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estern analysts acknowledge that Turkey’s May 14 elections are among the most important elections of 2023. Europeans follow the polls almost as eagerly as Turks because for the first time in two decades, there is hope in Europe that the Erdoğan administration can change. Many European- and U.S.-centered media outlets publish opinion pieces on Turkish elections on a daily basis. Roughly half of these articles predict that President Erdoğan will win the election again, while the other half speculate that Erdoğan will not accept the election results, if he loses.

The reason why European actors closely follow Turkey’s elections and are in favor of a government change is that under President Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkey has become an international actor capable of establishing a sphere of influence in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Turkic world, South Asia, and many countries in Africa.

President Erdoğan has taken Turkey out of the Western political orbit and turned it into a more independent player, adopting more autonomous and indigenous policies. This approach finds a response beyond Turkey’s borders. European political circles are equally disturbed by Turkey’s influence on Muslim minorities in Europe, including those of Turkish origin, which have become intensely sympathetic to Turkey under Erdoğan.

Europe’s Expectations and its “ideal” Turkey

Europe’s main expectation from Turkey’s May 14 elections is to see a weaker political profile come to power and for the country to follow a more inward-looking and less assertive regional foreign policy. There appears no plan in sight for Europe to revive membership negotiations with Turkey for the European Union. Even if Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and the Nation Alliance win the elections, there is no easy and fresh start with Turkey, which will continue to be pushed back. In fact, Kılıçdaroğlu’s promise to “lift visas to Europe” if elected was already denied by German officials.

A vision of a Turkey which follows EU foreign policy and integrates into the European economy as much as EU member states allow, but that remains outside of the union, is the ideal relationship between the EU and Turkey for European politicians. Against this backdrop, President Erdoğan’s vision of the “Axis of Turkey” with an expanded strategic autonomy and a balanced foreign policy is at odds with the European vision of Turkey.

European experts do not shy away from saying that Kılıçdaroğlu’s Nation Alliance would be more in line with their “ideal” Turkey. At the same time, the opposition’s possible election victory also worries them. As there is no plan in Europe’s short-term agenda to initiate a new phase in its relations with Turkey, it is easier and more convenient to maintain the status quo if Erdoğan remains in power. Europe seems to have no road map for how it will redefine relations with Turkey if the opposition wins. Although some European politicians are giving Turkish opposition figures pats on the back, this may not have immediate positive repercussions.

European Media’s Approach to Turkey

Dreaming of a Turkey without Erdoğan, many European think tanks, politicians, and media outlets have taken a firm stance on Turkey’s May 14 elections. Even though, they cannot foresee what the consequences of a possible government change would be for the European Union, they are aware that their capacity to influence Turkish politics will be extremely limited if Erdoğan is reelected. As a result, they have persistently avoided taking any political steps that could set a constructive agenda with Turkey, as they believe that revitalizing Turkey-EU relations could strengthen Erdoğan’s hand.

The EU’s short-term foreign policy expectations from Turkey are the following: Sweden’s admission to NATO, and Turkey’s abandoning a balanced position in the Ukraine War and taking a clear stance against Russia. However, European political actors are uncertain about the Turkish opposition’s possible approach to the migration issue and view the opposition’s discourse on the deportation of Syrian refugees in Turkey with hesitation. Europe is not prepared for a wave of migration through Turkey. That is why, there is also a narrow group of politicians who advocate in favor of the continuation of the current administration in Turkey. While there are opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation between Turkey and the EU in many areas such as energy, agriculture, transportation, industry, and technology, there is no political will to mobilize this potential.

While European analysts recognize that the Nation Alliance is an ideologically fragmented and fragile political entity, they agree that it is a preferable alternative to a strong Erdoğan administration. They believe that they can get along more easily with some members of the Nation Alliance. Moreover, possible cracks in the alliance can create a framework in which they can exert their own influence. In fact, many articles in German, French, and British media outlets argue that that the Turkish economy will decline further if the current government remains in power.

Nobody knows whether there will be a renewed mobilization in potential areas of cooperation, if Kılıçdaroğlu becomes Turkey’s new president. Some even suggest that if Erdoğan is reelected, Turkey-EU relations could regain a positive momentum through a gradual progress based on mutual interests. Moreover, the Erdoğan administration’s expectations from the EU are more modest than those of the opposition.

