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he Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) swept to a commanding victory in Bangladesh’s parliamentary election, television projections showed, in a pivotal contest expected to shape the country’s political direction after months of unrest.

The vote was the first national election since the 2024 youth-led uprising that forced former prime minister Sheikh Hasina from office.

Local broadcasters said the BNP-led alliance captured 209 of 300 seats, enough for a two-thirds majority in parliament.

After the scale of the win became apparent, the party thanked voters and urged supporters not to hold celebratory marches, instead calling for prayers across the Muslim-majority nation for peace and prosperity.

The BNP is led by Tarique Rahman, widely seen as the leading candidate for prime minister. He is the son of former premier Khaleda Zia and former president Ziaur Rahman.

During the campaign, the party pledged support for poorer families, measures to attract foreign investment, limits on time in office for a prime minister, and steps to tackle corruption.

Jamaat-e-Islami concedes

The main challenger, Jamaat-e-Islami, acknowledged defeat after its alliance secured 68 seats.

Party leader Shafiqur Rahman said the group would not oppose simply for political theater.

“We will do positive politics,” he told reporters.

The youth-led National Citizen Party, which played a visible role in last year’s protests, won only five of the 30 constituencies it contested.

Observers described the election as the most competitive in years. Hasina’s Awami League, which ruled for more than 15 years, was barred from taking part.

Media estimates suggested turnout surpassed 60%, well above the level reported in the previous ballot.

More than 2,000 candidates from at least 50 political parties were on the ballot, a record number. Voting in one constituency was delayed following the death of a candidate.

Constitutional referendum held alongside

A parallel referendum asked citizens to weigh proposals that include establishing a neutral interim government during elections, forming a bicameral legislature, increasing women’s representation, strengthening judicial independence, and introducing term limits for prime ministers.

While authorities had yet to publish official figures, local reports indicated strong backing for the reforms.

Speaking from exile in India, Hasina dismissed the vote as a “carefully planned farce,” arguing it excluded her party and failed to ensure genuine participation.

She called for the results to be annulled, restrictions on the Awami League to be lifted, and a new election to be conducted under a neutral caretaker government.

Opponents of the former premier say that elections held during her rule were frequently overshadowed by boycotts and accusations of intimidation.

(Source: Reuters)

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ach region has its own particularities. South Asia, for instance, is largely dominated by India. Any planning that ignores Delhi’s supremacy would be unrealistic. In a military context, the defence ecosystems of the countries in the region are fragile and remain in India’s shadow, with Pakistan being a partial exception. However, there is also significant dependency on Russia, China and the West.

Nevertheless, the search for multipolarity in world politics, brought about by upheavals in the international system, has also prompted countries to protect themselves from risk. Middle powers are now resisting having their destinies determined for them, instead seeking to determine them themselves. This creates opportunities for new partners who can respond to this quest. This is precisely the new reality of the quest for a multipolar world.

Although China remains Bangladesh’s primary military supporter, Dhaka is also seeking to increase Turkey’s involvement in South Asian geopolitics. This would enable Turkey to access the Bangladeshi defence market and gradually undermine China’s near-monopoly on Dhaka’s military supply.

Therefore, this pursuit has the potential to reshape regional dynamics. Discussions regarding the potential sale of Turkey’s HİSAR O+ and SİPER medium- and long-range surface-to-air missile systems to Bangladesh have raised concerns in India. India currently exercises strategic control over the Bay of Bengal and its eastern border, and is concerned that its air superiority on the eastern front may be diminished. While Dhaka’s acquisition of Turkish air defence technology does not match the reach of India’s Russian S-400 systems, it will provide Dhaka with a credible deterrent and complicate regional air planning near sensitive border areas. This could potentially reshape the balance of air defence capabilities in South Asia, where Russian systems currently dominate.

While India may not believe that the qualitative and quantitative superiority of its armed forces in the region can be questioned, it is aware that its strategic comfort could be disrupted. While Delhi is accustomed to managing Chinese influence in the region, the defence industry export initiatives of Turkey — a strong NATO member with an independent stance that aims to expand its influence in the Indo-Pacific with its ‘Asia Anew’ policy — represent a new situation for India. Turkey offers NATO-standard technology and takes a warm approach to issues such as technology sharing and joint production, imposing fewer conditions than its alternatives.

