“My life Kirkuk, my love Kirkuk

Falling for every word Kirkuk

Far away from the beloved

Whose candle is burning Kirkuk

They destroyed your castle Kirkuk

They cut down your children Kirkuk

Your death was announced from an adorned minaret Kirkuk”

These lines are from an elegy written for those who were martyred during the 1959 massacre.

It’s a historical fact that Turkic tribes travelled to Iraq even before Anatolia. Turk’s journey to Iraq began when Abbasid Caliph al-Mu’tasim decided to form a new army in 836, inviting Turkic Mamluk beys. With the condition of not blending in with the local populace, Turkic troops flocked into the region. Caliph al-Mu’tasim moved the capital from Baghdad to Samarra, a city founded for Turks whose population reached 35,000. Ultimately, Turks served at every level of the Abbasid government. In fact, in his manuscript titled “Tales from the Caliphate Army and Turks’ Virtue,” Arab scholar al-Jahiz wrote that “ideas about racial discrimination in order to protect Islam are false, especially after living under peace and trust that is facilitated by Turks.”

Kirkuk – the capital of culture and politics

The region encapsulating Kirkuk and Mosul was under the rule of Turkic states like Seljuks, Timurids, Jalairids, Kara Koyunlu Turkmens and Ottomans for many centuries. Ruled by the Ottomans for four centuries, Kirkuk was the capital of Mosul Province which was formed in 1850 and more importantly the source for administrators who were commended with the administration of the region. Indeed, despite all political changes, 22 Turkmens, 8 Arabs and 4 Kurds of Talabani and Barzanji families have served as the mayors of Kirkuk between 1875 and 2003. Even after World War I and during the British rule, Turkmens were present in the administration. Despite British occupation and rule, Turkmens never hesitated to side with Turkey in political matters. Due to the Turkmen stance in the Mosul dispute, half-spy half-researcher Gertrude Bell was forced to write that “Turkish families in the region should be closely surveilled by Britain because of their desire for a Turkish administration and opposition to Faisal’s kingship.”

It’s known that Turkmens have lived in Kirkuk city center with extended families since the Ottomans. Constructing an educated class, Turkmens work as traders, medical doctors, pharmacists, teachers and engineers. Rural surroundings of Kirkuk were historically populated by the Kurdish Talabani tribe. While Turkmens consists of Shiites/Ja’faris, Alawites/Bektashis and Sunnis, it is known that Talabanis are usually Sunni/Shafi’i and Barzanjis are Qadiris.

Oil was struck, valor was gone

This continued to be the case until World War I with little changes. However, it all changed after 1920. The swiftly growing oil industry in the British Iraq changed the demographics of the country. While Turkmens stayed away from the oil sector, it was attractive for Kurds and Arabs. Considered as slums, new districts like Arapha emerged with the influx of people to Kirkuk.

Founded in 1921, Iraq has gone through around 20 coups and a similar number of assassinations and political murders. The number of thwarted coup attempts is unknown. Deaths caused by plane crashes, alleged heart attacks and suicides could be also included to these counts, as all of them are questionable.

The reality is that this turbulence continued until Saddam’s rule. With the terror emerging as a result of the tyrannical understanding of the Ba’ath mentality, everything calmed down. Saddam didn’t only eliminate those who openly opposed him; he also killed those who were suspected of opposing along with their families.

General politics, assimilation

Including the Ba’ath rule, all those who were in charge of Iraqi politics aimed to assimilate Turkmens and demographically engineer the cities heavily populated by Turkmens. For instance, Saddam was gifting dowry to all Turkmen women who were marrying with men of Arab descent, while providing houses and employment to Turkmen men who were marrying with women of Arab descent in any city of Iraq, with the exception of Kirkuk. Under the Ba’ath rule, Kurds along with Turkmens were forced to identify themselves as Arabs when officials asked. This policy caused certain Turkmen families, especially the Bayats, to Arabize. Despite this, youth who were believed to be spreading Turkish nationalism and had similar political stances with Turkey were surveilled by the Mukhabarat –the regime’s intelligence agency- and were sentenced to various punishments, including execution.

Those who paid a price for Kirkuk: Necdet Koçak

I want to talk about Necdet Koçak whom I always remember and loved as a brother and whose death still pains me. I know that Necdet Koçak is a symbol of all martyred Kirkuk citizens since 1959 in the eyes of Iraqi Turkmens.

Koçak was born in Kirkuk in 1939. He finished his early education in Kirkuk and then came to Turkey to attend the Faculty of Agriculture at Ankara University in 1958. He graduated in 1962 and returned to Kirkuk. He started to work for the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture. He came to Turkey once again in 1964 to conclude his doctorate studies. He became an academic at the University of Baghdad in Iraq. He was arrested in March 1979 with the charge of “being a Turkish nationalist.” His wife Ayten Koçak extracts:

“Saddam’s henchmen came to our house on January 15, 1980 late at night. They told me that I could visit Necdet in prison. I went to the prison named Abu Ghraib near Baghdad the following day. They let me in. He [Necdet] was in a miniscule cell that a person could hardly fit, at a pitch-black corridor. Colonel Abdullah Abdurrahman and Adil Şerif were staying in the neighboring cells. Because of the ceaseless torturing, all three of them were exhausted. Colonel Abdullah Abdurrahman had lost his eyes because of diabetes and was writhing. Their bodies were covered with wounds. There were burn marks on both sides of Necdet’s temple. It was obvious that he was tortured with electricity. They didn’t allow us to speak properly. Necdet informed me about execution decision and said that the banner of struggle should never fall. It was his last will. We bid our farewells, then.”