The Two Portrayals of Turkey in Europe

There are two different portrayals of Turkey’s May 14 elections being presented to Europeans. European politicians and journalists often interact with Turkish citizens living in Europe who are white-collar migrants, media journalists, and members of academic elites. These individuals are largely politically pro-opposition, are ideologically motivated, or adhere to certain ethnocentric factions. Consequently, European media understand the developments in Turkey through the biased perspective of such actors, who publish partisan articles in media outlets on contemporary Turkish politics.

Turkey is also portrayed by a secularist European elite, whose perspective largely overlaps with the Turkish opposition, depicting Turkish politics one-sidedly. Articles produced by prejudiced actors are then translated into Turkish, generating another impact layer in Turkey. This offshore opposition, supported by Europe, aims to influence Turkish politics from abroad, and forms a biased political enclave that despises a conservative and nationalist government with Islamic moral codes in Turkey represented by a strong leader personified in Erdoğan. Having invested all their hope for change in the Nation Alliance, this enclave has the potential to influence its elite interlocutors in Europe.

However, citizens of Turkish origin across Europe draw a completely different picture. Almost two-thirds of those of Turkish origin in Europe voted for President Erdoğan in the 2018 presidential elections. This rate is on average 10 points higher than the support Erdoğan received in Turkey. In the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections, the picture is not expected to change dramatically. There is a silent majority of people of Turkish origin in Europe supporting Erdoğan. European politicians and bureaucrats are aware of this silent majority, whose views are not reflected or represented in the press or in academic circles.

Facing a labor shortage after World War II, in October 1961, Germany created a program to bring in so-called gastarbeiter or guest workers from Turkey. Besides Germany, other Western countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Austria also needed workers to boost production in their booming postwar economy.

Many of the Turkish guest workers who arrived in the country never left, and created a minority community that forever changed the demographics of Western European countries. As stated by the German Federal Foreign Office, “We called for workers, but people came.”

Today, sixty years on, individuals with Turkish roots form one of the largest minority groups in EU countries. Politics Today interviewed six motivated, educated young adults from five different countries who all share a migrant background.

Burhan Bayhan, 31, Denmark

Burhan Bayhan, a 31-year-old Danish-Turkish historian living in Copenhagen, told Politics Today he was never able to meet his grandfather as he died when Burhan was still a baby. This made him try to meet his grandfather through understanding and studying his legacy.

My grandfather Kemal Bayhan was one of many guest workers who sought their luck in Denmark in the late 1960s. He was born in a village in Sivas, Turkey, where he worked as a farmer. He got an invitation letter from an employer through a friend from his village who was already working there. He left behind a wife and five children, and came to Denmark in November 1969. He worked for many years in low-paying industrial jobs to build a better future for his family which he brought to Denmark in 1980 through family reunification. 

As a kid I used to play with his coin collection and ask my parents questions about him. But many questions about his first years in Denmark remained unanswered. So last year, I went to the Danish National Archives in hope of learning more about him. I found his immigration case, which answered all my questions. To my big surprise, I also found a picture of him and my grandmother which I had never seen before – this was really an emotional moment for me.

In a time where hatred and anti-immigrant rhetoric against immigrants became the norm, we should remember that these hardworking guest workers sacrificed a lot including their health for building and straightening our welfare system from which we benefit today. I feel really proud and lucky to be a descendant of a Turkish guest worker. Thanks to him, today, I am a well-educated and open-minded person, and their struggles keep inspiring me and giving me strength.

Rıdvan Denizoğlu, 21, Belgium

The process of adjusting to Belgian culture made the 21-year-old Rıdvan Denizoğlu question his background. This led to an identity crisis in which Denizoğlu has been asking himself whether he is Turkish or Belgian. After a long period, he came to the conclusion that it is a huge benefit to be in-between both cultures.

My grandparents were among the first Turkish guest workers to arrive in Limburg, Belgium, in the 1960s. My grandfather worked here for years in the Beringen coal mines. My mother was the first child of six, making the future generations of my family in Belgium a fact. I love to listen to my grandparents’ stories about this time, and they love to tell them. The common theme in all their stories is how hard it was to adapt when you come from a rural village in Ardahan in northeastern Turkey, and suddenly find yourself in industrial and ‘modern’ Belgium/Europe where nothing is the same.

