Selahattin Demirtaş Archives - Politics Today

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Demirtas later made a public statement in Diyarbakir three days after the murder of Boru and his three friends. In his speech he stated, “We made the call for people to join the protests (riot)” but argued that there was no violence, for which he actually did not use the word riot but “the glorious public resistance.” This speech in which Demirtas blamed the government for the use of violence also took its place within the indictment against Demirtas in his trial in Turkey.

I’m not sure whether the ECHR paid attention to this and alike speeches in the indictments in Turkey, but the ECHR verdict also held that Demirtas “could be said to have been arrested and detained on “reasonable suspicion” of having committed a criminal offence and that there had therefore been no violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.” Nevertheless, the Court ruled that Turkey had violated the right to be brought promptly before a judge, the limitation on restricting a person’s rights, and the right to free elections.

After the decision came out on Tuesday, there was a harsh debate as to whether Turkey will release Demirtas or not. I’m not an expert in law, but here is the decision: The Court held that the respondent State was to ensure that Mr. Demirtaş’s pre-trial detention was ended at the earliest possible date, unless new grounds or evidence justifying his continued detention were put forward; and that Turkey was to pay the applicant 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 15,000.

In response to the voices raised within the EU in regards to the ECHR’s ruling on Demirtas, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated: “Why are you so silent when it comes to Greece’s non-compliance?”

The Court’s most concrete decision is about compensation, but I’m not sure about Turkey’s response with regards to the payment. After all, President Erdogan stated that the ruling is not binding. Further, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu criticized the decision and the statements that the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the EU Commission, Federica Mogherini, made on Turkey. In his response, Cavusoglu was on the same line with President Erdogan’s earlier comments and responded to Mogherini by saying, “Why are you so silent when it comes to Greece’s non-compliance?” In a nutshell therefore, it seems that there are no signs for the immediate release of Demirtas.

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Will HDP Choose Democratic Politics and Stand Against the PKK?

Politics Today — Wed, 18 Jul 2018 06:03:24 +0000

“The perpetrators must be found regardless of who they are. Such acts are unacceptable.” These are the words remarked by the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) after the PKK terror group killed a man named Mevlut Bengi and hung his body on a lamppost with a note left near the body. The terror group does not hide its violent acts but rather announces them on their official website to intimidate the Kurdish people in the region, just as they did in the case of Remzi Guler, who was killed by the PKK along with his mentally challenged son, or like the suicide attack they organized at the bus stops in Ankara, during which 36 civilians were killed and 349 were injured. Most of the time, the PKK does not only claim responsibility for the mass murders, but also pays homage to their violent attacks and murders. Many examples of it can be viewed in the pro-PKK periodical titled Yeni Özgür Politika.

On the other hand, the HDP condemns all the murders perpetrated by the PKK without referring to the terror group and always issues the same statement: “The perpetrators must be found regardless of who they are. Such acts are unacceptable.” Several people occasionally object to this approach of the party. For instance, Leyla Zana, one of the most prominent figures in the Kurdish political movement, tried this. Zana was accused of betrayal as she criticized the PKK and said: “The Kurds supporting the HDP are politically-driven while the Kurds supporting the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) are driven by their emotions.” According to the PKK, all of the Kurds who support the AK Party are traitors regardless of their motivations. Muzaffer Ayata, one of the senior names within the PKK, answered this statement of Zana in 2016 on Yeni Özgür Politika: “The traitors are probably thinking that they will not be called to account and keep feeding on the bones thrown to them. They will always be cursed and called traitors.”

Altan Tan, the HDP Diyarbakir deputy last term, criticized the PKK and the HDP while analyzing the support Erdogan received from the Kurdish people following the constitutional amendment referendum. Tan said: “There is a group who have been inclined towards the AK Party although they formerly supported the HDP. The reason is obvious: The people do not want to see a civil war breaking out or politics based on digging ditches, but rather wish to see support to democratic channels.” Tan also accused the HDP of condoning all these and added: “Some people find it very difficult to answer the question why Erdogan enjoys an increasing support. They cannot admit that the PKK has made mistakes and that digging ditches, civil war attempts, conflicts, violence and terror were wrong.” Tan is a name who joined the HDP during the party’s later stages and eventually resigned from the party. But interestingly, the HDP did not defend Zana after the PKK blacklisted her although she was from the grassroots of the movement.

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In the latest elections, the HDP gained 67 seats in Parliament by receiving 11.6 percent of the vote. It was observed that the party’s vote share declined in the eastern and southeastern regions, where the Kurdish population is predominant. 30 percent of the party’s overall votes came from Turkey’s three largest cities, namely Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. So, it can be seen that the HDP’s vote share among the Kurdish population declined, while the vote share it achieved in metropolitan cities was partly due to the support given by the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP).

The electorate leaned towards the HDP mostly because of the view that the HDP might detach from the PKK if it grows stronger, which will lead to the consolidation of civil politics and bring an end to terror. During the last parliamentarian term, the HDP was busy with practicing or legitimizing the orders and discourses of the PKK. In the general elections held on June 7, 2015, the HDP received 80 parliamentary seats. Only one month after the elections, senior PKK figure Cemil Bayik called upon people to take up arms and prepare tunnels and trenches, while the HDP leader Selahattin Demirtas said: “We call people to protect this honored resistance of digging ditches to build our autonomy; taking a step back will clash with our dignity.” PKK headed to city centers and terrorized urban spaces by digging ditches. Thousands of Kurdish people had to emigrate due to the ditches dug in front of their houses. In the early elections held on November 1, 2015, the HDP’s vote share decreased from six million to five million, while the number of its deputies went from 80 to 59.