This, and similar stories to Necdet’s did not end with Saddam’s downfall. The last act of the coup which tore the social fabric occurred with the First Gulf War in 1991. Then, the American invasion in 2003 opened Pandora’s box. The first outcome of the invasion was the US-controlled destruction of civil and land registries in Kirkuk. Those who were exhilarated with the downfall of Saddam and the Ba’ath regime in 2003 did not know what to do when Washington began to “Kurdicize” the region. The historical texture was completely eradicated. The era marked by bombings and assassinations aiming to intimidate Arabs and Turkmens, attacks not being investigated and forced immigration of Turkmens to other countries, especially Turkey, has now started.

Following the independence referendum in northern Iraq on September 25, tensions have escalated between the central Baghdad administration and Erbil.

After the intervention of the Iraqi military forces in Kirkuk, a disputed area between KRG and Iraq, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi ordered the government forces to suspend all military activities in disputed areas.

Iraqi forces secure 40 oil wells in Nineveh

On Saturday an Iraqi army officer confirmed that Iraqi federal forces have obtained 40 oil wells from the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in recent military operations.

Army Major Hammam al-Abdali told the Anadolu Agency that “Iraqi joint forces have managed to assert control over 40 out of 44 oil wells in recent military operations in the Zummar district of Tal Afar [west of provincial capital Mosul].”

“The central government has sent engineering crews specialized in operating oil wells to the area in order to maintain all extraction without interruption,” he said.

He added: “Iraqi forces are also providing protection for the engineering crews so the latter can carry out their responsibilities without encountering difficulties.”

Following the independence referendum in Northern Iraq, the KRG had been subject to political and economic sanctions from regional and international actors.

Amid the military operation conducted by the central Baghdad administration in Kirkuk, the KRG administration proposed on Wednesday to freeze its illegal referendum in an attempt to halt the operations.

A statement published by the KRG read: “As Iraq and Kurdistan are faced with grave and dangerous circumstances, we are all obliged to act responsibly in order to prevent further violence and clashes between Iraqi and Peshmerga forces.”

Highlighting the clashes between the Iraqi and Peshmerga forces that erupted on October 16, 2017 the KRG stated: “Clashes have caused damage to both sides and could lead to a continuous bloodshed, inflicting pain and social unrest among different components of Iraqi society.”

“Certainly, continued fighting does not lead any side to victory, but it will drive the country towards disarray and chaos, affecting all aspects of life.”

In order to fulfill “our responsibilities and obligations towards the people of Kurdistan and Iraq,” the KRG proposed an immediate ceasefire and halt of all military operations, freezing the referendum results and starting an open dialogue with the Iraqi government on the basis of the Constitution.

Following the Kurdish independence referendum, political and economic sanctions have been imposed on the Masoud Barzani administration. On the basis of protecting Iraq’s territorial integrity, regional and international governments rejected the referendum, except Israel.

While the central Iraqi administration announced repeatedly that they do not recognize the referendum and interpreted it as a violation of the constitution, last week Iraqi forces entered Kirkuk amid the withdrawal of Peshmerga forces.

Successfully taking over Kirkuk, which has been a “disputed territory” and under the control of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces since 2014, Baghdad recently announced that they have sent reinforcement officers to Kirkuk in order to secure oil facilities in the northern city.

Speaking to Anadolu Agency, a local police officer, Capt. Hamed al-Obaidi stated that “Large police troops were dispatched to Kirkuk oil fields as part of a plan to secure oil facilities there.”

Al-Obaidi also confirmed that the Iraqi army will leave the task of securing the oil fields in Kirkuk to the police.

KRG welcomes US call for ceasefire

In response to the ongoing clashes in Iraq, especially since the referendum and the takeover of Kirkuk, the US State Department has called for both sides to cease violence.

On Friday State dept spokeswoman Heather Nauert stated that “The United States is concerned by reports of violent clashes around the town of Altun Kupri in northern Iraq,” adding that the US welcomed Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi’s instruction to federal forces to protect Iraqi Kurdish citizens and not to provoke them.

In response, the KRG welcomed this statement and in a statement claimed it was “ready to cooperate with an international coalition led by the US to support a ceasefire between Peshmerga and Iraqi forces.”

The KRG also added that it welcomed negotiations with Baghdad within the framework of the Iraqi constitution but without any preconditions.

While the loss of Kirkuk and oil fields in the province have been a major loss for the KRG, many have interpreted the KRG’s positive reaction to a ceasefire as a political weakness – such that calls for resignations have been made.