Turkish defense influence in South Asia

While it is natural for Delhi not to consider its supremacy to be in question, the limits of its influence have been firmly questioned by even its closest neighbours for some time now. Last year, relations between India and Bangladesh became strained following the fall of the Indian-backed government amid protests in Bangladesh, and after Delhi hosted ousted Prime Minister Hasina, who had sought refuge in India and was recently sentenced to death in absentia.

Turkey–India relations have generally progressed cautiously due to the misconception of viewing them through a Pakistani lens. However, they have improved in recent years, particularly since Ankara’s diplomatic support for Islamabad during Operation Sindoor and Delhi’s subsequent show of solidarity with actors with whom Ankara has had friction in the region, such as the Greek Cypriot Administration, Greece, and Armenia. This is based on the unfounded claim that Ankara disapproves of these actors, with an eye for retaliation or tit-for-tat.

In this context, India accuses Bangladesh’s Yunus-led caretaker government of facilitating the resurgence of Islamist political forces and strengthening ties with Turkey. From this perspective, Bangladesh’s potential as Turkey’s next key partner in South Asia, similar to Pakistan, is unsettling for India.

Historically, Turkey’s foreign policy orientation has been Western-centric, limiting its outreach to more distant regions further east, such as South Asia. However, this situation has changed in recent years, particularly since the launch of the Asia Anew policy in 2019.

2025 can specifically be described as the year in which Ankara’s strategic consistency in its Asia Anew initiative converged with Bangladesh’s clear policy approach of seeking to expand its partnerships beyond traditional actors. Consequently, by 2025, Turkey–Bangladesh relations had reached a new peak, particularly evident in defence and security cooperation. While the defence rapprochement between Ankara and Dhaka is not a new development, being based on decades of institutional cooperation, it is important to note that this cooperation has manifested as a transition from an operational arms trade relationship to a comprehensive, strategically important partnership.

By incorporating at least 15 categories of Turkish military equipment, ranging from advanced rocket launchers and howitzers to Bayraktar unmanned aerial vehicles and potentially Tulpar light tanks, Bangladesh has become the fourth-largest importer of Turkish defense products since 2021, recalibrating its security policy. Bangladesh’s 2030 subsequent goal of reducing its dependence on traditional suppliers and developing domestic defense-industrial capabilities by modernizing and technologically advancing military assets aligns with Turkey’s Asia Anew initiative.

Turkey’s role in Bangladesh’s defense transformation

Turkey’s involvement in Bangladesh’s defense transformation began in the late 1970s and 1980s with the provision of military training to the Bangladesh Navy and Army. This role expanded significantly in the 2010s. This expansion is evident in the scale of supplies, repairs and logistical support, as well as joint production and industrial cooperation.

Important examples of the supply scale include Otokar Cobra light armored vehicles, guided missile frigates and the TRG-300 Kaplan medium-range missile system. Turkish personnel have also been training Bangladeshi military personnel on the system within the country. Turkish assistance has also extended to repairing Bangladeshi navy ships damaged in the Beirut port explosion in 2020. This has been followed by further steps, including establishing a production line for artillery shells at Bangladeshi ammunition factories, efforts to establish defense industry zones in Chittagong and Narayanganj, and forming a bilateral Defense Industry Working Group. Last year also saw the Turkish naval corvette TCG Kınalıada (F-514) make a goodwill visit to Chattogram Port to celebrate 50 years of diplomatic relations and signal greater maritime engagement.

Turkey is also institutionalizing cooperation in counter-terrorism, cybercrime, counter-narcotics operations and intelligence sharing. It is supporting the development of the capacities of the Bangladesh police, border guards, coast guard and paramilitary forces. It is also providing humanitarian and technical support for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, including the reopening of the field hospital in Bhasan Char.

India’s concerns

In 2025, high-level discussions were held regarding the supply of Turkish-made combat UAVs and opportunities for joint UAV production, as well as the supply of Turkish-made HİSAR O+ medium-range and SİPER long-range air defense systems to Bangladesh. Some commentators in the region suggested that these discussions indicated a shift in strategic balances in South Asia that would cause India strategic headaches.

For Delhi, this may not be a routine arms deal. It could signal that Dhaka is diversifying its defense partners and breaking the old regional monopoly. This time, however, the supplier is Turkey, a powerful NATO country that is expanding its strategic presence right next to India’s troubled eastern flank, rather than China, with which Delhi has experience. This makes Delhi feel that its neighborhood diplomacy is facing a new, high-tech challenge.