With its 67 deputies, the HDP has another chance to choose democratic means over violence and polarization ahead of the new parliamentary term. Will the party consider the electorate’s demand of civil politics and stance against the PKK? Will they be able to show the courage to stand against the PKK, which has already been displayed by the electorate? Or are they willing to keep their violence prone policies?

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PKK, Kamikazes, Lotus Flower and Dessert

Politics Today — Thu, 12 Jul 2018 01:51:52 +0000

Last week, a father and a son who were breeding livestock for living were killed by a group of PKK militants in the Yalimli village of Diyarbakir’s Lice district. The father was 48 years old while the 24-year-old son was mentally challenged. According to the testimonials of the family’s relatives, the father, namely Remzi Guler, went to water their garden in Lice nine days ago along with his son Mahmut Guler. After a search that went on for nine days, the bodies of the father and son were found on Friday and it was revealed that both were shot to death. The PKK left a note near the bodies as is their custom.

The PKK had also left a note near the body of Mevlut Bengi, whose body was hung on a lamp post by the terror group members after being killed two weeks ago. They accused Bengi of acting as an informant and co-conspirator and stated that they executed him and hung him on the lamp post as a warning to others. Bengi was a 46-year-old man running a small grocery store in Turkmen village of Agri’s Dogubeyazit district and was a father of 11 children. The PKK militants abducted Bengi one day before the June 24 elections and killed him two days after.

Today the PKK continues to kill Kurdish people who do not support the terror group regardless of whether they are children or disabled. For instance, PKK militants killed a man named Osman Balic and his 3-year-old daughter Revsen on the grounds that Balic left the PKK. In another instance, they killed someone they accused of co-conspiracy in Cizre, filling his mouth with banknotes.

Of course, the PKK does not only announce their acts with the notes they leave near the victims’ bodies. They also claim responsibility for their attacks via their media outlets, including a number of websites. One of them is Germany-based Yeni Ozgur Politika newspaper that is freely distributed and sold across Europe. But recently, the execution news that was announced on the PKK’s offshoot HPG’s website was not directly announced on Yeni Ozgur Politika. They were only referred in an article in which several insinuations were made. The article penned by Ahmet Kahraman reads: “Lately, a man named Mevlut Bengi was killed in Dogubeyazit. It is claimed that he is a public enemy and an informant working for the AKP (the Justice and Development Party).” Kahraman went on to suggest that murder was not something desirable but justified the murders of the Kurdish people who give support to the AK Party instead of the PKK. It seems that the newspaper was obliged to defend the executions rather than praising them this time as they stir up a great reaction not only across Turkey but in the region.

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In fact, the PKK/KCK attack in Ankara that targeted military shuttle buses, for which the terror group’s offshoot TAK claimed responsibility, was put to captions by the same newspaper. In this attack, two PKK suicide bombers named Seher Cagla Demir and Ozgur Unsal blew themselves up at the Guvenpark bus stops located in Ankara’s Ataturk Boulevard, killing 36 people and injuring 349. The Peoples’ Democratic Party’s (HDP) presidential candidate Selahattin Demirtas’s brother Nurettin Demirtas portrayed Seher Cagla Demir by means of mythological figures and penned a lengthy article that likens her to Hercules. The article was published by Yeni Ozgur Politika. After writing an ode to the 26-year-old Demir code-named “Doğa” (meaning nature in Turkish) by employing the motifs of Greek and Roman mythologies, Demirtas finally likened her to lotus flower and went on: “Doga is Heracles. Some people deflect the issue from the main point on the grounds that death cannot be glorified or they likened the acts to the suicide attacks of Daesh. Doga cannot be defined as a suicide bomber. She is a heroine; she is a lotus flower that cannot be stained by any means.”

At the end of the article, Demirtas made a call to new suicide bombers: “Now is the time for Doga.”

On June 5, Yeni Ozgur Politika published an interview with Nurettin Demirtas, which was conducted in the place where he kept hiding. Likening PKK kamikazes to lotus flower and praising the murders, Demirtas this time asked for support to his brother, the HDP’s presidential candidate Selahattin Demirtas who is currently imprisoned. He said during the interview: “I can order dessert to those voting for the HDP and my brother on the mountains of Kurdistan,” and the interview was published with a photo portraying him while making a dessert.

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Ditches Against Peace, Terror Against Politics

Politics Today — Sat, 23 Jun 2018 02:26:37 +0000

During his years in office as Prime Minister, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed his determination to resolve the Kurdish question at the cost of his political life. Considering the terror group PKK, which has been operating for the past 30 years and is condemned by all the political parties in Turkey, it was still hard to publicly suggest a solution on the subject back then. Firstly, 13 years ago, Erdogan delivered a speech in Diyarbakır province: “It is improper for major countries to condone the past mistakes since the problems are all ours. To be more specific, the Kurdish question is not a problem confronted by a certain part of the nation, but a problem that interests the entire nation, including myself.” In 2009, he said: “Whether you call it the Kurdish question, Southeast question or East question… No matter how we call it, we have initiated working on the question.”

With this, Erdogan embarked on the most venturous peace project in the history of the Turkish Republic, which is widely known as the Reconciliation Process. He kicked off works to negotiate with the outlawed PKK through their imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan, who was until then described as a “baby killer” by media outlets, the judiciary and the political parties that were dominated by the secular Kemalist tradition.

