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n December 26, 2025, Israel became the first United Nations member to officially recognize Somaliland’s independence, significantly transforming the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa. This move marked a crucial shift in how global powers vie for influence over the Red Sea, one of the world’s most disputed maritime routes. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu framed the decision within the framework of the Abraham Accords, linking this recognition to a broader network of Israeli-Gulf Arab cooperation aimed at containing Iran and promoting regional cohesion.

However, this action is perceived as the projection of Israel’s tumultuous Middle Eastern policies onto the Horn of Africa, a region already plagued by ongoing conflicts. It also signifies a potentially misguided reassessment of power dynamics in an area where critical maritime chokepoints, terrorist movements, and shifts in strategic alliances intersect. The repercussions will echo well beyond the agreements of individual states.

Israel’s move was a clear violation of international norms, prompting a swift and categorical international response. The African Union, Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, Türkiye, Somalia, Djibouti, and the UN Security Council issued coordinated statements rejecting the move.

The African Union’s chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, explicitly invoked the 1964 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Border Inalienability Principle, a cornerstone of continental stability, warning that the recognition “sets a dangerous precedent with far-reaching implications for peace and stability across the continent.” However, this overwhelming diplomatic consensus obscures the fact that this move will accelerate instability and conflict in a region already teetering on the brink of catastrophic fragmentation.

To understand why Israel moved at this precise moment, we must examine two overlapping calculations: First, maritime security and the strategic importance of the Red Sea. Second, the role of the UAE as an architect of fragmentation in the Horn of Africa.

The Red Sea as a strategic pivot

The Red Sea is no longer just a shipping lane. It has become a critical arena where the balance of power between the traditional, Western-led maritime order and emerging threats to global trade is being contested. For example, since November 2023, the Houthis in Yemen have attacked over 190 commercial vessels, forcing hundreds of ships to reroute around South Africa. This has increased transit times by up to 50 percent and imposed costs of an estimated $180 million per month in protection fees paid to shipping agents, according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

The Houthis’ main justification for these actions was to demand an end to the genocide in Gaza. However, analysts contest this claim in the context of a possible Israeli move into Somalia, as there are reports suggesting that Israel plans to evacuate Palestinians to Somaliland in exchange for recognition. When discussing the strategic importance of the Red Sea, it is important to mention the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This 70-mile-long chokepoint, which separates Africa from Arabia, processes approximately one-third of global maritime commerce, including critical energy and container shipments.

Therefore, Somaliland renders the northern region of Somalia strategically indispensable to any actor seeking to project power over this maritime domain. Somaliland’s coastline along the Gulf of Aden positions it as a natural complement to Israeli objectives in three critical ways. First, it could serve as a naval logistics hub, offering berthing capacity for Israeli vessels seeking a continuous presence in the Red Sea. Second, it could counterbalance Houthi control of Yemen’s coastline. Third, it could provide a tangible foothold in the evolving geopolitical architecture of the Abraham Accords, as well as in the developments of world powers in the Horn of Africa.

According to a 2025 Institute for National Security Studies memo, Israel explicitly frames the Red Sea as “a distinct strategic arena where geopolitical and economic maneuvering, rather than security alone, is a fundamental component of Israel’s national security strategy.”(P. 16) Recognizing Somaliland operationalizes this doctrine, positioning Israel as a legitimate power broker in East African maritime governance. Previously, this posture was unavailable without some form of diplomatic entrée into the region.

The UAE’s involvement

Conducting this analysis without including the UAE’s involvement in this critical issue will be less imperative. Understanding Somaliland’s recognition requires examining the UAE’s footprint in the Horn of Africa over the past fifteen years. Since 2010, Abu Dhabi has systematically pursued a strategy that could be called “port-based imperialism”: establishing commercial and military footholds in strategically important harbors to project power while maintaining commercial legitimacy.

The UAE’s relationship with Somaliland exemplifies this doctrine perfectly. In 2016, DP World, a Dubai-based port operator majority-owned by the Abu Dhabi government, invested $442 million to develop the Port of Berbera. This secured a 30-year concession with an automatic 10-year renewal, effectively ensuring Emirati control over one of the Red Sea’s most critical deep-water facilities for the next four decades. Initially, the UAE sought to establish a military base in Berbera. However, facing international pressure and clear objection from the Somali government, the UAE recalibrated in 2019, presenting the arrangement as purely commercial. This is a textbook example of how great power competition in the 21st century operates through obfuscation rather than direct colonialism.

