On 16 September, 2019 the leaders of Turkey, Russia and Iran came together in Ankara for a trilateral summit in line with the Astana process. One of the main outcomes of the summit was the announcement of the formation of a participants list for the Syrian constitutional committee.

On 23 September, United Nations chief, Antonio Guterres said an agreement was reached on the composition of the constitutional committee and that the UN considers the committee to be the next step in efforts to find a political solution to end the more than eight-year-long war in Syria. Despite this significant progress, the formation of the constitutional committee isn’t final as the procedures of the committee are yet to be decided, and it is here that the differences between the Astana states will become more critical. The decision over the procedures of the committee will set the framework for Syria’s new constitution. Therefore, before the committee commences, the outcome of these discussions will be the most significant building block towards the reconstruction of Syria.

The formation of the constitutional committee in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 2254 has been a major obstacle for over the past eight years and only the Astana format has proven itself able to achieve progress. After the guarantors of the Astana process formulated their willingness to push along this process, the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition managed to come up with a list of 50 participants from their sides. Both sides were supported by their fellow backers in their efforts to formulate their own list, which is Iran and Russia for the regime and Turkey for the opposition. However, a third list was to be prepared by the UN of 50 independent figures but this faced several obstacles. This third list of independent members is of decisive importance, as whoever can manage to influence more than half of the independent members might secure its majority within the constitutional committee.

At first, the Assad regime protested against the decision-making role of the UN arguing that the UN’s role has to be limited to monitoring rather than taking an active role. Only with the pressure from the Astana format did the regime step back and accept the UN’s role in forming the list of independent members. However, the regime again blocked the process when the UN shared its list with all sides. The Assad regime argued that some of the independent members should have been in the list of the Syrian opposition instead. After diplomatic back and forths, the number of independent people considered problematic by the regime was reduced step-by-step, first to six then three until there was finally agreement on the last person during the Ankara summit.

At the current stage, the procedures of the committee have to be decided, but now the differences will be even bigger and won’t be limited to the Syrian opposition and the regime, but will include the differences between Turkey, Iran and Russia. Among other issues, the most visible will the question of who will head the committee. While Iran and Russia argue that the regime is the legal authority of Syria in the UN and deserves to head the constitutional committee, Turkey underlines that such a move will be fruitless and cannot result in a political solution, as such, the UN has to head the committee. From the Turkish standpoint, the Assad regime can be seen as a legitimate actor only if it wins an election after a genuine political transition process, but for Iran and Russia the regime is already a legitimate actor. After years of cooperation, the Astana process now comes to a point in which they have to decide if the opposition and the regime should be equal, or if both sides should find a solution under the regime’s direction.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Vladimir Putin, and Hassan Rouhani, the presidents of Turkey, Russia and Iran, met in Ankara on April 4 and they, once again, pledged to work together to conclude the everlasting war in Syria. The summit was the second of its kind following the Sochi meeting of last November and will be followed by another tripartite summit in Tehran. While the three countries diverge on a number of issues regarding Syria from the future of the Syrian regime to their threat perceptions, “Syria’s territorial integrity is sine qua non” for them as Erdogan said in the joint conference after the summit in Ankara. All three actors pursue to keep Syria’s territorial integrity intact despite their different rationales, methods and instruments for this goal. More, all three actors give each other the benefit of the doubt as they go through serious tests of their commitment to the tripartite cooperation.

While Turkey desires a future Syria with no piece of it under the PYD’s control, it wants Turkey-backed actors, such as the National Army (formerly the Free Syrian Army), to have its fair share of power in the new status quo to be built. The least Turkey expects to achieve is to contain the PYD zone and place a security belt between its forces and the Turkish territory. The most it expects, on the other hand, is to establish a new government in Syria which will include Turkey-backed actors in charge. Turkey’s best-case scenario has no place neither for Assad nor for the PYD in the whole or part of Syria.

Iran, on the other hand, is the strongest advocate of returning to the pre-war status quo in Syria. The most it expects to achieve is to hand the Assad regime the perfect control over the entire country so that it can have its proxy power to trouble its long time regional rivals such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and if circumstances dictate, Turkey. This way Iran seeks to have a contiguous sphere of control from Iran to Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The members of this bloc would not only choose to cooperate and build an alliance with Iran but they would also be ruled by rulers with deep and genuine allegiances to Iran. These countries, in Iran’s best-case scenario, will also be protected not only by their national armies but also by Iran’s militia forces being planted into their armies. While this is the perfect scenario for Iran, the least it can be satisfied with is to maintain Assad’s rule at least in Damascus if not in Idlib, Raqqa, or Haseke.