The Kurdish question was discussed thoroughly throughout the process, and every single taboo was faced. Introducing amnesty and building a new Turkey was being mentioned. A Committee of Wise People, which encompassed people from all segments and ideologies including nationalists, liberals, religious conservatives and seculars was formed. The Committee strived to explain the west and the east of the country to each other and convince people to the reconciliation process. Even the bases of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), who have recently formed an alliance ahead of the June 24 elections, listened to the suggestions. As the process went on, people stopped hiding their Kurdish identity and embraced it. Kurdish lessons were introduced in schools, and Kurdish political propaganda was allowed. In Nowruz celebrations that year, Ocalan, previously called a “baby killer,” addressed entire Turkey. All these developments were unimaginable for Turkey until then.

Everyone showed great enthusiasm to the process, but the first signs of the major problems in the process appeared during early 2015. After the general election held on June 7, 2015, PKK attacks abruptly gained speed with the influence of the new developments in Syria. In a short period, the reconciliation process was replaced by the ditches dug in cities and town centers, clashes and curfews. During this period, Turkey was simultaneously confronted with Daesh and PKK attacks. After a year, the military coup attempt organized by the Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) became the last straw for the Turkish nation.

Turkey faced a new fact particularly in the aftermath of the 2015 election: the ditches. Although the ditches were occasionally seen in several places before the election, the PKK systematically began digging ditches in many city and town centers following the election with the support of FETO operatives who infiltrated key state apparatuses and bureaucracy.

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During the November 1 election held in the midst of this chaos, the pro-PKK Peoples’ Democratic Party’s (HDP) vote share declined and thus the party lost 21 of its 80 deputies assigned to the Parliament with the June 7 elections. The AK Party again came to power alone and the new government was eventually formed. Instead of the reconciliation process, the new government prioritized enabling public security. Stating that they regarded the ditches as a defense mechanism, HDP co-chairs expressed autonomy discussions in the shadow of terrorism.

In 2016, a bomb attack was organized to a military shuttle in Ankara that carried both military and civilian officers. 29 people were killed in the attack while dozens were injured. The PKK’s break-away faction, namely the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK), claimed responsibility for the attack.

During the ditch terror they inflicted, half of the population in Sırnak’s Cizre and Silopi districts, Diyarbakir’s Sur district and Mardin’s Nusaybin district were directly affected by the incidents. The number of people migrating from the four districts reached 93,000. The people were so enraged that Murat Karayilan, a senior PKK figure, had to express that the ditch strategy in the cities was wrong.

Turkey will go to the polls on Sunday. Currently, the counter-terror efforts are ongoing both inside and outside the country. When it comes to how the HDP views the ditches after all the incidents, the party co-chair Pervin Buldan and the party’s presidential candidate Selahattin Demirtas gave the following answers with regard to the ditches that led to hundreds of casualties and displaced thousands of people: Buldan claimed, “People dug ditches in self-defense,” whereas Demirtas stated, “I do not have issued a single remark that shows support to the ditches. We should have been more insistent and courageous in our attempts to get rid of them.” (Demirtas issued a written answer as he is currently under arrest.)

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Demirtas’s Armed Heroes in his Speech for Peace

Politics Today — Wed, 20 Jun 2018 02:30:47 +0000

Selahattin Demirtas, the jailed ex-coleader of the HDP, gave his first speech on the national public broadcaster of Turkey on Sunday (for the text of the speech, see the link). He will give his second speech on Saturday but I believe his first speech gave enough material for some content analysis. While the speech is powerful to deliver its message to those who already support Demirtas, it was also not surprising for those who are critical of him.

Demirtas began his speech by questioning the rationale and fairness of his imprisonment, which is natural for anybody who is waiting to hear their sentence in prison. Nevertheless, it does not sound so strange to those who remember his brother Nurettin Demirtas. Nurettin Demirtas was a former leader of the very same political wing. He was also arrested and kept in prison for some time. Once released, Nurettin Demirtas fled to Iraq. He, more or less, kept his position in the movement but this time on the military wing – the PKK. He recently asked for votes for the political wing, the HDP while not bothering to change his “guerilla” uniform with a suit. In my opinion, Selahattin Demirtas would not flee in case of release but his brother’s escape in the very same situation might let many to think that the brothers might meet in the Qandil region where the PKK headquarters are located. Anyhow, what makes Demirtas’s Sunday speech more interesting and unfortunately sad for me is something else.

For a person who has a chance to show that he has no intention to support a terror organization, Demirtas picked the very wrong people as his references. Among the 15 people Demirtas cited on Sunday, one –Seyh Bedrettin- started an armed rebellion against the Ottomans in the 15^th century. Another figure we heard in the speech was a semi-mystical hero, Koroglu, who rebelled against the governor of Bolu. To be fair, the Koroglu legend has a nation-wide popularity in Turkey. Nevertheless, I cannot stop but question why Demirtas kept picking the armed men to prove that he is totally peaceful and has nothing to do with violence.

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Anyhow, next on the list is Sheikh Said. Demirtas paid his respect to Said in his speech but who is Said? He is the most prominent Kurdish rebellion leader of the early republican era. Said was executed once his rebellion failed but his rebellion shed the blood of many Turkish security forces, sounds familiar, huh? The next man is Seyit Rıza, a leader of another rebellion in the early republican era. He also rebelled and failed, killed and got killed. The next in the list is a trio. Deniz, Huseyin and Yusuf. They were armed, attempted to start a revolutionary guerrilla warfare against the Turkish state, were captured and executed in 1972. The next person Demirtas cited was the most troublesome for me. Mahir Cayan, another leader of a radical leftist organization, is also a documented killer who -not surprisingly- died in combat with Turkish security forces in rural Tokat.