For Bangladesh, the instability of its neighbor Myanmar is a serious problem and the frequent violation of its airspace and borders naturally compels Dhaka to demonstrate a strong defense capability. However, balancing the strategic asymmetry with India is also an important consideration for Dhaka.

Dhaka’s efforts to diversify its defense partnerships — with the aim of reducing excessive dependence on Chinese and Russian systems, and ensuring interoperability with Western hardware — position Turkey as not only a supplier, but also a long-term partner in Bangladesh’s evolving security environment. This is a direct response to Ankara’s goal of expanding its defence exports beyond traditional markets in the Middle East and North Africa, and of strengthening its role as a rising global defence exporter that can compete with Russian and Western counterparts without political constraints by offering affordable, ITAR-exempt systems. Bangladesh’s Ambassador to Turkey, Amanul Haq, emphasized in his statement to the Bangladeshi media that the developing cooperation with Ankara on defense is providing Dhaka’s armed forces with NATO-standard interoperability.

Protests are staple of political life in Bangladesh. Yet the student protests that began as a call for quota reform in the beginning of July, and later morphed into a national movement that have resulted in the fall of a 15-year old regime in a matter of weeks, are unprecedented in the nation’s living memory. While the country is no stranger to massive student or opposition protests, Sheikh Hasina, who has been in power for a total of two decades now, had always managed to come out on top, often resorting to tried and true tactics of intimidation with armed Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) student cadres, or employing riot police and all manner of security personnel to quell protests, followed by arm wrangling protesters with the courts.

And till now, Sheikh Hasina and her coterie have repeatedly managed to control such instances of unrest, projecting an image of stability that has kept confidence in her government high amongst international circles. This image was bolstered by a recent election in January 2024, which though touted as unfair by several Western governments, nevertheless was quietly accepted by the international community due to the government’s ability to keep the situation under control. But all that ended after a student-led national uprising, with zero foreign support, ousted her government on August 5, 2024 – Hasina tended her resignation and fled the country towards neighbouring India, a day after violent bloodshed and protests that claimed almost 100 lives.

Why did this movement succeed when others had failed? This time, there was something new under the sun. Young people, most of them within the age range of 20-25 years old, and who have known nothing but the Awami brand of governance till date, had been protesting for weeks against what they see as an unfair imposition coated in the name of respecting the legacy of Bangladesh’s proudest sons, its freedom fighters. According to protesters, the old quota system, awarding 30 percent of government jobs to families of freedom fighters, was both unfair and discriminatory. And they were perhaps right in more ways than one.

Leaving aside the absurdity of offering 30 percent of government jobs to 0.01% of the population, there are also serious concerns and drama surrounding compilation of the official list of freedom fighters – the Awami League government during its rule did not publish a complete list of freedom fighters, but at least three partial lists in installments; observers allege the current ‘revised’ lists consist mostly of supporters of the Awami League, or those who allegedly were able to pay hefty bribes to have their names included.

The decisive tipping point in the protests was Sheikh Hasina’s offhand remarks in the initial days of the movement that the young protesters were “Razakars,” a derogatory term identifying the protesters as being against the independence of Bangladesh and as pro-Pakistanis. These remarks incited never before heard slogans from protesters of “Tumi ke, ami ke, Razakar! Razakar! Ke boleche Ke boleche? Shoirachar shoirachar” (Who are You, Who am I? We are Razakars! Who says that? The tyrant!)” This belittling attitude by the head of the government, along with the heavy handedness of the measures, are the main reasons behind these students not stopping their protests even after the government courts appeared to acquiesce to their demands by scaling back the quota system from 30 percent to a mere 5 percent.

As the protests spread and continued, the government response betrayed a sense of recklessness to say the least. Communications and internet were totally shut down during that weekend; social media videos showed shooters in police helicopters raining bullets on protesters in the streets, as the army enforced an indefinite curfew with ‘shoot at sight orders’. The scale of unrest reached the point that the Bangladeshi army resorted to the use of highly advanced Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones for surveillance, as per social media posts.