The strategic importance of this arrangement lies in its deniability. By linking Somaliland’s economic viability to Emirati port investments, the UAE established a structural dependency that grants influence without exercising formal political control. For example, when Ethiopia sought recognition of Somaliland in exchange for maritime access to Berbera in early 2024, it was not negotiating with an independent state with an autonomous foreign policy. Rather, it was responding to incentive structures designed by an external power that manipulates regional actors toward fragmentation.

A security paradox

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is more than just a cause for concern about the country’s and the wider region’s future stability. It will undoubtedly create a security paradox that transforms recognition into an operational advantage for transnational terrorist movements.

Recognition of Somaliland coincides with a critical security development. Documented evidence shows that Al-Shabaab and Yemen’s Houthis are coordinating more closely. In February 2025, United Nations investigators reported that, in 2024, the two groups had progressed from communication to physical meetings and materiel transfers. The Houthis provided al-Shabaab with weaponized drones, ballistic missiles, and specialized training. This collaboration could intensify if Israel’s intention to transfer Palestinians to Somaliland is discussed.

The collaboration between these organizations generates multiplied threat cascades across the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Al-Shabaab’s extensive network of smugglers, fighters, and sympathizers provides the Houthis with expanded logistics corridors for transporting weapons from the Indian Ocean to the Gulf of Aden. In return, al-Shabaab gains access to precision weaponry and drone capabilities, exponentially increasing its ability to strike fixed military targets and high-value civilian infrastructure.

The implications for maritime security are catastrophic. Currently, the Houthis extract an estimated $180 million per month from shipping companies that pay protection fees. This figure would increase substantially if al-Shabaab successfully integrated maritime piracy into a coordinated regional attack strategy. Fundamentally, the geographic distribution of threats—the Houthis controlling Yemen’s western coastline, al-Shabaab controlling Somalia’s central territory, and Puntland in northern Somalia hosting ISIS members—creates a zone of contested sovereignty where traditional maritime law enforcement becomes impossible.

Somaliland’s separation from Somalia, formalized by Israeli recognition, undermines the already fragile unified maritime response to this threat. Somaliland operating as an effective client state of the UAE—with its port under Emirati concession and its foreign policy oriented toward maximizing external investment rather than regional security—becomes another vector through which external powers pursue influence while ignoring the security implications of this multiplication.

Security and political implications for the Horn of Africa

The preceding analysis reveals the facts and strategic rationale behind Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. The critical question for analysts is: What will happen next, and why does this specific move pose an exceptional danger to regional stability?

Scenario 1: The Somaliland legitimization trap

Israeli and Emirati strategy seems to be based on the idea that recognizing Somaliland’s statehood will increase their regional influence and presence. This logic is fundamentally flawed. The Horn of Africa region requires stability through the establishment of moderate, democratic, and cooperative governments. Otherwise, Israel’s move will be fallacious. Recognizing Somaliland without simultaneously resolving Somalia’s political fragmentation creates a perverse incentive structure. Resources that would otherwise strengthen Somalia’s central capacity are instead invested in Somaliland’s infrastructure, widening the development gap between north and south.

More critically, recognizing Somaliland solidifies Ethiopia’s strategic calculations regarding maritime access. Ethiopia has been negotiating with Somalia and Somaliland regarding port access and trade corridors. The formalization of Somaliland’s independence will likely accelerate Ethiopia’s strategic alignment with Somaliland. This could include formal recognition and military cooperation arrangements, which would further isolate Somalia’s federal government and create more conflict and competing power centers within the region.

Scenario 2: Al-Shabaab’s opportunistic expansion

Al-Shabaab has begun to analyze and discuss the Somaliland recognition narrative as a recruitment and legitimacy tool. Through encrypted channels and propaganda platforms, the group’s messaging emphasizes that foreign powers are deliberately fragmenting Somali territory to prevent unified resistance against terrorism and maintain conditions of state weakness that enable exploitation.

This narrative has substantial credibility in recruitment contexts. Young men in areas contested by Al-Shabaab observe that their government is fractured and that external powers are carving up their nation’s territory. They see that the only cohesive institutional force that can offer them structure, purpose, and material incentives is the insurgency itself.