Because of my background and experiences, I am following a primary school teacher training course because I do not agree with the way children with a migration background are treated. That is why, as a teacher with Turkish roots, I hope to realize a renaissance in which future Turkish children are treated fairly and can make the best of themselves. I am also president of the Youth of Willebroek (YoW) association. Our goal is to bring out the best in young people from all cultural backgrounds.

While dealing with such matters, I try to motivate the next generations to speak up, to use their talents, to show that we, as a younger generation, must continue the “legacy” of our grandparents. They came to an unknown place during difficult times to provide a better life for us. Despite the fact that we still have a hard time as “immigrants,” we have to thank them by working hard and to show them that their efforts were not in vain.

Büşra Suratlı, 27, Germany

Büşra is 27 years old, and was born and raised in Germany where she works as a civil servant. In addition to her work, she is studying to get her degree in business administration. Büşra talked to Politics Today about how her grandfather was homesick his entire life.

My grandfather Mustafa Özcan who was originally from Trabzon, left his family behind and came to Duisburg, Germany, as a “Gastarbeiter” in 1970 where he stayed with many other Turkish guest workers in a dormitory. They stayed in one room where everyone had his own closet and shared the same bathroom. My grandfather could only communicate with his family in Turkey through letters. Sometimes he would record an audio on cassettes and send them by mail which would take 10 days.

After 1976, my grandmother and children also came. In Hüttenheim, a total of six people lived in a two-and-a-half-room apartment. My dear grandfather used to travel 20 km a day by bike to go to the train station in the city center and buy the Tercüman newspaper which wasn’t even up to date. Most of the times it was from two days ago, but it was a great blessing for him.

Although his children lived in Germany, in the late ’90s, my grandfather decided to go back to Turkey. Then, he was only able to see his children and grandchildren during holidays when they would visit Turkey. The Turkish word “gurbet,” which means the state or feeling of being a stranger in a foreign country, or longing for one’s homeland, always remained part of my grandfather until his death. Being alone in Turkey made him become homesick for his family.

As a bilingual European Turk, I am currently working as a civil servant in Germany. I proudly tell the story of my grandfather to everyone. I feel very lucky for the decision he made. Most of the time, I think about his suffering and visualize it in my mind. My wish is to pass on these memories to the next generations, and not to let them forget that we are here because of them. I think it is important to represent our culture and homeland in an exemplary way for the sake of all the sufferings they went through.

Ahmet Turan Atmaca, 26, Netherlands

Ahmet Turan is 26 years old and is working in the field of environmental sustainability through recycling. He was born and raised in Rotterdam in the Netherlands where he was able to study at the same building his grandfather once worked at as a guest worker.

In the beginning of the 1960s, my grandfather Ahmet Atmaca came to the Netherlands where he stayed and worked at the Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij, which pre-World War II was the largest shipbuilding, ship-repair, and machine building facility in the port city of Rotterdam – it existed between 1902 and 1996. I’m proud to say that my grandfather was part of such an important company when it comes to the Dutch shipping industry.

I’m even more proud of the fact that I was able to study later at the same place my grandfather once worked. The older I get the more I realize what kind of hardship my grandfather had to endure. From a small village in Trabzon, a city on the Black Sea coast of northeastern Turkey, to the port city of Rotterdam situated on the Maas River. Only for this reason these two cities will forever hold a special place in my heart.

In 1994, my grandfather decided to move back to Istanbul. He would come and visit us in the Netherlands from time to time. Every time he came, we would take different walking routes in Rotterdam where we had the most precious conversations. I remember he loved to look at the Maas River, maybe because it felt like home, the Black Sea. I really think that my passion for caring for nature, the environment, and my admiration for the sea comes from the relationship I had with my grandfather.

Unfortunately, my grandfather passed away earlier this year. As the grandchild of a migrant, I think it is important to continue talking about their sufferings otherwise the next generations won’t be aware of what our grandparents once did for us. They really sacrificed their lives for us. Most of the Turks in Europe owe this to their parents and grandparents.

Yasin Güler, 25, France

Yasin is a motivated councilor of the municipality of Erstein, a city near Strasbourg, where he was born and raised. Yasin, who is 25 years old, holds a master’s degree in international law and currently lives in Paris. Here he works as a compliance Manager for an MGA Insurance Managing General Agent. He also has a great passion for Turkish classical music.

My story starts the same as a lot of other Europeans with Turkish roots. My father saved some money in the early ’80s to move to France. As a result of the introduction of the law on family reunification, my mom too, was able to come to France. Being the youngest child of a family of 5, I have always been very interested in culture, sports, and music. At this stage of my life, I realize that I, just like other children of migrant parents, have been asking myself questions the answers of which weren’t actually that hard to find.