Perhaps, the most ironic part of Demirtas’s speech was the “Yilmaz in prison” part. Yilmaz Guney was a famous actor and director. But, for God’s sake, this guy injured a man and killed another. What makes this comparison more tragic is Yilmaz Guney fled the country. Didn’t anyone tell Demirtas that his comparison of himself with Yilmaz Guney may not be a smart idea. What did Demirtas think by glorifying a man who killed a man and ran away as a fugitive?

To be fair, Demirtas also paid tribute to some unarmed men: a singer, a couple sufi slash poets, a couple prophets, and the prophet Mohammed’s grandson. Yet, nine armed men against these six is not a good ratio in a speech delivered to make one point clear: I am a man of peace. Here is my call for Demirtas. Next time you want to make it clear that you should not be in jail for alleged linkages to the PKK, do not salute the people who started armed campaigns against the state.

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The Odds for Erdogan and Demirtas in Turkey’s Presidential Elections

Politics Today — Sun, 06 May 2018 04:27:37 +0000

Last week, this column claimed that Erdogan is more popular than his very own party amongst Turkey’s Kurdish electorate. As all the other major parties have nominated their presidential candidates for the upcoming June elections over the past week, now we have the full picture to evaluate the odds for the Kurdish votes in Turkey.

Amongst the contestants, the conservative Saadet Party nominated the party leader Temel Karamollaoglu. The self-claimed socialist and ethnic party HDP nominated the jailed ex-leader of the party, Selahattin Demirtas. While Demirtas is closer to the Kurdish voters than Karamollaoglu, both can be seen sympathetic by the Kurdish electorate unlike the following two contestants.

Iyi Party’s candidate Meral Aksener is known as an ultra-nationalist character, while the CHP’s candidate Muharrem Ince is also portrayed as a secular nationalist figure by the electorate. Naturally, the latter two of these candidates, Ince and Aksener, will not be the first choice of Turkey’s Kurdish electorate. Amongst the other two contestants, Karamollaoglu is also not a likely choice given his party’s marginal vote share in Turkey. This leaves Demirtas as the only significant challenger for the incumbent Erdogan to win over the votes of Turkey’s Kurds. After all, the HDP under Demirtas’s leadership and Erdogan’s AK Party shared the first spot in heavily Kurdish populated districts in the previous elections. Hence, the June presidential election in Turkey’s eastern and southeastern cities will be a pairwise election between Erdogan and Demirtas.

Both candidates have their pros and cons for Turkey’s Kurds. Demirtas is a young candidate who once promised “peace,” which was a magic word in the decades-long terror-worn region. Further, as a candidate running from prison, he might gain the sympathy of a number of Kurds. Nevertheless, he suffers from two significant problems. First, the very same masses saw that Demirtas has no power over the future of the Kurdish question while the PKK keeps hijacking his electoral successes. From the eyes of the PKK politburo, every vote for the HDP in the region is counted as a vote to support the PKK’s terror campaign.

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For the PKK’s acting leader Cemil Bayik, the HDP would not even get 5 percent of the votes if it were not for the PKK. Since the PKK leadership sees the HDP secondary to the armed wing, they kept criticizing the HDP for failing to carry out its assignments given by the PKK leadership. Hence, Demirtas’s and the HDP’s agency and true capabilities are questioned for plausible reasons. The second handicap for Demirtas is his problematic record for the infamous 6-7 October events. During the Kobani siege of 2014, Demirtas severely criticized Turkey, which had already accepted tens of thousands Syrian Kurds fleeing the siege. In his remarks, Demirtas made a call for Kurds to go out and resist. The events spread to 35 cities and over 30 people lost their lives, including Yasin Börü, a 16 year old volunteering for a religious humanitarian aid organization. Börü was beaten, stabbed, burnt, and thrown off the roof by the pro-PKK crowd. Demirtas repeated his resistance calls on different occasions afterwards. While this is not a shame for pro-PKK Kurds, many conservative Kurds blame Demirtas for the events leading to Börü’s murder.

Erdogan, as the only other contestant who can expect to gain Kurdish votes on mass, has also pros and cons for the June elections. One disadvantage is to compete with Demirtas, who has a significant number of fans in the region and receives sympathy for running from behind the bars. Further, it is unclear how Erdogan’s electoral coalition with the nationalist MHP will affect the Kurdish votes for him. This is something that will unfold during the campaign process. On the other hand, his biggest advantage is that no other political leader of Turkey could ever recognize the Kurdish reality as much as him up to this day. After all, Erdogan is the leader who enacted the reforms from providing Kurdish elective courses in public schools to the starting of state TV channels broadcasting exclusively in Kurdish dialects, and to allowing political propaganda in the Kurdish language. He is the leader (both as PM and president) who recognized the Kurdish reality in unprecedented degrees and tried novel solutions such as the peace/resolution processes.

At the end of the day, it seems like the Kurdish votes will be split between Erdogan and Demirtas in the first round of the elections. Nevertheless, in case Erdogan is not elected in the first round, he will most likely compete with the main opposition party’s candidate Ince in the run-off stage. In such a scenario, Erdogan seems much closer to consolidating the Kurdish voters than his probable rival.

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Diyarbakır: How far from Normalization?

Politics Today — Mon, 09 Jan 2017 07:35:41 +0000

About this time last year, the government took a firm action against the PKK and started anti-terror operations in Diyarbakır. There were clashes in several districts of Diyarbakır, including Bağlar and Sur, but it was in the latter, an important headquarter for the PKK, that the most intense operation took place. These operations lasted almost three months in Sur district and consequently thousands of people have been affected by these clashes.