Scenario 3: Maritime Instability as the New Normal

If Somaliland achieves de facto independence and aligns strategically with Israel and the UAE, the Red Sea will be divided into multiple competing maritime jurisdictions: Houthi-controlled Yemen, politically unstable Somalia with competing authorities, UAE-aligned Somaliland, and an expanding Israeli naval presence. Managing maritime security in such an environment would become exponentially more complex.

Houthi attacks on commercial ships already pose challenges to global trade routes and create shipping delays that affect global supply chains. These attacks would likely intensify if the Houthis perceive an Israeli military presence in Somaliland as a direct escalation. Alternatively, operational coordination between the Houthis and al-Shabaab could extend maritime threats southward from the Bab el-Mandeb Strait toward other maritime states in the region, such as Kenya and Djibouti, creating what military strategists call “distributed threat zones,” where conventional maritime security approaches are inadequate.

August 2021 marked a decade of multifaceted cooperation between Somalia and Turkey. The 10^th anniversary of this sophisticated diplomatic engagement was celebrated both in Mogadishu and Ankara with ceremonies and conferences that evaluated and reflected upon the developments and outcomes of this relationship during the last ten years.

Turkey-Somalia relations have raised eyebrows in international politics and regional geopolitics, and consequently received an array of praise, scepticism, and scrutiny. Nevertheless, the two countries have maintained well-coordinated diplomatic relations.

What is the nature of Turkey-Somalia relations? What role is Turkey playing both in Somalia’s state-building and capacity-building processes? How has this relation reconfigured the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa region?

A momentous visit

On August 19, 2011, then Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid a surprising visit to Somalia. The Turkish prime minister was the first head of government or state to visit Somalia since the civil war broke out in 1991.

In 2011, Somalia and the whole East Africa region were facing one of the most calamitous famines in decades. Given Somalia’s feeble state capacity and the threat of Al-Shabaab terrorism, the country’s population was hard hit by the famine. Starvation and death alarmed international humanitarian organizations and the world at large. Images of malnourished Somali women, men, and children flooded the global media.

Today, Somalia has doctors and nurses who graduated from Turkish universities and have played significant roles in Somalia’s efforts against COVID-19 and the shortcomings in the health sector. Moreover, most of the students who graduated have become junior bureaucrats and government workers, the most famous being the current Minister of Justice Abdulkadir Muhammad Nur.

In 2015, a brand-new hospital, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Research Hospital, was inaugurated in Mogadishu. Over the years, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) has renovated numerous hospitals and health facilities across the country that were dilapidated from the civil war.

More crucially, Turkey has become Somalia’s prime partner in the security sector alongside the European Union mission in Somalia and the United States. Turkey’s military base in Mogadishu, Camp TURKSOM, saw the graduation of its third class of military cadets in August 31, 2021. The camp has trained approximately 10,000 military officers since its establishment in 2017. What is more, Turkey is training the Somali Haramcad Special Police Unit and Gorgor Commando Brigade in Turkey – both bodies have dealt heavy blows to the Al-Shabaab terror group.

In the last decade, Turkey has achieved its substantial goals of capacity-buildings in Somalia while simultaneously closely considering regional politics and geopolitical sensibilities.

Walking a tight rope

Both Turkey and Somalia treaded a tight rope geopolitically in enhancing their diplomatic and strategic interests. Turkey’s diplomatic overtures in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan brought the country into the fields of interests of the U.S., the UK and, the Gulf states leading to strategic encounters and confrontations.

The Turkish military base in Mogadishu was perceived as an entrance of a new power into the geopolitically strategic Horn of Africa and Red Sea region – a region that already hosts American, French, Chinese, and British military installations.

Consequently, the different Somali governments in the last decade have faced both implicit and explicit pressure regarding their diplomatic relations with Turkey. The debacle that surrounded the UAE military base in Somalia crisis is just one example, and resulted in the Emiratis suspending all military and social assistance to Somalia.

However, all the Somali governments that came to power maintained strategic balancing acts in their diplomatic relations with Turkey. In my opinion, they are cognizant of their own strategic interests and objectives, and consequently calibrated their foreign policy accordingly. Hence, Somalia maintained strategic relations with Turkey, the U.S., the UK, China, and Saudi Arabia in the security sector and military capacity-building, and avoided diplomatic tensions in the region.

