The presidential crisis in Venezuela is among the top topics occupying the world agenda. The crisis has reached its apex with the U.S. assigning Venezuelan National Assembly President Juan Guaidó as the acting president of the country on January 23, 2019; and tension still prevails in the country with no prospect of getting temperate.

In fact, the debates leading up to the crisis were ignited with the re-election of Nicolás Maduro as the President of Venezuela. Socialist President Maduro was elected for his second 6-year term in presidential office on the election held on May 20, 2018. Although his victory did not reverberate much in the international arena at first, a number of individuals and institutions voiced their objection to the situation. Aside from the Lima Group, which comprises the representatives of 17 Latin American countries who first met in 2017 to resolve the Venezuelan crisis ongoing since 2012, the U.S. and the EU also questioned the legitimacy of the elections and proclaimed that they will not recognize the election results. So, it can be said that the debates that grew and evolved into the current crisis were first ignited at that time.

Considering the course of events, the presidential elections in Venezuela, which is an internal affair of the country in its essence, became a major topic on the global agenda in a short period due to the involvement of global forces and turned into an instrument of power struggle. The debates questioned the legitimacy of the Venezuelan administration under Maduro’s rule and caused polarization regarding which state supports the ruling power and which state does not. Many different aspects of the issue have been approached in visual and printed media. What about Turkey? This piece will focus on Turkey’s approach to the crisis, the possibility of a military coup in Venezuela (probably backed by the U.S.) amid the rapidly changing turn of events, and the country’s future.

A post-modern coup method at work

As the presidency of Donald Trump began in the U.S. in 2017, the U.S. underwent substantial changes in terms of its methods and approaches. This situation has manifested itself in many points within the past two years. The U.S. administration is not very eager to perform its “responsibilities” in other lands stemming from being a global power. This situation can be seen in many instances, including the Paris Agreement on climate change, trade wars, and customs agreements such as NAFTA. Apparently, as much as the country still looks to make the most of the opportunities it enjoys for being the global hegemon, it also adopts a policy that is unwilling to shoulder responsibilities and burden related to the rest of the world.

Of course, this is not solely related to the president’s personal choices; and the clearest thing that can be said  is that the ways of doing things have changed around the world. Things do no longer work out with old, traditional procedures and practices. The countries comprehending this fact adopt new positions and policies that are in line with the new context, which lead to less ambiguity. In the case of the U.S., this new situation was reflected on the implementation of different policies while interfering with the internal affairs of other countries, as seen in the Venezuelan crisis.

The ways of doing things have changed around the world. Things do no longer work out with old, traditional procedures and practices.

Viewing the recent history of Latin America, it is seen that the U.S. played a direct or indirect role in most of the military coups staged in the region so far. Up until the early 2000s, U.S. interests in the continent coincided with military dictatorships in Latin America and therefore the former sustained close relations with junta regimes. So, the U.S. has confronted serious problems and accusations at both national and international levels. The developments in the recent period also hint that the Washington administration is likely to follow a different strategy in the new period. Instead of military sanctions and interventions, it now prefers to impose economic and political sanctions on other countries.

Military interventions have a heavy cost for the American economy. In fact, it does not seem coincidental that the Venezuelan crisis has been discussed in terms of its legitimacy ever since its beginning. This period indicates the legitimacy of all kinds of forces other than military force and hard power. The most common practice of Washington in this new political context is employing the tactic of imposing economic sanctions and interfering with the internal affairs of countries through these sanctions. Undoubtedly, this is not a new tactic as it was used in Africa before and is still being employed in countries like Iran, North Korea, and Russia. This also has a considerable effect on negotiations. In other words, the U.S. is able to strain countries that it targets without attempting large-scale military interventions unlike the past.

Rather than pursuing high-cost military interventions, the U.S. is now able to strain countries that it targets by imposing economic and political sanctions. 

Apparently, the issue of “being recognized as a president” that haunts elected leaders will be a more common phenomenon from now on. It would be useful to look at the Venezuelan crisis through this lens. Accordingly, while it is true that some issues have been experienced in democratic processes and some human rights violations have been observed in the country, although they do not reach a level to undermine the legitimacy of the administration, it is not an ethical policy to intervene in another country’s internal affairs – let it be the U.S. or another country. As much as the role of the ruling power in the persistence of the crisis, the opposition also has a role, since it always relies on foreign powers and therefore sets the ground for military intervention. Consequently, the latest U.S. intervention in Venezuela is overt support to a coup in a post-modern way.