Calls for Barzani to resign

On Sunday The Kurdish Movement for Change (Gorran) Party called on President Barzani and Vice President Kosrat Rasul to resign from their posts.

Speaking at a news conference party spokesman Shorsh Haji stated: “They have to resign from their posts. At the same time, the Cabinet should also be abolished.”

Calling for the formation of a “national salvation government,” Haji added: “Our people have lost many of their achievements which they gained shedding their blood. Peshmerga [fighters] lost their grandeur. We lost many friendly countries. The reason for all of this is due to the failures of the party in power.”

Following the Kurdish independence referendum which was held in northern Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) controlled areas, the central Iraq administration have responded with political and economic sanctions.

In addition, with the withdrawal of the KRG-loyal Peshmerga fighters, Iraqi military forces have taken control of Kirkuk.

Following the military operation, on Thursday a Baghdad court issued an arrest warrant for Kosrat Rasul, vice-president of the KRG.

A statement released by Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council read: “The Rusafa investigations court has issued an arrest warrant for Kosrat Rasul following the latter’s recent statements in which he referred to Iraqi Federal Police units in Kirkuk as ‘occupying forces.’”

“The court views Rasul’s statements as a kind of incitement against the Iraqi Armed Forces,” it added, noting that the arrest warrant has been issued in line with Article 226 of Iraq’s penal code.

On Wednesday Rasul, who is also a leading member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), compared the recent “invasion” of Kirkuk by Iraqi forces – along with other disputed areas of Iraq – to the “Anfal operation.”

Here Rasul was referring to a series of ethnic cleansing campaigns carried out in northern Iraq by former President Saddam Hussein during the 1980s.

Oil fields in control of Baghdad administration

Confirming that the Iraq forces have re-gained control of the oil fields in Kirkuk, the Iraq Oil Ministry spokesperson Asim Cihad said: “The ministry now also holds oil wells and facilities in Kirkuk.”

Following this move, the Iraqi government asked British Petroleum (BP) to develop oil fields in Kirkuk.

The ministry called on BP to urgently make the necessary plans for developing Kirkuk’s oil fields, adding that the central government has the right to develop oil fields in all cities of Iraq.

As a result of the Peshmerga failing to resist operations initiated by the Iraqi Army on October 16, most parts of Kirkuk are now controlled by the Baghdad administration.

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Peshmergas’ withdrawal with the premise of “not being as powerful as the Iraqi Army” allowed the army to march into Kirkuk with ease. While the Peshmerga Command in Erbil accuses PUK Peshmergas, it could be asserted that these events are the reflection of a political will. While certain PUK factions aligned themselves with Erbil, the Talabani family distanced themselves from the Erbil administration after the division within the party following Jalal Talabani’s sickness. It was known that the PUK was improving relations with Baghdad and Iran while criticizing the Erbil administration for monopolizing the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) revenues, administration and justice system. As the Masoud Barzani administration intended to expand its authority to Sulaymaniyah following the referendum results, the PUK, led by the Talabani family, wanted to benefit from the crisis between Baghdad and Erbil. Withdrawal of Peshmerga units from Kirkuk without resistance could be assessed as a reflection of the political power struggle within KRG. Despite statements made by some Peshmerga forces and the PKK elements in line of defense, the Iraqi Army has captured most of Kirkuk. Baghdad replaced Najmiddin Karim, who played a prominent role in escalating tensions in Kirkuk, with Rakan Saeed Ali Juburi, who is of Arabic descent. The Kirkuk Police Department announced that they are on duty, while underlining their allegiance to Baghdad. Arabs and Turkmens, who were discomforted by the KRG, welcomed the Iraqi Army’s initiative. Baghdad regained control in Kirkuk.

It should be underlined that even though Kirkuk was a “disputed territory” according to the Iraqi constitution, Erbil seized the control of the city by abusing the conjectural opportunities after 2003.

In other words, the KRG administration’s presence in Kirkuk is what is “disputed.” Despite this fact, Barzani’s emphasis on Kirkuk being a “Kurdish city” and the realization of the referendum in the city, with the support of former Governor Najmiddin Karim, clearly indicated that the KRG wanted to establish an “independent Kurdish state,” which included disputed territories, such as Kirkuk. In fact, Iraqi Kurds have shown time and time again that they were seeking for a dominance surpassing their own influence and they have clearly indicated their geographical dominance aims with the 2006 constitution prepared for the KRG.

For this reason, current events transpiring in Kirkuk and north of Nineveh region are the culmination of the power struggle between Baghdad and Erbil for the “disputed territories.”

According to the KRG and the Iraqi administrative provisions, there are 13 cities and 3 towns which are deemed as disputed territories. Some of these territories are mentioned in the 2006 Constitution prepared by the KRG. Thus, the KRG perceives certain cities and towns that are outside of its jurisdiction and under Baghdad’s control as its own. According to the 8^th Article of the 2006 constitution, the following cities and towns are asserted to be within the KRG’s jurisdiction: Dohuk region; Erbil, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah regions; Akre, al-Shikhan, Sinjar, Tal Afar, Tall Kayf, Karkush, Zummar and the vicinity in Nineveh region; towns of Bashiqa and Aski Kalak; towns of Khanakin and Mandali in Diyala region; towns of Ba’adra and Jesan in Wasit region.

Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah are regions with a Kurdish majority. Evaluating the disputed regions in the south of Dohuk, it could be seen that the town of Zummar in Tal Afar is under KRG control. Gaining control of Zummar after Daesh’s withdrawal, the KRG administration revealed its intention to govern Tal Afar in 2006. However, as the city mostly consists of Turkmens, the KRG was unable to do so. Moreover, the line between Dohuk and Mosul up until Tall Kayf is also under the control of Peshmerga. The destruction caused by the fight with Daesh on the line between Tall Kayf to Zummar, going around the Mosul Lake is clear, as there are ghost towns and towns lying in ruins. The KRG was also unable to gain control of Sinjar, which lies on the west of Tal Afar, towards the Syrian border. The population of Sinjar is 40% Arab, 40% Yazidi and 20% Kurdish. While the PKK, Peshmerga, and Hashd al-Shaabi control certain zones of the city, in parallel with the Iraqi Army’s operation in Kirkuk, it has been stated that Hashd al-Shaabi has gained control of Sinjar.

40 kilometers northeast of Mosul, most of the population of al-Shikhan is constituted by Yazidis and was under the control of the Peshmerga while this article was being written. Kirkuk, on the other hand, could be deemed as the most glaring disputed territory among them all, which is also the most discussed city by the Turkish public. The KRG had enjoyed an increased control over Kirkuk especially after Daesh’s withdrawal. However, Turkmen and Arab populations in the city were discomforted by the KRG administration embodied by the former governor Najmiddin Karim. For this reason, Kurds and Turkmens in the city preferred to boycott the September 25 referendum. Having the most oil and natural gas reserves among the regions desired by the KRG, Kirkuk became the very apparent fault line of the crisis between Baghdad and Erbil on October 16.

By deploying military (Peshmerga) and police (Asayish) forces to the territories it controls, the KRG has chosen to consolidate its power.

While northern regions of Mosul were captured by KDP Peshmergas, certain parts of Kirkuk, Saladin and Diyala regions were captured by PUK Peshmergas. While the KRG was initially aligned with the Iraq central government in terms of security, it has increased its autonomy throughout the process. The emergence of Daesh in Sunni-majority regions, which include certain disputed territories, enabled a new process. When Iraqi security forces withdrew from the region, including Kirkuk, in June 2014, the KRG was able to seize control of various disputed territories.

Uncertainties about the disputed territories in the constitution resulted in a fight for geographical dominance since 2005, in which power was the main determinant, rendering the disputed territories increasingly disputed.

While KRG leader Barzani desired to resolve the disputed territories issue in his favor with the September 25 referendum, now he has started to lose previous gains. Entering a new era beginning with the Iraqi Army’s operation in Kirkuk, the crisis between Baghdad and Erbil indicates that further operations to other disputed territories will take place – as was suggested by the mobility in Sinjar. Being successful against Daesh, capturing Kirkuk within a day and being supported by regional and international actors, the Iraqi central government could be expected to launch new operations in the short and mid-term in order to gain control over the disputed territories. Considering that the division between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and PUK also caused a division in the military force, the KRG will have a hard time in responding to Baghdad. Meanwhile, the schism between the KDP and PUK, which became apparent over Kirkuk might result in changes that could upset the political, administrative, social and economic balances of the KRG. Lead by the Talabani family, the PUK administration will seek to re-balance the KRG administration which is dominated by Erbil.

Following the Kurdish independence referendum which took place on September 25 in Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) controlled areas in northern Iraq, the Iraqi government had responded with multiple economic and political sanctions.

After imposing political and economic sanctions on the KRG, including the control of its airspace, the Iraqi army have intervened in Kirkuk – a major disputed area, which is rich in oil.

According to a local police source, Iraq forces entered Kirkuk’s main government headquarters on Monday, following an earlier retreat from the area by Kurdish Peshmerga forces.

Speaking to the Anadolu Agency, Kirkuk Police Captain Hamed al-Obaidi said: “A large Iraqi Federal Police Force has entered the government headquarters [in Kirkuk] over which they have raised the Iraqi flag.”

According to the police captain, “hundreds” of local residents gathered outside the building, welcoming the police.

The move came shortly after Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi commanded Iraq’s security forces to raise the Iraqi flag in all areas of dispute between Baghdad and the KRG.

Following, while no detailed information was provided, on Tuesday, a ministry spokesman announced that all oil fields and facilities in Kirkuk are now under the full control of Iraq’s Oil Ministry.

Turkish support

On Monday the Turkish National Security Council issued a statement making clear its support for Baghdad’s operation in Kirkuk.

Referring to the meeting held, the statement said: “Our sensitivity and anticipation of the central Iraqi administration’s operation in Kirkuk… and the aim to establish the city according to its historical depth has been particularly emphasized.”