Russia, as the key actor that coordinates Turkey’s and Iran’s diverging perspectives on Syria, desires to drive U.S. out of Syria in its best-case scenario and contain the U.S. sphere of influence in the east of the Euphrates in its not-so-good but acceptable scenario. Russia has no commitment to Assad as an individual leader or to Iran’s project of building the new Persian Empire. Assad’s presidency or Iran’s militias in Syria are nothing more than simple instruments to contain U.S. expansionism within Syria.

While a level of discrepancy surely exits amongst the future projections of these three countries, their prospects of Syria are not entirely incommensurable. They are for sure willing to work together in order to keep Syria as a single unified country against the U.S. attempts to carve out a chunk of it to be handed to the PYD. While Turkey-backed rebels and Iran-backed regime forces are on the opposite sides on the ground, Turkey and Iran, as the sponsors, have the capacity to tone down the conflict and start a negotiation process between the rebels and the regime.

A version of territorial power-sharing between the Turkey-backed rebels and Iran-backed regime can maintain the conflict in low intensity until all three parties reach an agreement over the future of Syria. Such an arrangement relies on the idea that Turkey and Iran – with Russian backup – will be satisfied with the less of two evils rather than pursuing their best-case scenarios immediately. For Turkey, the lesser evil is Assad ruling a part of Syria rather than the whole, while the PYD remains Turkey’s main concern. For Iran, the lesser evil is Assad ruling part of Syria rather than none while Israel and Saudi Arabia remain as Iran’s main concerns. For Russia, the lesser evil is accommodating Iran and Turkey’s diverging concerns rather than pushing for an all-Russian initiative.

After all, that’s Russia’s only shot to be able to balance U.S. presence in Syria. Among such diverging priorities, Turkey, Iran and Russia will need to give each other the benefit of the doubt rather than assuming the worst, which, in this case, would be spoiling the accommodation process and pursuing their maximalist, or best-case scenarios at the cost of the other two.

The upcoming Turkey-European Union (EU) summit in Bulgaria is a “very important step” in resolving issues between the EU and Turkey, according to a senior EU official on Wednesday.

The remarks came ahead of a key EU-Turkey summit set for March 26 in Varna, Bulgaria — the current EU term president – that would bring together EU leaders and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

EU-Turkey relations, regional and international issues, including global foreign policy, security, fight against terrorism, the Middle East, Africa and Russia are expected to be discussed during the summit, the senior EU official, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to restrictions on talking to the media, said.

An “environment of trust” exists between Turkey and the EU to discuss specific issues, he said, adding that the meeting provides a platform where both sides could listen to each other.

The official said Turkey’s visa-free travel to Europe would also be discussed at the summit, adding that the European Commission was examining files ahead of the meeting.

In 2016, Turkey and the EU signed a deal aiming to stem the irregular migration flow through the Aegean Sea by taking stricter measures against human traffickers and improving conditions for nearly three million Syrian refugees in Turkey.

The deal also allows for the acceleration of Turkey’s EU membership bid and visa-free travel for Turkish nationals within the Schengen area, on the condition that Ankara meets all of the 72 requirements set by the EU.

The official added that a “privileged partnership” model for Turkey in the EU is not the case but only an offer of full membership of Turkey.

– Astana talks

On the active role of Turkey in the Astana peace talks, the official said the EU is not part of it but Turkey, the closest partner of the bloc, could represent its interests.

The Astana peace talks were launched on Jan. 23-24, 2017, with an aim to end violence and improve the humanitarian situation in war-torn Syria.

The three guarantor countries — Turkey, Iran and Russia — had agreed to establish de-escalation zones in Idlib and in parts of the Aleppo, Latakia, and Hama provinces.

The official said Turkey is “representing the EU in a way” in the Astana process.

Turkey had applied for the EU membership in 1987 and accession talks began in 2005.

However, negotiations stalled in 2007 due to the objections of the Greek Cypriot administration in the divided island of Cyprus, as well as opposition from Germany and France.

To gain membership, Turkey has to successfully conclude negotiations on 35 policy chapters that involve reforms and the adoption of European standards.

As of May 2016, 16 chapters had been opened and one concluded.

However, in December 2016, the member states said no new chapters would be opened.

Since then, the country has held many negotiations with the bloc officials, insisting that Turkey wants to open Chapter 23 on the judiciary and fundamental rights and Chapter 24 on justice, freedom, and security.

Source: AA

Before a trilateral meeting, Putin acknowledged his Turkish and Iranian counterparts’ support in preventing the Syria’s disintegration. “It would not have been possible to end the military process in Syria without the roles of Turkish and Iranian leaders. With the support of Turkey and Iran, the disintegration of Syria was prevented,” he said.

The talks lasted two hours, with Putin saying that they were detailed and included all aspects of the Syrian settlement.

In a joint statement at the summit, three guarantors declared that they would continue to cooperate for the sake of reducing violence in Syria. The three presidents also reiterated their strong commitment to supporting the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria.

