Saudi authorities have recently arrested eight human rights defenders who were supporting the women activists whose trial was widely condemned by international human rights groups. This development came at a time when the Saudi leadership initiated a supposedly reform process, which aims to “transform” the country into a more liberal and open-democratic political and social setting. However, many observers have criticized this process and claim that the real motivation behind the reform movement was different.

Saudi Arabia has been seeking some form of reform movement for decades. As the social fabric and popular demands have been under transformation in the country, different segments of society have sought for a new kind of regime. For many years, those demands were neglected by Saudi authorities who were in favor of the status quo. Two important developments challenged this already existing picture.

The 9/11 attacks was the first development in this regard. As 15 of the 19 terrorists who took part in the attack were Saudi citizens, the country came under heavy pressure by Western states. Despite various demands, the Saudi authorities did not deepen the investigation of those who participated in the attacks. But, in order to overcome the pressure, Saudi Arabia initiated a reform program that aimed to decrease the role of religion in society and politics, and re-designed the country’s economy. The late King Abdullah allowed for women to vote and launched a number of reform initiatives in education, religion, and civil society.

For many years, reform demands were neglected by Saudi authorities who were in favor of the status quo. But two important developments challenged this picture.

The second development that forced Saudi Arabia to pursue reforms was the Arab revolutions of 2010. The protest movement that changed the status quo in the Middle East for good was perceived as a direct threat by Saudi Arabia for its regime’s survival. When King Salman came to power in 2015, he accelerated the reform movement in the country. This reform process witnessed its peak when Mohammad bin Salman rose to the most crucial positions in the Saudi state establishment. As a Crown Prince and the de facto ruler of the country, MbS made historical decisions that were initially presented as landmark reforms that could transform Saudi Arabia for good. With the help of a multi-dimensional PR campaign in the West, MbS was considered as the long-waited young man who will transform Saudi Arabia. And for a long time he was presented as such. A number of recent developments however, gave the impression that the real motivation behind the reforms initiated by MbS was different than what was being presented.

Therefore, the so-called reform process in Saudi Arabia has been re-evaluated by many observers. It is argued that the reforms in Saudi Arabia do not aim to establish a democratic country, but rather allows for Mohammad bin Salman to increase his grip on power. This can be seen from the authoritarian nature of reforms that have been in place for the past years. Critics argue that the reforms have been serving to restrict civil rights and liberties, let alone act in favor of them.

By publicizing the image of democratic reforms in the country, the Saudi administration aims to convince the international public that the rights and freedoms in the country have been expanded.

The first motivation of these reforms is to initiate a new economic opening that would allow Saudi Arabia’s ailing economy to foster. Despite its oil-based wealth, the Saudi economy has been facing challenges that threaten the country’s future financially. In order to overcome these problems, the Saudi leadership initiated the 2030 Vision program, which aims to diversify economic activities, including allowing women to work and to integrate the Saudi financial system to the global economy. The Saudi leadership took steps such as allowing women to drive, giving them priority in work places, protecting its citizens in the workforce, and encouraging foreign investment. Such reforms are made to contribute to the country’s economic condition rather than providing democratic rights to its citizens.

Another motivation for the reform movement is to prevent the increasing criticism of Saudi Arabia by international rights groups and Western governments. By publicizing the image of democratic reforms in the country, the Saudi administration aims to convince the international public that the rights and freedoms in the country have been expanded. These efforts have been heavily contested in the eyes of international observers.

What Saudi Arabia needs at this stage is to establish strong democratic institutions, enrich rights and freedoms, enhance civil liberties, and allow its citizens to express their opinion freely and follow a solid economic reform process.

A final reason behind the reforms of Saudi Arabia is to silence the Islamic opposition in the country. Religious figures in the country have been criticizing the regime’s decisions in many issues. This has created discomfort among the Saudi administration and therefore they decided to take action against those who criticize the regime. With those recent reforms, the Saudi leadership is trying to create a perception that the arrest and trial processes of the country’s leading religious figures are legitimate and that these decisions are of great importance for the future of the country. By offering a new and liberal understanding of Islam, the Riyadh administration also aims to create an image of a modern and reformist regime that distances itself from the so-called “radical interpretations” of Islam.