Following the National Security Council, speaking at the AK Party group meeting on Tuesday, Prime Minister Binali Yildirim stated that Kirkuk should be run in accordance with its “historic depths,” claiming that “It is a positive development that Kirkuk has been taken under the control of the Iraq central government.”

He added: “The points to consider here are that an administrative system that should re-establish a demographic status based on the historical depths of the region should be put in place.”

While Turkey has come out in full support for the central Iraq administration, President Trump announced his administration’s neutrality in this regard.

Talking to reporters at the White House, Trump said: “We’ve had for many years a very good relationship with the Kurds, as you know, and we’ve also been on the side of Iraq, even though we should have never been there in the first place. We should never have been there. But we’re not taking sides in that battle.”

Referring to the Iraqi force’s operation in Kirkuk as a “battle,” the U.S. State Department issued a statement, which read: “We strongly urge all parties to avoid provocations that can be exploited by Iraq’s enemies who are interested in fueling ethnic and sectarian conflict.”

More, the statement added: “In particular, we note that there is still much work to be done to defeat Daesh in Iraq, and continued tensions between Iraqi and Kurdish forces distract from this vital mission.”

“The United States will continue to stand with our Iraqi partners to ensure the defeat of Daesh.”

The Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum, which was held upon the insistence of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masoud Barzani despite all the objections of local, regional and international actors, poses numerous risks that could drift the entire region into a state of chaos. The rising tension in Kirkuk after the Kirkuk governor Najmiddin Karim declared the referendum and the subsequent developments have shown how the decision to hold a referendum could drag Iraq and the region into further instability.

Tensions between the Erbil and Baghdad administrations, which have reached their peak due to the referendum decision, have also reverberated into relations between the Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi army. Peshmerga forces were not included in the anti-Daesh operations launched in Hawija, a southern district of Kirkuk. In the midst of this strained atmosphere, only a week before the referendum, a conflict broke out between the Turkmens and Kurdish groups in Kirkuk, illustrating that the tension looming over the city might culminate into a major scale conflict at any moment. In addition, the fact that the Iraqi Turkmen Front, a significant actor in the city, announced that they would not recognize the referendum, revealed that the tension between Turkmens and Kurds would not simmer down after the referendum.

As Erbil increasingly insisted on the referendum, the Baghdad administration did not hesitate in responding with hostile measures. The Iraqi Parliament discharged the Kirkuk governor from duty and vested the Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi with all kinds of authorities in order to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq by referring to his title of “Commander-in-Chief.” Vested with this authority, Abadi displayed that they would harshly respond to the KRG’s steps toward independence by stating a day before the referendum that the referendum is null and void. On the day of the referendum, the Iraqi Parliament assigned the Abadi government to send troops to Kirkuk. These developments highlighted that the decision-makers in Baghdad and the Abadi government have taken a determined stance concerning the referendum and the disputed territories in a coordinated and synchronized way. All these factors indicate that the disputed territories, which include Kirkuk, constitute the focal point of the referendum crisis.

The KRG administration insists on seizing control over the disputed territories by affording all the risks of conflict mainly due to the natural resources in those areas. According to the figures provided by the International Energy Agency, the overall oil reserves in the KRG region correspond to 4 billion barrels, while the inclusion of the disputed territories to the KRG will increase this amount to 45 billion barrels. Given that oil forms a large part of the KRG’s total revenues, Kirkuk’s importance for Erbil can be seen more clearly.

Another reason for the KRG’s expansionist policy in the disputed territories is the ambition to control the lowlands and the areas that are fit for cultivation aside from the highlands where Kurds are densely populated. The KRG regards the valleys that contain water resources and which are fit for cultivation, such as Tel Keppe and Zummar located in the north of Mosul, as strategic targets. Therefore, the KRG estimates that an independent Kurdish state would not be sustainable unless it includes the disputed territories.

Possible conflicts that could arise following the referendum

Following the referendum, conflicts could possibly break out in the disputed territories that strained the relations between the KRG and the Iraqi central administration. The Iraqi Parliament’s instructions to Abadi for intervention indicate that the disputed territories will bear witness to a sovereignty struggle in which the rivals may use force. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution rules holding referenda in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine which administration the territories will belong to. However, not all disputed territories are clearly specified in the Article. Due to this, the KRG were able to create an actual state and claim sovereignty, seizing control of a line that expands from Mosul in the west of Iraq to Mandali in the east. Before considering the requirements of organizing a referendum in these territories, it must be discussed whether the areas de facto seized by the KRG are within the disputed territories. A scenario in which these discussions cannot be finalized through negotiations might lead to a civil war. The process as of 2003 has clearly illustrated that if and when desired results cannot be obtained through negotiations, this ends in a civil war for Iraq.

A possible conflict between Baghdad and Erbil will undermine the fight against Daesh while creating a more convenient area of crisis for terror groups such as the PKK and its Syrian wing PYD. Conflict between Peshmerga and Iraqi forces may exacerbate the tension among different ethnic and religious groups in the disputed territories. Daesh and similar terror groups are likely to take advantage of such chaos and expand their domains. Besides, the PKK will want to consolidate its presence in Sinjar and make room for itself by benefiting from the crisis. The PYD stated that they would be ready to perform their duty at a possible conflict in Kirkuk, which clearly illustrates that the PKK and the PYD wish to make room for themselves by taking advantage of a possible crisis in Iraq.