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Last week we visited Diyarbakır, where we met the Governor of Diyarbakır, Huseyin Aksoy, about the reason why operations in Sur lasted longer than other terror operations in the region. Governor Aksoy said that the operation took longer than expected because the government was being careful not to cause any civilian casualties. Aksoy said security forces were ordered to be very careful and responsive to locals during that process. And he added the operation took so long because of the PKK’s trenches, hundreds of which had been dug across Sur’s narrow streets. Almost 23,000 people living in Sur had to leave their houses, in order to avoid being caught in the clashes. The office of the Governor of Diyarbakır put some of these displaced families into hotels and some into guesthouses. The rest of the displaced moved into their relatives’ houses. It should be pointed out that this displacement is not a positive situation, and locals need a sustainable way to continue their lives. Right now, the displaced have no good memories about having to leave home, but there was no other choice for the government, because the PKK could use them as human shields.Sur is among the most disadvantaged districts in Diyarbakır. The PKK targeted Sur on purpose, because the region’s most fragile and poor people live there, that’s why PKK terrorists could easily force them to leave their homes, or threaten and intimidate them into doing what the terror group wanted, even forcing some to give their children as fighters for the PKK. It is very similar to DAESH’s strategy of recruiting fighters from largely Muslim ghettos in France, for instance.Meanwhile, interestingly, there was not even one ditch in the Diclekent or Kayapınar districts of Diyarbakır, where many prominent figures like Selahattin Demirtaş, Altan Tan live. To be sure, there are hundreds of possible reasons behind the PKK’s choice to stay out of these areas, maybe Selahattin Demirtaş living there is one reason, but there are some other reasons we need to analyze properly.

Interestingly, there was not even one ditch in the Diclekent or Kayapınar districts of Diyarbakır, where many prominent figures like Selahattin Demirtaş, Altan Tan live.

Most of the PKK’s funders are businessmen living in Diclekent and Kayapınar, where you can find very luxurious restaurants, coffees and houses. In a sense, the PKK could not touch their lives, their comfort zone. While these financiers were responsible for the PKK’s operations, they lived in neighborhoods far removed from the consequences of their funding.

Sociological Gap in Diyarbakır

We could not easily say that Diyarbakır’s sociology is fine now. The people of Diyarbakır look a bit tired and confused. Tired of being instrumentalized by the PKK and the HDP. But somehow people are trying hard to return to their ordinary lives.

When we walked around the streets of Sur, we saw that people could finally open their shops up, because the PKK, which used to intimidate them into closing their shops to send a political message, was no longer around. Another interesting situation is that interest in any gatherings or protests has gone down. In 2015, for Nowruz celebrations, almost 200,000 people gathered in Diyarbakır, however in 2016 only 18,000 people gathered to celebrate the festival, despite frequent calls from the HDP and the permission of the Governor of Diyarbakır. Can we conclude that people were afraid of going out and celebrating Nowruz? Absolutely not, we can conclude that people are very tired and from now on they just look for peace in Diyarbakır. Nowruz, a traditional new year celebration, used to turn into a pro-PKK protest praising all types of violence and threats against Turkey’s solidarity. Because of this over politicized and violent discourse at the festival in Diyarbakır, people no longer want to participate in this so-called “cultural celebration.”

One evening during our stay in Diyarbakir, Aysel Tuğluk, HDP’s leading deputy, was taken into the custody. I was around the Diyarbakir Court House incidentally, and surprisingly, there was no one in front of the courthouse for protesting this decision. I checked media coverage to see if people were not aware of it, but in fact there was plenty of breaking news about the detention. Yet there was not even one person to protest. In short, the people of Diyarbakır ran out of patience, and they have no tolerance for any calls for violence or clashes. They just want to return to their normal lives without any terror, any clashes, and any threats from the PKK and HDP.

The people of Diyarbakır ran out of patience, and they have no tolerance for any calls for violence or clashes.

They are silent and passive to all the things happening around them. This current situation in Diyarbakır is a kind of sociological gap. People have some ideological and political hesitations about what they really should do. Some of those I met put lots of stress on the question of what would happens if the government sits at the negotiating table with the PKK again? Despite the all anti-terror operations, all the political discourse against the PKK and HDP, people are still keeping this possibility in their mind. And they are afraid of this scenario, in which the PKK gets control again and takes revenge on the people. The government must gain the confidence of the people about these fears; otherwise this gap could create a boomerang effect against the normalization process of the city.

The Need for a Social Risk Map

To capture the full Diyarbakır picture, there is an urgent need for a social risk map of Diyarbakır. Mapping the social risks in the city, actually in the region as well, is the most important preliminary work before applying social policies. This means putting together a general picture of potential risks to the communities of Diyarbakır. An index could be developed to figure out the most fragile parts of the social structure, which may include: average household income, the unemployment rate (especially for youths), mobility over one year, drop-out rates at schools, crime rates and so on. After this, the most fragile parts can be identified, and social policies can be applied according to this index.

For now, the Governor and the municipality conduct some social projects for youth in particular. To build more sport centers and to renovate youth centers in the city, the Ministry of Youth and Sport has recently provided 16 million TLs. The Ministry of Family and Social Policies also provides similar funds for rehabilitation works. This support is very significant, but still needs to be systematized by the social risk map created, according to the social needs of the city.

Academics living in Diyarbakır point out that young people are radicalized by the racial and violence oriented narratives of the PKK and HDP.

While doing this, there are two important priority areas: education and religious affairs. Almost all people we met in Diyarbakır, academics, public authorities, NGOs pointed out these two significant areas. If the government and local authorities could create long-term coherent policies for education and religious guidance, normalization could be achieved in Diyarbakır. Otherwise in a couple of years, we may witness the same clashes in the city’s ancient streets.

