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kraine’s military intelligence service says it is preparing to carry out more complex maritime drone operations next year, after the country’s uncrewed surface fleet succeeded in forcing Russia’s Black Sea forces into a defensive posture and limiting their naval movements.

In comments to The Associated Press, the commander of the Defense Intelligence Directorate’s (GUR) Group 13 maritime drone unit said Ukraine’s sea-based attacks have reached a “plateau” in recent months, as Russia adapted its tactics following a series of high-profile strikes earlier in the war. The officer, identified publicly only by the call sign “13th” under Ukrainian security protocol, said the change in Russian behavior demonstrated both the impact and the challenges of Kyiv’s evolving drone program.

“We are effectively limiting the enemy’s movement, but those dramatic, high-profile strikes we saw earlier haven’t happened for some time,” he said. “That’s because the enemy has adapted.”

Ukrainian officials announced last month that maritime drones were used to hit vessels belonging to Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet,” a network of tankers used to evade sanctions. The commander declined to discuss those operations, citing restrictions imposed by the intelligence service.

According to Group 13, Russian naval vessels now stay close to their bases, typically traveling no more than 25–40 kilometers from port to fire cruise missiles before quickly returning. “They barely operate,” the commander said. “They constantly hide. And in a way, that is also a result of our work — because you can imagine the cost of maintaining a fleet that cannot operate at sea.”

The interview took place at an undisclosed location inside Ukraine. The officer wore full uniform, with his face covered and eyes obscured for security reasons. The intelligence agency requested that details of the site, equipment storage, and logistics not be revealed.

Drones on the front line of a naval war

Maritime drones have become one of Ukraine’s most significant tools in countering Russian naval power. Kyiv operates two separate programs — one under its armed forces, the other under its intelligence service. Group 13 oversees the Magura family of sea drones, which have been credited with several major strikes on Russian warships, landing craft, and logistics vessels.

The unit currently uses two primary models: the Magura V5, a compact high-speed ramming drone used in explosive attacks, and the Magura V7, a larger multi-role platform capable of carrying various weapons. Both systems are controlled remotely through compact consoles equipped with joysticks, thermal and optical screens, and safety mechanisms.

During a recent demonstration for journalists, Ukrainian operators displayed a V7 equipped with modified U.S.-made AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. In May, GUR said one such drone downed a Russian fighter jet — a development the commander described as “a breakthrough” in modern naval warfare, marking what Kyiv claims is the first time a maritime surface drone has shot down an aircraft.

Next phase: AI-Enabled strikes

The commander said Ukraine’s next wave of innovation will center on expanded use of artificial intelligence. Current drone operations rely on a combination of human control and software assistance. Operators guide the systems over long distances, while AI assists with horizon scanning, obstacle recognition, and initial target identification.

“Right now, the search process is part operator, part AI,” he said. “In the future, you’ll launch the drone and it will independently search for a target, distinguish civilian ships from military ones, and make more of the decisions.”

Ukraine, he added, has accumulated “a huge amount of operational data” — including video from combat missions, sensor readings, navigation routes, and engagements — which will be used to further train AI algorithms.

Although he declined to provide specifics, the officer said experts in Ukraine and partner states were examining long-range strike options, submersible systems, and potential “mixed-fleet” operations involving coordinated attacks by aerial, surface and underwater drones.

International partnerships growing

Ukraine is also working to expand co-production of maritime drones. During a visit by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Athens in November, Kyiv and Greece agreed to begin joint projects on maritime uncrewed vehicles, deepen intelligence-sharing on sea-based threats and increase training opportunities for Ukrainian operators.

Officials in Kyiv view cooperation with NATO member states as essential to sustaining Ukraine’s drone capabilities amid Russia’s ongoing attempts to jam, disrupt or intercept uncrewed systems.

Despite Russia’s adaptations, the commander insisted that Ukraine’s naval drone fleet continues to play a decisive role in restricting Moscow’s movements in the Black Sea. Analysts say Russia’s decision to relocate key vessels from Sevastopol to ports farther east — including Novorossiysk — was driven in large part by Ukraine’s repeated drone strikes over the past two years.

“We’re working on many fronts to change the situation and create a turning point,” the commander said. “We haven’t lost effectiveness. We’re holding the enemy in check — and preparing for what comes next.”

(Source: The Associated Press)

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n a move that could exacerbate already strained relations between the Maldives and India, Turkey has initiated the delivery of its renowned combat drones, the Bayraktar TB2, to the island nation. The delivery, part of a bilateral agreement between Turkey and the Maldives, aims to enhance the security capabilities of the Maldivian armed forces amid escalating tensions in the region.

