After two years of stormy relations with Turkey, Haider al-Abadi, the former Prime Minister of Iraq, managed to establish workable relations with Turkey. Had he won the election, he would have continued to work with Turkey on several strategically important issues such as the establishment of a second pipeline for oil export from Iraq to Turkey, and joint efforts in order to eradicate the PKK presence in the Qandil mountains. Both countries were also planning to expand the size of commercial trade.

Adel Abdul Mahdi has been chosen as Iraq’s new prime minister-designate, and Barham Salih as the new president. Now, Turkey needs to be prepared for a post-Abadi era. This piece is about the intensified rivalry taking place between pro-Iranian and pro-American Iraqi political groups, which both seek to form a government, and reflect on how the probable result of this rivalry will affect Turkey-Iraq relations.

U.S. and Iran scramble for the cake

All these depend on the larger scene: What will be Trump’s forthcoming strategy to contain Iran’s expansionist policy in the Middle East? If Trump’s policy is to make Iraq the theater for the first attempt to restrain Iran, as some policy analysts have suggested, then confrontation will be more probable. It is clear that the U.S. and Russia have reached a tacit agreement, agreeing that Syria is in the interest of Russia, and thus leaving the job of containing Iran’s influence in the country to both Tel Aviv and Moscow.

During the last two months, both Brett McGurk, the U.S. Special Envoy on War against Daesh, and Qasim Soleimani, the commander of the Quds revolutionary guard and the person in charge of Iraq’s file, made numerous visits to Baghdad and Erbil to rally support for the groups that they have influence on in order to form the “biggest election bloc” – the largest political alliance in parliament. The U.S. supports the bloc of al-Islah (Reform) headed by Abadi, and Iran favors the bloc of al-Bina (Reconstruction) founded by Nouri-al Maliki. The later has an edge and it has managed to elect Mohammed Halbusi, who is a pro-Iranian Sunni leader, as speaker of Parliament.

Why did Abadi lose his bid for power?

Towards the end of September, many of Abadi’s allies began to desert his camp, and this seriously weakened his chance to be re-elected. Abadi proved too tactless and has been alienated by many in his own camp. On the other hand, al-Maliki has exhibited considerable diplomatic skills and made compromises with both the Sunni Arabs and Kurds. According to unconfirmed reports, he conceded to the Kurds and the right of the Kurdish peshmerga to return to the disputed territories. Abadi has apparently refused to do what forced Masoud Barzani to side with al-Maliki.

In addition, al-Maliki has made deals with Sunni leaders to withdraw popular mobilization forces (Hashd al-Shaabi) from their cities. This irritated Abadi who considered these actions as illegal and being done without his prior knowledge – behind his back. Consequently, he sacked Falih Fayyad, his National Security Advisor, whom he accused of betrayal and inefficiency. The loss of Fayyad, a prominent Dawa leader and the son of a powerful Shiite tribal leader, accompanied by the use of excessive force against demonstrators in Basra, put Abadi’s statesmanship into serious question.

It was probably this state of affairs that convinced Muqtada Sadr, the powerful cleric and leader of the winning Sairoon bloc, to desert Abadi and reconcile with Hadi Ameri, the head of the powerful Badr militia. More, Abadi’s hasty and not so well-calculated statement to implement U.S. sanctions against Iran, has delivered a serious blow to his ability to present himself as a leader of Iraq. A statement in the pro-government daily Erem in Tehran on August 16, 2018, described Abadi as a “governor of Iraq who has been appointed by an Iranian general and who will face the same fate as Saddam.”

However, the final blow to Abad’s bid for a second term came with the statement of Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the most influential Shiite cleric in the country, banning those who have been in office before to take the post again.

Turkey’s stand in Iraqi politics

Turkey should take the existing tension between Iran and the U.S. into consideration as it will not diminish and may even end in direct confrontation in Abdul Mehdi’s era. Turkey should also be prepared for a possible inter-Shiite military confrontation in a proxy war. The burning of the Iranian consulate in Basra, and subsequent unknown missile launches on U.S. interests again in Basra and the Green zone in Baghdad, are clear indications that the U.S.-Iranian confrontation in Iraq has entered an alarming stage.

