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n a move that could exacerbate already strained relations between the Maldives and India, Turkey has initiated the delivery of its renowned combat drones, the Bayraktar TB2, to the island nation. The delivery, part of a bilateral agreement between Turkey and the Maldives, aims to enhance the security capabilities of the Maldivian armed forces amid escalating tensions in the region.

The agreement, which includes the supply of a command control station and six TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), follows a visit by Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu to Turkey in November 2023. During the visit, President Muizzu engaged in discussions with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and toured several Turkish defense industry companies.

The timing of the drone supply is significant, as it comes amidst growing tensions between the Maldives and India since President Muizzu assumed office last year. Traditionally, the Maldives has maintained close ties with India, but under Muizzu’s leadership, the country has been tilting towards closer relations with Beijing, raising concerns in New Delhi.

Indian troops in the Maldives

One of the major points of contention between the Maldives and India has been the presence of Indian troops in the Maldives. President Muizzu has been vocal in calling for the withdrawal of Indian military personnel stationed in the country, adding to the diplomatic friction between the two nations.

Developed by Baykar, the Bayraktar TB2 drones have gained recognition for their effectiveness in various conflicts worldwide, including in Azerbaijan, Libya, and Ukraine. The TB2 drones played a significant role in countering Russian forces during the early stages of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, showcasing their combat capabilities on the global stage.

The supply of TB2 drones to the Maldives underscores Turkey’s growing influence in the defense industry and its willingness to expand its strategic partnerships beyond its immediate region. With exports to 33 countries, including NATO and EU member states, Turkey’s defense industry continues to make strides in the international market.

However, the delivery of the drones to the Maldives is likely to further strain relations between the Maldives and India, potentially leading to heightened tensions in the region. As both countries navigate delicate diplomatic waters, the impact of Turkey’s involvement in the region remains to be seen.

The delivery of the Bayraktar TB2 drones to the Maldives marks another chapter in the evolving geopolitical landscape of the Indian Ocean region, with implications for regional stability and security.

Baykar Technology has recently revealed a computer-generated video showing the features and capabilities of the Bayraktar Kizilelma armed drone. The company stated that the first flight of the Kizilelma is planned for 2023.

The Kizilelma is the latest member of the Bayraktar drone series by Baykar Technology. The design was first revealed to the public in July 2021. The program was previously known as “Muharip Insansiz Ucak Sistemi” (MIUS, Unmanned Combat Aircraft System).

The name “Kizilelma” (“Red Apple” in Turkish) was announced in March 2022. The concept of “red apple” is important in Turkish tradition, symbolizing an idea or ultimate goal for the nation or state. The name, therefore, has a special meaning, manifesting the significance of this challenging project for the company and for Turkey.

Kizilelma’s technical characteristics

The Kizilelma is an armed drone, powered by a single turbofan engine. The aircraft has delta wing and canard configuration: the small forewings (canards) are mounted forward of the main wings, which have triangular shape. The overall geometry of the airframe is consistent with contemporary stealth aircraft design with minimum protrusions and body angles seemingly optimized for decreasing the radar cross section (RCS). It can be assumed that the airframe coating and the paint will be of radar-absorbing material (RAM) for better stealth.

According to technical specifications shared by Baykar Technology, the Kizilelma will be able to remain airborne for five hours and will have an operational ceiling of 35,000 feet. The maximum takeoff weight of the aircraft will be six tons with a payload capacity of 1.5 tons. The maximum combat radius, which is the maximum distance from its base the Kizilelma can cover to perform combat missions, is stated as 500 nm (about 925 km).

The Kizilelma will have an internal weapons bay to carry precision-guided missiles and bombs, a feature that further contributes to the aircraft’s stealth characteristics. Although the images and videos released by Baykar Technology do not show any hardpoints under the wings for carrying weapons or other systems, their presence is highly possible.