The agreement, which includes the supply of a command control station and six TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), follows a visit by Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu to Turkey in November 2023. During the visit, President Muizzu engaged in discussions with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and toured several Turkish defense industry companies.

The timing of the drone supply is significant, as it comes amidst growing tensions between the Maldives and India since President Muizzu assumed office last year. Traditionally, the Maldives has maintained close ties with India, but under Muizzu’s leadership, the country has been tilting towards closer relations with Beijing, raising concerns in New Delhi.

Indian troops in the Maldives

One of the major points of contention between the Maldives and India has been the presence of Indian troops in the Maldives. President Muizzu has been vocal in calling for the withdrawal of Indian military personnel stationed in the country, adding to the diplomatic friction between the two nations.

Developed by Baykar, the Bayraktar TB2 drones have gained recognition for their effectiveness in various conflicts worldwide, including in Azerbaijan, Libya, and Ukraine. The TB2 drones played a significant role in countering Russian forces during the early stages of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, showcasing their combat capabilities on the global stage.

The supply of TB2 drones to the Maldives underscores Turkey’s growing influence in the defense industry and its willingness to expand its strategic partnerships beyond its immediate region. With exports to 33 countries, including NATO and EU member states, Turkey’s defense industry continues to make strides in the international market.

However, the delivery of the drones to the Maldives is likely to further strain relations between the Maldives and India, potentially leading to heightened tensions in the region. As both countries navigate delicate diplomatic waters, the impact of Turkey’s involvement in the region remains to be seen.

The delivery of the Bayraktar TB2 drones to the Maldives marks another chapter in the evolving geopolitical landscape of the Indian Ocean region, with implications for regional stability and security.

Australian journalist Antony Loewenstein’s groundbreaking book, The Palestine Laboratory: How Israel Exports the Technology of Occupation Around the World, offers a chilling exposé of Israel’s military-industrial complex and its sinister role in perfecting and exporting oppressive technologies developed through the prolonged occupation of Palestinian territories. For over half a century, the West Bank and Gaza have served as a testing ground for weaponry, surveillance tools, and control mechanisms, solidifying Israel’s position as a global leader in the military-techno complex.

Loewenstein takes readers on a riveting journey through a clandestine world, backed by secret documents, revealing interviews, and on-the-ground reporting. The book unveils, for the first time, the meticulous architecture of control that Israel has honed through surveillance, home demolitions, and brutality, evolving from the occupation of Palestinian lands. 

From the notorious Pegasus software implicated in high-profile hacks to the weapons supplied to oppressive regimes like Myanmar, Israel’s technological prowess is exposed as a driving force behind some of the world’s most brutal conflicts. A striking example is the use of Israeli drones by the EU and Frontex, battle-tested in Palestine, for surveillance and border control, particularly in response to the refugee crisis after 2015. 

The author skillfully connects the dots, illustrating how Israel’s ethno-nationalistic approach has become a global model, influencing governments such as Modi’s in India where admiration for Israel’s actions in the West Bank influences their approach in regions like Kashmir. Loewenstein highlights the alarming rise of Israel as a major player in spying technology and defense hardware, revealing the dark underbelly of its contributions to the violation of human rights on a global scale.

The book further unmasks the ruthlessness with which Israel leverages the experiences gained from an illegal occupation. It argues that Israel has successfully exported its tested technologies and methods to over 130 countries worldwide. This includes the sale of spyware, smart walls, facial recognition tools, and other tools of occupation and repression. The book serves as a stark reminder of how Israel’s oppression of Palestinians has become the cornerstone of its military and security industries.

Moreover, The Palestine Laboratory sheds light on Israel’s questionable alliances, exposing its support for despots worldwide. Over the past 50 years, the U.S. and Israel have formed close partnerships, with Israel serving as an invaluable partner in arming and training nations that the U.S. officially couldn’t support due to various restraints.

Turkey’s military UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) created a storm in and around the Middle East with a lot more potential in the bag for the industry’s future. The Bayraktar TB2s immense impact on the Turkish military operations in Syria and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict created a momentum for more exports. As several countries publicly announced that they were considering acquiring these smart weapons systems, a number of countries penned contracts with Turkey to purchase them swiftly.