The reform initiatives led by Mohammad bin Salman do not aim to establish a genuine democratic regime in Saudi Arabia, but rather increase the authoritarian nature of the ruling class. It is widely believed that these reform packages will lead to a more authoritarian Saudi regime. What Saudi Arabia needs at this stage is to establish strong democratic institutions, enrich rights and freedoms, enhance civil liberties, and allow its citizens to express their opinion freely and follow a solid economic reform process. This will not only benefit Saudi Arabia, but will also benefit the greater Middle East.

Following his election to the U.S. presidency in late 2016, Donald Trump produced two political strategies towards the Middle East. The first one is the plan dubbed as the “deal of the century,” which aims to solve the Palestine-Israel conflict. Although this has not been made public, Trump has slowly been trying to implement this plan. The second is the Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative that has recently dominated the U.S. agenda towards the region.

In this context, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo held a meeting on September 28, 2018, with the participation of six countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the foreign ministers of Egypt and Jordan. After the meeting, it was stated that the U.S. administration would provide full support to the establishment of a Middle East Strategic Alliance consisting of GCC +2 countries in order to combat armed organizations in the Middle East, to bring peace in Syria and Yemen, and to stop the harmful activities of Iran. In the following period, the U.S. media reported that Trump had planned to hold a Washington Summit with the leaders of the GCC +2 countries on 12-13 October. However, this never happened.

The Jamal Khashoggi incident, which took place on October 2, determined the agenda of Middle East politics. A Saudi citizen and a columnist for the Washington Post, Khashoggi disappeared after he entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. This incident created a global reaction against the Saudi regime, which is believed to be behind what happened to Jamal. More, a serious campaign against Saudi Arabia began from many spheres in the U.S. and the cooperation between the Trump administration and Riyadh has been heavily criticized. These developments made a negative impact on Trump’s Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative, which already suffers from different structural problems.

The first of these problems is the crisis between Qatar and other Gulf neighbors, namely, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. In June 2017, these countries started a political and economic embargo against Qatar, which further deepened the crisis between countries in the region. The main reason for the rapid deterioration of the crisis is the harsh steps taken by Mohammad bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and Mohammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces. These policies increased the mistrust among the members of the GCC, and countries such as Oman and Kuwait have initially preferred to stay out of this anti-Qatar campaign. Both countries even criticized the Saudi and Emirati initiatives against Qatar. Therefore, it can be said that the unresolved Gulf crisis is the main obstacle for Washington’s Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative.

Another disagreement among the members of the GCC is the different attitudes taken in regards to Iran. While Saudi Arabia has been the champion of demonizing Iran, countries like Qatar and Oman have not pursued hostile policies. In fact, Oman has maintained good relations with Iran for many years and has signed numerous deals with the Tehran administration, especially in the field of energy. During the past few years, Oman has not criticized Iranian involvement in the civil war in Yemen and this attitude of Muscat has further angered the regime in Riyadh.

Another dispute among the Gulf Cooperation Council members has been taking place between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The disagreements between the two countries have increased in recent years. The first of these disputes is the status of the Khafji oil field, which the two countries jointly used for many years. However, due to the number of disagreements between the two, Saudi Arabia suspended its oil production, forcing Kuwait to do the same. Since then, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have failed to reach a consensus on the solution of this problem.

The second dispute surrounds the embargo on Qatar. Kuwait’s mediation efforts during the embargo on Doha were not accepted by Riyadh or Abu Dhabi. It is noted that Riyadh in particular failed to take a step for the solution of these problems. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s failure to address these issues, which were planned to be discussed during his visit on October 1, 2018, indicates that the Saudi administration has followed an uncertain policy in relations with Kuwait.