The Iraqi government accused ex-Baathist elements as being behind the events in Basra, and pro-Iranian groups in Iraq attributed the events to the U.S. and its Arab allies in the region. It can be argued that the events were in general spontaneous and triggered by Iran’s decision to cut off power to Basra due to the economic crisis in Iran. The people in Basra have repeatedly taken to the streets in recent weeks to protest against the lack of government services, and water contamination that left thousands in hospitals.

Besides, both Soleimani and Ameri have already threatened to attack U.S. interests in Iraq if they were excluded from forming a government. Qais Al-Khazali, the leader of the powerful Asaeb al-Haq militia, made similar threats.

In case of a diplomatic rupture between Iraq and Turkey, Turkey’s national interest and security might be jeopardized. First of all, the PKK can avail itself from the chaos by extending its influence on the KRG. There is a boiling situation in the unsettled province of Kirkuk. The rapture may cause a clash there and the Turkmen may suffer in consequence. Besides, Turkey’s 11 billion worth of trade with Iraq can be seriously affected. Therefore, Turkey needs to develop and put in place contingent plans for such eventuality. Thus, Ankara cannot afford to be a bystander as things take a confrontational posture in the relations between Iran and the U.S. in Iraq.

Since the new prime minister is, to a large extent, a man of compromise between the U.S. and Iran, if he manages to form the government he will most probably try to pursue Abadi’s foreign policy objectives. Although he has stated that he wants a full mandate to form the government, he cannot afford to ignore Muqtada Sadr’s (his main patron) pressure with regard to further distancing Iraq from both Iran and the U.S.

Aware of his close ties with the Kurdish leadership in Iraq, he will probably try to open up to the KRG and come to close terms with them in regards to the sale of oil through the existing oil pipeline in the KRG. This means that he will try to please Barzani and most probably ignore or postpone the second pipeline that Abadi and the Turkish government agreed upon – an agreement to the displeasure of KRG leaders.

Being an economist and supporter of the market economy, Abdul Mehdi will try to expand commercial ties with Turkey and will try to avoid any political tension with Ankara. However, his foreign policy towards Turkey will not be free from Iranian and the U.S. influence. Abdul Mehdi’s anticipated foreign policy will in general be a continuation of the Abadi era, and Turkey-Iraq ties will continue on its current course of commercial growth and normalization.

As the dust of the war in Kirkuk and the disputed territories in northern Iraq settle down, there are two issues on the forefront: the future of relations between Erbil and Baghdad, and the future status of Masoud Barzani. It is fair to maintain that the Kirkuk Operation signaled the end of Kurdish independence for decades to come and spelled the demise of Barzani.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is likely to remain a weak and divided region, increasingly subservient to Baghdad. With the loss of over 50% of the disputed territories and the majority of its oil fields, combined with the commitment for Iraq’s territorial integrity, as was displayed by the international community during the Kirkuk Operation, Kurdish leaders lost any hope they had for independence in the foreseeable future.

The future of Barzani in KRG politics

Masoud Barzani was elected as president of the KRG in the 2009 general election. His term was extended in 2013 through a political arrangement made between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). On August 19, 2015, his presidency expired and this led to a crisis of legitimacy and mass protests, which were led by the Gorran movement. During the campaign for the referendum, Barzani repeatedly asserted that he will not run for presidency, and that accepting to be president of the KRG was the biggest mistake of his life – apparently Barzani thinks he is too important to occupy a position which was like being a governor of three provinces.

Though late, Barzani seems to have realized that being leader of the KRG automatically puts him in a hierarchically minor position vis-à-vis the Baghdad government. Following the losses inflicted on the KRG during the Kirkuk Operation, fingers were internally and externally pointed at Barzani as he was held responsible for the Peshmarga’s major defeat.

Moreover, officials in Baghdad and abroad, the US in particular, sent the KRG unfailing messages of possible repercussions of the referendum, which were single-handedly carried out in spite of objections raised by the international community. Thus, he gambled and lost more than what he estimated.

Having heard the message clear and loud, on October 29 Barzani sent a letter to the KRG parliament in which he requested for his powers to be delegated between the government and parliament. It is noteworthy that on October 24 Kurdish lawmakers voted overwhelmingly to extend the current term of the parliament for eight more months to be followed by an election. In his resignation speech, Barzani vigorously defended his decision to hold the September 25 referendum. He stated: “The results can never be erased… the Iraqi attack on Kirkuk and other Kurdish held territory vindicated my position that Baghdad no longer believed in federalism and instead wanted to curtail Kurdish rights.”