The guarantor countries also emphasized the confidence-building measures in order to speed up the search for political solutions in Syria.

Fast, secure and continuous humanitarian aid; release of detainees and identification of missing persons were pointed out as the measures necessary.

Turkey and Russia, together with Iran, are the guarantor countries that brokered a cease-fire in Syria in December 2016, leading to the Astana talks, which are running parallel to the Geneva talks for peace in Syria.

Erdogan

President Erdogan said “The world has witnessed the positive results of establishing a close working environment between Turkey, Russia, and Iran on the Syrian issue.”

The talks in Astana, Kazakhstan are the “best example” of this, the Turkish leader added.

He pointed out; “Exclusion of terrorist elements — that target both Syrian political unity and territorial integrity and our country – from the process, will be among Turkey’s priorities.”

Turkey is stating from the beginning that it is against any form of “problem-solving” with the role of terrorist groups PYD, YPG which are PKK’s Syrian affiliates.

Erdogan repeated that Turkey cannot share a platform with any terrorist organization that poses a threat to its national security.

Erdogan referred to the Geneva talks under the auspices of the UN, and said the National Dialogue Congress would contribute to the Geneva process.

Putin

President Putin – claiming that the summit was a means to strengthen the territorial integrity of Syria – said the Astana process prevents the division of the country which is now moving towards a “new phase of political solution” and added that he sees the possibility of an end of the war.

He also expressed his gratitude to the Turkish and Iranian leaders for welcoming the idea of holding the Syrian National Dialogue Congress regarding the solution of the Syrian crisis.

“The presidents of Iran and Turkey supported the initiative to convene an all-Syrian forum-congress of the national dialogue in Syria. We agreed to hold this important event at the proper level and ensure the participation of representatives of different sectors of Syrian society,” Putin said after the talks in Sochi on Wednesday.

Rouhani

President Rouhani said “We are pleased to see that the three countries have agreed on Syria’s territorial integrity, independence and unity, and we are in close cooperation to ensure peace and stability in Syria.”

He said that the trilateral meeting is significant in opening up a “new prospect” to settle the situation in Syria.

Rouhani also emphasized that Iran is serious in its fight against international terrorism and is ready to offer help to other countries.

He also reiterated Iranian support for Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, saying there should be no foreign intervention in Syria’s internal affairs “without the consent of the legitimate government of Syria.”

Putin-Assad met on Monday

Before the summit with the Turkish and Iranian presidents, Putin met Assad who came to Sochi with an unannounced visit on Monday.

Putin informed Erdogan and Rouhani about the results of his 4 hour long meeting with Assad and about the regime’s “readiness to carry out constitutional reform and stage a free, UN-supervised election.”

Following the talks with Assad, the Russian President held phone conversations with the heads of the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which made analysts suggest that the violent conflict in Syria could be coming to an end.

Syria has been locked in a civil war since early 2011, when the Assad regime cracked down on pro-democracy protests with unexpected ferocity. This led to the military conflict between the Syrian opposition groups and the Assad regime over the war-torn country’s territory.

Now, in its seventh year, the war in Syria has killed hundreds of thousands of people and displaced more than 12 million, causing a refugee crisis all over Europe and its neighboring countries.

*Written by Suna Nur Sarihan. 

At the beginning of 2017, Russian specialists submitted a draft of the new Syrian constitution. While this document was intended to trigger discussions, nothing has recently been reported about a movement in this direction. Determined to start work in this area, Russia has initiated a new conference to draft a new constitution for Syria. The location of this conference – Sochi, Russia – will make it possible to isolate this assembly from foreign influence, especially from the west. With the Sochi initiative, Russia also wants to expand its political role in Syria by outlining Turkey and Iran.

On Tuesday, Russia invited 33 Syrian groups and political parties to a “Syrian Congress on National Dialogue,” also referred to as the “People’s Conference,” which should have taken place on 18 November in the Black Sea resort of Sochi.

Invited groups and political parties include Popular Front for Liberation and Change, The National Coordinating Body for the Forces for Democratic Change, People’s Party, The Popular Will Party, Syrian National Youth Party for Justice and Development, Solidarity Party, The National Congress Party for Secular Syria, Alternative Current for Syria; High Committee for Negotiations, Stream of “Kamh,” The “Southern Front,” The Syrian National Council Party, The National Coalition for Revolution and Opposition Forces, The Democratic Union Party (Al-Qamishli), The Democratic Union Party (Kubani /Ain Al Arab), “Syrian Union Party,” The Kurdish National Council, Movement (together) for a Free and Democratic Syria, “Syrian State Building Current,” Syrian Democratic People’s Party (Damascus), “Syria Al Watan” Party, National Congress Party, Arab Baath Socialist Party, The Social Democratic Party, Coalition of Forces of Peaceful Change, Syrian National Youth Party, Council of Elders, Syrian National Democratic Rally, Syrian National Social Party, Left-center Democratic Association of the Assyrians “Metacas Party,” The Arab Democratic Union Party, “Arab Socialist Union” Party and the Socialist Unionist Party.