Another issue that hinders Trump’s Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative is Egypt’s reluctant attitude. Initial signs of Cairo’s reluctance in joining Saudi Arabia’s efforts to counter Iran was seen during Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen. The Egyptian army did not provide full-scale support to the operation, leading to a temporary crisis between Riyadh and Cairo. Egypt has also followed a different path from Saudi Arabia in Syria. The Sisi regime had multiple meetings with Bashar Assad and further engaged in military and intelligence cooperation with Damascus. Additionally, Sisi’s close relations with Russia is another sign of Egypt’s reluctance to join a U.S.-led campaign as Cairo aims to follow a balanced policy between Russia and the U.S.

One of the most important obstacles in establishing an Arab alliance against Iran is the possible discomfort of the Shiite population living in these states. The Shiites living in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait, would be alienated from such an alliance and from the U.S. policy to encourage a sectarian divide.

Future of the Middle East Strategic Alliance Project initiated by U.S. President Donald Trump is vague and doubtful. The future of the Trump administration in U.S. politics, the process of political transformation in the region and the deepening of the political divisions between the Gulf countries can be stated as the most important obstacles of this project.

The most striking feature of the Brunson case is that the U.S. has resisted to understand Turkey’s new foreign policy, and this led to a crisis between the two countries. Just to remind the reader, American Pastor Andrew C. Brunson has been kept under arrest for almost two years with the accusation of aiding terrorist groups such as the PKK. He was put on trial, found guilty and was condemned to a three year plus imprisonment by the Turkish courts.

U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President Mike Pence claimed earlier that he had been innocent and expressed that he had to be released immediately. The language adopted in those statements bore a degree of threat and was disrespectful to the Turkish judicial system. That’s why Turkish officials have criticized President Trump and Vice President Pence for not showing patience and being disrespectful to the judicial process after the release of the pastor. They underlined that Turkey is a country where the rule of law is shown due respect. In fact, the issue was more than being about the rule of law, it is more of respecting Turkey’s sovereignty and recognizing its new international status.

The Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi’s probable murder in the Saudi Arabia Consulate in Istanbul also points to the same problem. It is clear that the Saudi crown prince Mohammad Bin Salman ordered the killing of Mr. Khashoggi on account of his critical stance towards the Saudi regime. Regarding the very close and special relations between Prince Salman and President Trump’s son-in-law and senior envoy to the Middle East Jared Kushner, it is not hard to guess that the U.S. was closely following the issue and was informed that Mr. Khashoggi was ordered to be killed. Choosing Istanbul as the location for this outrageous act, which directly defies the norms of international politics, does not seem to be random. It has been rightly put forward by some analysts that the purpose of this unfortunate act of killing was not just to get rid of an opponent of the Saudi regime but to get Turkey involved into this unfortunate incident and to violate its sovereignty.

Combining these two recent incidents with the Trump administration’s supply of heavy weapons and diplomatic protection to the Syrian branch of PKK (YPG) and its unabashed and militant foreign policy towards Palestine and Jerusalem, one can conclude that the U.S. shows no respect to Turkey’s security concerns and sovereign rights. More to the point, the Trump administration fails to understand Turkey’s new foreign policy doctrine. Turkey has been following a revisionist foreign policy for a couple of years. It has been seeking adjustments in the existing distribution of power in its region and in the international system in general.

Turkey’s current Syrian policy and its call for reforming international institutions such as the UN Security Council on the basis of new international realities can be given as examples to this revisionist turn in Turkish foreign policy. Despite that these are defensive policies, since they were put into action after Turkey came under attack by terrorist groups and its long-term allies, they manifest the desire for change in international politics.

The U.S.’s uncompromising posture pushes Turkey towards more activism in its foreign policy. President Erdogan has just vowed to eliminate all the YPG militants in Manbij and cleanse off the region from the terrorist elements located in the east of the Euphrates river. This would be a punch in the face to the YPG (and also to the U.S.) who has already suffered a terrible loss in the Operation Oil Branch in Afrin. After that done Turkey would secure the control of all its southern border with Syria and become a more powerful actor in Syrian politics and in the region in general.