The Turkish defense industry offers a wide range of precision-guided weapon systems for the Kizilelma. Among them are the SOM-J air-to-surface cruise missile, the HGK, the LGK, the Minyatür Bomba (MB), TEBER and Lacin precision guided bombs, ÇAKIR air-launched anti-ship missile, and Gökdoğan and Bozdoğan air-to-air missiles. The main sensor of the Kizilelma is planned to be an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar system, currently being developed by ASELSAN as well as advanced electro-optical cameras and electronic warfare systems.

Baykar Technology presents fully automatic takeoff and landing and beyond line of sight (BLOS) data-link capability as among the Kizilelma’s capabilities. The Kizilelma is also claimed to be aircraft carrier compatible, being able to perform takeoff and landing operations from short flight decks.

There are three different ideas on the role of UCAS in the future of airpower. The first is an all-UCAS air force, where air-to-air and air-to-ground missions are undertaken by a single or various types of combat drones. The air-to-air missions include combat air patrol (CAP), interception of enemy aircraft, and the escort of friendly air, sea, or land assets against air threats.

Air-to-ground missions can be listed as close air support of friendly ground units, precision strikes, standoff strike of high value targets (HVT), tactical air support of maritime operations (TASMO), suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), and destruction of enemy air defenses (DEAD).

Armed drones so far have been exclusively used for air-to-ground missions, in addition to Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR). Air-to-air warfare requires agility, speed, and maneuverability, which are achieved through aerodynamic design and high-performance engines. Furthermore, aerial warfare, especially within visual range (WVR) combat, also known as “dogfighting,” requires instantaneous decision-making and reaction skills as well as full situational awareness.

These requirements put a heavy load on the sensors and computing systems of a drone. The software and hardware technology are promising in terms of providing effective solutions to these cognitive challenges, but the decision-making cycle and the delegation of authority to a fully autonomous system in air-to-air combat is the subject of a complex ethical, hierarchical, and organizational debate, rather than a technological issue.

The second school of thought regarding the future of airpower is creating a mixture of staffed and unmanned systems, deploying drones for high-risk missions such as SEAD/DEAD, electronic warfare, and precision strike of HVTs from standoff ranges. In this approach, known as “manned-unmanned teaming” (MUM-T), the most prominent scheme is to use a number of UCAS under the leadership of a piloted combat aircraft.

The UCAS deployed in this model is named a “loyal wingman.” A drone with enough flight performance to accompany fighters and the intelligence needed to semi-autonomously support them can be described as a “loyal wingman.” There are several loyal wingmen development projects in the world, such as the Kratos XQ-58A Valkyrie, Boeing MQ-28 (Ghost Bat), and Sukhoi S-70 Okhotnik.

The third approach is the incremental take-over of combat missions by UCAS. This argument can be considered as the middle ground between the previous two concepts. While it is true that building up a fully drone-based air force is more of an organizational, ethical, and doctrinal problem, it may indeed be an eventuality. UCAS are already suited for the majority of air-to-ground missions while optimizing them with air-to-air combat will require more research on AI and well-defined operational concepts as well as legal and ethical frameworks.

The Turkish Air Force today

The Turkish Air Force (TurAF) combat fleet consists of around 240 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon and 40 F-4E 2020 aircraft. These combat aircraft are supported by seven KC-135R tankers and four E-7T Barış Kartalı airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft. The earlier models of the F-16 fleet, around 35 Block 30 type F-16s have been receiving extensive structural upgrades which will allow them to operate well until the 2030s.

The TurAF originally planned to induct the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter to replace the F-4E 2020 fleet and operate with the Milli Muharip Ucak (MMU, TF-X) which will enter service in the late 2020s and which would replace the F-16s. However, after Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 air defense system from the Russian Federation in 2019, the United States cancelled the delivery of the F-35As to TurAF and removed Turkey from the project.

This development affected the TurAF’s modernization plans. As a result, to fill the capability gap until the MMUs arrive, Turkey requested the sale of 40 F-16Vs and 80 kits to upgrade existing F-16s to the F-16V standard. The F-16V is the latest model of the F-16 family and incorporates advanced sensors and capabilities.