The region’s countries are against the referendum

Iraq’s neighbors, including Turkey and Iran, have adopted a strict stance against the referendum as they foresee the heavy costs of managing the potential risks of a possible independence in northern Iraq. In a statement he issued on the day the referendum was held, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remarked that the border gate with Iraq is only open for Turkey-bound traffic, adding that some additional measures might be taken regarding the KRG’s oil transfer. In addition, it is clearly seen that Turkey has taken some critical steps in terms of economic and diplomatic sanctions considering the increasing coordination between Tehran, Baghdad and Ankara. In addition, the Turkish military launched drills near the Habur border gate, which is an important passage point between Turkey and northern Iraq, demonstrating that high level security measures have been taken with regard to the issue.

Similarly, Iran also believes that the KRG referendum threatens the stability of the entire region as well as Iraq. Therefore, the country closed its airspace to Erbil and conducted drills near the northern Iraq border ahead of the referendum. Besides, Iran displayed a determination to engage in joint action with Ankara and Baghdad concerning the developments in the KRG by pursuing heavy telephone traffic with these capitals. It was also reported that Iranian General Qasem Soleimani wanted to visit northern Iraq in order to stir negative views regarding Barzani within political circles. This indicates that Iran has also activated its influence in the field against the referendum by adopting diplomatic, economic and military measures.

Iran is also concerned about the possibility that an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, with ethnicity-based motives, might threaten Tehran’s control over Iranian Kurds. The country presumes that with the effect of the KRG referendum, the Iranian Kurds might demand expansion of their rights even though they do not ask for independence. An ethnicity-based instability within Iran could threaten the domestic politics of Iran in general, since Iran is a country comprising multiple ethnic groups such as Kurds, Arabs, Turks, Baloch people and various other minorities.

Another possibility that concerns Iran is the division of Iraq into three parts in case Iraqi Sunnis also found an independent state following the declaration of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. In such a case, the Sunni state can join the anti-Iran league since they have had problems with the Shia ever since the occupation, and this would threaten the corridor Tehran has recently formed that extends through Iraq to as far as Syria and Lebanon.

Iran also estimates that it might lose its current allies if an independent Kurdish state is formed since the country has profound ideological differences with allies of the KRG. When the Iranian administration hosted a delegation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Tehran in June, the PUK did not take up any stance against the referendum although the Iranian administration expressed its reservations over it. In addition, Kirkuk governor Najmiddin Karim, who is a PUK member, announced that Kirkuk would also take part in the independence vote. This development showed that Iran, which harshly stands against the referendum, could not alter the opinion of the PUK although the country is known for its close links to the political party.

All in all, given that the PUK has a secular and ethno-nationalist ideology and the public opinion acts as a determinant over the political actors in the KRG, the foundation of a Kurdish state under the leadership of Barzani would undermine Iran’s influence in the KRG.

Finally, Barzani’s amicable relations with the U.S. and Israel escalate Iran’s security concerns. Iran fears that an independent Kurdish state might act as a base for the operations to change the regime in Iran and the KRG might turn into a factor threatening the country.

Due to the clear stance of the Ankara-Tehran-Baghdad triple against the referendum and the fact that other international actors are not supporting Erbil in the current state, it seems that the Erbil administration has taken steps backward in the short term. The fact that KRG officials also emphasize negotiations and positively welcome Ayatollah Sistani’s call for “lowering the tensions and invitation for negotiations” could be interpreted as the willingness to communicate with Baghdad. Considering issues such as sovereignty in disputed areas, the extraction and sale of oil, the status of the Peshmerga within the Iraqi security forces – which are deeply rooted problems – these negotiations can turn into a means of time-gaining between Baghdad and Erbil. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that almost all actors in northern Iraq agree on independence and see it as their “right,” so therefore it would be wrong to expect the Erbil administration to completely eliminate the independence process. For this reason, even if negotiations begin between the two parties, it can be concluded that in the long-term the quest for independence in northern Iraq will continue to remain as an element of tension in the region.

Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) is set to hold an independence referendum next week, which has drawn severe criticism from both Turkey and the US.

Residents in provinces controlled by the KRG are due to vote on September 25 on independence from Baghdad.

The oil-rich province of Kirkuk is among the contested areas where the vote is planned.

Regardless of calls for negotiations before the referendum, Barzani has announced that he will not be able to agree terms with Baghdad.

The KRG President continuously called for Baghdad to provide an alternative to the referendum if the Iraqi government wanted to see the referendum postponed. However, recent announcements are in directions that suggest the two parties will only sit together after the referendum has occurred.

Barzani stated that “Baghdad has failed to provide alternative solutions,” so therefore “we will sit at a negotiating table after the referendum.”

He also added that becoming a full autonomous state “can take up to two years.”