Academics living in Diyarbakır point out that young people are radicalized by the racial and violence oriented narratives of the PKK and HDP. This increases the anxiety of the youth in the city, and makes them vulnerable to being instrumentalized for street clashes. Now families are looking for alternatives to save their children from the threat of the PKK and HDP. Public authorities and NGOs have to put forth alternatives to rehabilitate the young people of Diyarbakır. Actually at this point, Kurdish youth need to have a new dialogue without any type of violence or hatred. What Kurdish youth really needs is to have a positive agenda to focus on their future’s plan, especially in terms of education and employment. In brief, any social policy or project that does not reach the youth will not succeed in ensuring a normalization process for the communities in Diyarbakır.

The post Diyarbakır: How far from Normalization? appeared first on Politics Today.

The Collapse of the HDP’s Politics

Politics Today — Mon, 09 Jan 2017 07:30:47 +0000

On July 22, 2015, the PKK terrorist organization shot dead two policemen in the Ceylanpınar district of Şanlıurfa, marking the end of the so-called “reconciliation process,” a political initiative Turkish authorities had developed to establish a permanent peace in the region. Since then, hundreds of civilians and security officers have fallen martyr in a new wave of bloody PKK terrorist attacks.

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The optimistic climate which the reconciliation process created, came to naught, and the region’s economy suffered greatly as a result. The PKK, meanwhile, accelerated its propaganda campaign and searched for ways to create legitimacy for its attacks by controlling the social sphere, particularly in east and southeast Anatolia.

A New Concept for Counter Terrorism

Turkey has taken conclusive steps to overcome the security concerns created by the PKK. One of these steps, following the words of President Erdogan, was to initiate a constant fight against the terrorist organization. Hundreds of PKK militants have been neutralized with this strategy. The government took control of the transit routes used by the PKK in the mountainous areas. It also largely eliminated the social pressure and the oppression of the PKK’s urban structures in the cities. The second strategic step taken in the struggle against the PKK was to limit its social and political activities. Several media organs and associations that the PKK used as its propaganda machine were closed to reduce its public visibility and to limit its provocations. It was within the same strategic framework that some of the deputies and mayors of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) were taken into custody. As in the case of Selahattin Demirtaş, the co-leader of the HDP, many of these deputies and mayors were charged with crimes of “establishing an organization to commit crime,” “being a member of a terrorist organization,” and “being a member of an armed terrorist organization.”

Social Anger towards the HDP

In two elections held in 2015, the HDP gained momentum in the east and southeast. The party had significant success at the end of the Turkish general elections on June 7, 2015 and entered the Grand National Assembly with 80 deputies. Although its power partially shrunk, the HDP became the third largest party in the National Assembly with 59 deputies when the results of the compulsory early elections held on November 1, 2015 were announced.

It is appropriate to use the term “power poisoning” to explain what happened after the election. The HDP had become radicalized, hardened, and began to have a similar discourse and policy with the PKK. The statement of Figen Yüksekdağ, the co-leader of the party, was a clear challenge: “We lie our back on the PYD [the Democratic Union Party] and the YPG [the People’s Protection Units].” With the call of Bese Hozat, the co-chair of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), the PKK had initiated the so-called “Revolutionary People’s War” in the months to follow. The PKK militants and its sympathizers paralyzed the daily life of the Kurds when they brought guns to the cities and dug trenches in the streets.

Dozens of people, including children, elderly, and women were killed after the PKK’s DEASH-style car bomb attacks, which aimed to hit the main cities of the country such as the capital Ankara and Istanbul. The HDP, however, has never shown the expected attitude towards the PKK-initiated violence. The Kurds’ expectation from the HDP was to have a high-level political discourse, which would counterbalance the PKK’s terrorist activities. They were greatly disappointed. Selahattin Demirtaş and other deputies chose to remain silent against the PKK domination that began on the evening of the 7 June, 2015 elections. The HDP thus suffered a great loss of prestige in society.

Voices from the streets

It is important to note that the streets in Turkey’s southeast remained calm in the wake of the steps taken by the Turkish authorities to counter terrorism. I had the opportunity to witness the strong roots of this discreet approach during my recent visit to Siirt and Batman. My interactions with the local population of these cities helped me to understand the discreet attitude of the street at the following four junctures:

When the HDP reached its peak

One should carefully read the reaction of the Kurdish population living in the region to the imprisonment of the HDP co-chairs, some deputies, and mayors, as well as the appointment of custodians to the local municipalities. Regardless of whether it really happened or not, an anecdote that I heard in Siirt demonstrates that the majority of the local population was alienated from the HDP’s politics and politicians. The anecdote tells us that an HDP mayor who was going to be taken into custody in a few minutes looks at the entrance gate from the window of his office and states that “if we had won the hearts of people, there would be tens and thousands at our door, but now there are not even a handful men in front of the door to stop the police officers from entering the building.” He then regretfully said to those around him: “there is nothing to do.”

People tell each other, in the form of urban legends, what some of the custodians who are appointed to the municipalities achieved in just 2-3 months compared with what the DBP municipalities have done in 4-5 years.

Although dozens of mayors have been taken into custody from the Democratic Regions Party (DBP), the HDP’s fraternal party in the region, the locals did not show any reaction. The reason behind the lack of local support for the DBP is the fact that the DBP municipalities have spent their time and energy on PKK propaganda, instead of serving the public. People tell each other, in the form of urban legends, what some of the custodians who are appointed to the municipalities achieved in just 2-3 months compared with what the DBP municipalities have done in 4-5 years.