The TurAF armed drone fleet consists of the Bayraktar Technology’s Bayraktar Akinci and Turkish Aerospace’s Anka-S. The Akinci has recently started entering service and with its 1,500 kg payload carrying capacity and BLOS communication, significantly boosted the TurAF’s ISTAR and strike capabilities.

On August 29, 2021, Baykar Savunma delivered the first batch of Bayraktar Akinci (Raider) drones to the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). Designed and developed by Baykar Savunma, Akinci is the latest culmination of the company’s drone development projects. The introduction of Akinci into service is a major milestone in Turkey’s efforts to become a major drone power and leading defense and aerospace technologies developer.

In the past few years, Turkey’s drone industry, its products and their performance in various operations and conflicts have generated great interest. This is especially true in regard to the impact of Anka-S and Bayraktar TB2 armed drones on the Syrian regime forces during Operation Spring Shield in early 2020, which stimulated debates among scholars, observers, and professionals in defense and security circles regarding the future of drones and warfare in general.

As a direct result of their performance in various conflicts, Turkish drones have attracted the interest of numerous countries. Turkey has so far exported Bayraktar TB2 to Qatar, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Libya, Morocco, and Poland, while Turkish Aerospace Industries has sold Anka to Tunisia. Selçuk Bayraktar, the chief technology officer of Baykar Savunma, has recently stated that the company is in talks with ten countries for the export of Bayraktar TB2.

As a project, Akinci represents the opening of a new chapter for Turkey both in terms of its air power with its new capabilities, and with regard to its aerospace industry by virtue of its new technological competencies.

Akinci and its capabilities

The Bayraktar TB2 is a tactical armed drone, capable of flying at 18,000 feet altitude for up to 27 consecutive hours. The aircraft can carry two or four guided bombs, and is capable of executing a fully autonomous takeoff and landing. Serving the Turkish Armed Forces, the Bayraktar TB2 has fulfilled over 350,000 flight hours since 2014. Having a maximum takeoff weight of around 700 kg, Bayraktar TB2 carries a sophisticated electro-optical camera system to detect and track targets while collecting imagery intelligence (IMINT).

Akinci, on the other hand, is much bigger, heavier, and more sophisticated than Bayraktar TB2. According to the information on the company’s website, Akinci has a maximum takeoff weight of around 6,000 kg, making it the biggest aircraft designed and developed in Turkey. Akinci is powered by two turboprop engines provided by Ukrainian engine manufacturer Ivchenko-Progress. It can carry around 1,500 kg of guided bombs and missiles as well as an electro-optical camera, radar, and various electronic intelligence/signals intelligence (ELINT/SIGINT) sensors. Akinci can remain airborne for approximately 24 hours at 30,000 and 40,000 feet altitude.

Also, with the use of laser target designator systems, Akinci can illuminate a target, calculate guidance information for onboard precision weapon systems or pass along that target information to friendly units for strike. The TAF showed remarkable capabilities in executing such complex air-to-surface strike operations in Idlib, Syria and in Libya, and assisted Azerbaijan in achieving the same in Nagorno Karabakh. By virtue of its greater payload-carrying capacity both in terms of weapons and sensors, Akinci will boost the network-centric organization of the TAF.

Akinci will also be equipped with an advanced radar system, under development by ASELSAN. Incorporating active electronically scanned array (AESA) technology, the radar will enable Akinci to detect aerial and ground targets over a long range irrespective of weather. The AESA radar is highly resistant to enemy electronic countermeasures and enables the platform to track several targets simultaneously. Akinci, through onboard air-to-air missiles, can engage with aerial threats on its own or pass along the target information to friendly units, contributing to the update of the strategic air threat scene.

Last but not least, Akinci will be equipped with various types of ELINT/SIGINT sensors, which are extremely crucial in executing strategic intelligence missions during both times of peace and conflict. With its capability of flying for long periods at high altitudes, Akinci will be able to cover large regions around Turkey, collecting intelligence over different segments of the electromagnetic spectrum.