The potential impact for this export momentum is threefold. First, the export of UAVs to Eastern Europe will create a new dimension to NATO’s security approach against Russia. Second, it will encourage other Eastern European or even European countries to purchase these military systems. Third, if we look at the issue’s security dimension, the Turkish military superiority in NATO and the Middle East will be strengthened as the systems will transform into a prestige and tactical presence.

Eastern European countries such as Hungary, Latvia, Albania, Serbia, and Poland have all expressed interest in the Bayraktar TB2s, which has been on the front burner since the decisive Turkish operations in Syria. The Turkish aerial superiority resulting from the UAVs become the hotbed of discussions as the Russian air-defense systems such as Pantsir-S1 and S-200s were damaged or destroyed on several occasions.

As the military records of destroyed air defense systems became viral, the Bayraktar TB2 has attracted attention in almost all regions of the world. This interest was crowned by several procurement procedures and memoranda of understanding between Baykar Inc., the producer, and countries like Qatar, Azerbaijan, Poland, and most recently Albania.

Baykar Inc.’s exports were globally discussed when Russia’s rival, Ukraine, decided to import this technology in 2019. Twelve Bayraktar UAVs and three ground control stations (GCS) were purchased for $69 million with a 5-unit addition in 2020. There were statements about a joint venture between Ukraine and Turkey (including Ukrspetsexport and Baykar) to produce aerial technology and precision systems. It was stated that Turkey allowed Ukraine to sell the domestically produced TB2 drones to clients other than those of Turkey. However, the exact content of the agreement is yet to be made public.

Eastern European states such as Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Albania, and the Republic of Serbia have publicly announced their interest in purchasing Bayraktar TB2s.

The Eastern European interest in Baykar’s UAVs has become more salient after the second Nagorno-Karabagh War in 2020. The Turkish help to Azerbaijan through the Bayraktar TB2s dramatically changed the course of the interstate conflict. However, the explosive development in exports occurred in 2021 as most interested states overcame their political burdens and actualized their demands through diplomatic channels. Eastern European states such as Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Albania, and the Republic of Serbia have publicly announced their interest in purchasing Bayraktar TB2s.

This $80 million deal opened the North African market for Turkish military drone exports. Five months later, another North African country, Morocco, struck a deal to acquire 13 Bayraktar TB2s with four GCSs in a deal worth more than $70 million.

Moreover, several Middle Eastern and African countries such as Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Egypt expressed interest in purchasing the Turkish UAVs in the future. The Turkish expansion of military technology into Africa caused serious challenges for France as Khalifa Haftar’s forces were defeated thanks to the UAVs’ military superiority.

The battle-proven Turkish military systems might create the opportunity for states with security challenges such as Libya, Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan.

This process might hint at the same potential impact in other African countries with sovereignty issues such as Morocco (Western Sahara), Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Increasing Turkish influence in these territories might challenge EU and the U.S. gains in this region while encouraging these states to resent the status quo.

The battle-proven Turkish military systems might create the opportunity for states with security challenges such as Libya, Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan, etc. to control their territory effectively and fight against terrorist activities at home. The Turkish military experience in Turkish, Iraqi, Afghani, and Syrian territories might also serve as leverage for the increasing Turkish influence and trust in Turkish military technology.

It is well known that Turkey has expanded its military technology to African markets through procurement deals with Morocco, Tunisia, Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda. The EU leaders and Russia might feel concerned because of this expansion, a feeling which could extend to Eastern Europe as well.

Foreign concerns about Turkish UAVs’ increasing presence in the coming decade is not limited to Western countries. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has been the primary destination for Chinese military UAVs too. Thus, an increasing Turkish presence in this sector might directly hinder the Chinese export and influence in MENA.

Moreover, if all of the potential buyers in Eastern Europe such as Bulgaria, Latvia, Hungary, and the Republic of Serbia finalize their procurement of Bayraktar TB2s, then three out of four continental neighbors of Greece and two out of four European neighbors of Russia will protect their borders using Turkish UAVs.

When these two factors are considered together, it becomes apparent that the Turkish leap in the UAV technology will earn some of the share that was long preserved by the West and China – the new Eastern contender.

Moreover, the use of Bayraktar TB2s in Syria and Azerbaijan in 2020 proved that they’re not merely capable of monitoring and defending territories but can also effectively carry out attack missions. This aspect propounds the notion that the Turkish UAVs are going to have an impact on the offense-defense balances in these regions.

The changes to the status quo in regards to the manufacture of UAVs might set forth political turbulences in the EU and NATO led by the French dismissal of the Turkish penetration of the EU in terms of military technology. All in all, Turkey’s military procurement deals with Poland and Albania created another dimension in the European security discussions which are destined to have a lasting impact on the coming decade.