The sole concern of the U.S. in this context is not Venezuela; the superpower rather seeks to send a message to the world. In my opinion, the process run against the Maduro administration is the product of an unsuccessful policy. Every step taken by the U.S. on the matter of Venezuela is actually sustaining the Maduro administration. Without the U.S. intervention, the Venezuelan administration would change with a radical move due to the low oil prices, hyperinflation and serious welfare loss. The Venezuelan people had already lost much of their strength to endure, so the Maduro administration would fall without any intervention.

The latest U.S. intervention in Venezuela is overt support for a coup in a post-modern way. 

Turkey’s stance and effect on the trajectory of the crisis  

Although relations between Turkey and Venezuela do not have a particularly long-standing history, the close relation and increased contact between the two countries leaders have improved economic and political ties in the recent period. Therefore, Turkey has clearly recognized Maduro as the legitimate leader of Venezuela and supported him, which has been considered a proper action and a principled decision. This approach is also in line with international law.

Turkey’s approach to the Venezuelan crisis is not solely on the governmental level. The Turkish public have also shown close interest to the subject. The most important factor underlying this interest is the July 15 coup attempt and its aftermath in Turkey. Undoubtedly, the Turkish people have encountered difficult times during the past 3 years and this process has not completely ended yet. Although the level of this relation is in the right direction in terms of principles, it would be more appropriate for Turkey to behave more carefully in its support to Maduro. This is due to the fact that, while the chances are low, Turkey needs to consider a Venezuela without Maduro. It is inevitable for Turkish foreign policy makers to come up with alternative scenarios and draw a roadmap that pays attention to Turkey’s interests. Regardless of the premise of international law, the Trump administration has already started threatening countries and institutions that engage in trade activities with the Maduro administration. This is most likely to continue.

Turkey should act as a mediator

The relations established between Turkey and Venezuela in a short span of time should be predicated on equal terms that does not violate the sovereignty of any party. Consequently, Turkey has a serious potential of acting as a mediator in the solution of the issue, thus the country should take on a proactive role in consideration of the trust it enjoys and without needing to wait for the results of the developments. Turkey can contribute to the stability of Venezuela by abstaining from getting involved in the crisis and focusing on the solution.

Ankara can also advise the Maduro administration to act in a more moderate manner in the face of the incidents and foreign provocations, which will help the legitimate government act within the framework of international law.

Of course, these endeavors should not only be limited to the political sphere. As negotiations continue, the urgent needs of the Venezuelan people – such as food, healthcare, hygiene – should also be provided. As is known, the Maduro administration does not accept foreign aid coming from countries that stand against him, as these countries use aid for show casing. Thanks to the positive impression that Turkey has in Venezuela, it is able to deliver humanitarian aid through its various institutions such as the Turkish Red Crescent, Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) and the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) as well as a variety of Turkey-based non-governmental organizations. This may also positively affect the mediating talks and avert an illegitimate political or economic intervention on an international scale.

More, Ankara can also advise the Maduro administration to act in a more moderate manner in the face of the incidents and foreign provocations, which will help the legitimate government act within the framework of international law.

What next? Military intervention or civil war?

The first two questions that come to mind in the context of the Venezuelan crisis are whether a military intervention led by the U.S. is tabled, or whether the crisis will evolve into a civil war.

Although the Trump administration (especially Vice President Mike Pence and National Security Advisor John Bolton) insist that a military intervention is being tabled for Venezuela, this is a low possibility due the new global political strategy adopted by the U.S. On the other hand, it will be against the nature of politics to contend that a military intervention is definitely off the table. Supported by the Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó, this discourse aims to intimidate the Maduro administration.

Aside from heavy costs and its contradiction with international law, the U.S. is avoiding military intervention for three other important reasons. First, is the problem of location. Although the U.S. can exercise military interventions in different corners of the world, it will not prefer to do so when its “backyard” is in question. The U.S. will not want to see the presence of an unstable region in its proximity and cannot afford a possible migration wave caused by it. So, unless the Maduro administration surrenders easily, the U.S. administration will be negatively affected.

Secondly, the U.S. has drawn the support of a substantial number of countries in the continent against the Maduro administration, although only on the political realm. However, as indicated by many analysts, a military intervention will not enjoy the same amount of support. Countries like Brazil and Argentina will probably give no support to such a move. Therefore, the U.S. will not attempt such an act without the approval of Latin American countries, but will increase economic and political oppression in the following period.