All the aforementioned imagery, radar, and electronic intelligence data will be transmitted to the ground control system and other friendly assets through an onboard satellite communications (SATCOM) system developed by ASELSAN. With the help of the SATCOM and Türksat satellites, Akinci can be controlled over an extremely long range, receiving command signals, and sending back all intelligence data. In this way, the SATCOM-equipped Akinci will increase Turkey’s strategic intelligence and strike range.

The transformation of the Turkish aerospace industry

Akinci is the largest air platform to be designed, manufactured, tested, and flown by Turkey. Designing and manufacturing a six-ton drone that is equipped with various sensors and precision guided weapons as well as a ground control system to monitor and control all functions through direct line-of-sight and SATCOM communications data links require advanced skills and know-how in several engineering and project management skill sets.

To establish and maintain a supply chain to manufacture the aircraft and the incorporated ground systems, and deliver them on time to various customers, The Turkish Aerospace Industries and the entire ecosystem of subcontractors and suppliers needed to transform. In other words, Akinci, as well as other ambitious Turkish Aerospace Industries projects such as the TUSAŞ MMU (Milli Muharip Uçağı or National Fighter Jet), Hürjet, and T625 Gökbey, can be considered as catalysts of the transformation of the Turkish aerospace industry. Through the realization of these challenging projects, the Turkish aerospace sector build up the necessary experienced human resources and infrastructure to reinforce and develop its position in the global market.

Akinci epitomizes Turkey’s ambitions of becoming a drone power through indigenous development of advanced technologies and the possession of highly capable systems and platforms. The effectiveness and efficiency of armed drones in counterterrorism operations and in regional conflicts arguably provided enough motivation to decision-makers for devising, planning, and executing a national drone strategy. Starting with the Anka and Bayraktar projects, Akinci is the latest step in this strategy.

Akinci’s impact, both as an armed drone and as an aerospace industry product, for Turkey is worth monitoring. Without a doubt, it will act as a capability multiplier for the Turkish Armed Forces in the short term. Its export performance and role in Turkey’s regional security policies will likely be seen in the medium term.

Turkey’s military UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) created a storm in and around the Middle East with a lot more potential in the bag for the industry’s future. The Bayraktar TB2s immense impact on the Turkish military operations in Syria and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict created a momentum for more exports. As several countries publicly announced that they were considering acquiring these smart weapons systems, a number of countries penned contracts with Turkey to purchase them swiftly.

The potential impact for this export momentum is threefold. First, the export of UAVs to Eastern Europe will create a new dimension to NATO’s security approach against Russia. Second, it will encourage other Eastern European or even European countries to purchase these military systems. Third, if we look at the issue’s security dimension, the Turkish military superiority in NATO and the Middle East will be strengthened as the systems will transform into a prestige and tactical presence.

Eastern European countries such as Hungary, Latvia, Albania, Serbia, and Poland have all expressed interest in the Bayraktar TB2s, which has been on the front burner since the decisive Turkish operations in Syria. The Turkish aerial superiority resulting from the UAVs become the hotbed of discussions as the Russian air-defense systems such as Pantsir-S1 and S-200s were damaged or destroyed on several occasions.

As the military records of destroyed air defense systems became viral, the Bayraktar TB2 has attracted attention in almost all regions of the world. This interest was crowned by several procurement procedures and memoranda of understanding between Baykar Inc., the producer, and countries like Qatar, Azerbaijan, Poland, and most recently Albania.

Baykar Inc.’s exports were globally discussed when Russia’s rival, Ukraine, decided to import this technology in 2019. Twelve Bayraktar UAVs and three ground control stations (GCS) were purchased for $69 million with a 5-unit addition in 2020. There were statements about a joint venture between Ukraine and Turkey (including Ukrspetsexport and Baykar) to produce aerial technology and precision systems. It was stated that Turkey allowed Ukraine to sell the domestically produced TB2 drones to clients other than those of Turkey. However, the exact content of the agreement is yet to be made public.

Eastern European states such as Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Albania, and the Republic of Serbia have publicly announced their interest in purchasing Bayraktar TB2s.