Following his resignation, Barzani has repeatedly stated that he will stay fighting as “an ordinary Peshmarga.” On November 1, 2017, he toured Peshmarga forces on the new frontiers, separating them from Iraqi troops and Shiite militias near Fishhabur in Dohuk and Makhmour in Mosul.

Political analysts anticipate that Barzani will remain leading KRG politics from behind the scenes for several reasons. In his letter to the KRG parliament, while Barzani did not admit defeat or apologize, he requested for his nephew and son-in-law Nechirvan Barzani, the ongoing prime minister of the KRG, to lead the country out of the current crisis. Nechirvan Barzani does not have the personal caliber to stand to Barzani. While the Barzani dynasty is formed on the basis of a religious hierarchical order where the orders of the elders are strictly obeyed, his close aides are not at pain to conceal this reality. “Barzani will stay in Kurdish politics and lead the high political council, but on Nov. 1st he will no longer be president of the region,” Hemin Hawrami, a senior advisor of Barzani stated. Umed Khoshnaw, head of the KDP group in the KRG parliament stated that the resignation of Barzani will give him “more time to play a bigger role in supporting Peshmarga efforts to defend Kurdish rights,” and that “he will stay to be the only person capable of guaranteeing Kurdish rights and the unifying element of Kurdish society.”

The Abadi factor in future relations between Baghdad and Erbil

Following the success of the Iraqi forces, the Baghdad administration re-negated from earlier agreements they made with PUK officials for a joint administration in Kirkuk and in other disputed territories. Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds Corp, who planned and executed the Kirkuk Operation (October 16-20, 2017), had made a secret deal with leading members of the PUK in order to divide and eventually overrun the KRG. Should the plan realize, it will lead to the formation of a new region in Sulaymaniyah and Halabja.

Other than departing from the arrangements made, Abadi issued decrees in order to try officials who participated in the independence referendum. Thus, sixteen Kurdish law makers are currently facing trial in Iraqi courts. The central government is now planning to send 221 employees to the KRG in order to monitor airplanes and crossing gates in the region. Moreover, the Baghdad government is trying to force the KRG to hand over its remaining oilfields, tax incomes and other internal incomes in exchange for sending some KRG employees their salaries. Besides, Abadi has requested for all border points and airports, which have initially remained under KRG control, to be surrendered to the Federal authorities. Finally, the prime minister has also insisted for the KRG military and security forces to be downsized and for the surrender of their heavy weapons to Baghdad. However, Kurdish authorities have not, and most probably will not, accept downsizing the number of Peshmarga forces or surrender weapons, as they do not trust the Baghdad administration. It is also significant to note here that the number of Kurds and Sunni Arabs in the Iraqi federal army and security forces have been decreased to less than 7 percent.

On October 20, 2017, the US called for direct negotiations between Baghdad and Erbil in order to deescalate the fighting. Prior to this, the KRG had already welcomed Abadi’s initiative for dialogue between the two parties, and had requested for the international community to help start such talks. However, just after the call from the US, an Iraqi court issued a decree to arrest Kosrat Rasul Ali, PUK’s acting General Secretary and the Deputy President of the KRG, on the ground that statements he made were provocative and against the safety of the Iraqi army. Kosrat had stated that the entrance of Shiite militias into disputed territories during the Kirkuk operation was an occupation and was the result of internal treason within the PUK.

In addition to the decree issued to arrest Ali, Abadi emphasized that negotiations will only take place between Baghdad and Erbil if the latter declare the referendum results null and void. More, the Iraqi prime minister asked for the surrender of all the international crossing gates, which the KRG still controls. It is worth noting here that the KRG leadership could not afford to conform to such a request. However, on 25 October, Masoud Barzani issued an order freezing the results of the referendum and expressed readiness to negotiate with Baghdad on the basis of the constitution. Therefore, on 20 November Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court declared that the Kurdish independence referendum “was unconstitutional and the results void.” This further strengthened Baghdad’s hand in a stand-off with the KRG.