The initiative taken by Russia excludes the armed Syrian opposition, which, while a party to the Astana talks, strongly opposes this move taken by Moscow. The High Committee on Negotiations, composed of the Exile Opposition, armed groups and independent personalities formed at the Riyadh Conferences, also stated that they won’t participate in the Sochi Conference. Many other Syrian opposition bodies also rejected this initiative. As Fatih Hassoun, head of the Tahrir Homs Brigade, which operates in the Rastan pocket in North Homs and member of the Astana delegation team said in a private conversation: “One of the results of the Astana Conferences […], and we made sure that the results of the Astana Conferences would not be the result of the so-called Conference of Peoples in Humeimin or Sochi, which was strongly promoted by Russia.”

On the other hand, this initiative also includes the PYD/YPG – the Syrian branch of the PKK, which is accepted as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the European Union and the US. While the US and the European Union deny links between the YPG and the PKK, Russia does not even list the PKK as a terrorist organization. Turkey, which fears a “terror corridor” operating on its southern borders, has strongly opposed Russia’s invitation for the YPG to join the Sochi conference.

Spokesman of the Turkish President, Ibrahim Kalın expressed Ankara’s opposition to the Russian invitation of the Syrian Democratic Union (PYD) to participate in the Syrian National Dialogue Congress. Talking to reporters, Kalın said: “We do not see the issue in Kurds being invited to the Congress of the Syrian people as representatives of the Syrian population, but PYD is a terrorist organization. Giving them space on the negotiations platform is unacceptable, we shall never agree to this.” Turkey’s rejection was no surprise, but why did Russia invite the PYD/YPG?

While in principle Russia is attempting to find a solution through the Astana talks with Turkey and Iran, Moscow also wants to use the YPG card to secure its political and military gains in Syria. Thus, while on one hand Russia is using the Turkish threat against the YPG for political and military gains, the Putin administration is also attempting to use the YPG towards Turkey in order to receive concessions from Ankara. For example, following negotiations with the YPG, Russia has succeeded in gaining exclusive access to some of the military facilities around Afrin, including the Mennaq military airport.

Russia has also established a military presence in Tel Rifaat, which, with the help of de-facto Russian air support, was captured by the YPG from Syrian opposition factions. Russia is not only present militarily, but is also actively recruiting fighters for the 5th Legion – a military body announced by the Assad regime on 22 November 2016. This legion’s commanding power directly follows Russian orders. Many fighters of the Syrian Democratic Union led by the YPG have deserted from the group and have joined the 5th legion. It is reported from sources that Russia pays these deserted recruits in Tel Rifaat $400 per month. This is four times higher than the salaries of YPG militants in Afrin.

In spite of these developments, it must be noted that Russian relations with the YPG are complicated. While the YPG in the Sheikh Maqsoud district of Aleppo is enjoying self-governance, when the Turkey-backed Syrian rebel factions wanted to launch an attack on the YPG in the Manbij region, it was the Russians who brokered an agreement between the Assad regime and the YPG in order to protect the group. The agreement included both a military presence of Russia and the Assad regime in the Manbij region and control of an administrative building in return for protection against military operations conducted by Syrian rebels.

Turkey and Russia have made significant progress in the Astana talks and in accordance with this process, Turkey has deployed its forces to southern Afrin. While Turkey is besieging the YPG on multiple surfaces, regime-held areas in Aleppo are still providing supplies to Afrin. Within this, Russia has expanded its military presence in the area. Since Turkey’s main concern has been to dismantle the YPG from northern Syria, one wonders how Russia will appease Ankara. Moscow is playing a multi-level game in order to increase its influence in Syria: while Russia wants to limit Turkey, the Putin administration is also trying to limit the Americans in Syria with the help of Turkey. Russia also knows that a solution in Syria without Turkey is not possible. Therefore, to avoid a dominant Turkish policy in Syria, Russia doesn’t want to lose the YPG card, as if necessary, Russia will not be reluctant to use the YPG against Turkish interests in Syria. It should be remembered that the PYD still maintains a political office in Moscow.

Cooperation with the YPG is also a Russian strategy in regards to its rivalry with the US. While the US controls the YPG east of the Euphrates River, Russia intends to control the group west of the Euphrates River. More, as noted in the draft constitution that was written by Russian specialists at the beginning of this year, Russia also holds a positive outlook on the idea of an autonomous YPG region in northern Syria. Thus, while the US has provided, and continues to provide, immense military support to the YPG, Moscow is the main political power which has the needed influence over the Assad regime to grant the YPG an autonomous region in northern Syria. Therefore, Russia wants to drive the US out of Syria by winning the sympathy of the YPG. While Russia usually perceives factions in Syria supported by the US as its enemy, this is different in the case of the YPG.

