Yemen War or Gulf Rivalry? The Saudi Arabia-UAE Divergence

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ollowing the mass protests that erupted in many Arab countries after 2010, regional actors adopted significant policy changes and formed alliances with like-minded countries. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia were among the most prominent examples of such alliances. Posing as anti-revolutionary, these two countries coordinated their actions in many countries. This partnership included the air, land, and sea blockade of Qatar, another Gulf country. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also cooperated in Yemen. Their cooperation escalated to the point of military intervention.

Over time, both the political alliance formed on the basis of opposition to Qatar and the military cooperation established in Yemen have become increasingly damaging for both countries. One of the first signs of this was seen in the different approaches to normalising relations with Qatar following the crisis. While Saudi Arabia rapidly normalised relations with Qatar through the Al-Ula Summit in 2021, the United Arab Emirates, although involved in this process, did not exhibit the same willingness or warmth as Riyadh.

For Saudi Arabia, intra-Gulf reconciliation meant ensuring regional stability and reasserting its leadership claim; however, the UAE preferred a more distant, cautious approach to relations with Qatar. This divergence can be interpreted as an early sign that the two countries’ strategic priorities were beginning to diverge subtly.

By the end of 2025, this divergence had transcended mere competition over Yemen, revealing that serious problems between the parties could no longer be concealed. In December 2025, Saudi Arabia and the UAE confronted each other directly in Yemen, marking one of the most severe crises in recent years. The crisis escalated to the point of open accusations, ultimately reaching a new phase with the UAE’s announcement of its complete withdrawal from Yemen.

What happened?

In December 2025, events in Yemen exposed the long-suppressed strategic differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Arab coalition, formed in 2015 under the banner of ‘restoring the legitimate Yemeni government’ and countering the Houthis, had evolved by 2025 into an increasingly covert power rivalry, having started out as a joint security intervention. Differences in goals, means, and priorities within the coalition became particularly pronounced from 2018 onwards, and December 2025 marked a turning point at which these differences were formalized.

Saudi Arabia’s airstrikes targeting Southern Transitional Council (STC) elements in Mukalla, Hadramut, and Mehri between 26 and 31 December 2025 concretised this rupture. By targeting forces that were effectively its partners, which had been trained and supported by the UAE, Riyadh created an unprecedented situation in the history of the coalition. Consequently, Yemen became a conflict zone where actors within the same alliance used force against each other.

Hadramut and Mehri have assumed a central role in this new phase. These two eastern provinces, which remained relatively uninvolved in direct conflict with the Houthis for a long time, have now become the main testing ground for intra-coalition rivalry. The STC’s expansion into these provinces, which consolidated its control over South Yemen by early December 2025, was perceived by Saudi Arabia as crossing a red line. In an article for The Conversation, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, an expert on the Gulf, noted that the timing of this move, which coincided with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit, reinforced Riyadh’s belief that Abu Dhabi was aware of and approved this step.

This crisis has once again confirmed that the divisions within the coalition are nothing new. The clashes in Aden in 2018, between UAE-backed Security Belt forces and Yemeni government troops, were the first serious test of the coalition’s unity. In 2019, Riyadh interpreted the UAE’s reduction of its military presence and continued influence through local armed groups as the Emirates’ abandonment of Saudi Arabia. Betül Doğan Akkaş of Ankara University explains this process in her article for Anadolu Agency as a ‘buck-passing’ approach.

According to this approach, while the UAE remained part of the coalition, it largely shifted the political and military costs of the Yemen intervention onto Saudi Arabia. The Riyadh Agreement, signed in the same year, and the Presidential Council, established in 2022, were arrangements that masked, but did not eliminate, this structural division. Competition shifting to the eastern provinces in 2023 and 2024 set the stage for a process that culminated in the coalition becoming effectively dysfunctional in December 2025.

Why is South Yemen important?

The competition over Hadramut and Mahra is driven by deep geostrategic considerations. According to the US-based MBN, Hadramut holds Yemen’s most significant oil and natural gas reserves. This makes it critically important for the country’s economy and energy security, given its long coastline on the Arabian Sea and its potential export ports. In contrast, Mahri is directly linked to Saudi Arabia’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, thanks to its proximity to the Omani border, access to the open sea, and alternative energy and transport corridors. The UAE, however, views these areas as part of a broader network of ports and maritime trade extending from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa.

Therefore, the crisis in Yemen reflects a clash of strategic approaches between the two countries regarding the future of the regional order, rather than a temporary military dispute. Saudi Arabia considers Yemen strategically important to its national security and regional position within its 2030 Vision, whereas the UAE is pursuing a riskier path, involving collaboration with non-state actors and establishing influence through ports and security networks.

Gulf rivalry beyond Yemen?

According to Arab News, a news agency close to Saudi Arabia, tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have deepened, extending beyond Yemen to broader regional politics. The report, citing CNN, suggests that the crisis may have been caused by misinformation conveyed to Abu Dhabi, namely that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had requested sanctions against the UAE from President Donald Trump during his November visit to Washington.

Riyadh categorically denies this claim and believes that the misinformation has led to the mobilization of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council in Yemeni provinces near the Saudi border. Tensions escalated into open conflict on 30 December, when Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes targeting what it claims is a military deployment in Yemen linked to the UAE that was not coordinated with the coalition.

According to Arab News, the disagreement is not limited to Yemen, pointing to a deeper strategic divergence between the two countries. Saudi Arabia believes the UAE is collaborating with destabilizing actors in Yemen, Sudan, the Horn of Africa, and Syria, and it criticizes Abu Dhabi’s normalization process with Israel, which began in 2020. Although the UAE has withdrawn its troops from Yemen and emphasized its commitment to Saudi Arabia’s security, the situation reveals that the relationship between the two countries has shifted from one of tacit harmony to one of overt and structural competition.