Abadi welcomed the court ruling and called on Kurdish authorities to respect the constitution. His government described the court decision as “further vindication” of its “constitutional position.” While the KRG under Nechirvan Barzani has not declared whether they will accept or reject the ruling, N. Barzani himself has condemned the process, claiming that the court made its decision “unilaterally and without the presence of Kurdish representatives.” In addition, Masoud Barzani described the Federal court’s decision as biased and politically motivated.

In spite of all developments, the US and EU member states maintain their pressure on Abadi in order to begin negotiations with the N. Barzani administration and for the end to any further military operations. On November 24, 2017, the Iraqi government prevented a planned visit of the German Foreign Minister to Erbil. This caused Germany to cancel the visit to Iraq.

It can be argued that there are two distinct reasons for why Abadi is maintaining a firm stand on the KRG: firstly, Abadi is concerned that he may be perceived as too soft on the issue of Kurdish separatism and secondly, in preparation for the national elections in May 2018, the prime minister plans to run on a separate platform from that of an al-Maliki’s State of Law bloc, which he currently belongs to. Nevertheless, he is also well aware of the existing fragile and vulnerable political condition of the KRG, which has been brought about by the Kirkuk Operation.

Although Masoud Barzani remains as president of the KDP and is playing a consultative, though not insignificant role to Nechirvan Barzani, his career as a “national” leader seems to have come to an end. Thus, as Abadi continues to build his authority in the country, relations between the Baghdad and KRG administrations have entered a new era in which the semi-independent status of the KRG has become something of the past. The much spoken about Kurdish ascendance in the Middle East has inevitably proved to be a mirage.

Following the military operation of the Iraqi Armed Forces in Kirkuk, the KRG leader Masoud Barzani described the withdrawal of the Peshmerga and the handover of Kirkuk to Baghdad as “treason.”

According to Rudaw English, in a televised address, Barzani said: “The Peshmerga and all the people of Kurdistan were stabbed in the back by a poisonous dagger.”

On October 16, Iraqi forces took over Kirkuk from Kurdish elements, which also gave the Baghdad administration control of oil wells in the disputed territory.

Following these developments, on Sunday President Barzani announced that he would not participate in the upcoming November 1 Presidential elections.

A letter read out for the President during the regional government’s parliamentary session stated: “As a Peshmerga, I will continue at the service of our people; I refuse to get any extension and will not continue in this position; law should not be amended for me.”

Aydin Maruf, a parliamentary member from the Iraqi-Turkmen Front, told Anadolu Agency that following a voting process it was later agreed to transfer the presidential duties of Masoud Barzani to the parliament and the Council of Justice.

Maruf also stated that the KRG’s Presidential Council had been abolished.

Earlier on Saturday evening, senior assistant to Barzani, Hemin Hawrami tweeted: “President Barzani called for Parliament / Presidential elections on 12/7 to be held on November 1. Parliament extended its work for two seasons.”

After the vote, a group of people stormed the regional parliament building, firing shots in the air as they made their way inside.

The group, which claimed to be supporters of Barzani’s KDP, chanted slogans in favor of Barzani and hurled stones at the Parliament building.

Following the Kurdish independence referendum, political and economic sanctions have been imposed on the Masoud Barzani administration. On the basis of protecting Iraq’s territorial integrity, regional and international governments rejected the referendum, except Israel.

While the central Iraqi administration announced repeatedly that they do not recognize the referendum and interpreted it as a violation of the constitution, last week Iraqi forces entered Kirkuk amid the withdrawal of Peshmerga forces.

Successfully taking over Kirkuk, which has been a “disputed territory” and under the control of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces since 2014, Baghdad recently announced that they have sent reinforcement officers to Kirkuk in order to secure oil facilities in the northern city.

Speaking to Anadolu Agency, a local police officer, Capt. Hamed al-Obaidi stated that “Large police troops were dispatched to Kirkuk oil fields as part of a plan to secure oil facilities there.”

Al-Obaidi also confirmed that the Iraqi army will leave the task of securing the oil fields in Kirkuk to the police.

KRG welcomes US call for ceasefire

In response to the ongoing clashes in Iraq, especially since the referendum and the takeover of Kirkuk, the US State Department has called for both sides to cease violence.

On Friday State dept spokeswoman Heather Nauert stated that “The United States is concerned by reports of violent clashes around the town of Altun Kupri in northern Iraq,” adding that the US welcomed Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi’s instruction to federal forces to protect Iraqi Kurdish citizens and not to provoke them.