Overall, Russia is playing a complicated political game in Syria, trying to manipulate the disputes between all the political groups to its advantage. The Syrian Congress on National Dialogue is a new step in Russia’s efforts to strengthen its role in Syria. While Russia has ruled out the US, Europe and the Gulf States with the Astana talks, Moscow is now trying to exclude Turkey, Iran and all other actors with the initiative in Sochi. While excluded from the Geneva and Astana talks, the YPG controls a large part of Syrian territory. Aware of its strong position in Syria therefore, Russia has invited the YPG to the Sochi conference as it is trying to take control in Syria by dividing other actors.

Iran evaluated the Arab Spring from its own perspective as an aim to overthrow prevalent dictatorships in the region with democratic systems. While Tehran supported the rhetoric of revolution in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, the country was disappointed by the fact that it did not receive a warm welcome from leaders including Mohamed Morsi and Rached Ghannouchi. This is particularly the reason why Iran did not refrain from criticizing Morsi during his tenure in office. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, with a delay of a few days, Kayhan, Iranian government’s influential newspaper presented the General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi coup as a “U.S. coup in Egypt.”

Syria was a different issue in many aspects. Since the complexities in Iran following the 2009 elections had not entirely settled down, there was a possibility that demonstrations could also spread to the country. In addition to the domestic imbalances, Iran also had tense relations with supporters of the Syrian opposition. For instance, relations with Saudi Arabia caused Iran to distinguish the Syrian affair from what it termed, an “Islamic awakening.”

Particularly after the peaceful demonstrations that evolved into armed insurrection, Tehran left aside its ambivalent attitude and took the field in favor of the Assad regime. Iran first intervened in Syria through the medium of Hezbollah and its military aides, then heaved a sigh of relief with Russia’s involvement in the war in October, 2015. As it became obvious that the U.S. would not interfere in the Syrian conflict, especially after a Russian jet that violated Turkish airspace was downed, Iran assumed that the Syrian war was almost coming to an end.

In fact, while Ankara and Tehran had adopted similar positions in regards to the Syrian conflict, at least in discourse, this was not recognized due to the heated atmosphere and conflict environment. While both countries alluded to different groups, they both denounced the existence of foreign fighters in Syria, made clear that Syria’s territorial integrity was of vital importance and emphasized that the fate of Syria should be drawn by the Syrian people themselves.

So, what was the main point of disagreement between Turkey and Iran? While on one hand Tehran defended Assad’s participation in the elections which were to be supervised by international organizations, claiming that Assad’s legitimacy was ongoing within the public, Ankara argued the exact opposite. The Turkish administration claimed that Assad had lost his legitimacy and stressed that his participation in the elections would hinder fairness and impartiality. Consequently, as Turkey delayed the dispute of the future of Assad until the later stages of the Astana Talks, this allowed for the positions of Tehran and Ankara to merge closer together.

Iran’s expectation from the Astana process

As briefly stated earlier, Iran never refrained from expressing the belief that the Syrian crisis was an internal security issue. According to this standpoint, defending Syria was more important than defending Khuzestan, so therefore if Iran had not intervened in Syria it would have had to fight within its own territory. It is true that Iran has strived to protect Assad’s seat and reaped considerable acquisitions so far. Nonetheless, Tehran was aware that Syria would never return to its pre-war status and that therefore it would not be able to control the country with the limited forces in hand. For this reason, Iran benefits from the term “useful Syria,” which was coined by Assad, and initiates economic, political and military investments in these areas.

As can be recalled, the Astana process was initiated following the improvement of Ankara-Moscow relations after an apology was issued to Russia in June 2016. Considering the caricatures covered in the Iranian press, which included libelous contents against the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, it became clear that Iran was not very pleased with Turkey’s apology. Turkey’s coordination with Russia during the Aleppo operation in December particularly agitated Iran, which reflected its objection to this move by blocking the evacuation operations through its militia in the field. As a result, Iran became an active member of the Astana process, which was officially initiated in January 2017.

As is known, the Astana process is based on the idea of permanently ending the conflicts after a certain period by establishing various de-conflict zones, and so far, the new political system to be formed following the conflicts has barely been discussed. With this, the new draft constitution proposed by Russia in January 2017 did not draw interest from the parties and has been suspended for the time being.

Another important aspect that ought to be underlined when evaluating the Astana process from the perspective of Iran is that the process displayed the breadth the country has covered in the Syrian crisis. In other words, considering the fact that Iran was not invited to the Geneva talks in June 2012, the replacement of Geneva with the Astana process, to which Iran is a guarantor state, can be interpreted as a diplomatic success for Tehran.