The central government of Iraq is opposed to the poll, claiming that it would affect the war against Daesh, cause instability and violate the Iraqi Constitution.

The referendum was also on the agenda during the 72^nd session of the UN General Assembly. During his speech, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called on northern Iraq’s KRG to suspend its referendum for independence, stating that it would further engender instability in the region.

Baghdad and the regional government need to achieve compromises “on the basis of territorial integrity and the realization of the ideals to build a common future,” Erdogan told UN members.

“Steps such as demands for independence that can cause new crises and conflicts in the region must be avoided,” he said.

Potential sanctions

Following his speech at the UN, talking to reporters, Erdogan also warned of sanctions against the KRG if they intend to proceed with the planned referendum.

“We have always supported” the KRG, Erdogan told reporters. “We think this approach of theirs amounts to ignoring the Republic of Turkey, which has stood by them and counted them as a close ally.”

“The cabinet will undoubtedly evaluate this situation and assess possible sanctions, which will not be ordinary,” he warned.

The proposed independence referendum by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is due to take place on Sept 25 regardless of criticism by regional and other governments.

Residents in provinces controlled by the KRG are due to vote on independence from Baghdad.

The oil-rich province of Kirkuk is among the contested areas where the vote is planned.

In light of all developments, last week Iraqi lawmakers voted to remove Kirkuk’s renegade governor, Najmiddin Karim, from office.

The parliamentary vote was based on a request by Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi.

In response, Kirkuk’s provincial council condemned the decision and council head Ribwar al-Talabani stated that “Karim was elected and confirmed in his position by the provincial council and only the council has the authority to remove him.”

Despite the parliamentary decision, Karim is yet to leave office.

The parliamentary vote was prompted by an August 29 decision by Kirkuk’s provincial council to include the disputed province in the referendum.

The decision triggered an uproar in Bagdad and calls by Iraqi politicians and MPs to remove Karim from office.

Further in relation to the referendum, on Monday, the Supreme Court of Iraq ruled to suspend all activities related to the referendum until it could determine the poll’s constitutionality.

Meanwhile, KRG leader Masoud Barzani has stated that a “yes” vote would not initiate an automatic declaration of independence but would lead to further negotiations with Baghdad.

Barzani insists on referendum

Regardless of calls from Turkey and the US to postpone the referendum, Barzani has said that the poll will not be postponed unless a viable alternative is conformed.

The referendum on Kurdish regional independence will not be postponed unless Baghdad can offer an “alternative arrangement” that would also guarantee the rights of the region’s Kurds, Barzani said on Tuesday.

President Trump has called for negotiations between Baghdad and the KRG, which he claimed the US would lead.

Speaking at a campaign rally in the city of Soran in northern Iraq’s Erbil province, Barzani said the poll’s primary goal was to “show the world that we want independence.”

“We are open to hearing alternatives [to the referendum],” he said. “But in the absence of any such alternatives, the planned [Sept. 25] referendum is set to go forward.”

Barzani stressed during his speech that the KRG’s problem was not with the international community but with Baghdad, and therefore the referendum could not be postponed unless Baghdad reach an alternative.

However, he added, any such alternative arrangement “would have to be guaranteed by the international community, including the U.S. and the EU.”

He went on to give Baghdad “two or three days” in which to propose an alternative scenario.

“Otherwise,” he continued, “we will head to the polls on Sept. 25.”

“Erbil wants independence,” Barzani declared, “not ministerial portfolios or budget allocations.”

There is an alarming rise in the tension between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil (KRG). From an approaching conflict between the two in Kirkuk, Turkmen will suffer the most. The oil flow from Kirkuk and KRG will be disrupted too. The clash could weaken both sides and the PKK will avail itself of the possible power vacuum. All these can severely harm Turkey and cause a serious foreign policy crisis. What has sparked the crisis and what options does Turkey have to prevent a clash?

The apparent reason in the rise of the intensity in the conflict is KRG President Masoud Barzani’s insistence on holding an independence referendum on 25 September 2017. A close scrutiny of the ties between the two parties, however, reveals that there is a wide range of issues keeping them apart. The Baghdad government’s preoccupation with the war against Daesh has delayed the inevitable clash. With the battle of Mosul approaching its end, the political and military resistance of Sunni Arabs has been severely dealt with. There have been numerous recent calls from Baghdad to end the only defiant Shiite -dominated regime Iraq faces, that in the north from KRG. Should Turkey remain inactive and unable to defuse the tension, Iraq may soon witness its worst civil war and the Iraqi state could melt away. The consequences can be ruinous for all Iraqis and regional actors, especially for Turkey. Iran will avail itself of this new round of violence to assure its total dominance over Iraq and the building of a Shiite crescent will be completed.

Rising Tension

During the last decade, the relations between Erbil and Baghdad have been plagued with numerous contentious issues. This became apparent with the departure of US forces from Iraq in late 2010 when the former Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki inaugurated a sectarian policy which alienated and marginalized both Sunni Arabs and Kurds. Although the current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi promised to undue his predecessor’s policies and make the regime inclusive, al-Maliki’s followers and pro-Iranian Shiite militias have hindered his efforts. The Iraqi regime is now more exclusive than ever. Only two weeks ago Ibrahim al-Jafaari, the foreign minister, issued a decree which removed several Sunni individuals from Iraq’s foreign diplomatic corps.