In response, the KRG welcomed this statement and in a statement claimed it was “ready to cooperate with an international coalition led by the US to support a ceasefire between Peshmerga and Iraqi forces.”

The KRG also added that it welcomed negotiations with Baghdad within the framework of the Iraqi constitution but without any preconditions.

While the loss of Kirkuk and oil fields in the province have been a major loss for the KRG, many have interpreted the KRG’s positive reaction to a ceasefire as a political weakness – such that calls for resignations have been made.

Calls for Barzani to resign

On Sunday The Kurdish Movement for Change (Gorran) Party called on President Barzani and Vice President Kosrat Rasul to resign from their posts.

Speaking at a news conference party spokesman Shorsh Haji stated: “They have to resign from their posts. At the same time, the Cabinet should also be abolished.”

Calling for the formation of a “national salvation government,” Haji added: “Our people have lost many of their achievements which they gained shedding their blood. Peshmerga [fighters] lost their grandeur. We lost many friendly countries. The reason for all of this is due to the failures of the party in power.”

While the Iraqi central administration and other regional and international actors have spoken out against the Kurdish independence referendum that was held on September 25 in KRG-controlled areas, different institutions within Iraq have diverged on their mutual stance on this issue.

On Wednesday an Iraqi court issued an arrest warrant for the head and members of the election commission responsible for the independence referendum.

Spokesperson for the High Judicial Council, Abdulstar Bayraqdar stated that “The Rusafa Investigation Court has issued an arrest warrant for the head and members of the commission who supervised the referendum in the Kurdistan region.”

He said that the warrant was issued after the National Security Council “filed a lawsuit arguing that the referendum was contrary to the decision of the High Federal Court.”

While an arrest warrant has been issued for the head and members of the election commission, Iraq’s Federal Court rejected a parliamentary request to rule on whether or not the participation of Iraqi Kurdish MPs in the poll violated the Constitution.

The Court issued a statement underlining that “The court is not competent to deliver a verdict – or give an advisory opinion – in this regard.”

“We have therefore dismissed the request [by parliament] as the issue remains outside our jurisdiction.”

Baghdad insists on the cancellation of the referendum

Following the independence referendum, while the Baghdad administration have emphasized they will not negotiate with Erbil unless the referendum vote is cancelled, the Kurdistan Regional Government administration insist they are ready for dialogue with Baghdad “without any preconditions.”

In a statement published by the KRG’s official website, the Kurdish administration also said that the sanctions imposed by the Iraqi central government in retaliation to the referendum were “unconstitutional” and that exacerbating tensions would benefit nobody.

After the referendum Baghdad banned all international flights to KRG-controlled areas and closed all foreign diplomatic missions based in the region

Following the Kurdish independence referendum which took place on September 25, where residents in KRG-controlled areas were asked whether they wanted to separate from Baghdad, tensions have escalated between Erbil and the central Iraqi administration.

While the results of the referendum have been announced as 93 percent in favor, the Iraqi administration have repeatedly underlined that they do not recognize the result as it is an infringement on the Iraqi Constitution.

In addition to the central Iraqi administration, Turkey, Iran and the US have openly opposed the referendum, calling for the territorial integrity of Iraq.

In most recent developments, Prime Minister al-Abadi emphasized that “The central government is solely authorized to provide security in disputed areas [of Iraq].”

While according to Iraq’s 2005 Constitution, Kurdish Peshmerga forces are answerable to the central government in Baghdad, on the ground they take their orders from the Kurdistan Regional Government.

In regards to this, Al-Abadi said “I urge Peshmerga forces deployed in these areas to refrain from fighting federal government forces.”

Gold and oil: economic limits on the KRG

Increasing political and economic sanctions on the KRG following the independence vote, on Tuesday Iraqi authorities banned the import of gold and other precious metals through airports in the northern region.

Iraq Planning Ministry spokesman Abdul Zohra al-Hendawi stated that “The ministry’s economic committee has decided that, from now on, only Iraq’s Baghdad and Najaf airports will be used for the import of gold and other precious metals.”

He added that the decision was made in order to prevent the “illegal import” of gold into the country.

In addition, Turkey’s government is considering the decision they will take on whether to continue the KRG’s oil transfer through Turkey.