Undoubtedly, Iran has been satisfied with Turkey temporarily suspending its insistence on an urgent regime change. This contentment has been reflected in the statements of Iranian authorities and the commentaries covered by the country’s press organs. As a matter of fact, Iranian authorities have tried to inculcate Turkey with this idea for years, contending that the primary threat to Ankara was not the regime but the fundamentalist terror groups and mainly the outlawed PKK. Consequently, Turkey’s present position might be seen as a diplomatic gain for Iran. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu’s words, “what I say about Syria is not important to me, what the Syrian people say is important,” found extensive coverage in the Iranian media. Therefore, Turkey’s focus on border security, with suffice to bringing immunity to an Idlib-centered Sunni region seems as an acceptable agreement to Iran.

It is also worth addressing the PYD, which is the Syrian offshoot of the PKK, at this point. In actual fact, both the Syrian and Iranian regimes condoned the PYD particularly during the first stages of the Syrian crisis, mainly with an aim to close both the country’s northern borders with Turkey and the groups that Turkey supports. This signified a tactical and temporary cooperation rather than a strategic one.

Therefore, it will not be surprising if Iran adopts a similar stance to Turkey towards the terror group in the upcoming period if the PYD is fully controlled by the U.S. and starts to clash with the regime and the Russian forces as already seen in the example of Deir ez-Zor. This is mainly due to the fact that Iran and Turkey have been following a common line against Kurdish nationalism for nearly half a century. While Iran most certainly perceives the Kurdish movement as a national security threat, following the independence rhetoric, Tehran has not abstained from facing Masoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Hence, the intense diplomacy traffic that followed the referendum in northern Iraq reflects that there is significant intersection in the threat perceptions of both Iran and Turkey’s national security.

Optimism in Astana talks

There are several other reasons to be relatively optimistic about the Astana process. Despite the gains in the field, administrators in Tehran are experienced enough to know that an absolute victory in the Syrian crisis is not realistic. In particular, the U.S. has lately been working on various scenarios with the aim of troubling Iran. These scenarios include, President Trump’s refusal to confirm Iran’s compliance with the nuclear agreement and Iran’s possible marginalization from a Russia-Turkey convergence, which will leave Tehran week in Syria. All these possibilities suggest that Iran will endeavor to minimize its problems with Turkey after this stage. Unprecedented military contacts between the two countries over the last forty years can also be evaluated within this framework.

Thus, while Iran was initially against Turkey’s involvement in the Astana process, it seems that Tehran currently supports this process. More, it is evident that Ankara has been gradually diverging from the U.S. since the July 15 coup attempt. This situation has become more apparent as it became obvious that the Trump administration’s policies on the Middle East were not so different from that of Obama’s. Therefore, forces approaching each other in regional politics will want to obtain a tangible result. In a sense, the Astana process will be a practical manifestation of the cooperation between the three parties and different opportunities for cooperation might emerge providing that the process succeeds. As part of this process, all actors have to make various sacrifices, as was displayed by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s emphasis on President Erdoğan’s leadership during his latest visit to Turkey. During this visit Putin also indicated that the Astana process would have failed without Erdoğan’s personal initiative.

Another positive aspect of the Astana process for Iran is the chance it offers to focus on the nuclear crisis, an issue that has lately simmered as the Trump administration keeps taking slow yet determined steps to void the nuclear agreement, at least in practice. Iran’s reduction of targets and getting along with the regional forces will surely favor the country in such a period. For this reason, the country started developing an attitude that is open to all kinds of cooperation with Turkey, including military and economic cooperation. Tehran’s downshift might also affect Turkey-Iraq relations. Baghdad’s latest statements on Turkey have probably been approved by the Tehran administration, and under the present circumstances, Iran will regard Turkey, which has close relations with Russia, as lesser of two evils in the face of the possibility that a trio comprising Saudi Arabia, Israel and United Arab Emirates might be effective in the Middle East.

Challenges

Nevertheless, the Astana process is likely to confront several serious challenges. First of all, it is not very certain how the armed groups in Idlib will be evacuated. The profound presence of al-Nusra in the region and the possibility that some groups on friendly terms with Turkey might be targeted by Russia or the regime indicate the fragility of the process. But more importantly, it is certain that there will be serious debates about how the new political system will be formed at the end of the process. As for Iran, the administration assumes that Assad will preserve his seat at least in the short term after this phase, and that the basic “red lines” will be protected during the permanent changes afterwards. In addition, Iran does not rule out the possibility of a new conflict through Hezbollah and cannot figure out how far it could trust Russia in such a case. The fact that Russian air defense systems failed to function during various attacks from Israel over the past year has strengthened the rumors that Russia’s policies on Syria are guided by Israel. Thus, if this is the case, a violent war between Israel and Hezbollah seems quite possible in the last act of the Syrian crisis.