Last but not least, such an intervention is not favored by countries like Russia, China and Turkey. This is a significant aspect of the issue in terms of its conformity to international law, since Russia and China are members of the UN Security Council and stand against a possible intervention.

The second question is whether a civil war might break out in Venezuela. It must be noted that the possibility of a civil war is higher than that of a military intervention. If the process is not effectively managed and the external support to the opposition continue, which seems very likely, a civil war might break out. Also, if the options suggested by the U.S. fail, the country will not refrain from igniting a civil war since the situation has turned into a matter of prestige for the Trump administration. The statements issued by the U.S. authorities agree that there is no return. The Venezuelan opposition, which is completely dependent on foreign support, also seems determined in igniting a civil war.

Since Turkey’s transition to a multi-party political system as from the election held on 14 May, 1950, the country had to experience numerous interregnum periods mainly due to military coups. One of these military coups was the February 28 coup in 1997. Although 22 years has passed, the societal problems and traumas caused by the coup have not be fully recovered yet. On the other hand, the regulations marked by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan abolished the oppressive and prohibitive practices remaining from February 28.

The memories of the latest military coup attempt Turkey experienced are still fresh in the country’s collective memory while its traces are still visible in bureaucracy and society. During the atrocious coup attempt organized by a group of Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) operatives who infiltrated the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), 251 citizens were killed and 2194 were injured. The atrocity was answered by an unprecedented resistance that marked its name in Turkey’s political history. Political will and society united and repelled the coup attempters. The nation defended the political will in the streets and paid heavy prices to protect democracy, which has been a turning point in Turkey’s democracy. Upon President Erdogan’s call, people took to the streets and reclaimed the public offices and media organizations occupied by the pro-coup forces, which was a first in the country’s history of coups that goes back to 26 May, 1960. The awareness spurred and shaped by this demeanor will certainly play a crucial role in building Turkey’s future.

Turkey and military coups

As of the election on 14 May, 1950, that marked Turkey’s transition to democracy, the country has experienced a slew of overt or covert military coups. The military coup staged on 27 May, 1960, was the first one and resulted in the capital punishment of then Prime Minister and Democrat Party leader Adnan Menderes and two ministers. A junta of military officers ended the 10-year ruling power of the Democrat Party, which came to power in every election by enjoying popular support. Only 11 years later, on 12 March, 1971, the military gave a memorandum to civilian politics and forced the government, ruled by the Justice Party leader and then Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, to resign. So, between the years 1970 and 1980, Turkey suffered a long-standing conflict between the right-wing and left-wing and had to deal with unstable coalition governments, which ended with another coup attempt staged on 12 September, 1980.

Following the 1980 coup staged under the tutelage of then Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren, Turkey confronted a long period of oppression marked by arrests, tortures, and prohibitions. The volatile democratic climate, which was established perfunctorily after the period when the military controlled political life, started to decompose again with the election victory of politicians who were not considered acceptable by the system.

The military oppression period that started in the early 1990s culminated in yet another military coup staged on 28 February, 1997. The February 28 coup is one of the most far-reaching coups in Turkey’s history since the military officers that organized the coup and their co-conspirators in bureaucracy did not only aim their political opponents but also plotted an extensive intervention that affected all segments of society. The scope of the prohibitions that were put into practice after the February 28 manifests this intent.

The February 28 coup is one of the most far-reaching coups in Turkey’s history since the military officers that organized the coup and their co-conspirators in bureaucracy did not only aim their political opponents but also plotted an extensive intervention that affected all segments of society.

The climate of February 28

Some contextualization on the process leading up to the coup is required to comprehend the political and social background of the February 28 coup. During the 1990s, Turkey could not achieve political or economic stability since it was ruled by coalition governments throughout these years. In an atmosphere where political power was in decline, other power mechanisms such as military, media, capital, bureaucracy and global forces enjoyed increasing influence on the country.

In the local election held in 1994 amid all these, the Welfare Party chaired by Prof. Necmettin Erbakan had a victory since the local candidates of the party won both in Istanbul and Ankara, the two most populous provinces of Turkey. Becoming the Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor after the election, Erdogan practiced “project municipalism,” “administration skills” and “face-to-face communication policy,” all of which added up to the formation of a role model and spread to the rest of the country.