They also talk about certain groups, which the municipalities have enriched by transferring resources and awarding them the contracts. It seems that there were three interrelated factors at work when it comes to the alienation of the Kurdish population from the HDP and its associates: the HDP had a discriminating attitude in its relations with the society. It transferred the economic resources to certain interest groups, and moved closer to the PKK at the height of its political power. The prevailing public opinion among the Kurds is that if the HDP had moved in an opposite direction and had not received this many seats in the parliament, the situation would be different. They, on the other hand, still consider their votes for the HDP as a positive development since it helped them understand the real intentions of the party and witness how it suffered from “power poisoning.”

The “I voted for peace” discourse

“I voted for peace” is one of the prevailing discourses among the locals in the region. The discourse, often expressed by HDP voters, is pronounced as a sign of regret. “I would never vote if I knew the HDP would follow such a way,” one local told me on condition of anonymity. “We voted since we believed that the PKK would withdraw and the civilian politicians would stand against the armed terrorists. The HDP, however, treated us as an apparatus to contribute to the PKK’s war and used our votes as a demonstration of power to increase its political violence. We expected the HDP leaders to strengthen civilian politics and to contribute to an everlasting peace when the party gained 80 deputies in the June 2015 elections.” On the streets of Batman and Siirt, it is almost common to hear “did you also vote for peace?” statement, which the local Kurds use in an ironic way to make fun of how they were deceived before the elections.

“We won’t make you president”

One of the common arguments people used to criticize the HDP politics is the “we won’t make you president” campaign slogan by Demirtaş, targeting President Erdogan. Demirtaş used this slogan for the first time at a party group meeting in the Assembly amid loud applause. This sharp political move increased the reputation of Demirtaş and opened space for him in the Dogan Media group’s coverage of the elections. It is no doubt that the “White Turks” were very much pleased by this statement. The Kurds, who voted for the HDP, however, had a hard time understanding the basis and the aims of this political move at that time. Now, they realize that this political discourse was detrimental to their interests. Most of the Kurds believe that Demirtaş lost great prestige among the locals with this sharp political move since the expression “we won’t make you president” was wrong and had no rational basis for the Kurds. This statement is now one of the main arguments that the Kurds used to direct their criticism towards Demirtaş.

The PKK terrorist attacks damaged the regional economy

The Turkish economy remains robust in the face of global fluctuations, manipulations, and impositions. The economic conditions, however, have put pressure on people. The implications of the economic struggle are more visible in the Kurdish-populated regions of eastern and southeastern Anatolia. The threatening atmosphere that the PKK terrorism created, the efforts of the terrorist organization to prevent state investments, and the tribute that the PKK had asked from private investors, made the conditions harder for the region’s economy.

In Hasankeyf, a shopkeeper who welcomed us in his carpet shop said that the last time he sold a carpet was one and a half years ago. It was an appalling moment.

The security threat posed by the PKK has squeezed the daily life of the Kurds in two ways: dozens of Kurds, including children, lost their lives during the terrorist attacks. The PKK militants looted their houses, burned their businesses and vehicles. The flow of tourists to the region came to a halt. In Hasankeyf, a shopkeeper who welcomed us in his carpet shop said that the last time he sold a carpet was one and a half years ago. It was an appalling moment. Directing his anger to the PKK and HDP, the shopkeeper told us that one and a half years ago, Hasankeyf was filled with both local and foreign tourists.

There are also other factors that played a role in the collapse of the HDP’s politics: The PKK’s killings on June 6-8, 2014 and the devastation of the trench and barricade warfare that the PKK had launched in southeast Turkey after the June 7, 2015 elections. The terrifying memories of these events are still alive. People tell each other the stories of how the PKK terrorists forced old men to dig trenches in the streets and desperate women to leave their houses when they learned that a tunnel would go through their bedrooms.

Perhaps many of the Kurds have not yet spoken aloud, but the clear majority has deeply buried the PKK in the very trenches that the terrorist organization had dug in their inner worlds. Even in the regions where the HDP has received close to 100 percent of the vote, the Kurds have not abided by the PKK’s calls for street rallies or boycotts. The reason behind this is the fact that the Kurds condemned “trench politics” and denounced it as tyrannical.

The post The Collapse of the HDP’s Politics appeared first on Politics Today.

How the PKK Declined Peace Opportunities since Abdallah Ocalan’s 2013 Call

Politics Today — Tue, 11 Aug 2015 05:24:02 +0000

Chronology of the period since Öcalan’s call for PKK to leave Turkey

March 21, 2013: PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s Nevruz message

April 25, 2013

May 7, 2013

Selahattin Demirtaş’s announcement on the pullout: “The pullout will officially start tomorrow. We are estimating that it will last three or four months.”

July 2, 2013

Some protests were kicked off in Diyarbakır province’s Lice district on the pretext of road works and outpost constructions. One protester died.

Sept. 9, 2013

Sept. 30, 2013

March 15, 2014

The KCK announced that the government was “no longer the addressee of the democratization move.”

March 21, 2014

June 1, 2014

June 8, 2014

In the province of Bitlis, terrorists blocking a road opened fire on security forces with rocket launchers and long-barreled weapons. A bomb attack took place in the district of Lice.

June 9, 2014

A national flag in the garden of Diyarbakır’s Second Air Force Command was taken down by a terrorist.

July 10, 2014

Aug. 5, 2014

Aug. 19, 2014

A statue of PKK member Mahsuni Korkmaz was erected in Lice. The court issued a decision to demolish the statue. Clashes broke out, one was killed.

Aug. 20, 2014

In Diyarbakır, a group of terrorists organized an attack on an outpost.

Aug. 24, 2014

Terrorists attacked a thermal plant located in Silopi district’s Görümlü neighborhood with rocket launchers and long-barreled weapons.

