In his definition of monarchical tendencies in African political culture, Professor Ali Mazrui put forward four factors. The first factor is the quest for aristocratic effect, as leaders desire large consumptions and expensive lifestyles. The second factor is the personalization of authority which in some instances goes to the extent of creating a distinct or royal title for the leader. The third factor is the sacralization of authority, which relates to personalizing authority and glorifying a leader and his office or institution. The fourth and last factor is the search for a royal historical identity motivated by a vague sense that national dignity would be lacking without a glorious past of ancient and kingly success. These factors could be seen in some African countries that practice family dynasties today.

Political dynasty exists when close family members or relatives succeed a retiring leader or president in office. It is more associated with monarchies, and political dynasty is not peculiar to Africa even though kings still reign majestically in most African countries due to their position as custodians of tradition and history of their people.

Multi-party elections and peaceful transfers of power have become more common in the continent since the 1990s, and today, among the fifty-four countries in Africa only three monarchies still maintain their monarchical status as head of state or government (Morocco, Lesotho, and Swaziland).

However, family dynasties could also be seen in some African countries. The common examples of ruling families and family dynasties in the continent are the handing over of power from fathers to sons, or from one brother to another. The current examples of sons succeeding their fathers are that of Gabon, Togo, Kenya, and Chad. In other countries with the longest-serving presidents, such as Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, and Cameroon, leaders are planning to hand power to their sons.

Family politics and ruling dynasties in Africa could be seen more in local government’s politics and state positions where candidates campaign based on their kinship or dynasty lineage.

There have been several failed plans by some presidents to make their wives the next presidents. In Zimbabwe, former leader, Robert Mugabe failed in his plan of handing power to his wife, which led to a crisis within his party ZANU-PF and the 2017 coup d’état. In South Africa, former president Jacob Zuma couldn’t influence his party, the African National Congress (ANC) during his ex-wife, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s leadership battle.

Family politics and ruling dynasties in Africa could be seen more in local government’s politics and state positions where candidates campaign based on their kinship or dynasty lineage. Yet, at the continental and national levels, the examples of Kenya, Ghana, and Chad offer a clear glimpse of ruling families and their impacts on democratic systems and politics.

Also, supporters and campaigns tend to focus on the personalities and family records of both men; Kenyatta’s political influence as the son of the first president and his family fortune all provide him with a distinct edge in elections, while on the other hand, Odinga’s supports cut across those who saw him as representing the economically and politically marginalized communities. For many Kenyans, the competition and rivalry between the two families mean choosing between Kenyatta who is the “good son” of the palace that will spend anything to protect the status quo, or between Odinga who is an underdog that will revolutionize the polity.

The implications of the family dynasty in Chad could be seen in the personification of state and national politics, constitutional amendments, and the cult of personality that revolves around the Débys.

In Chad, the ruling family has the fingerprints of military elements and foreign power support. In 1990, former president Idriss Déby, a Zaghawa of the Bideyat clan seized power and ruled the country until his sudden death in 2021 due to the injuries he sustained during clashes with northern rebels. The solution in this situation, as called for in Chad’s constitution is to hand power over to the National Assembly. However, the military and presidency disregarded the constitution and swiftly named General Mahamat, Déby’s 37-year-old son as the country leader. The unconstitutional move was also supported by many African and foreign leaders, including France who all pointed to the increase in terrorism and violent activities in Lake Chad and Sahel regions.

The implications of the family dynasty in Chad could be seen in the personification of state and national politics, constitutional amendments, and the cult of personality that revolves around the Débys. The 30-year rule of Idriss Déby is characterized by assigning family members and allies from his Zaghawa ethnic group to senior government positions.

Chad is highly diverse ethnically, hence tearing up the constitution after the death of Idriss Déby and putting another Déby at the helm of power complicate the relationships between Zaghawa which dominates the national politics, and others. This also led to divisions within the military, and intensified the internal crisis between the ruling family, especially between General Mahamat and his brother Zakaria, who was rumored to have been one of the first in line for succession.

In Ghana, the current president, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, was born into a prominent family and a residence that headquartered the first political party in Ghana. Akufo-Addo’s father, Edward, grand uncle, J.B. Danquah, and uncle, William Ofori Atta were all among the “Big Six” leaders (or founding fathers) that helped Ghana gain independence in 1957. Akufo-Addo’s supporters are also quick to point to his father’s contribution to Ghana whenever the opportunity arises.

However, the case of Ghana is different from what is seen in other African nations that practice family dynasties in politics, such as Togo or Chad, because the long-established families in Ghana play by the rules. Family ties in the Ghanaian case don’t necessarily weaken the democratic institutions, as Ghana is regarded as one of the most stable democracies in Africa, and everyone still has the same chance and opportunity to run for political seats.