The first reflection of the Welfare Party’s success in municipalities was seen in the 1995 general election, in which the party had a notable success by receiving 22 percent of the vote share and becoming the first party. Of course, it was hard for political engineers to accept this success. As a result, the power to form the government was not granted to the first party but to the second and third parties, namely the Homeland Party (ANAP) chaired by Mesut Yılmaz and the True Path Party (DYP) led by Tansu Ciller. However, since the ANAYOL coalition government formed by these two parties had a short lifespan, then President Suleyman Demirel assigned Erbakan to form a government, after which Erbakan and DYP formed the REFAHYOL coalition government on 28 June, 1996.

Some groups within the army and Jacobin Kemalists in the bureaucracy were disturbed in the face of this development, and their discomfort started to reflect in the media from the very beginning of the coalition. In fact, the military never wanted to recognize Erbakan as Prime Minister despite the sensitive and soothing remarks of Erbakan as well as a large part of the media outlets who defined themselves as secular, universities, judiciary, and large organizations of business world. Eventually, a series of operations to shape opinions and open intervention attempts were ignited to undermine the 54th government led by Erbakan.  

Tanks of February 28

The process that has gone down in history as the “post-modern coup of February 28” was led by a certain group of military personnel within the TSK and conducted against the civilian government of the period. While this process is referred to as such due to the 9 hour long meeting of the National Security Council held on February 28, 1997, where anti-democratic decisions were taken, it in fact refers to the well-planned coup process that had military, civilian, financial, bureaucratic and media dimensions, and which were simultaneously put into action.

One of the more symbolically important events of the February 28 process is the deployment of tanks to the streets of Sincan, Ankara by the General Staff. As a reaction to the Al-Quds night event organized by the Sincan municipality, which at the time belonged to the Welfare Party, tanks were moved to the streets of Sincan on February 4, 1997, 5 days after the event. Choosing Sincan for such a display was a direct message. While tanks were in the streets of Sincan, news about the rise of reactionism that did not reflect reality were being pushed by the media.

News of this kind were intentionally pushed by the media to legitimize the coming interference in civilian politics. Another important symbolic indicator of the era is that both de facto bans against religious people in public spaces were put into effect and anything projecting an image of religiousness was demonized and portrayed as deserving ridicule. The February 28 coup, which happened after such an atmosphere was successfully created, forced the government of Erbakan to resign on June 18, 1997, and subsequently the Welfare Party was closed on January 16, 1998, by the Constitutional Court.

Several names, including Prime Minister Erbakan, were barred from politics. In accordance with their agendas, the perpetrators of the February 28 coup implemented many bans during the process. But these bans were removed one by one in the 17 years following the electoral victory of the AK Party, founded on 14 August, 2001, under the leadership of Erdogan, in the elections held on November 3, 2002.

Gradual dismantling of the anti-democratic inheritance

The bans and rights abuses put into place with the claim that “February 28 will last a thousand years” were in effect for a long time. The reason behind the fact that these policies could continue during the AK Party era is the power held by the bureaucratic oligarchy in Turkey, which should never be neglected as an actor in Turkish politics. Along with this, despite all obstructions and interference attempts of various kinds, governments under the leadership of Erdogan removed the bans implemented as part of the February 28 process, contributing greatly to the democratization of society and politics in Turkey.

It might be hard to talk about all of them, but it is important with respect to remembering and understanding the oppression of the period that some of the important bans that were implemented by the perpetrators of the February 28 process and were removed by Erdogan are discussed here. Here, the first topic that must be mentioned are the headscarf bans. The headscarf ban was first forced on students studying in universities, and then was made more extensive, coming to include all public spaces.

Among such bans, the ban on headscarf in universities was the first to be removed in the AK Party era in 2011. In 2013, by making a change in the “Regulations Regarding the Dress and Appearance of Public Institutions Personnel,” the ban on the headscarf for female public personnel was removed. Again in 2013, four female parliament members of the AK Party attended the general assembly with headscarves, signaling that the February 28 process was over. Another regulation introduced in 2014 removed the headscarf ban for students in middle schools and high schools. Another change in the Turkish Armed Forces Dress and Appearance Regulations in 2017 made it possible for female military personnel to wear headscarves. After the removal of this ban, it was seen that some female officers in the military preferred to wear the headscarf at work.