The Eastern European interest in Baykar’s UAVs has become more salient after the second Nagorno-Karabagh War in 2020. The Turkish help to Azerbaijan through the Bayraktar TB2s dramatically changed the course of the interstate conflict. However, the explosive development in exports occurred in 2021 as most interested states overcame their political burdens and actualized their demands through diplomatic channels. Eastern European states such as Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Albania, and the Republic of Serbia have publicly announced their interest in purchasing Bayraktar TB2s.

This $80 million deal opened the North African market for Turkish military drone exports. Five months later, another North African country, Morocco, struck a deal to acquire 13 Bayraktar TB2s with four GCSs in a deal worth more than $70 million.

Moreover, several Middle Eastern and African countries such as Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Egypt expressed interest in purchasing the Turkish UAVs in the future. The Turkish expansion of military technology into Africa caused serious challenges for France as Khalifa Haftar’s forces were defeated thanks to the UAVs’ military superiority.

The battle-proven Turkish military systems might create the opportunity for states with security challenges such as Libya, Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan.

This process might hint at the same potential impact in other African countries with sovereignty issues such as Morocco (Western Sahara), Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Increasing Turkish influence in these territories might challenge EU and the U.S. gains in this region while encouraging these states to resent the status quo.

The battle-proven Turkish military systems might create the opportunity for states with security challenges such as Libya, Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan, etc. to control their territory effectively and fight against terrorist activities at home. The Turkish military experience in Turkish, Iraqi, Afghani, and Syrian territories might also serve as leverage for the increasing Turkish influence and trust in Turkish military technology.

It is well known that Turkey has expanded its military technology to African markets through procurement deals with Morocco, Tunisia, Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda. The EU leaders and Russia might feel concerned because of this expansion, a feeling which could extend to Eastern Europe as well.

Foreign concerns about Turkish UAVs’ increasing presence in the coming decade is not limited to Western countries. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has been the primary destination for Chinese military UAVs too. Thus, an increasing Turkish presence in this sector might directly hinder the Chinese export and influence in MENA.

Moreover, if all of the potential buyers in Eastern Europe such as Bulgaria, Latvia, Hungary, and the Republic of Serbia finalize their procurement of Bayraktar TB2s, then three out of four continental neighbors of Greece and two out of four European neighbors of Russia will protect their borders using Turkish UAVs.

When these two factors are considered together, it becomes apparent that the Turkish leap in the UAV technology will earn some of the share that was long preserved by the West and China – the new Eastern contender.

Moreover, the use of Bayraktar TB2s in Syria and Azerbaijan in 2020 proved that they’re not merely capable of monitoring and defending territories but can also effectively carry out attack missions. This aspect propounds the notion that the Turkish UAVs are going to have an impact on the offense-defense balances in these regions.

The changes to the status quo in regards to the manufacture of UAVs might set forth political turbulences in the EU and NATO led by the French dismissal of the Turkish penetration of the EU in terms of military technology. All in all, Turkey’s military procurement deals with Poland and Albania created another dimension in the European security discussions which are destined to have a lasting impact on the coming decade.

To the majority of Palestinians, the settler-colonial encounter is primarily, if not exclusively, an encounter with weapon power. That to me is one of the most inescapable philosophical provocations of what Rashid Khalidi called “the hundred years’ war on Palestine”.

Since the second decade of the Twentieth century to today, the (re)production of masses of Palestinians as the hosts and hostages of zones of encounter with arms has been the condition of Israeli existence, citizenship and sensoria, national history and spatiality.

Be it through fracturing the Palestinian body politic into occupied territories, besieged camps, and enemy entities, or fracturing Palestinianess itself into different categories of compromised existence that “magnetize” state violence—making the exercise of weapon power the sole practicable option for Jewish statehood and sovereignty has been the choice of consecutive Israeli governments whose legitimacy has been intrinsically tied to making this choice go unmarked.

That is the underwriting logic for what has passed as “politics” between the river and the sea and beyond in those hundred years which is no more than the martial art of making Palestinians available as a genre of the human that can only be accessed and expelled from view by weapons while securing the Israelis unlimited possession and use of these martial technologies.

