The Russia-Ukraine war marked a watershed moment in relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia, which had previously been strained by the Georgian war and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Post-Cold War efforts to improve EU-Russia relations through trade and dialogue have not succeeded in transforming Russia politically into the democratic regime the EU desired. On the contrary, the Russian political regime has embarked on an expansionist policy of violating the independence and sovereignty of countries in the former Soviet geography and sphere of influence by military force. This has led key EU countries such as Germany and France to reassess their approach to Russia.

The EU countries, which somehow maintained relations with Russia after the war in Georgia (2008) and the annexation of Crimea (2014), realized that Russia’s expansionist policy would not stop with the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, which Russia announced as a “special military operation”. We have begun to observe that a new approach to the EU’s relations with Russia has been adopted in this process.

The swift imposition of EU sanctions against Russia was the first step in this new approach. Against the possibility that this coercive measure would fail to convince Russia to make peace and that this war would spread to other parts of Europe, Germany’s decision to increase its military capacity with a fund of 100 billion euros, announced by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on February 27, 2022 as a turning point (Zeitenwende), signaled a serious transformation.

The EU’s strategic autonomy in the field of defense, which gained momentum with the adoption of the Strategic Compass in March 2022 when France held the rotating presidency of the European Union, was accelerated by the two-year Russia-Ukraine war and the growing needs in the field of defense. Steps have been taken to support this with new policies, programs, and funding.

Another step in this direction was the decision to establish the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), led by Germany and including Turkey, to create a defense shield with missile defense systems against Russian aggression from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The reasons behind this move are the increased importance of missile defense systems based on the lessons learned from Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure and Russia’s deployment of Russian hypersonic missiles in Kaliningrad, between Lithuania and Poland, in August 2022.

However, this law does not change the fact that the European defense industry does not have sufficient stocks to meet Ukraine’s demand for ammunition in a short period of time. In other words, the Russia-Ukraine war has left EU defense production unable to replenish depleted military stocks and meet the pace needed to support Ukraine. The main reason for this ammunition problem is that EU defense industry production is based on a peacetime economy, not a wartime economy. Shifting to a wartime economy means shifting a significant portion of the budget from other areas to defense.

At this point, the EU adopted the European Defense Industry Strategy (EDIS) to address these concerns. Based on the results of the defense investment gap analysis and an extensive consultation process, the first European Defense Industrial Strategy, entitled “First ever Defense Industrial Strategy and a New Defense Industry Program to Enhance Europe’s Readiness and Security”, was presented by the European Commission and the EU’s High Representative on March 5, 2024.

Keeping production going and building industrial confidence through ambitious targets is an important part of this strategy. The strategy also calls for EU countries to work together to purchase at least 40 percent of defense equipment by 2030, to spend at least half of their defense procurement budgets on products made in Europe, and to trade at least 35 percent of defense goods between EU countries instead of with other countries. The strategy is intended to help make the EU more secure and resilient and would also benefit key allies such as Ukraine.

The Cost of Energy Security

Besides providing ammunition to Ukraine, French President Emmanuel Macron recently mentioned direct military support and readiness for a major war in Europe. All these discourses should also be read in the context of Russia’s moves in Africa and the price it is paying for France’s energy security. France, which gets a significant part of its energy from nuclear power, also gets a significant part of its uranium, the fuel for nuclear power, from Africa. After the coup in Niger, pro-Russian Niger’s decision to suspend uranium exports to France increased France’s discomfort with growing Russian influence in the region.

Moreover, the search for an alternative natural gas supplier to Russian gas and to reduce energy dependence on Russia was further intensified by the Russia-Ukraine war. As a result, the search for natural gas from Africa gained momentum. The planned Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline, which would transport Nigerian natural gas through Niger and Algeria to Europe, appears to have been blocked by Russia. As France is squeezed by Russia’s strategic moves in Africa, we observe President Macron’s assertive statements, the steps taken to strengthen the defense industry, and finally, as an alternative to endangered energy supplies in Africa, France is turning to one of the world’s largest uranium producers such as Kazakhstan.

Some EU members, led by France, want nuclear energy to be widely used in Europe to combat climate change, and nuclear energy is seen as the main alternative to eliminate energy dependence on Russia. Against this backdrop, the first Nuclear Energy Summit was held in Brussels on March 21, 2024, and proposals were made to promote the use of nuclear energy.