I realized that even though my roots are miles away, through my passion for art and music, I slowly start to understand that I belong to both countries. From a very young age, I’ve been aware of the possibilities the country I was born gave me, and, therefore, it was more than crucial to give back to the French community through my education and personal achievements. An example of this is my work for the municipality after I became a councilor. As the second- and third-generation Turks in Europe, our lifestyle and achievements today we owe to our family members, friends, and every individual who helped us through this process.

Sometimes I’m exposed to the question of whether I feel more Turkish or French. I use the term “exposed” because I don’t think that there is a certain answer to this: there are just people with stories and paths they have walked on – that is what matters.

Latife Özdemir, 23, Netherlands

My grandfather Vahdettin Özdemir was born and raised in a small village in Elazığ, southeastern Turkey. After elementary school, he had to stop his education and work with his father because of their poor conditions. He once told that they only had one pair of shoes at home and that he had to share this with all his siblings. In the winter, he sometimes had to walk barefoot through the snow.

In the early ’60s, my grandfather went to Germany, where he worked in the coal mines for a long time. After a few years, he decided to move to the Netherlands where he stayed in a dormitory with a lot of other guest workers while working at the harbor of Scheveningen in The Hague.

My grandfather used to send voice messages through cassettes from The Hague to his village in Elazığ to my grandmother and their children. My father tells us that whenever a cassette would come, the whole village would come together to listen to his stories and how hard life was abroad. Sometimes the cassettes came months later. My grandfather used to sing Kurdish songs known as “Dengbêj” (a genre of singing storytelling) in which he expressed his feelings and the hardships he was going through.

Because my grandfather had to stop his education from a very young age, he encouraged my father to study. Although my father was lucky enough to be able to continue his education in the Netherlands, it wasn’t always easy to adapt to the culture and learn the Dutch language. In 2001, three years after I was born, my father got his master’s degree in criminal law from Leiden University. Currently, I am studying law as well, and I am more than proud to hear these stories and reflect on the migration and integration history of our family. I hope the next generation of Turkish Europeans will continue telling these stories and become more active as an integral part of modern European culture.

“Germany has declared war on the PKK. We can fight back. Every Kurd is a potential suicide bomber.” These words were spoken by Abdullah Öcalan, the founder of the PKK terror group, three years after the group had been banned in Germany due to arson attacks, self-immolations, the blocking of motorways, and storming of Turkish consulates.

However, despite these words, the PKK continued to pursue its double-pronged strategy. In Europe, the terror group focuses on non-violent propaganda work with demonstrations, marches, culture festivals, and various campaigns as well as extorting money and selling drugs to finance its violent terror activities in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. This dual approach by the PKK to use Europe to attack Turks, Arabs, and Kurds with terror requires a dual counter-terror strategy.

While Turkey, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the Syrian Interim Government of the opposition focus more on the militant side of the PKK, Europe has to combat and extinguish the PKK base in Europe that subsidizes the militancy of the PKK with fresh radicalized recruits, funding, and propaganda. Despite the ban of the PKK across European capitals, Europe’s approach to the PKK has always been under the bar of minimum. In recent years, with the growing popularity of the Syrian branch of the PKK – the YPG – the PKK has managed to expand its base in Europe and established strong ties with the far-left.

Weak law enforcement against the PKK – The Case of Germany

According to the German secret service yearly report, the PKK has 14,500 members in Germany alone. However, the number of attendees to its demonstrations in Germany reached 25,000 people. The German intelligence service estimates that 290 people from Germany joined the PKK militants in Turkey, northern Iraq, and Syria since 2013. While 32 of them died during combat, 150 returned to Germany.

In 2020 alone, the PKK has collected at least 16.5 million EURO in Germany

In 2020 alone, the PKK has collected at least 16.5 million EURO in Germany. The total amount of collected money in Europe is estimated to be 30 million EURO. While this happened, the German courts sentenced 3 PKK figures to imprisonment of a period between 2,5 and 3 years.

The European fight against the PKK is symbolized in a recent incident in Germany. According to the report, 90 members of the PKK marched in Lüneburg, Germany, and decided to continue traveling by train. The train crew refused them as they had no tickets and did not abide by the COVID19 safety rules. The PKK members got violent and attacked the crew and the police that were called in. Several criminal proceedings were started against the 90 PKK members, but not on charges of being a member of a terror group or demonstrating in support of it. They were charged with assault and resistance to law enforcement officers.