Another ban implemented as part of the February 28 process was regarding Imam Hatip schools. In 2009, the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) made the decision to end the policy of using a different multiplier in the university admission evaluations of Imam Hatip graduates. Following this, in 2012, Imam Hatip schools in middle school were re-opened with a legislative regulation. Similarly, bans on Quran courses were removed. Following the executive order number 653 accepted in 2011, the regulation introduced as part of the February 28 process limiting the minimum age of attendants in Quran courses was removed, creating a space for families to freely make their decisions.

Another well-known attribute of the perpetrators and sympathizers of the February 28 process is their eagerness to shut down political parties. The Welfare Party and subsequently the Virtue Party were shut down by the Constitutional Court. In 2008, a case to shut down the AK Party was opened and the AK Party was saved from being shut down with a single vote. Within this context, as part of the constitutional amendments in 2010, the AK Party implemented changes in the 149th article of the Constitution, making it harder to shut down political parties. Today, the decision to shut down a political party can only be taken if the Constitutional Court reaches a two-thirds majority.

In addition to these, extremely important steps were taken to secure democracy and remove anti-democratic influences in the judiciary by the restructuring of the High Council of the Judges and Prosecutors as well as the Constitutional Court. In the fight against anti-democratic influences in the military, unprecedented regulations were introduced in the era of AK Party governments. Some of these are the re-structuring of the Supreme Military Council and the removal of military justice and martial law.

Also, due to the oppression in the February 28 process, many public personnel were blacklisted, referred to disciplinary committees and forced to resign. The numbers show this clearly as between 1997 and 2001 roughly 11 thousand teachers were forced to resign, and 3 thousand 527 teachers were dismissed. This corresponds to 11 percent of the teacher shortage experienced in the period. In this period, 33 thousand 271 teachers underwent disciplinary inspections due to certain reasons, 11 thousand 890 received disciplinary punishments and 4 thousand 625 Ministry of National Education personnel were blacklisted. National Intelligence Agency (MİT) also flagged 2 thousand 639 public personnel, 418 academics and 949 teachers as “related to reactionism” within this period.

The psychological and physical oppression of the perpetrators of the February 28 coup on generally the conservative groups of the public in Turkey, which is observable in the above stated numbers, ended in the Erdogan era. The necessary efforts were made to ensure that the Directorate of Religious Affairs, Imam Hatip Schools, Quran courses and Religious Studies Faculties had the required personnel, preventing efforts to discredit these institutions. Discriminatory policies employed on public personnel solely due to their religious identities such as blacklisting, mobbing and disciplinary action were stopped.

April 27 military memorandum, violent Taksim Gezi Park protests, judiciary attack in December 2013,  various economic attacks and finally the bloody military coup attempt of July 2016… All these failed due to the strong support of the national will towards the civilian government.

Institutionalization of the democratic atmosphere

With the military coups that had been happening almost each decade, juntas within the military imposed their decisions on politics and society. The time span in which this state of affairs changed is the 17-year-long period of AK Party governance, which was founded in 2001 under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Certainly, the length of the period in which civilian politics under the leadership of Erdogan governed Turkey does not mean that military juntas have given up on coups. On the contrary, many coup attempts took place and these coup attempts were not limited to the military dimension, instead being conducted by employing different centers of power.

From the April 27 military memorandum to the violent Taksim Gezi Park protests, from the attempt in December 2013 by law enforcement and the judiciary to the economic attacks from abroad, and finally the bloody military coup attempt of July 2016, many coup attempts took place. But all these attempts failed due to the strong support of the national will towards the civilian government. Thus, as opposed to the other periods in which military coups took place, in the AK Party era, civilian politics resisted coup attempts with the authority it has taken from the nation, leading to the continued rule of democracy.On the 22nd anniversary of the February 28 coup, Turkey is at an important stage on the road of democratization. The most important thing that must be done following this stage is the creation of an atmosphere that will institutionalize these achievements. 

On Monday, the 57th anniversary of the execution of Turkey’s first democratically elected Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, was commemorated by the Turkish people. At the commemoration on Sunday, Turkey’s current Interior Minister, Suleyman Soylu, who has an important closeness and relation to Menderes, actually summarized Menderes’ political perception of the majority of contemporary Turks by stressing“I want to ask you, what did Adnan Menderes want except democracy? What else did he want except this country’s development, its progress, and the fact not to be humiliated due to people’s beliefs? What other aspirations did he have except constructing dams, building roads for this country, develop the country’s agriculture, and, to develop the country’s industry?”