In the meantime, as the country emerged out of a media blackout, news sources spoke of nearly 200 protesters killed, and thousands injured and arrested, while unofficial sources claim death numbers were in several hundreds. After news of the massacre came to light, many on the international arena started asking questions – diplomats questioned the deadly response by Bangladeshi authorities, asking why United Nations (UN) marked APC’s and helicopters were used to suppress the protests. Millions of expatriate Bangladeshis demonstrated in front of Bangladeshi embassies abroad, echoing local demands for Hasina to step down.

While putting on a stern face in front of the cameras, her hold on power was slipping fast – remittance from abroad, a vital source of government income, was drying out, leaving the economy in tatters, and as evidenced in statements from Volker Türk, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as a European Union representative, Bangladesh’s image at the UN and the international stage was fast eroding as well. However, instead of backing down, Hasina’s government went even more hardline, carrying out a brutal campaign of mass detentions, carrying out open massacres in broad daylight, and banning opposition parties Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing Islami Chhatrashibir. The moves are reminiscent of the authoritarian one-party era in the early 1970s, which only ended with the gruesome assassination of Sheikh Hasina’s father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in 1975. Following all this, the student protests then morphed into a national movement with one demand – Sheikh Hasina must step down immediately, which is what ultimately happened.

Historians, however, will find more to say when they get around to studying the impact of these massive student-led national protests, whenever that may be. The Awami League, with the help of secular Bengali intellectuals, has been a proponent of a national history that rarely seeks to look beyond the pivotal moment of 1971, focusing instead on the 1971 civil war as being a pivotal ‘Holocaust’ style origin moment for Bengali nationalism. This has contributed to rather simplistic narratives within Bengali national history, making it easy to glorify heroes and demonize alleged villains – this especially came in handy in 2010’s when Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government was easily able to tap into raw public sentiment using a black-and-white narration of events of 1971, with a backdrop of the controversial figure of 3 million deaths, to execute its political opponents in the name of war crimes trials.

For long, the ‘Other’ of the Bengali nationalists of the Awami League have been Islamist political parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, and its sympathisers from within other opposition parties such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), something that the Awami League has effectively been able to use to maximum advantage. But employing the same trope against general student protesters in the present, and effectively making them the new ‘Other,’ seems to have backfired spectacularly. With the backdrop of Awami mis-rule vivid in public memory, this trope had galvanized public opinion against the Awami League, to the extent that many young protesters were seen not backing down in the face of repeated police firing. In relation to this, it is mentionable that the Awami narrative of protesters being ‘Razakars’ also explains the unspeakable brutality and inhumanity inherent in the government response, echoing the spirit of the genocidal sentiment of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and his ministers when they labelled Palestinians as ‘human animals.’

One often comes by the famous quote from L.P. Hartley’s 1953 book, The Go-Between, “The past is a different country; they do things differently there.” The dynamics of the student-led national protests have opened the doors to what it means to be a Bengali today – is there more to the history of 1971 than as a tool of condemnation? In today’s Bangladesh, why is there more of a nationalist black-and-white narrative of 1971 and less of colourful tapestries of 1947-71, the long colonial period, and the rich pre-1757 Turk, Afghan and Persian Muslim history? I, for one, hope that more young Bangladeshi students, having ensured the fall of tyranny, and are currently still on the streets fighting for the restoration of democracy and basic human rights, will also begin to ask themselves these questions, and break walls of historical taboo to seek a more nuanced understand of the past, an endeavour that can be highly rewarding to both the individual and the Bangladeshi society. I believe that thought process has already begun, as seen in the toppling of statues of Mujib and his daughter, but the process should accelerate. Only through such fearless ventures into the past, in a society that rewards merit and helps nurture it, can one truly begin to seek better futures.

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n January 7, 2024, Bangladesh, home to 170 million people, is set to hold its 12th general election, marking another chapter in the nation’s tumultuous electoral history. With a track record marred by allegations of vote rigging, violence, and protests, this year’s election is already facing controversy, heightened by the opposition’s decision to boycott. Since gaining independence from Pakistan in 1971, only a few of Bangladesh’s elections have been deemed “free and fair,” raising concerns about the democratic process in the country.

The historical backdrop of Bangladesh’s elections reveals a recurring pattern of political turmoil, electoral disputes, and power transitions. The upcoming election is no exception, as Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s refusal to accept the opposition Bangladesh National Party’s (BNP) call for a neutral caretaker government has led to the BNP’s decision to boycott the polls.