Recently the US has failed to convince al-Abadi to allow several Sunni politicians, who have been forced into exile by al-Maliki, to attend a conference in Baghdad to build a credible Sunni leadership in Iraq. On July 20, 2017, the Shiite militias in Mosul clashed with the Nineveh Guards which is a further indication that Shiite militias are determined to re-establish their pre-2014 exclusive security rule in Mosul.

The ongoing conflict with KRG should be also viewed within this context. The KRG arguably feels that the partnership in government, which Kurds feel that the post-Saddam era will present to them, is all but an illusion. On 19 June 2017, in a response to al-Abadi’s statement which described the referendum as illegal, Barzani said “the Iraqi constitution, which was intended to create an inclusive government ruling by consensus of its major components, is dead in letter and spirit. Why is Article 140 of the constitution, which was supposed to be implemented in 2008, not implemented and neither is it on the agenda of the government in Baghdad?” Barzani pointed out that the Kurds have been gradually forced out from most important security, military and political positions, and al-Malik’s slogan to establish a government of the “political majority has been completely established in reality.”

Lately Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that the referendum in northern Iraq is unacceptable. There is a heated exchange in the media and political statements made in Baghdad, Tehran, and Erbil. Although al-Abadi has been generally accommodating, recently his language became more threatening to the Kurds. Even Ammar al Hakeem, who has been in the past a close ally of Barzani, has recently threatened him with dire consequences should he proceed with the referendum. On 20 July 2017, the all-powerful bloc of State of Law in the Shiite Alliance issued a call in a statement to put Barzani on trial for charges of treason and collaborating with Israel and Turkey against Iraq. The Iranian regime too is threatening Barzani.

Having failed to dissuade the leaders of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan from supporting the referendum, on 18 July 2017 Muhammed Baqri, the of Chief of Staff of the Iranian armed forces, reminded the Kurds of Iran’s punitive and powerful weapon capacities.

 The Possible Clash in Kirkuk

Kurdish sources allege the Baghdad government has deliberately delayed the expulsion of around 2,000 Daesh militias from Haweja district, south west of Kirkuk, in order to use it as a pretext to attack Kirkuk. Peshmerga sources have recently detected the arrival of hundreds of Iranian revolutionary guards in areas adjacent to Kirkuk.

Unless the US and Turkey deliver a strong message to Iran, one can expect Qasem Suleimani, the head of Quds Corp, to soon appear in the ruins of Kirkuk to boast of victory over the so-called pro-Israeli and Saudi agents among the Kurds. The attack on Kirkuk can make tens of thousands of Turkmen homeless and asylum seekers at the frontiers of Turkey. The toothless Turkmen National Front and its followers can be caught in the middle of a devastating conflict. One of the possible consequences of an attack on Kirkuk is that it can also deepen the crisis between the Shiite and Sunni Turkmen groups. It is noteworthy that Iranians have already mobilized 12,000 Turkmen as part of the Shiite militias in Iraq for a possible attack on Kirkuk. There is also a potential for the Baghdad regime to use the old rivalries between Kurds and Turkmen and this might hurt Turkmen who have no military power to match that of the Kurds.

What can Turkey do to rescue Kirkuk?

Barzani and all other Kurdish parties have put too much stakes on the referendum and Kirkuk to retreat from their decision to hold the referendum. Forcing Barzani to give up the referendum will be a serious blow to his standing among the Kurds and will only help his foes, especially the PKK. Regardless of the stated objection of many Western countries to the referendum, Barzani appears to have received some assurances from many circles in the West to go ahead with the referendum. It suffices to say that on 28 June 2017, The Washington Post, which is close to the circles of decision making in the US, had Barzani write an op-ed to sell the idea of the referendum.

Turkey can still use its economic and political leverage with Barzani to delay the declaration of independence after the referendum. Donald Trump’s administration and several European Union countries prefer to enhance al-Abadi’s position in Baghdad in order to enable him to curtail the drastic Iranian influence over his country. This policy requires KRG not disrupt al-Abadi’s work. Barzani can be pressured by the US to be content with the de-facto annexation of the disputed territories and more independence using its current policy of selling its oil and gas abroad.

Being aware of this realty, Turkey can seek US support to defuse the situation before the current tension goes out of control and gives Iran access to Kirkuk. In addition, Turkey should give clear signals to both al-Abadi and Iran that Kirkuk is an issue that touches its national security and it will not stand by watching if things deteriorate. Besides, Turkey could use its leverage with Barzani to safeguard Turkmen rights if the referendum is held in Kirkuk. Hosting a meeting with both Barzani and Turkmen leaders in Turkey is long overdue. Shortly, Turkey needs to engage both Baghdad and Erbil in a more vigorous and foreword policy to spare Kirkuk from the destruction which has been inflicted on Mosul.