Speaking at the 8^th Turkey Energy Summit, Energy Ministry Undersecretary Fatih Donmez stated that while no decision has yet been made, the issue is currently on the agenda and is being examined.

He asserted that “We will decide on our stance based on instructions from the [Turkish] government. As of today, there is no decision yet, although this does not mean that there will not be one.”

Oil is a main asset of the KRG, and the regional government has enjoyed close ties with Ankara by using a pipeline stretching from northern Iraq to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan in order to export oil.

However, following the independence referendum relations between Turkey and the KRG have deteriorated.

On September 25 Iraqis residing in KRG-controlled areas in northern Iraq voted on whether to declare independence from Iraq.

While the referendum result was announced as 93% in favor, the international community criticized the Kurdistan Regional Government for holding the referendum. Only Israel has openly supported the initiative.

Following the referendum and following the death of former President Jalal Talabani, President of the KRG, Masoud Barzani called for dialogue between Baghdad and Erbil in order to solve issues with the central government.

“We will work to solve problems and differences with Baghdad through dialogue,” Barzani told reporters after he laid a blanket of flowers on the tomb of the former Iraqi President.

“We hope that Talabani’s death will be a chance for rapprochement between all political parties in the Kurdish region,” Barzani said.

Deal ‘non-binding’

Following calls from the KRG, on Saturday Barzani met with Allawi and al-Nujaifi in Sulaimaniyah for talks aimed at easing tension between the two administrations.

According to a statement released from Barzani’s office, the three leaders agreed on starting dialogue between Erbil and Baghdad in order to “calm the tense atmosphere” following the independence referendum.

The three also supposedly agreed on carrying out talks with an open agenda, agreed on lifting sanctions on Erbil and launching meetings between the two administrations as soon as possible.

While Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi called for the KRG to cancel the illegitimate referendum results, claiming that this is the only way talks between Baghdad and Erbil will begin, on Sunday the Iraqi Parliament also decided that an agreement reached between Barzani and Vice-President Ayad Allawi and Osama al-Nujaifi were not binding.

Saad al-Hadithi, a spokesman for the Prime Minister’s Office said in a statement that “the Iraqi administration will not recognize anything violating our Constitution and the attitude of the central government has not changed.”

The Kurdish independence referendum, initiated by Masoud Barzani in northern Iraq, has occupied the political agenda for a long while.

On September 25 Iraqis in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) controlled areas were asked whether they wanted to declare independence from Iraq.

While the result of the referendum has been announced to be 93% in favour of independence, the international community, including the UN, US, Turkey and Iran refuse to accept the result.

Deeming the referendum as illegitimate, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has once again claimed that it is not too late for the KRG to resolve the issue.

He insisted that the KRG should take necessary initiatives in order to cancel the result of the referendum “within the given time.”

He added: “If necessary steps are taken within that time, then ok, but if not, then the demands and steps [made by] the Iraqi administration will be an important criteria for us.”

While the referendum in northern Iraq has received worldwide criticism, Turkey’s presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin confirmed that Turkey’s objection was to the illegitimate referendum held by the KRG “not against the Kurdish people.”

During a live television interview, Kalin was also asked about President Erdogan’s visit to Iran.

Kalin confirmed that “We are on the same page with Iran on that issue [KRG referendum]. Protecting Iraq’s territorial integrity is not a thing that Turkey and Iran agree on. Practically the whole world thinks the same.”

Speaking at a joint news conference with his Iranian counterpart Hassan Rouhani in Tehran, Erdogan said: “What is the referendum organized by northern Iraq’s regional administration for? No country in the world apart from Israel recognizes it.”

Colonialist ambitions in the Middle East

In further comments regarding the independence referendum, President Erdogan said on Thursday that global colonialist groups were deploying the “divide and rule” strategy in the region.

During a meeting in Ankara the President said: “Our ancient geography has been going through a tough, painful and unsteady period in which the cards are being reshuffled and the maps are being reshaped.”

“Exactly like the past century, the motto for this century is ‘divide and rule.’ This strategy has been implemented successfully by global colonialist groups for many years.”

Further, he claimed that the purpose of this strategy was to divide Syria and Iraq along ethnic and sectarian lines in order to surround the south of Turkey.

In reference to the September 25 referendum, the President said: “Nothing has finished, everything has just started.”