As long as the U.S. clings to its current policy of disrespecting Turkey’s sovereignty and supporting its enemies, this will get Turkey to feel more insecure and as a result it will accelerate its policy of defensive expansion in its vicinity. The Trump administration has to find a better policy to be able to contain Turkey. Supporting the YPG, giving unconditional support to Israel, disrespecting Turkey’s sovereignty and opening an economic war have so far backfired. Turkey has grown more powerful.

Repressive regimes in the Middle East often practice various methods to silence the dissent. One of these increasingly utilized methods is “enforced disappearance.” Enforced disappearance is defined in the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance as “the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State.” Article 5 of the Treaty labels enforced disappearance as a “crime against humanity” and urges all signatory states to prevent such actions.

Jamal Khashoggi: A silenced Saudi journalist

A recent example of such a case took place at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Jamal Khashoggi, a prominent Saudi journalist and influential figure in Saudi Arabia, disappeared after he entered the Consulate General of Saudi Arabia. It’s widely argued that the Saudi administration might have played a role in the disappearance of the journalist, who is also a columnist for the Washington Post. In an attempt to divert against the backlash, in an interview he gave, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman stated, “the Saudi government have no information on the whereabouts of Jamal Khashoggi.”

Those who followed the incident however, claim that the Saudi regime is responsible for Khashoggi’s disappearance. Some even fear that Khashoggi may have been a victim of an unsolved murder. This case has created international outrage as the journalist has close relations with influential figures in world politics. There have been a number of numerous calls from state representatives, media organizations, and human rights campaigners for the immediate release of Khashoggi, and Turkey has begun an official state investigation.

If the Saudi government is responsible for the disappearance of Jamal Khashoggi, this event can be accepted as a case of enforced disappearance. However, even if it is so, a sanction would not be possible for Saudi Arabia in the context of international conventions, as the Kingdom is not a signatory of the Convention for the Protection of All Persons, just like other countries in the region, including Egypt.

Enforced disappearance cases in Egypt

Egypt has kept the lead in the Middle East with the most cases of “enforced disappearances” during the past couple of years. After the military coup in 2013, the Sisi regime targeted activists and dissent that opposed the military regime. In many cases, the regime directly arrested opposition figures on claims of supporting terrorist organizations, spreading false news, and supposedly threatening public order. In other cases, a number of activists disappeared without the knowledge of anyone, including their families and lawyers. In these cases, the missing person is usually found in prison – usually months after their “enforced disappearance.”

One of the most horrendous events in this regard took place in 2016. Italian citizen and PhD candidate at Cambridge University, Giulio Regeni, disappeared in Cairo on January 25, 2016. 9 days later, he was found dead with signs of heavy torture. Although the Egyptian security authorities took no responsibility for his death, human rights campaigners and the family of Regeni claimed that the regime was responsible for his death.

These enforced disappearance cases in Egypt showed a rapid increase especially after the military coup in 2013. According to a report by the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms, at least 378 people disappeared in-between August 2016 and August 2017. The total number of disappeared persons since 2013 would go well beyond 1000. In many cases, the government initially denies having any information on the whereabouts of the person that has disappeared. However, most of the people reported missing are usually found in prison weeks or even months later. Some of them, though, have never been found.

The practice of “enforced disappearance,” which has been employed by countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, against the dissidents of the regime, is against human rights and is considered a crime against humanity under international law. Therefore, both human rights campaigners and the international community have to put pressure on governments that practice “enforced disappearance” as a method of silencing the dissent.