So is the case because weapons make possible the destruction of all social and political relations except for the relation of enmity that justifies the zero-sum logic of settlement and separation according to which it is either “them or us”.

Generations of Palestinians, particularly those in the West Bank and Gaza, have and continue to experience the reinscription of this logic every time they interact with armed settlers, be they in uniform or out of uniform. The Israelis have made that this violent interaction is the rule that the “settler” as an anthropological figure appears as no less than a combination of a human-weapon assemblage in Palestine.

In practice, most of Israel’s unmanned war operations involve automatic procedures that require little to no “human interference”. For example, a number of Israeli medium and large size aerial drones are equipped with autonomous take-off and landing capabilities, automatic piloting on pre-programmed paths, object and terrain scanning softwares for the identification of targets, as well as the use of algorithms to match targets with ordnance in order to maximize the speed and quantity of destruction.

In fact, the Israelis, like other users and developers of these machines (namely the United States), place remotely-controlled weapons on an evolutionary trajectory towards full automation, merchandizing their work of death as the inevitable conclusion to the course of technological innovation.

They index their progress according to sanitizing classifications of the human-machine interface that foretell a gradual yet linear ejection of settlers from the machinations of martial governance, progressing from “humans in the loop” where soldiers are involved in the selection and execution of targets, to the “closed-loops” of full machine autonomy where target identification and elimination is strictly an algorithmic process executed by mechanical agents.

Indeed, the official plan of the Israeli state is to increase the population of these machines and diversify them “to develop a system that fits a wide range of missions in the field …[that] can help the IDF control populated areas for extended periods of time” while minimizing the amount of training and resources required to do so. Programs to , and a third of the military’s ground war machinery in the next five to ten years are put in place to carve out death-worlds “where autonomous soldiers could carry the weight in the war [my emphasis]”.

Of course, these classifications are not ontologically, ethically, or legally neutral. However, what they show more than anything is that in the robotic era of war, the Israeli mode of problematizing Palestinian-Israeli relations has so far been reducible to the question of reengineering the relation between the settler and the weapon.

Indeed, under the sign of the drone and the robots of war, the inseparable matters of warcraft and statecraft as pursued by the Israeli state have been technically reassembled to establish spatial, legal, and political distance between the Palestinian and the Israeli through creating spatial and procedural distance between the Israeli and the weapon.

Can the labor of making the Indigenous disappear be outsourced to machines? What happens when Palestinian existence is mediated (or made invisible) by robotic weapons? Can martial rule over millions of people become an autonomous architecture of the settler polity rather than a matter of political deliberation and sovereign decision-making?

These are the question that seem to be shaping a new form of mechanized apartheid which, taken to its final conclusion, would see the Palestinian as no more than an object, a digital phantom to be contained, controlled, and killed by machines but never encountered as a subject.

Like the Palestinians, together and apart, entire populations are being dragged into a droneworld that contains their existence. The new martial dream incited by these machines is no longer one where exploitation can limit the unilateral detriment and destruction to which peoples can be exposed.

Rather, the forces of separation that have taken over the contemporary world see no problem in making exploitation obsolete as long as they can automate labor and extract value from the robotic technologies of cruelty they produce. One thing to keep in mind though is that automation is never automatic. It is a form of labor at the heart of which is erasing the very subject whose violent dreams machines are meant to realize.

The use of armed drones, or Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), continues to evolve nineteen years after a CIA MQ-1 Predator drone saw its unsuccessful combat debut over Kandahar, Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, in the first days of the so-called “War on Terror.”

Though the United States until recently restricted exports of its long-endurance Predator and MQ-9 Reaper UCAVs, China, Iran, Israel, and Turkey have since developed and widely exported their own combat drones. These cost one-third or less than the price of a $15 million Reaper system, though they do have significant deficits in remote-control range, endurance, and weapons payload in comparison.  Nonetheless, these new Predator-style drones, as well as smaller and cheaper unmanned systems are now impacting conflicts across the globe.