Adding that an air embargo has been imposed on the Kurdish region, Erdogan stated that: “You have Iran on one side, Turkey in the north, Iraqi government in the south and Syria in the west. What will you do? Where will you go? How will you get out?”

“Who is giving advice to you? You have only Israel backing you. You put the former French foreign minister on your right and a Jewish Zionist on your left, and are working together on a table. They are not your friends… They are with you today and will disappear tomorrow.”

Source: AA and other agencies

In spite of calls from various leaders all over the world, including Erdogan, Trump, and French President Macron, the KRG President Masoud Barzani chose to go ahead with the independence referendum.

The voters in KRG-held areas vote today, Monday 25 September, on whether to secede from Iraq.

As the vote continues to take place, Iraq Parliament’s speaker Salim al-Jubouri has made it clear that the results of the Kurdish referendum will not be legally binding.

Highlighting the intention of protecting Iraq’s territorial integrity, in a statement Jubouri said that “We [the Baghdad administration] are keen on keeping the Kurds in our homeland.”

Further, he stated that “The unity of Iraq is our main concern and we will not give it up,” going on to blame “wrong policies” for the current state of tension.

Against claims made by Barzani, Jubouri said that “the referendum will affect the upcoming election and will drag the country in a new phase.”

Iran closes border with Northern Iraq

The Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has also come out strong against the referendum, stating that Iraq has his country’s full support for actions necessary to preserve its unity.

According to a written statement by Iraq’s Prime Minister’s office, during a phone call with PM Haider Al-Abadi, Rouhani “stressed his country’s full support for the Iraqi government and all its steps that had taken to preserve Iraq’s unity and territorial integrity.”

“Al-Abadi affirmed the Iraqi government’s efforts to complete the liberation of all Iraqi territory from Daesh’s terrorist gangs, which is a priority for them.”

The statement continued: “Al-Abadi stressed the government’s clear stance to prevent unilateral and unconstitutional procedures that threaten the unity of Iraq, peaceful coexistence among the people of the country, rejection of the referendum and will not deal with its results.”

Following this phone call, the Foreign Ministry of Iran has announced that it has closed its border with northern Iraq’s Kurdish region on Monday.

A day earlier, Tehran ended flights between the territories.

During a news conference in Tehran, Ministry spokesman Behram Qasimi said that “At the request of Iraq, we have closed the airspace and ground borders with the Kurdish Regional Government.”

Iraq has lately been the focal point of world politics due to the discussions regarding the Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum, which has been urged by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Apparently, no country in the region other than Israel supports the referendum. Iraqi Kurdistan President, Masoud Barzani’s insistence on holding the referendum has even played a role in converging Ankara, Baghdad and Tehran administrations.

While it is more than natural for the referendum to be discussed within Turkish media circles due to the territorial proximity with Iraq, the discussions conducted often go too far as policy recommendations that will strain Turkey are made. Within these discussions many facts are distorted and this unavoidably leads to growing confusion within the public. Due to this reason, it is crucial to clearly answer and understand the question as to what Turkey desires and expects from Iraq.

First, the leading subject matter Turkey pays attention to within its Iraq policy is preventing the outlawed PKK and other terror groups from using the country’s territory. The fundamental reason for Ankara’s close interest in Iraq is due to the country’s failure to ensure security within its own territory and its failure to prevent the PKK’s deployment in northern Iraq. Maintaining a successful fight against the PKK within its own borders, Turkey primarily confronts Iraqi territory when it concentrates on cutting off the external sources of the terrorist organization.

As Baghdad and Arbil cannot or do not impede Qandil’s employment as the PKK headquarters, where the terror attacks against Turkey have been plotted for years, the PKK aspires to expand its domain to Sinjar by taking advantage of the upheaval stirred by Daesh. The PKK’s rising influence in Iraqi territory inevitably increases Turkey’s interest in the country. If the PKK seizes territory in Iraq or Syria, Turkey’s fight against the terror group will have a poor chance to succeed. Therefore, Ankara’s fight against the PKK begins from Iraqi and Syrian territories and extends to as far as Germany, Belgium and even the United States.