Iran, to a large extent, considers itself in a successful position in regards to the current state of the Syrian crisis. Firstly, the legitimate opposition at the onset of the crisis has so far declined and fallen apart. Secondly, the countries supporting the opposition withdrew their support for various reasons and started acting through the YPG (People’s Protection Units). As occurred in the 1991 Iraq war, they are building a safeguarded separatist zone for the following phase. The current political map is acceptable for Iran as nearly all major cities such as Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Latakia are controlled by the regime and the region is not likely to be affected by an imminent threat providing that the U.S. remains outside out of the equation.

Meanwhile however, Iran may face two major risks in the current phase: an extensive Israeli attack and second, the incrimination of Trump’s crackdown on the country. In consideration of such possibilities, it is apparent that Tehran is striving to develop and maintain sound relations with Moscow and Ankara. In addition, the recent referendum and subsequent developments in its aftermath have allowed Iran to form a new front with the central Iraqi government and Turkey. Therefore, it is fair to state that, in light of regional developments, the Turkish-Iranian rapprochement, which came into being following the Qatar crisis, is likely to continue in this trajectory for a while.

Following Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield, which saw the Free Syrian Army (FSA), backed by Turkish forces, clear Daesh from the territory in north Syria between August 2016 and March 2017, the Idlib operation has been the second phase of Turkish direct involvement in Syria.

As a guarantor state within the Astana Talks, which Russia and Iran are also a party to, and as part of the mission to establish “de-escalation zones,” the main force of Turkish troops have entered Syria’s Idlib.

While the military convoys crossed from Reyhanli in southern Turkey’s Hatay province on Thursday night, the military announced that Turkish troops have crossed into Idlib in order to monitor de-escalation zones, with the aim to bring an end to the six-and-a-half-year conflict in Syria.

In a statement published by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), the military informed the soldiers had begun establishing observation points.

“Turkish Armed Forces elements that are to serve in the Idlib de-escalation zone have started their activities by establishing observation posts from Oct 12, 2017, as part of the Astana agreement…”

“The Turkish Armed Forces continue to carry out their duties in the territory within the engagement rules agreed by the guarantor countries in the Astana negotiations.”

During the weekend, reconnaissance teams entered Idlib as part of an international agreement to establish four de-escalation zones cross Syria.

According to the statement released by the TSK, the de-escalation zones were created in order to “enhance the effectiveness of the cease-fire regime, end conflicts, bring humanitarian aid to those in need [and] establish the necessary conditions for the return of those displaced.”

After the agreements taken between Iran, Turkey and Russia during the Astana talks, the Turkish administration emphasized that it was to observe the ceasefire between the Assad-loyal militias and the Syrian rebel factions. In addition, Turkey wants to prevent Idlib from destruction by the Russians who would use the presence of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) as an excuse for their actions. Turkish presence on the ground therefore should provide security and stability to the region.

Turkish experiences in the Syrian war, especially after the Euphrates Shield operation, convinced the Turkish government to become proactive in the region. The government is aware that if they do not act today, another party will act tomorrow at the cost of the Syrian revolution and Turkish foreign policy priorities. Another reason for Turkish intervention in Idlib is plans regarding Afrin. As Erdogan stated, the Idlib operation is planned to be used as a step for new military operations in Syria.

Rapprochement between Turkey and Russia

Turkey’s cooperation with Russia is based on reciprocity. The Russians know how costly an operation in Idlib will be and therefore prefer to control the situation on the ground with the help of Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey wants to strengthen its hand with a tactical alliance against the YPG units supported by the US. While an offensive to isolate Afrin is still on the table, the current Idlib operation would lay the foundations for this. More, Turkey wants to protect the ‘achievements’ of the Syrian rebels in Idlib and fears of a second Aleppo, Raqqa or Mosul to become a reality in Idlib. The Turkish presence in Idlib would inherently widen the Turkish sphere of influence in Syria and across the Middle East.

Nevertheless, the alliance between Russia and Turkey is a balancing act for both sides. While Russia must keep Assad-loyal militias, who consider Turkey as an enemy, under control, Turkey has to explain its alliance with Russia to the Syrian rebels. In view of the fact that Russia has been heavily bombarding the Syrian population for some time now, this becomes an herculean task. Turkey’s main argument will be the alternative to the Idlib operation: the total destruction of the region by Russia.

Will Turkey fight against HTS?

One can see from observing President Erdogan’s statements and from the current silence of HTS that both sides want to avoid a mutual confrontation. Within HTS, discussions continue on how to deal with the new situation – while one wing fears a confrontation with Turkey, the other wants to fight Turkey at all costs.