What does the future hold for Turkey-Somalia relations?

Over the years, Turkey has become Somalia’s prime partner in state-building. Moreover, the two countries have long-term bilateral economic agreements regarding Somalia’s offshore oil, gas, and fishing explorations.

The Somali diaspora, which was traditionally based in Europe and North America, is increasingly investing and relocating to Turkey, indicating deep-rooted, people-to-people good relations between the two nations – another aspect of the efficacy of Turkish cultural diplomacy towards Africa. Hence, Turkey-Somalia relations are deepening in numerous fronts from state-building to security, and education to cultural and diaspora mobility.

As long as the perception of extra-regional and extra-continental solutions are given priority, the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the western coast of the Indian Ocean will remain on paper.

International actors that lead the maritime security operations in the Gulf of Aden and the western coast of the Indian Ocean have often used the issue of piracy as a security pretext to realize their hidden interests of maintaining hegemonic power.

Overall, on different occasions, their involvement in the counter-piracy operations on the Somalia coast has been portrayed as a morally justified act to maintain law and order in the strategically important waterway through which more than 33,000 ships navigate annually.

Maritime piracy has existed since ships first went out to sea. However, the issue has been making headlines since the late 1990s, reaching a peak between 2005 and 2008.

The dramatic escalation of maritime piracy along the coasts of Somalia in the 2000s posed a great challenge to the international community which passively stood by and watched.

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean has certain distinguishing characteristics. The first and foremost difference is that unlike pirate attacks in other parts of the world, such as the Straits of Malacca (located between Malaysia and Indonesia), pirate assaults in the Horn of Africa mostly target large vessels and bulk carriers that often transport coal and iron ore, and tanker ships that transport petroleum, chemicals, and crude oil.

In other words, in the Horn of Africa, larger and strategically important ships on international waters are targeted more frequently than smaller vessels.

Certain news outlets associated the acts of piracy in the Gulf of Aden with local governments. Undermining the capacity of regional actors in the fight against piracy serves ulterior motives.

Additionally, the Horn of Africa region was depicted as a lawless region and the regional powers’ commitment to maritime law enforcement was questioned. Certain news outlets associated the acts of piracy in the Gulf of Aden with local governments. Undermining the capacity of regional actors in the fight against piracy serves ulterior motives.

As efforts to develop regional and continental plans to ensure the Gulf of Aden’s maritime security faded away and some earlier initiatives failed, the military presence of international actors was strengthened.

There are two reasons behind the intentions of international actors to establish military bases in the Gulf of Aden. The first motivation is the presence of oil and the Gulf of Aden’s geopolitical significance.

The second is the Western perception of the continental powers’ innate inferiority. Western powers perceive themselves as superior, as redeemers, and as the guarantors of maritime security in the Gulf of Aden and the western coast of Indian Ocean. This, in turn, further legitimatizes their guardianship of the Horn of Africa’s regional actors.

While regional attempts to solve the piracy problem in the Gulf of Aden proved unsuccessful due to legal and political complications, the Western media outlets, political elites, and academics magnified the weak law enforcement, economic desperation, and the absence of a workable legal system in the region, creating the image of an environment in which international actors could and should intervene.

They ignored the capacity of regional powers such as, among others, Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, and Sudan, in the fight against piracy.

In addition, the international actors’ active maritime law enforcement activities in the coast of Somalia have not been sufficiently observed. Political administrators in Mogadishu, for example, were not empowered by global powers so as to be able to strengthen their country’s internal stability.

So far, the political havoc in Somalia is used as a leverage to justify non-regional global actors’ presence in the western coast of Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.

The piracy in this region is still a challenge for maritime security and regional and global stability. If not halted, it is likely that piracy in the region will sponsor terrorism.  However, the appropriate solution to overcome the maritime security problems in the Gulf of Aden and the western coast of the Indian Ocean is not the military deployment of global powers.

Rather, a final solution to the long-standing maritime security problem of the region could be achieved through the empowerment of the regional authorities. Meanwhile if the binaries of superior/subordinate and weak/strong are not left behind, politics will continue to generate self-created differences that will not solve the maritime security issue of the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean  or any other issue for that matter.