The second most important aspect of Turkey’s Iraq policy is the protection of the country’s territorial integrity. Considering the current Iraqi Constitution, it can be stated that the KRG’s insistence on independence is far from being rational. This is due to the fact that the KRG is quite influential in the country’s administration, as it rules federated areas with its autonomous parliament and government and has its own armed forces. This venture Barzani has undertaken in order to guarantee the political future of his own family, as he is cornered in domestic politics, is likely to bring a series of devastating consequences to the entire Middle East. Therefore, Ankara objects to the independence referendum to avert such a ravage.

http://thenewturkey.org/the-kurdish-quest-for-independence-in-iraq-and-its-repercussions-for-turkey-and-the-region/

Moreover, the third important feature of Turkey’s Iraq policy is the protection of Iraq’s independence. This goal means objecting to turning the Baghdad government into a puppet controlled by Tehran or Washington. The Iraqi government’s increasing reliance on the United States or Iran leads to developments that upsets the delicate balance between Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens in the country, and certainly leaves the country in constant chaos. The uprising of Sunni Arabs and the subsequent rise of Daesh following the extreme Iran-focused policies of the Maliki period can be drawn as a reflective example to this.

In addition, guaranteeing the rights of Turkmens is another subject Turkey attaches importance to as part of its Iraq policy. The Turkmens in Iraq regard Turkey as a guarding power regardless of their sects, which lays an extra burden on Ankara.

The final objective that stands out in Turkey’s Iraq policy is sustaining and improving economic cooperation with the country. During the tenure of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) governments, the approach that lays emphasis on economic cooperation in the context of relations with other countries, especially neighbors, has also been effective in the relations with Iraq. In this framework, Iraq has become Turkey’s third largest export market. Considering that a great deal of this export is made to the KRG region, it becomes more understandable that Ankara would not wish to jeopardize its relations with the Arbil administration. However, due to the above-stated security concerns, the main determinants of Turkey’s Iraq policy have inevitably been the PKK question and Iraq’s territorial integrity.

The proposed independence referendum by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is due to take place on Sept 25 regardless of criticism by regional and other governments.

Residents in provinces controlled by the KRG are due to vote on independence from Baghdad.

The oil-rich province of Kirkuk is among the contested areas where the vote is planned.

In light of all developments, last week Iraqi lawmakers voted to remove Kirkuk’s renegade governor, Najmiddin Karim, from office.

The parliamentary vote was based on a request by Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi.

In response, Kirkuk’s provincial council condemned the decision and council head Ribwar al-Talabani stated that “Karim was elected and confirmed in his position by the provincial council and only the council has the authority to remove him.”

Despite the parliamentary decision, Karim is yet to leave office.

The parliamentary vote was prompted by an August 29 decision by Kirkuk’s provincial council to include the disputed province in the referendum.

The decision triggered an uproar in Bagdad and calls by Iraqi politicians and MPs to remove Karim from office.

Further in relation to the referendum, on Monday, the Supreme Court of Iraq ruled to suspend all activities related to the referendum until it could determine the poll’s constitutionality.

Meanwhile, KRG leader Masoud Barzani has stated that a “yes” vote would not initiate an automatic declaration of independence but would lead to further negotiations with Baghdad.

Barzani insists on referendum

Regardless of calls from Turkey and the US to postpone the referendum, Barzani has said that the poll will not be postponed unless a viable alternative is conformed.

The referendum on Kurdish regional independence will not be postponed unless Baghdad can offer an “alternative arrangement” that would also guarantee the rights of the region’s Kurds, Barzani said on Tuesday.

President Trump has called for negotiations between Baghdad and the KRG, which he claimed the US would lead.

Speaking at a campaign rally in the city of Soran in northern Iraq’s Erbil province, Barzani said the poll’s primary goal was to “show the world that we want independence.”

“We are open to hearing alternatives [to the referendum],” he said. “But in the absence of any such alternatives, the planned [Sept. 25] referendum is set to go forward.”

Barzani stressed during his speech that the KRG’s problem was not with the international community but with Baghdad, and therefore the referendum could not be postponed unless Baghdad reach an alternative.

However, he added, any such alternative arrangement “would have to be guaranteed by the international community, including the U.S. and the EU.”

He went on to give Baghdad “two or three days” in which to propose an alternative scenario.

“Otherwise,” he continued, “we will head to the polls on Sept. 25.”

“Erbil wants independence,” Barzani declared, “not ministerial portfolios or budget allocations.”