Notably, in 2019-2020 the long-running Libyan civil war became dominated by drone warfare, which largely superseded sporadic and costly strikes from manned aircraft. First, the United Arab Emirates deployed Chinese-built Wing Loong drones armed with laser-guided Blue Arrow missiles in support of the Libyan National Army (LNA). When a 2019 offensive on Tripoli stalled, the LNA largely ceased ground operations and turned to drone strikes to maintain pressure.

However, Turkey then deployed Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs to support the opposing Government of National Accord (GNA). In the new phase, drone targeted drone on the ground, finally realizing the science-fiction trope of war between robots. Concerted drone strikes eventually destroyed numerous Pantsir-S1 short-range air defense systems defending the LNA’s key western airbase, leading the LNA to withdraw in May.

Earlier in March, Turkish Bayraktar and Anka-S drones impacted the Syrian Civil War, where Ankara opposes the efforts by Damascus to crush the last rebel stronghold in Idlib province. After several deadly attacks on Turkish troops, Turkey retaliated with waves of drone strikes supported by Korral jamming systems that overwhelmed Syrian air defenses, destroyed dozens of Assad-allied armored vehicles and artillery systems, and killed hundreds of personnel, bringing the offensive in Idlib to a halt.

These are decisive operational outcomes, even though UCAV losses were also non-negligible. Air defense shot down at least eight Bayraktars over Libya. Bayraktars and more valuable Anka-S drones were also lost over Syria. But these losses were materially and politically acceptable in ways that the loss of a dozen manned warplanes would not have been.

Unmanned Systems and the Threshold for Violence

Militaries worldwide are eager to procure drones because they lower the stakes for inflicting violence, and can kill more cost-efficiently than other methods.

A combat aircraft like an F-16 has been able to launch precision-guided weapons for decades, and such aircraft can carry more weapons and travel at a higher speed than any drone in service. But every time that an F-16 is deployed, there exists a risk, however small, that it will be lost over hostile territory, which could have dramatic political repercussions.

Thus, every F-16 sortie requires support assets, which may include electronic warfare aircraft to suppress air defenses, airborne warning, and command aircraft (AWACS) to maintain situational awareness, and search and rescue units on standby to rescue a downed pilot. All of the aircraft involved cost tens of thousands of dollars per flight hour to operate, and exhaust their fuel quickly unless a (large, expensive) tanker airplane is deployed to keep them aloft.

UCAVs, by contrast, cost less per flight hour, do not require rescue or escort assets, and can loiter over combat zones for over 20 hours searching for targets – and lost drones usually incur few political consequences. That said, the threshold for violence against drones, even unarmed types, has also proven much lower—in part because it can be observed that countries do not consider shooting down a drone to be as serious as an attack on a manned aircraft.

However, the tendency to see drones as acceptable targets could also backfire by inadvertently triggering escalation to deadly conflict. After Iran downed an unarmed U.S. RQ-4N drone in 2019, the U.S. reportedly came close to launching a deadly counter strike.

The Small UAS Threat

Predator-style drones and their missiles so far remain too large, expensive, and sophisticated to be operated by non-state actors. However, the same is not true for affordable and widely available civilian micro- and mini-drones.

In the Battle of Mosul, ISIS (Daesh) used numerous small drones to drop hand grenades or kamikaze themselves with explosive payloads into government forces. In Syria, insurgents launched a “swarm” of thirteen drones at a Russian airbase, though without much success. In Venezuela, a jury-rigged drone was employed in a failed assassination attempt on President Maduro.

Such Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (SUAS) afford non-state actors the ability to inflict greater costs in casualties and terror on government-aligned forces without exposing themselves to retaliation. However, they have yet to decisively impact a conflict.

However, states are also developing and fielding weaponized micro- and mini-drones (or “loitering munitions” or “kamikaze drones”) like the U.S. Switchblade, Israeli Harops and the Turkish Kargu-2. These relatively lightweight systems can serve as precision-guided missiles on the fly. The first kamikaze drone attack was delivered by an Israeli-built Harops drone in 2016 during conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Future Drone Combat Systems

Current UCAVs are slow and lack the speed to evade air defense fire; furthermore, those capable of long-range/endurance remain too expensive to be truly expendable. Thus their usefulness in a “Great Power conflict” is limited.

