “Donroe Doctrine,” or as “isolationism,” would be to oversimplify the issue. While there are indeed isolationist currents within the New Right, the strategic thinking developing around Vice President Vance and, in particular, Elbridge Colby appears focused on building a framework centered on selective engagement and prioritization. Therefore, the first question is quite simple: Whose war will America fight?
The first major rift in the Evangelical-Zionist alliance
The simple yet critically important question we posed above essentially touches on the most sensitive fault line within the American right over the past fifty years. Behind the strategic relationship between Israel and the U.S. lies a social force as significant as the Pentagon, Congress, the security bureaucracy, and interest groups: Christian Zionism. Particularly within certain white Evangelical communities, Israel’s existence is not viewed merely as a geopolitical issue. Biblical prophecies, the Second Coming of Christ, and theological interpretations centered on the Holy Land have transformed support for Israel into an integral part of religious identity.
And for both prominent figures in the American New Right and the majority of the global public, the influence rooted in this highly distorted understanding remains strong today. A April 2026 survey by Pew, one of the U.S.’s world-renowned public opinion research firms, indicates that 24 percent of white Evangelical Protestants who attend church regularly hear messages supporting Israel in their churches, while the figure is only 7 percent among Catholics. However, the picture is reversed among those who report hearing critical messages opposing U.S. military intervention in Iran; 12 percent among Catholics and 2 percent among white Evangelicals.
An even more striking shift is occurring across generations. According to Pew’s 2026 data, the negative sentiment toward Israel and Netanyahu in the American public is stronger among younger people—which is a very healthy trend. Even among Republicans—despite the theological perspective that has been virtually drummed into this political base over the past 30 years—58 percent of those over 50 trust Netanyahu, while that figure drops to 30 percent among those under 50.
It should come as no surprise, then, that the well-known circles holding this worldview—panicked by this situation—plan to bring approximately 1,000 Evangelical pastors to Israel by the end of 2025. One of the aims of this visit was to counter, in their view, the growing influence of criticism of Israel within conservative media on young Christians. However, despite these frantic efforts, an issue that for fifty years was practically taboo to even discuss within the Republican right has now become one of the main points of contention within the right itself.
The old order will certainly resist in order to avoid being dismantled. But for the first time, the fanatics’ base finds itself in a situation where it cannot be certain of its future loyalty. For this reason, Vice President Vance is strategically waging the battle not through Christianity but through the distortions in foreign policy theology. That said, at this stage, it would be premature to interpret this struggle in Washington as “Catholics versus Evangelicals.” After all, Vance also possesses a strong Catholic identity. Tucker Carlson speaks from within the ranks of American Christian conservatism. A significant portion of the MAGA base is already made up of Evangelicals. Therefore, it must be reiterated that the real battle is not against Christianity itself, but is focused on a specific interpretation of Christianity as it pertains to foreign policy.
In this context, the New Right raises the following question: “Are Israel’s security and American national interests always one and the same?” Indeed, questioning this issue could produce revolutionary consequences far beyond what Washington anticipates. Israel may continue to be an important strategic partner for the U.S. Israel’s security may be important from the perspective of American interests. However, these two propositions do not—and will not—mean that Washington must adopt every threat assessment made by Tel Aviv or deploy American military force in every regional war.
Iran: The testing ground for Washington’s internal strife
Iran has become the arena where this theoretical debate—or war—between the Evangelical/Zionist establishment and the New Right has turned into a real-world foreign policy test. The “War on Iran,” which has been ongoing since February 28, has once again demonstrated that Washington’s military resources are not unlimited. By the end of August, debates had intensified over how the strain on U.S. ammunition stocks—particularly in air and missile defense systems—was fueling concerns about America’s deterrence capabilities against China and Russia. Indeed, the New Right’s strategic objection also takes concrete form here. If China is the primary long-term challenge to American power, how many military resources can the U.S. afford to expend in the Middle East? How much capacity can it allocate to Europe’s defense? How much ammunition can it send to Ukraine? What must it retain to deter China from invading Taiwan? Can the U.S. manage three major geopolitical fronts simultaneously?