Through the above examples and Mazrui’s definition, one could conclude that family dynasties have their roots in African cultures which promote the continuation of legacies and expansion of kingdoms from fathers to sons. The impacts in modern democratic politics, however, are that political power is concentrated in one or few families and authority is restricted amid a few, hence political rule in a country turns into a monarchical system.

Although some might argue that family dynasties bring development and stability in some countries, the conclusion that could be derived from the realities in many African countries is that the culture of family dynasties in democratic systems will result in prioritizing family lineage and alliance over competence, weak accountability, lack of competitiveness, transparency, representation in politics and more divisions among different ethnic groups. And the end products are corruption, bad governance, and economic mismanagement.

Chad contributed 1,200 troops to the G5 Sahel forces since 2017, until recently when its authorities announced the recall of 600 troops from the regional front, half of its contingent, “in order to redeploy them to better adapt to terrorist organization.” This decision came after France also announced in June that its operations in the Sahel to combat the militants, also known as Operation Barkhane, will be reduced from 5,100 soldiers to 2,500-3,000 by early next year.

The reasons behind Chad’s decision are not far to seek. The country is battling domestic instability after the offensive launched by the Chadian rebel group Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), on 11 April 2021 – the same day as the country’s presidential election – in the northern Chad led to the death of the incumbent President, Idriss Déby who seized power in 1990 in a coup that overthrew President Hissene Habré, for whom he had served as head of the army.

Although the killing of President Déby on the battlefield was shocking because he was poised to win the election and thus extent his 30-year rule. But his presence on the battlefield was not unusual, as he was known to have led many battles against rebel attacks during his rule; in 2006, 2008 and 2019, his forces (with the support of the French army) successfully defended themselves against rebel attacks. These moves also helped President Déby’s image as a powerful leader. He surged in popularity among young Africans in April 2020 after he led a counterattack against the Boko Haram that had just killed about 100 Chadian soldiers in Lake Chad.

The political situation took another turn in Chad when the presidency announced a day after the death of the President, that Idriss Déby’s son, General Mahamat Idriss Déby will take over as the president in place of his father. This move was termed an “institutional coup” and was rejected by opposition leaders and rebels who called for the return to civilian rule.

In August, the Transitional Military Council which initially refused to dialogue with the rebels and claimed victory over them in May, invited the rebels to participate in national dialogue. Yet, threats and challenges from the armed opposition groups remain, which give an insight to why some of the 600 soldiers that were withdrawn by Chad from the G5 Sahel force are those with heavy weapons.

Also, the withdrawal of these soldiers could deepen the security crisis in the African Sahel and affect the counterterrorism efforts. Sahel is highly competitive at the international level and a strategic location for its countries. The region stretches from the Atlantic Ocean eastward through northern Senegal, southern Mauritania, the great bend of the Niger River in Mali, Burkina Faso, southern Niger, northeastern Nigeria, south-central Chad and into Sudan.

The major concern in the Sahel region is that, despite the combined efforts from the G5 Sahel force, attacks have escalated, and violent activities have spread rapidly due to the alliances between terrorist groups to expand their presence in the border region between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

Chad’s military is the most effective Sahelian force engaging in regional counterterrorism operations and withdrawing the soldiers from the tri-border area of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger would relieve the terrorist groups of pressure in the region.

Burkina Faso and Niger have witnessed an upsurge in recent attacks. The insurgency in Burkina Faso started in 2016, and the attack on 4-5 June 2021 was considered the deadliest since the crisis began. The local authorities reported that gunmen killed at least 132 civilians when they attacked the town of “Solhan” in the Sahel region of northern Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, Niger also witnessed similar attacks this year, in which at least 137 civilians were killed.

Also, in northeastern Nigeria and Lake Chad, the killing of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau created a new dimension; ISWAP took control of most of what remained of Boko Haram, with the surviving members of Shekau being incorporated into ISWAP. There are also reports of cooperation between criminal gangs and terrorist groups to spread to new areas in the northwestern Nigeria.

Chad is the largest troop contributor to the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali, known as MINUSMA, with over 1,400 Chadian soldiers stationed there in as of July 2021. Recent reports also showed that Chadian MINUSMA soldiers have been active against JNIM. On April 2, for example, a major JNIM attack on a MINUSMA outpost in northern Mali was repelled. Thus, the withdrawal of the Chadian forces could increase the workload of the UN mission in northern Mali, and benefit Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM).

Finally, while Chad is looking inward so as to secure its stability which the international community sees as vital due to its role in the counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel, it would be better to accompanied it with a political solution through finding common areas between the military and the oppositions.

Although, looking inward and withdrawing soldiers from the G5 Sahel force could weaken the regional efforts to curb the spread of terrorist groups into other neighboring countries. It could also cede terrain to any of the deadly groups in Sahel and bring their deadly incursions closer to the Chadian borders and terrains, except if other countries in the G5 Sahel, such as Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Niger all increase their efforts.