Jordan had experienced minimum level of protests during the Arab uprisings that started in late 2010. The regime of King Abdullah had utilized strategies that allowed him to keep his regime alive despite the regional turmoil. In the early days of 2011 protests, the main allies of King Abdullah were the Hashemite and Christian communities in the country. Strong support from powerful elites of these communities caused marginalization of protesters. As a result, civilians who went to the streets for protests lost their popular and intellectual support. In the following period, it was not a difficult task for the security forces to disperse the protesters. At the political stage, King Abdullah removed the cabinet and implemented a number of reforms to appease protesters.

However, the following years witnessed the continuation of chronic problems in the country. Human rights issues remained source of discomfort for the public, and problems regarding political participation, civil society, and freedom of expression have continued. The reform requests in these fields were not met by the regime.

The economy was another source of disappointment for the public in Jordan. While unemployment has reached 18%, the country’s debt currently represents 96% of its GDP. Decreasing foreign aid has recently forced the Jordanian government to ask the International Monetary Union (IMF) for fresh credit. Following the agreement in 2016, the IMF requested a number of reforms from the government. As part of these reforms, Amman has recently decided to increase income tax and raised prices in a number of products such as oil and electricity by 5.5 % and 19 %.

The downturn of the economy, discontent of the poor and the government’s austerity measures have forced Jordanians to protest against the bad management of the economy. On May 2018, thousands of protesters went to the streets in the capital Amman and other cities to protest the economic conditions in the country. Mainly syndicates and labour unions in many sectors organized the protests. In the following days, there were calls for a general strike in which thousands of professionals such as doctors, dentists, bankers and journalists participated. Following the demonstrations and strikes, King Abdullah took Prime Minister Hani al-Mulki from office and appointed Omar Al-Razzaz, who was Minister of Education and had previously worked in the World Bank. Despite the government reshuffle, the protesters seemed determined to continue until their demands were fully met.

The protests in Jordan are another disturbance for the King Abdullah leadership, who is also experiencing problems in foreign policy. Despite the conflicts in neighboring regions such as Syria, Iraq and Palestine, Jordan is known for its relatively stable political and economic structure. However, particularly during the past year, King Abdullah has been facing challenges with regards to its relations with traditional allies. Jordan’s hesitance in joining the Saudi-led political campaign against Qatar caused disappointment for Riyadh. Jordan has also hinted that it can have better relations with Iran and may develop a strategic partnership with Turkey.

Another reason for the tension between Jordan and Saudi Arabia is the Palestine issue. While Saudi Arabia, the United States and Israel have been joining their efforts and perspectives in dealing with the crisis, Jordan chose not to stay on the table anymore. Around two thirds of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian origin, and there are thousands of Palestinian refugees living in the country. This makes Jordanian population as a natural supporter for the Palestinian cause. Therefore, it is almost impossible for the King Abdullah leadership to join the Saudi-U.S.-Israel alliance. For this reason, Muhammad bin Salman, the de facto leader of Saudi Arabia, now considers Jordan as a burden.

King Abdullah’s response to young crown prince in Saudi Arabia came in the last days of 2017, with the decision of removing his two brothers and one cousin from the important ranks in the Jordanian security establishment. The reason for this decision was a Saudi initiated coup attempt in which two brothers and a cousin of King Abdullah would be involved. This development has been one of the turning points in Saudi Arabia and Jordanian relations.

Considering the recent developments, it can be predicted that Jordan will have to face more serious challenges in the coming period. Its economic problems will continue to exist as the country needs external support, the new political setting in the region will put more pressure on King Abdullah’s regime. As the region will focus more on the Palestinian issue, it will also bring Jordan on the spotlight in regional politics.

For many years, Saudi Arabia has followed a passive foreign policy under the security umbrella of the United States. The Arab revolutions, however, changed this traditional foreign policy attitude of the Saudi regime. This situation became more visible especially after Selman bin Abdelaziz’s rise to power in 2015. The latest sign of this transformation is Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MbS) month-long tour to Egypt, the U.K., U.S., and France.