Recent developments suggest that a deal was reached between both parties. According to several videos and pictures, HTS fighters escorted Turkish observers to Darat al Izzah. The start of the Turkish observation mission was announced today by the Turkish army itself without providing detailed information. The Turkish army will be stationed at Darat al Izzah to overlook the deployments of the PKK-affiliated YPG forces in Afrin from the south. The Turkish presence in Darat al Izzah would also give Turkey the ability to pursue further military operations inside Syria, in order to fully encircle the YPG territory in Afrin.

Nevertheless, the situation in Idlib is provocative, which makes escalation more likely. Daesh and Jund al Aqsa sleeper cells are present in the region. Assad regime agents are also available. In addition, hardliners within HTS will want to take action against Turkey. Therefore, even if HTS decides not to attack Turkey, terrorist attacks on Turkish troops are likely. As a result of such attacks, the situation between Turkish security forces and HTS could quickly escalate.

The situation became even more complicated after Daesh militants in the Uqayribat region east of Hama crossed the Khanasser road towards the rebel-held areas in north-eastern Hama. The Uqayribat pocket of ISIS was besieged by the Assad regime and they crossed into the rebel-held territory without being bombed by the regime or Russia. Daesh in the rebel-held area began to fight HTS forces and captured several villages. The outcome and effects of this recent development are unpredictable, but it will surely complicate the situation in Idlib.

What would have happened if Turkey hadn’t intervened in Idlib?

After the former official branch of Al-Qaeda, the Al-Nusra front publically abandoned their link to Al-Qaeda and changed its name to Jabhat Fath al Sham. This move was interpreted by the US administration as a foolish attempt, which does not include any sustainable change of the group. Additionally, Jabhat Fath al Sham created a broader coalition called Hay’at Tahrir al Sham with other Islamist groups and the formerly US-backed Nureddin Zengi Movement. The new formation is led by Abu Jabir, the former leader of Ahrar al Sham. However, insiders claim that he is a “leader under Muhammad al-Jolani,” the former leader of Al-Nusra and the new military leader of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham. Recently, Abu Jabir was taken from his position and Muhammed al-Jolani was chosen as the temporary leader of HTS until a new leader is appointed. This decision comes after Nureddin Zengi, Abu Saleh Tahhan and his followers, Ibn Teymiyyah battalion and other several small units left the formation of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham.

During the creation and aftermath of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham, HTS abolished some Syrian rebel brigades like Jabhat al Shamiya, Suqour al Sham, Festaqem Kema Umirt, Jaysh al Mujahiddeen and the Idlib branch of Jaysh al Islam. Although thousands of Ahrar al Sham’s fighters deserted to the new formation of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham, Ahrar al Sham was able to gain more by accepting these abolished brigades as new units of Ahrar al Sham. Since then, tensions between Ahrar al Sham and HTS have not calmed down and the readiness of Ahrar to act against HTS improved. HTS on the other hand is in a constant effort to extend its areal control in the region. Therefore, the Al-Qaeda affiliated Hay‘at Tahrir al Sham captured the strategical Bab al Hawa border crossing to Turkey from its main rival Ahrar al Sham, increasing its dominance over the northwest of Syria.

With the increasing control of HTS, the region around Idlib was seen as a ‘safe-haven’ for Al-Qaeda. After the defeat of Daesh, the international community would have its new target – HTS. If Turkey had not intervened in Idlib, Russian and Iranian backed regime militias may have started a campaign to invade the region with the approval of the international community in the name of the “War against Terror.” This campaign would lead groups like Ahrar al Sham, Feylaq as Sham and other Syrian rebel factions to unite with HTS to resist against regime militias. This resistance would lack legitimacy and therefore foreign backing. The Russian-backed regime militias would have used genocidal tactics to conquer the area which would have ended in a massive refugee flow towards Turkey. Already the largest host of Syrian refugees, Turkey would have had to deal with a new refugee crisis and would have lost its leverage in Idlib to its enemy in Damascus. Additionally, Al-Qaeda would have remained in the area and would have started a guerilla tactical war, which would have resulted in a decade-long insurgency. Revolutionary factions in Idlib could evolve into terrorist groups within this given scenario.

All in all, while the Turkish intervention in Idlib carries risks, it is a necessary step that needed to be taken in order to save civilians in Syria and preserve Turkish interests. As the main advocate of the Syrian rebel factions, the largest host of Syrian refugees and as a guarantor during the Astana talks, there should be no doubt and discussion over Turkey’s involvement in solving the Syrian crisis. With Turkish absence, Idlib would face huge destruction, indiscriminate bombing, massacres, huge refugee flows and would become a new Raqqa, Mosul or Aleppo. Turkish foreign policy aims and the future of the Syrian civilians in Idlib are now hand in hand.