Widespread speculation about potential vote tampering has drawn attention from the international community. Charles Whiteley, the European Union ambassador to Bangladesh, expressed concerns about the election’s conditions, leading the EU to decide against sending a full observer team. The deployment of the military ahead of the elections reflects fears of potential violence.

A Historical Overview:

1. 1973 – Awami League’s Controversial Victory: Following the country’s independence, the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, orchestrated the first elections but faced allegations of kidnapping opposition leaders and electoral manipulation, setting the stage for autocratic rule.
2. 1979-1980s – Military Rule and Sham Elections: The military takeover after Rahman’s assassination led to a series of elections widely viewed as shams, with accusations of vote rigging and low voter turnout.
3. 1991 – Interim Caretaker Government: Under an interim caretaker government led by Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed, the 1991 elections were seen as neutral, resulting in a narrow victory for Khaleda Zia’s BNP.
4. 2001 – Power Shifts to BNP: The 2001 elections, held under a caretaker government, saw the BNP securing a majority amid accusations of violence targeting minority Hindus.
5. 2006-2008 – Political Crisis: The absence of elections in 2006 triggered a political crisis, marked by protests, violence, and military intervention, eventually leading to elections in 2008.
6. 2014 – Abolition of Caretaker Government and Crackdown: The removal of the caretaker provision in 2011 paved the way for the controversial 2014 elections, marked by a crackdown on the opposition, including house arrest for BNP leader Khaleda Zia.
7. 2018 – Allegations of Rigging: The introduction of electronic voting in 2018 didn’t prevent accusations of rigging, violence, and voter suppression, resulting in the Awami League’s landslide victory.

2024 – BNP Boycotts Again

Amid the ongoing demand for a neutral caretaker government, the BNP has opted to boycott the 2024 elections. The ruling Awami League’s influence over the electoral system raises concerns about the fairness of the process, with predictions of Prime Minister Hasina securing a fifth consecutive term, making her the longest-serving leader in Bangladesh’s history.

In the backdrop of this troubled electoral history, Bangladesh faces a critical juncture, where questions about the democratic process and the legitimacy of its political institutions remain at the forefront of national and international discourse.

Source: Aljazeera English.

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n August 14, millions of people in Bangladesh watched in shock and disbelief as news broke of the death of Allama Sayeedi. Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, a popular scholar, preacher, and Islamist politician had been imprisoned by Sheikh Hasina’s government since 2010 and died of a heart attack at the age of 83. According to local sources, he suffered a heart attack on August13, but was transferred to a specialist hospital by the authorities a day later. At the hospital, his condition deteriorated rapidly and he was reported to have died at 8:40 p.m. local time.

Experts have pointed to inconsistencies in statements from the medical team, which just hours earlier had said his condition was stable, leading many to suspect that poor medical care was the reason for his death. News of his deteriorating health and subsequent death spread like wildfire on social media, and thousands of his supporters surrounded the BSMMU hospital premises in Shahbag, in the heart of Dhaka, anxiously awaiting news. When news of his death broke, the crowd swelled to thousands, demanding that his funeral prayers be held the next day at Dhaka’s central Baitul Mukarram Mosque.

The Bangladeshi government refused to accept to the request, insisting that the body be buried in his hometown, far from the capital, and that only a limited number of people be allowed to attend his funeral. While Allama Sayeedi’s supporters remained outside the hospital until late into the night, a brutal police force finally dispersed the protesters and his coffin was taken away. The next day, 50,000 people attended his funeral prayers in his home town of Pirojpur.

Allama Sayeedi feared in life and death

Sheikh Hasina’s government had every right to be afraid of the gathering masses in Dhaka on the night of the scholar’s death—the last time people took to the streets in Allama Sayeedi’s name was to protest the 2013 verdict in the case investigating his alleged involvement in war crimes during Bangladesh’s 1971 War of Independence. The same Hasina government ordered security forces to take a hard-line stance and more than 100 innocent protesters were slaughtered when police and army used live ammunition to disperse mass protests in major cities across Bangladesh.

But who was Allama Sayeedi who so terrified the Hasina government both in life and in death? A man of humble scholarly origins, Delwar Hossain Sayeedi was born in 1940 in Pirojpur, Barisal district of Bangladesh, into a family with a madrassa background. He dominated the Islamic lecture circuit in Bangladesh for the past 50 years, clearly delivering the message of Islam and the Koran in vaaz mehfils (open-air/open-air mass meetings) attended by hundreds of thousands of people. His oratorical style, both eloquent and melodious, made him popular with people from all walks of life.