During the past year, MbS was busy with eliminating domestic actors that could potentially pose a threat to his power. Following his appointment on June 21, 2017, as Crown Prince, MbS became the most influential actor in Saudi politics. As part of this objective, in September 2017, MbS ordered the arrest of about 30 religious scholars who could become an obstacleto his planned reforms. A similar process was applied to the powerful political and business actors in the country. In November 2017, at least 500 princes, bureaucrats andbusinessmen were taken into custody at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in Riyadh. Following these operations, MbS made it clear to all parties that he is the most powerful actor in the country.

In the following period, MbS began to focus on foreign policy, which is another instrument that he employs in order to strengthen his rule. His first visit as Crown Prince was scheduled to Egypt, the country that depended on Saudi cash flow in the post-2013 military coup. During the visit, MbS mainly gave symbolic messages. He visited the leader of the Coptic Church Pope Shenouda III and attended a theatre performance at Cairo Opera House. Another symbolic importance of the visit was the decision of Egypt’s High Court that had given the final approval to transfer the Tiran and Sanafir Islands to Saudi Arabia. Finally, MbSand Egyptian leader Abdalfattah Al-Sisi also agreed on a new $16 billion investment fund that would help boost bilateral trade and investment.

During his second trip, MbS visited Britain and sought to garner support from political actors in the U.K. MbS continued to expand his cooperation with British partners as both countries signed agreements worth billions of U.S. dollars. In one such agreement, Saudi Arabia ordered 48 Typhoon war jets worth about $10 billion from Great Britain. Bin Salman was also welcomed by Queen Elizabeth at Buckingham Palace.

MbS’s next visit was to the U.S., where he spent 3 weeks. During his stay, Bin Salman met with several senior officials, most notably U.S. President Donald Trump, and also met with leading actors in political circles, the business community, media and civil society.

The first objective of this visit can be stated as developing cooperation between Riyadh and Washington. This was especially observed during the press release that Trump made with Bin Salman. Trump shared pictures of 12.5 billion dollars worth aircraft and other defense industry products that were ordered by Saudi Arabia. He proudly emphasized that due to these orders, thousands of people in the U.S. will keep their jobs. This attitude of Trump was interpreted as his perception of Saudi Arabia as a “cash machine” rather than a strategic ally.

Another important reason for MbS’s visit can be stated as improving the negative image of his country, especially in the eyes of the U.S. public. During the past couple of years, the Saudi leadership has tried to change this perception, particularly on the international level. MbS initiated further reforms that would help to create a better image for the country throughout the world. MbS also hinted that the Saudi regime would distance itself from the Wahhabi ideology as the Crown Prince confessed that the U.S. initiated the idea of Wahhabism during the Cold War in order to block Socialist ideology from spreading across the region.

The final dimension of MbS’s visit to the U.S. is the economy. With its petroleum-based economy, Riyadh aimed at diversifying its economic landscape. For this reason, it is of great importance for the Saudi regime to welcome investors that can contribute to the economic well being of the Kingdom. In order to discuss business opportunities, bin Salman met with prominent business and media figures such as Michael Bloomberg, Bill Gates, Masayoshi Son, Elon Musk, Thomas Friedman, Rupert Murdoch and Henry Kissinger. Another group which Mohammad bin Salman visited was the Israeli lobby in the U.S. MbS met with the representatives of the most powerful Israeli lobby organizations such as AIPAC, Anti-Defamation League, and the American Jewish Committee. These meetings can be interpreted as Saudi Arabia’s commitment to establishing strong relations with Israel in both regional and global politics.

Mohammad bin Salman’s final visit was to France where he met with President Emmanuel Macron. Both politicians announced the strategic partnership between the two countries.

It is obvious that Mohammad bin Salman’s Saudi Arabia will continue to become an active and interventionist regional player with strong support from international actors. The country will also continue to employ hard power capabilities in partnership with its regional allies such as the UAE, Egypt and Israel. This process will further accelerate with the rise of Mohammad bin Salman to the top position in the country, a process that will most probably be completed in the near future.