More dramatically, leaks show that Macron received a designated terrorist. Recent leaks by a Belgian journalist prove that Ilham Ahmed is a PKK veteran. An interviewee provided the Belgian journalist Hedwig Kuijpers with a picture of Ilham Ahmed during her days in a PKK academy in northern Iraq estimated to date between 2007 and 2009.

The PKK did not only exploit the situation in Syria but also used it to expand its ties with the European far-left.

The new momentum gained by the PKK thanks to the name game allowed the terror group to increase its propaganda activities and network across European capitals. The YPG under the name of the Syrian Democratic Council or others opened several political bureaus and engaged in several diplomatic relations.

European Leftists Support the PKK

The PKK did not only exploit the situation in Syria to gain diplomatic and political opportunities but also used it to expand its relations and ties with the European far-left. An internal EU policy paper by the office of EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove, released by non-profit monitoring group Statewatch, showed that the EU’s anti-terror chief has expressed concern over strengthening ties between European extreme leftists and the YPG/PKK terrorist organization have recently been getting stronger.

Many western radical leftists joined the ranks of the YPG in Syria and have become propaganda tools of the PKK that advocate for the ‘leftist utopia’ in Syria. The implementation of democratic confederalism – a radical governance model of Murray Bookchin – was a strong part of Abdullah Öcalan’s terror agenda. While Syrians suffer under this totalitarian governance model, the idea is gaining popularity among the European left.

The PKK actively instrumentalize the support of radical leftists and western militants who joined its ranks in Syria to gather support for itself. This support ranges from propaganda to parliamentary members demanding the delisting of a terror group that killed over 40,000 people. Most importantly, the European left support for the PKK allows the terror group to access entirely new capital and resources to boost its terror activities.

The PKK now can use the western leftist white men for its interest. The PKK exploits the radical left to strengthen its base in Europe towards European governments and officials as well as towards the Kurds. The PKK plays the radical European leftist also against Kurdish rivals. For instance, when the PKK attacked the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in northern Iraq, radical leftists tried to enter the region and demonstrate in northern Iraq against the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This attempt was prevented by the Kurdish authorities who denied these radical leftists entry to the country.

After the peak of the PKK in the period between 2014 and 2018, the terror group suffered a blowback after the other. The joint Turkish-Syrian military operations, as well as the Kurdish cooperation with Turkey in northern Iraq, drew the PKK back. As I wrote in an earlier article, a de-facto unnamed regional alliance of Turks, Kurds, and Arabs was formed against the PKK.

The Turkish government, the Kurdish Regional Government, and the Syrian Interim Government are trying to end the terror of the PKK. While this happens, the PKK’s base in Europe gives the terror group a lifeline. The lack of law enforcement against the PKK, the fruits of the name-game of the PKK, and the European leftists support are what will keep the terror group alive. In contrast to the American unreliable support, the base of the PKK in Europe is more stable and has the potential.

If the U.S. pulls out of Syria as it did in Afghanistan, it may affect the PKK greatly, but Europe guarantees that the PKK will continue to live. Europe needs to address its wrongdoings in combatting terrorism. Otherwise, the terror of the PKK may take the lives of many more innocent Turks, Kurds, and Arabs.

No doubt, Turkey’s relationship with the European Union has not been a rose garden. The first contact dates back to the 1960s and the Ankara Agreement, and over time led to the establishment of a customs union. The gradual institutional rapprochement culminated in 2005, when the negotiations for full Turkish membership began.

The process immediately exposed fractures within the European block, attributable for the most part to the existence of a certain criticism towards Ankara. The admission process introduced significant issues to the political debate in Turkey, aiming primarily at a more democratic governance.

However, from the very beginning, the accession path has been affected by a lack of cohesion and a lack of a joint perspective from the European side, mainly due to the divergent stances of some member states.

Hence, the negotiations progressed only slowly, and the unresolved Cyprus issue in conjunction with the double standards by member states led by Germany and France contributed to undermining the principle of pacta sunt servanda.

Though since 2004 Ankara has continued to support the solution offered by the Annan Plan, it has faced not only the intransigence of the Greek administration, but also the full annexation of Cyprus as a member state of the European Union, which, in turn, has vetoed most of the significant chapters by causing to halting the negotiation process.