It is very common to hear his lectures still being played loudly in vehicles, restaurants, mobile phones, and people’s homes in Bangladesh, despite a government ban on mentioning his name in public. But that is not all: Allama Sayeedi was also a two-time member of parliament for the Pirojpur-1 constituency in the Barisal Division in southern Bangladesh, representing a Hindu-majority constituency, from July 1996 to October 2006. Fluent in Bangla, Arabic, and Urdu, the author of 75 books, he was also very active in humanitarian causes and was instrumental in raising funds for Muslim communities in the West, such as Europe and the U.S.

A witness in favor of Allama Sayeedi was abducted

At one point in the trial, Sukhranjan Bali, a prosecution witness who was testifying as a defense witness instead, was abducted from the courthouse steps and forcibly disappeared as he was about to testify that Allama Sayeedi had not murdered his brother. Bali was found many months later in an Indian prison, but by then it was too late: Sayeedi had been found guilty by the ICT and sentenced to death. However, Sayeedi’s immense popularity was a factor the government had not taken into account. In the afternoon of the day of the first verdict on February 28, 2013, police and army forces were ordered to crack down on demonstrators, firing on them. An estimated 100 protesters died across the country in the days of political violence that followed.

Following the state-sponsored violence and the exposure of the trial as a farcical, politically motivated witch hunt, the senior judges were forced to resign and Sayeedi’s death sentence was inexplicably commuted to life imprisonment in September 2014, presumably to maintain a veneer of impartiality and, more importantly, to prevent popular protests that could potentially topple the government from getting out of hand.

The trial of Allama Sayeedi at the ICT, along with a number of other trials of well-known opposition and Islamist politicians such as Abdul Quader Mollah, Kamaruzzaman, Golam Azam, Motiur Rahman Nizami, Ali Ahsan Mujahid, Mir Quasem Ali, and Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury, were touted by the Hasina government and its allies as necessary to bring closure and justice to the victims of the 1971 war. Instead, the farcical and biased nature of these political trials exposed deep-rooted plans to decimate the opposition to the Hasina regime through judicially sanctioned killings of key opposition figures and to strengthen the incumbent regime’s grip on power, effectively establishing dynastic rule for decades to come.

An enormous cost of the Hasina government

Hasina and her allies appear to have succeeded so far, ruling Bangladesh with an iron fist since 2009. But the cost has been enormous. Throughout this long period of Hasina’s misrule, the biggest victims have been the Bangladeshi people. Large-scale corruption, security, and governance failures, high inflation, high unemployment, rising poverty and a general lack of basic services are just some of the everyday problems that are getting worse for ordinary Bangladeshi citizens. Public dissatisfaction with the government is high; serious allegations of widespread vote rigging, ballot stuffing, and voter intimidation by the authorities in the last two general elections in 2014 and 2019 have severely undermined public confidence in the current regime and regularly trigger periods of mass unrest and political agitation.

Whatever relief Hasina and her supporters imagined they would get from Sayeedi’s death, it does not seem to have materialized. Far from diminishing his legacy, the circumstances of Sayeedi’s death and the injustice done to him in life have made him a shaheed (martyr) in the eyes of ordinary Bangladeshis. Many members of Hasina’s political party have criticized her on social media, saying “Islam comes first” when they were expelled for supporting Allama Sayeedi as a victim of Hasina’s injustice.

Tens of hundreds of funeral prayers were held for the revered scholar both locally and internationally. Unable to stop the national and international outpouring of support for Allama Sayeedi and his family, the government has resorted to tactics of surveillance, widespread raids, arrests, and imprisonment of opponents.

If anything, Sayeedi’s death is a Pyrrhic victory and has done more to diminish Hasina government’s legitimacy in the eyes of Bangladeshi citizens than to glorify it. His death has exposed a horrible side of the Hasina government and made it clear for all to see how Islamophobic, incompetent, and authoritarian this government really is. The authoritarian government of Sheikh Hasina may still be in power, but it is long dead in terms of political legitimacy and the right to represent the people of Bangladesh. You can kill many people, but you cannot kill an idea.