Given all these complex questions, we must understand that Vice President Vance’s role in seeking a diplomatic solution with Iran is not limited to Middle East policy alone. We are aware that Vance played an active role in the negotiations for the interim agreement reached in June. As of August, however, while diplomatic efforts continue, we see that the dispute remains unresolved. Ultimately, the Iran issue has effectively become a testing ground for the new power struggle in Washington. The American New Right is also questioning this: Who will determine the priorities of American power?
He who controls the bureaucracy controls the state
From the perspective of the New Right, the struggle is certainly not limited to the ballot box. Everyone is aware of the enduring state ecosystem that has formed over decades in Washington—spanning the Pentagon, the State Department, intelligence agencies, federal regulatory bodies, think tanks, universities, and the halls of Congress—even as presidents come and go. Behind the concept of the “deep state”—which gained popularity during Trump’s first term—lies a far more serious debate about the administrative state: when the political will of an elected president clashes with the institutional preferences of the entrenched bureaucracy, who will have the final say?
This is precisely where the Vance generation’s connection to post-liberal thought takes on significance. Because the goal is not merely to win elections, but to transform the U.S. government’s personnel recruitment and decision-making mechanisms. However, it is also a fact that the New Right faces certain risks in this struggle, which it is determined to pursue. Managing the critical distinction between strengthening democratic oversight of the bureaucracy and reducing state capacity to mere party loyalty is of critical importance.
The New Right, which seeks to transform Washington’s established institutions, could weaken its own power project if it purges experienced bureaucrats and thereby loses the state’s memory and expertise. Consequently, the true test for the American New Right will not be “dismantling the bureaucracy,” but rather strengthening American state capacity while keeping the bureaucracy subject to the elected political will.
The new atlantic equation: “NATO 3.0”
From Europe’s perspective, the most significant consequence of this ideological transformation in Washington is evident within NATO. Europe is certainly not an enemy to the New Right. However, the outdated model of relations that has persisted from the Cold War era to the present is no longer sustainable. Under the current system, in which the U.S. maintains approximately 80,000 troops in Europe, the Pentagon is reevaluating its force structure in Europe. The message delivered last month by Elbridge Colby—a leading figure in defense policy—to NATO allies was crystal clear: Europe must assume primary responsibility for its own conventional defense. The term Washington is using is particularly noteworthy: NATO 3.0.
Colby describes this as a transformation that moves allies from “dependence to partnership.” The goal is not to dismantle NATO, but to reshape the division of labor within the alliance. While Europe assumes a larger share of conventional defense, the U.S. can maintain its nuclear deterrence, strategic support, and critical high-tech capabilities. If this new understanding of cooperation and alliance takes hold, the post-1945 Transatlantic security arrangement will also change. Washington will no longer be the party that largely produces security, while Europe is the consumer.
Germany will accelerate its rearmament. The influence of Poland and the Nordic countries will grow. The European defense industry will expand. The nuclear capabilities of the United Kingdom and France will become more significant. And, in particular, Turkey’s strategic value will multiply. With its access to the Black Sea, its location at the intersection of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, its substantial military capabilities, operational experience, and a growing defense industry, Turkey will become one of the indispensable central countries in a NATO where Europe assumes greater responsibility for its own security.
This will also be one of the areas where Turkey’s interests may align with those of the New Right in Washington: a new Atlantic architecture based on a more balanced burden-sharing, in which the true weight of members’ military capabilities is felt more strongly.
Europe’s shift to the right: The “remigration” dilemma
Another area of connection between the American New Right and Europe lies on the social front of politics. Immigration, border security, national identity, deindustrialization, the welfare state, and sovereignty are now reshaping politics on both sides of the Atlantic. A segment of the European right is seeking a solution in the concept of “remigration.” However, Europe’s demographic reality does not allow for simple populist solutions. In many European countries, the foreign-born population has become a permanent and significant part of society. The idea of collectively deporting millions of legal immigrants, naturalized citizens, or their descendants cannot constitute a viable state policy.
Europe needs a program that is more challenging but also more realistic. This must include effective border control, a significant reduction in irregular migration, the distinction between economic migration and asylum, preventing the abuse of the welfare system, a strong commitment to integration, more deterrent penalties for crime, and the swift enforcement of deportation orders against foreign criminals who must be removed under the law. Integration must also move away from the old, passive understanding of multiculturalism. Settling in a country will no longer simply mean taking advantage of its economic opportunities. Learning the language, working, paying taxes, complying with the legal system, and accepting the fundamental constitutional values of the society in which one lives will become part of the social contract.