If those were the assumptions, nowadays the relations with the European Union experience growing tensions leading to a mutual crisis of confidence. What we have witnessed in the recent months in the Eastern Mediterranean and over the main European negotiation tables are nothing more than the products of those unresolved issues and stances that have little to do with realpolitik.

Although the European Union acts and operates according to the principle of unity and solidarity in itself, a careful analysis reveals that the treatment of Turkey has been different.

On the one hand, there is a tendency by a block in the EU to dominate the European debate and its key issues with reference to a self-assumed political and moral superiority expressed chiefly by Emmanuel Macron who tries to monopolize the European rhetoric and represent France as the leader of the liberal world.

On the other hand, there are mediating attempts based mainly on strategic and consistent considerations. French President Macron, along the lines of the traditional anti-Turkish sentiment, has not skimped on granting support to Greece and Cyprus over the critical issue related to the delimitation of territorial waters, which recently has seen an escalation of tones and maneuvers in the Mediterranean.

Among the representatives at the table only Greece accepted the proposal to punish Turkey, while Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Malta opposed more severe sanctions against Ankara. Therefore, in preparation for the Special European Council on October 1-2, which convened specifically to assess the situation in the Aegean Sea, a more intense collaboration has emerged between Paris, Athens, and Nicosia, while the other coastal states opted for a constructive approach based on dialogue.

In this frame, Rome plays a key role by proposing a positive agenda towards Turkey. Since the very beginning, Italy has supported Ankara’s EU accession, which is considered of great importance from both a strategic and a political point of view. At that time, the so-called Friends of Turkey, including Italy, Spain, the UK, and Sweden, was established with the explicit aim of balancing the existing negative approaches.

However, more recently, in the resolution following the meeting of the Council of Europe on December 10-11, EU leaders reaffirmed the EU’s strategic interest in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey and stressed the importance of keeping channels of communication between the EU and Turkey open.

A positive EU-Turkey agenda is on the table, provided by Turkey’s readiness to resolve differences through dialogue and to act in accordance with international law.

The offer of a positive EU-Turkey agenda remains on the table, provided Turkey shows readiness to promote a genuine partnership with the union and its member states, and to resolve differences through dialogue and in accordance with international law. This approach confirms that Italy, Spain, and Malta – supported as well by Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Germany – have succeeded in prevailing a softer line towards Ankara.

The reasons behind this dialogue-based orientation are manifold. First, there is a subtle acknowledgement of the legitimacy of certain Turkish requests and of the importance of Turkey as a valuable partner, proving how much Europe and Turkey need each other. In a time of uncertainty and several crises, Turkey stands as a crucial gateway in the containment of threats and risks for Europe.

The fight against terrorism, arms trafficking, and human trafficking are some factors underlying the existence of a strong complementarity. Moreover, Angela Merkel on behalf of the whole EU, was one of the main architects of the Refugees Deal signed with Turkey in 2016, whose aim was to stem the irregular migratory flow across the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Despite the numerous vicissitudes and certain non-compliances on the European side, the agreement has been effective in containing irregular immigration, demonstrating once again that Turkey is a partner Europe can count on.

For the same reasons, a certain degree of support and sympathy are expressed by Hungary and Poland, whose relations with Turkey are very positive. In other words, a further deterioration in the relations and in the mutual trust could generate a snowball effect that the whole EU, considering the fragility of some internal mechanisms of control and on the migrants’ reception policies, would not be able to cope with.

As a matter of fact, the Mediterranean is an area of shared historical and strategic interest where Ankara as a smart power is acting in an increasingly assertive way. After all, the Turkish presence in scenarios that suffer from the decision-making vacuum left by the European powers, has led to a certain level of stabilization.

In Libya, alongside Fayez al-Sarraj and the government legitimately recognized by the UN, Ankara has effectively established itself as a peacekeeping force, protecting the interests of European countries as well. All EU states support the UN-recognized government of al-Sarraj with the exception of France which stands close to the warlord Haftar and therefore had to complain about the presence of Turkish soldiers in Tripoli.

In the frame of the Berlin Conference of January 29, 2020, Italy and Germany contributed toward mediating and channeling Turkish expectations to the European tables. Speaking of the alignments and divisions on the fields, Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio reiterated, “We must accept the Turkish presence in Libya.”