On July 20, the European Union Commission announced its plan to provide 1.2 billion Euros for the long inactive European Defense Fund (EDP) to support 61 joint defense research and development projects.

The step was taken after the EU declared that it would increase its defense expenditure. This move raised questions about whether the EU states are now more willing to form a European military identity given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. What then does the EU’s decision to raise its defense budget mean?

Europe’s Solutions to Europe’s Problems?

The idea of creating a European army has a long and contentious history in Europe, dating back to the 1950s when it was conceived as a mechanism to boost the defense against the Communist threat without straightforwardly rearming Germany after World War II.

Along with political and economic integration policies, EU member states worked to develop a joint defense understanding to address the security challenges Europe may face. One significant attempt along this line was the Western European Union (WEU), which was founded in 1954 and dissolved in 2011. The reason behind the dissolution was that the WEU did not provide security to all EU members and was limited to only 10 states, namely Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

In 2004, following the lessons learned from Kosovo, the European Defence Agency was founded, and over time special EU military bodies were established. In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) provides a common EU defense strategy. Notwithstanding, the treaty still specified the significance of a national defense strategy, including NATO membership and/or neutrality.

The Berlin Plus agreement signed between NATO and the EU on March 17, 2003, allows the union to use NATO facilities and capabilities. A good example is Operation ALTHEA, formally known as EUFOR (European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina), a military deployment succeeding NATO’s former SFOR (Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and IFOR (Implementation Force), and established as multinational peacekeeping forces to carry out and implement the Dayton Peace Accords.

The EU’s Recent Defense and Security Initiatives

In recent years, the European Union started paying more attention to security and defense cooperation. The year 2017 witnessed the establishment of the following defense organizations: the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which, as of June 2019, has 25 participating EU countries; the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC); the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD); and the European Defence Fund (EDF).

Moreover, the European Parliament took steps toward a resolution in December 2018 on a plan to facilitate military mobility within and across the EU. This step is significant for enhancing the response time of military personnel and access to equipment in response to crises.

With the Strategic Compass published in March 2022, the EU announced that it aims for a stronger and more capable EU in security and defense. The Strategic Compass aims to give the “European Union an ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU’s security and defense policy by 2030.” The Compass states the EU’s intention to respond quickly to crises by establishing a force of 5,000 troops with a rapid deployment capacity.

Highlighting the complementary function to NATO, Strategic Compass emphasizes a “stronger and more capable EU,” while NATO remains the foundation of collective defense for global and transatlantic matters for the EU member states.

How Far Does the EU Need NATO?

Some EU countries such as France, Germany, and Italy prioritize the EU’s own defense and promote the idea of an EU army. French President Emmanuel Macron has been a strong proponent of this idea; back in 2019, he had directed harsh criticism against NATO claiming that it was “brain-dead.” But the Russian military invasion of Ukraine fortified NATO’s international position, leading EU member states to rethink their security and defense.

Today, there is considerable support among other EU member states for the EU maintaining its own security. Italy’s Prime Minister Mario Draghi argued for the need to enhance European security. At the end-of-year news conference in Rome in December 2021, Draghi told reporters,  “Do we have missiles, ships, cannons, armies? At the moment, no.” Draghi highlighted that NATO’s real focus is not the Russian threat, but China and the Indo-Pacific region.

Tensions between the U.S. and some EU countries, too, fuel debates on Europe becoming a self-sufficient and self-reliant power. In NATO-EU security relations, the distrust felt by some EU member states—especially evident during the Trump administration—has a potential to resurge in the future. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the EU Commission, said in a statement in 2021 that the EU should seek to beef up its military capabilities to confront security threats and global crises.

There is also a counter-approach among some EU member states on the issue of a European army. The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and Poland believe that NATO can be more effective against the Russian threat with Poland and Latvia being at the forefront of this opinion.

Finland and Sweden have long remained neutral in international politics, but recently changed their opinions on joining NATO, proving once again the importance of the North Atlantic Alliance. Furthermore, countries such as Belgium, Sweden, and Germany started to increase their military spending in order to reach the 2% defense investment NATO guideline—something the U.S. has been complaining about for years. It is remarkable that Germany, which kept its defense budget the same for years, has finally increased it to €100 billion.