The American New Right stands at a crucial crossroads precisely here. Until now, it has been easy to organize anger among a broad segment of the American public. But they are aware that actually governing the state is difficult. Recent social and legal events have shown that the problems facing the U.S. and Europe—which are trying to manage their borders, production needs, aging populations, and labor markets all at once under the slogan “Let’s send everyone home”—cannot be solved. A sustainable right-wing politics must establish controlled immigration, strong integration, public order, and national identity within the same framework.
Could a new transatlantic right emerge?
Here lies perhaps the least-discussed consequence of the transformation in Washington. A new ideological network of communication is being established between the U.S. New Right and Europe’s rising right-wing movements. However, this will differ from the classic conservative alliance led by the U.S. during the Cold War. The new common terms will not be “free market” and “globalization”; rather, they will be concepts such as production, sovereignty, family, borders, energy security, industrial policy, and civilization. For this reason, the effects of the New Right movement may not be limited to U.S. domestic politics alone. On both sides of the Atlantic, the Washington branch of a broader political transformation—which has emerged in response to the economic, political, and social devastation caused by three decades of neoliberal globalization and the imposed economic-political model—will eventually spread to the other side of the Atlantic as well.
Nevertheless, in the second half of the 21st century, the interests of Europe and the United States will diverge more significantly than they have in the preceding 80 years. While Washington seeks to focus on China, Europe will continue to view Russia as the primary threat. As the U.S. demands higher defense spending from Europe, Europe will accelerate its pursuit of strategic autonomy. Competition between American protectionism and European industry will intensify. Consequently, the emerging framework appears likely to take the form of a new Atlantic order—based on a bargaining of interests among sovereign nation-states—rather than a new “Right International.”
From an international economic and political perspective, the paradox lies precisely here: Can the New Right—which is moving the Atlantic alliance away from ideological unity—transform it into a more realistic partnership where interests are discussed more openly? For this reason, the 2028 U.S. presidential election will not be merely an American election. President Trump has broken down the door of American politics. Vice President Vance’s generation, meanwhile, is debating what kind of America will emerge beyond that shattered door. Will it be Reagan’s free-market Republicanism? The Bush-era neoconservative interventionism? Or a Middle East-centered foreign policy rooted in Christian Zionism? Or a new brand of American conservatism centered on productive capacity, national sovereignty, borders, the family, and the selective use of force?
The answer to this question will extend far beyond Washington’s borders. Of course, U.S.-Israel relations may not sever overnight; however, it is clear that they will become more conditional and interest-driven. Iran policy appears set to take shape more independently of Tel Aviv’s threat assessments. Europe will assume a much larger share of its own security. NATO will transition from a model in which the U.S. military protects Europe to a new division of labor in which Europeans take on conventional defense. Turkey’s influence in Atlantic security will grow. And China will emerge as the top priority rival, drawing an increasingly larger share of U.S. strategic resources.
Can the American New Right achieve all of this? The answer to this question will not be determined solely by its ability to win elections. It will depend on whether the movement can transition from populism to a rational, statesmanlike approach. Will they be able to discuss the influence of Christian Zionism on foreign policy without alienating evangelical voters? Will they be able to effectively manage allegations of anti-Semitism and related manipulations while criticizing Israeli governments? Will they be able to preserve state capacity while subjecting the federal bureaucracy to democratic oversight? Will they be able to demand greater responsibility from Europe without creating a dangerous gap in NATO’s deterrence? Will they be able to protect American interests in the Middle East and Europe while prioritizing China?
And will they be able to offer their political allies in Europe a governance model stronger than populist anger? One of the most significant conservative power struggles in Washington in the past half-century is playing out most intensely between, on one side, the economic, political, and foreign policy order inherited from the Reagan-Bush eras, and on the other, the New Right—emerging from the political space opened by Trump and now being institutionalized by the Vance generation. The outcome of this internal political struggle in Washington will clarify for what purpose and on whose behalf American power will be wielded in the second quarter of the 21st century. The answer to this question will shape the fundamental parameters of the new world order—from U.S.-Israel relations to Iran, and from competition with China to European security. For the “internal war” in Washington is not confined to Washington alone; through this political struggle, the very future of the Atlantic is being debated in Washington.
(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)