To the majority of Palestinians, the settler-colonial encounter is primarily, if not exclusively, an encounter with weapon power. That to me is one of the most inescapable philosophical provocations of what Rashid Khalidi called “the hundred years’ war on Palestine”.

Since the second decade of the Twentieth century to today, the (re)production of masses of Palestinians as the hosts and hostages of zones of encounter with arms has been the condition of Israeli existence, citizenship and sensoria, national history and spatiality.

Be it through fracturing the Palestinian body politic into occupied territories, besieged camps, and enemy entities, or fracturing Palestinianess itself into different categories of compromised existence that “magnetize” state violence—making the exercise of weapon power the sole practicable option for Jewish statehood and sovereignty has been the choice of consecutive Israeli governments whose legitimacy has been intrinsically tied to making this choice go unmarked.

That is the underwriting logic for what has passed as “politics” between the river and the sea and beyond in those hundred years which is no more than the martial art of making Palestinians available as a genre of the human that can only be accessed and expelled from view by weapons while securing the Israelis unlimited possession and use of these martial technologies.

So is the case because weapons make possible the destruction of all social and political relations except for the relation of enmity that justifies the zero-sum logic of settlement and separation according to which it is either “them or us”.

Generations of Palestinians, particularly those in the West Bank and Gaza, have and continue to experience the reinscription of this logic every time they interact with armed settlers, be they in uniform or out of uniform. The Israelis have made that this violent interaction is the rule that the “settler” as an anthropological figure appears as no less than a combination of a human-weapon assemblage in Palestine.

In practice, most of Israel’s unmanned war operations involve automatic procedures that require little to no “human interference”. For example, a number of Israeli medium and large size aerial drones are equipped with autonomous take-off and landing capabilities, automatic piloting on pre-programmed paths, object and terrain scanning softwares for the identification of targets, as well as the use of algorithms to match targets with ordnance in order to maximize the speed and quantity of destruction.

In fact, the Israelis, like other users and developers of these machines (namely the United States), place remotely-controlled weapons on an evolutionary trajectory towards full automation, merchandizing their work of death as the inevitable conclusion to the course of technological innovation.

They index their progress according to sanitizing classifications of the human-machine interface that foretell a gradual yet linear ejection of settlers from the machinations of martial governance, progressing from “humans in the loop” where soldiers are involved in the selection and execution of targets, to the “closed-loops” of full machine autonomy where target identification and elimination is strictly an algorithmic process executed by mechanical agents.

Indeed, the official plan of the Israeli state is to increase the population of these machines and diversify them “to develop a system that fits a wide range of missions in the field …[that] can help the IDF control populated areas for extended periods of time” while minimizing the amount of training and resources required to do so. Programs to , and a third of the military’s ground war machinery in the next five to ten years are put in place to carve out death-worlds “where autonomous soldiers could carry the weight in the war [my emphasis]”.

Of course, these classifications are not ontologically, ethically, or legally neutral. However, what they show more than anything is that in the robotic era of war, the Israeli mode of problematizing Palestinian-Israeli relations has so far been reducible to the question of reengineering the relation between the settler and the weapon.

Indeed, under the sign of the drone and the robots of war, the inseparable matters of warcraft and statecraft as pursued by the Israeli state have been technically reassembled to establish spatial, legal, and political distance between the Palestinian and the Israeli through creating spatial and procedural distance between the Israeli and the weapon.

Can the labor of making the Indigenous disappear be outsourced to machines? What happens when Palestinian existence is mediated (or made invisible) by robotic weapons? Can martial rule over millions of people become an autonomous architecture of the settler polity rather than a matter of political deliberation and sovereign decision-making?

These are the question that seem to be shaping a new form of mechanized apartheid which, taken to its final conclusion, would see the Palestinian as no more than an object, a digital phantom to be contained, controlled, and killed by machines but never encountered as a subject.

Like the Palestinians, together and apart, entire populations are being dragged into a droneworld that contains their existence. The new martial dream incited by these machines is no longer one where exploitation can limit the unilateral detriment and destruction to which peoples can be exposed.

Rather, the forces of separation that have taken over the contemporary world see no problem in making exploitation obsolete as long as they can automate labor and extract value from the robotic technologies of cruelty they produce. One thing to keep in mind though is that automation is never automatic. It is a form of labor at the heart of which is erasing the very subject whose violent dreams machines are meant to realize.