Menderes has still a fundamental meaning for Turkish democracy and a special place in the minds of Turks with regard to the country’s past and future. It wouldn’t be even that wrong to mention that both left and right-wing oriented Turks remembered his era and his destiny while having for the first time actively resisted against putschists on Turkey’s streets during the recent coup attempt on 15 July 2016.

Menderes was hung by the military junta on September 17, 1961 subsequent to the coup d’état against his ruling DP government on May 27, 1960. Besides Menderes, Fatin Rustu Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan, who were the Foreign Minister and Finance Minister at that time, were also executed by the junta as well. During that time, the Prime Minister had been arrested together with various DP members by the putschists while the judiciary of the junta accused him among other things of violating the constitution and contradicting “Ataturk reforms.”

Menderes symbolized an important figure for Turkish citizens who wanted to end the single-party-regime of the CHP, which ruled the country from 1923 to 1950. Apart from his political experience as a member of the short-lived Free Republican Party (FRP), which was closed down by the government after four months in 1930, Menderes entered into politics as a member of the only party in the country, the CHP on the eve of President and CHP Chairman Mustafa Kemal’s visit to Aydin. Even though it was not Menderes’ purpose to be elected as a CHP MP, he was mentioned on the CHP candidate list, which was based on Mustafa Kemal’s personal decision and which Menderes later noticed. Thus, Menderes became a CHP MP until his expulsion in 1945, at which time the DP was initiated by some similar minded politicians. After the multi-party system was introduced in Turkey also due to external factors in 1946, Turkish citizens became more and more aware of Menderes and his popularity increased during the opposition years (1946-50).

In the first “controversial” democratic election in 1946, for which the DP did not have the necessary time to mobilize and organize itself, the DP had won only 62 seats in parliament. Therefore, it remained in the opposition until May 14, 1950 when it ultimately won the election, receiving 53 percent of all votes. The 1950 elections constituted a watershed in the history of modern Turkey due to the fact that until that time parliamentary politics was perceived merely as an extension of the Kemalist state bureaucracy and administration led, by the single-party-regime. Thus, for the first time, a so-called popular electorate received the opportunity to express its political choice against an ultra-secularist statist approach, represented by the CHP elites.

The DP’s main objective under the Menderes administrations (1950-60) was to change things as soon as possible by addressing the main motto, “Enough! It is the nation’s turn to speak” (Yeter! Söz Milletin) Actually, the DP internalized some of the liberal ideas of the Progressive Republican Party, which had been closed down in 1925, even prior to the establishment of the Free Republican Party – a reaction by the single-party-regime, which early noticed that Turkish people do not accept CHP’s policies.

It can be said that in contrast to the CHP, the DP represented a relatively tolerant and respectful position regarding religion, religious lifestyles and free-market capitalism – despite its similar Kemalism-based stance. However, the DP cadres did not have the necessary power to ensure a comprehensive liberalization of the entire economy for a long period. In other words, the nature of Turkey’s economy did not lend itself to wide-ranging liberalization with additional unexpected declines particularly in the agricultural sector. Nevertheless, these facts do not have a decisive importance regarding Menderes himself as a symbol of Turkish democracy and the people’s will.

Subsequent to the deposing of his last government (1957-1960) by the Turkish Armed Forces on May 27,1960, Menderes was arrested along with various leading party members and put on trial until September 17, 1961. When the junta hung two of his ministers and Menderes himself, several policies which had been implemented by the DP governments in the 1950s that allegedly contradicted with “Atatürk reforms” were cancelled by the junta.

Moreover, the Kemalist version of secularism, after an alleviation period of 10 years between 1950 and 1960 again gained importance as was the case from 1923 until 1950. More interestingly, various projects in the field of economy, which were initiated by the Menderes administration, were also canceled by the junta as well.

Today, for many Turks, although analyzing or reading political developments from a right – or left-wing perspective, it has to be admitted that for most people today Prime Minister Menderes is accepted as a personality who represented the people’s voice – despite political and human weaknesses, which are common in every era. Thus, to understand Turkey’s current political dynamics and the people’s negative stance against potential contemporary tutelage biases, one has to understand those developments in Turkey’s history. Most people still are in the opinion that Turkey owes much to Adnan Menderes due to his struggle for democracy, because otherwise it’s still believed that a quasi-single-party-regime would have continued.