Accordingly, the United States, China, and Russia are pursuing new, sophisticated UAVs thought to be survivable in a shooting war against a hi-tech adversary. One approach is to arm stealth drones like the RQ-170 and the (prototype) Russian Okhotnik-B, although supersonic drones are also under development.

Inexpensive “loyal wingman” drones designed to assist fighter pilots in aerial warfare are also approaching entry into service in the 2020s, as are aerial decoy drones for diverting air defense fire.

Russia has also combat-tested an unmanned ground combat vehicle (UGCV) in Syria, though with disappointing results due to inherent difficulties in maintaining a long-distance communication link through intervening terrain, while the U.S. plans to field a trio of UGCVs in Light, Medium and Heavy-weight categories.

At sea, the U.S. Navy hopes that cheap robotic warships (USVs) will help fill out its shrinking fleet at an affordable cost. China, Russia, and the U.S. are also developing several types of submarine drones. These will be useable in surveillance roles fairly soon, but autonomous, combat-capable submarines will surely follow.

The drones killing humans today are directly controlled by other human beings. Autonomous functions are usually limited to behaviors to avoiding crash and collision and returning towards the controller if the signal is lost.

However, that will change. Advanced combat drones may be designed to perform their missions in situations where their control signal may be disrupted or inaccessible, such as a stealth UCAV penetrating enemy territory or a submarine deep beneath the surface of the ocean. Automated missile defense systems may demand reaction speeds exceeding human capability.  Swarms of small drones would be impossible to individually control, meaning their decision-making would be tied to networked AI.

Particularly chilling is work to adapt UCAVs to use facial recognition technology, which is notoriously prone to error, to identify persons for lethal attacks. There would then exist the risk that an autonomous combat system may attack when, or whom, it should not attack.

Defenders of autonomous systems argue AI might be less error-prone than humans, who have accidentally shot down airliners and bombed wedding parties. Critics counter that an autonomous combat system will lack the human ability to judge from context whether the use of violence is appropriate.

Regardless, the genie is out of the bottle as the technology to manufacture affordable UCAVs spreads globally, affording even resource-poor armed forces like that of Nigeria new ways to wield airpower more affordably and effectively than before.

But in turn, security forces must now develop and field affordable short-range air defense capabilities to defend against drones, including low-cost radars, jammers, laser weapons, and even anti-drone drones as traditional missile-based air defense solutions may prove too expensive per shot to contain the threat posed by smaller swarming drones.

Drones undoubtedly offer a relatively low-cost and low-risk means to surveil and project violence. However, the capacity to kill higher numbers and more efficiently does not mean that killing is necessarily justified, effective, or free of collateral damage.

Though touted as being more precise weapons compared to the traditional method of plastering a “kill zone” with large unguided aerial bombs or artillery shells, drones strikes have nonetheless resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths in part because they can be used so much more liberally than manned warplanes. Even the normalization of targeted assassination has worrying implications.

While drone proliferation in 21st-century warfare is inevitable, it is desirable to develop mutually-agreed-upon norms regulating their use in multi-national forums. Unfortunately, it seems unlikely such effort will be undertaken by countries eager to field UCAV systems and export them abroad.

The Trump administration has dismantled a large part of the arms control regime painstakingly erected in prior decades, so it seems doubtful that drone warfare will take priority over arms control measures of strategic, space-based and cyber weapons in the coming years. The U.S. and its rivals have also collectively weakened alliances and international institutions which could be used to negotiate such regulations in favor of transactional two-party negotiations.

China and other countries’ success in drone exports have led the U.S. to ease its own restrictions, a move very much in the commercial interests of domestic defense manufacturers. Meanwhile, neither Beijing nor Moscow believe that human rights concerns should limit arms sales abroad. Ultimately, Predator-style drones remain most effective when used by a state against weak states or non-state actors. In an international order based on states, those most impacted by drone warfare usually do not have a seat at the table.