Sept. 18, 2014

The HDP issued a call to boycott schools on the pretext of education in their mother tongue. Dozens of schools were set ablaze in many provinces.

Sept. 22 2014

HDP deputy Aysel Tuğluk threw stones at military officers when police and military officers blocked the crowd heading to Kobani.

Oct. 3, 2014

In Tunceli province’s Pülümür district, some PKK militants attacked an outpost.

Oct. 8-9-10, 2014

Oct. 13, 2014

Some PKK militants were identified in Tunceli while leaking into a launch base area. A clash took place.

Oct. 21, 2014

During the HDP’s İmralı visit, Öcalan announced that a new phase started on Oct. 15 and tangible steps would be taken.

Oct. 25, 2014

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Three undercover military officers were killed in Yüksekova.

Oct. 29, 2014

The HDP called on people to take to the streets again.

Oct. 30, 2014: In Diyarbakır, Necdet Aydoğdu, 24, a military officer, was killed by two masked assailants while he was off-duty, shopping with his wife downtown.

Nov. 24, 2014

Speaking to Fırat News Agency, Sabri Ok, a senior KCK member, remarked that there were no developments in their agenda regarding disarmament.

Dec. 20, 2014

Cemil Bayık said, “Laying down arms would mean death…”

Dec. 27, 2014

Jan. 23, 2015

A HDP delegation negotiated with Qandil. It was stated that the KCK thought the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) did not display the responsible approach required for the negotiation process.

Feb. 9, 2015

Feb. 15, 2015

Feb. 17, 2015

Demirtaş: “Öcalan issued a conditioned disarmament call.”

Feb. 28, 2015

Öcalan called on the PKK to lay down its arms.

March 21, 2015

April 11, 2015

In Ağrı, PKK members attacked military officers. Four officers were injured.

5 May 2015

June 7, 2015

The HDP imposed pressure on ballots in the eastern regions. Block votes were cast in hundreds of ballot boxes in villages.

June 12, 2015

After Demirtaş’s call that the PKK could lay down its arms with Öcalan’s call, the KCK announced, “We own the will of disarmament. Demirtaş or Öcalan cannot urge us to lay down our arms.”

June 29, 2015

July 11, 2015

July 12, 2015

The PKK opened fire on a minibus.

July 14 2015

KCK Co-Chair Bese Hozat wrote an article entitled “The new process: a revolutionary people’s war,” calling the conflict a revolutionary people’s war.

July 20 2015

ISIS attack in Suruç: An explosion took place in Kobani simultaneously with an explosion in Suruç. Thirty-two people were killed in the Suruç explosion.

20 July 2015

Military officer Müsellim Ünal was killed in a clash between the PKK and officers in Adıyamanç

KCK Co-Chair Cemil Bayık called on people to take up arms, dig trenches and create tunnels in their homes.

22 July 2015

Police officers Feyyaz Yumuşak and Okan Acar were shot dead in their houses in Şanlıurfa’s Ceylanpınar district.

In Adana, Kalem-Der member Ethem Türkben was killed by the PKK in front of his pregnant wife and three children.

23 July 2015

In Diyarbakır, a police squad heading to a traffic accident scene was ambushed. Polis officer Tansu Aydın was killed and one officer was injured.

24 July 2015

Turkey launched operations in northern Syria and northern Iraq.

The post How the PKK Declined Peace Opportunities since Abdallah Ocalan’s 2013 Call appeared first on Politics Today.

How the PKK Declined Peace Opportunities since Abdallah Ocalan’s 2013 Call

levent — Tue, 14 Jul 2015 10:29:43 +0000

Chronology of the period since Öcalan’s call for PKK to leave Turkey

March 21, 2013: PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s Nevruz message

April 25, 2013

May 7, 2013

Selahattin Demirtaş’s announcement on the pullout: “The pullout will officially start tomorrow. We are estimating that it will last three or four months.”

July 2, 2013

Some protests were kicked off in Diyarbakır province’s Lice district on the pretext of road works and outpost constructions. One protester died.

Sept. 9, 2013

Sept. 30, 2013

March 15, 2014

The KCK announced that the government was “no longer the addressee of the democratization move.”

March 21, 2014

June 1, 2014

June 8, 2014

In the province of Bitlis, terrorists blocking a road opened fire on security forces with rocket launchers and long-barreled weapons. A bomb attack took place in the district of Lice.

June 9, 2014

A national flag in the garden of Diyarbakır’s Second Air Force Command was taken down by a terrorist.

July 10, 2014

Aug. 5, 2014

Aug. 19, 2014

A statue of PKK member Mahsuni Korkmaz was erected in Lice. The court issued a decision to demolish the statue. Clashes broke out, one was killed.

Aug. 20, 2014

In Diyarbakır, a group of terrorists organized an attack on an outpost.

Aug. 24, 2014

Terrorists attacked a thermal plant located in Silopi district’s Görümlü neighborhood with rocket launchers and long-barreled weapons.

Sept. 18, 2014

The HDP issued a call to boycott schools on the pretext of education in their mother tongue. Dozens of schools were set ablaze in many provinces.

Sept. 22 2014

HDP deputy Aysel Tuğluk threw stones at military officers when police and military officers blocked the crowd heading to Kobani.

Oct. 3, 2014

In Tunceli province’s Pülümür district, some PKK militants attacked an outpost.

Oct. 8-9-10, 2014

Oct. 13, 2014

Some PKK militants were identified in Tunceli while leaking into a launch base area. A clash took place.

Oct. 21, 2014

During the HDP’s İmralı visit, Öcalan announced that a new phase started on Oct. 15 and tangible steps would be taken.

Oct. 25, 2014

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