Reports from the Russian side of the Russia-Ukraine border suggest that a large-scale military mobilization is underway. Experts warn that mobilization of such intensity could only occur before a large-scale military invasion of a foreign country. Alarmed, Ukraine also mobilized its troops and declared that it will resist a possible Russian occupation by all means. The U.S. firmly asserted that there will be severe economic consequences in the form of sanctions should Russia take such a drastic step.

Wanting to keep Ukraine as a buffer zone between Russia and the West, Russia signals that the strengthening of the relations between NATO and Ukraine will invite a harsh Russian response. However, Russia’s security strategy and operation style as well as regional parameters show that a full-scale invasion of Ukraine is unlikely.

The statements of Russian officials, especially by Putin and Lavrov, show that Russia is keeping such an option on the table in response to NATO’s expansion further east. Therefore, the movements of Russian troops near Ukraine should be seen as brinkmanship aiming at getting concessions from the U.S. in Eastern Europe.

Following the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, the military ties between Ukraine and NATO strengthened much to Russia’s anger. In other words, Russia’s attempts to bring Ukraine closer to its orbit were counterproductive. In 2017, Ukrainian Parliament approved NATO membership as a strategic and foreign policy objective.

Such an objective found its place in Ukraine’s new National Security Strategy in 2020. Ukraine currently receives military aid from the U.S. within the framework of Operation Fearless Guardian, mostly in the form of training. Ukraine has also purchased various types of weaponry from the U.S. Most recently, Ukraine deployed Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones, which proved useful for reconnaissance flights and shooting strategic targets in the recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in Syria, and in Libya.

The total number of mobilized Russian troops reached as many as 12,0000, including medical units, which could be useful in a full-scale invasion

These moves significantly angered Russia, which openly declared in an increasingly warning tone that Ukraine’s sliding to the West is not permissible. Meanwhile, Russian troop movements towards the Ukrainian border gained impetus throughout 2021. The total number of mobilized Russian troops reached as many as 12,0000, including medical units, which could be useful in a full-scale invasion. Russia also adopted a confrontational and threatening discourse against Ukraine, openly signaling the gravity of the issue with threats coming from the very top echelons of the Russian administration.

In parallel with the rapid escalation between Russia and Ukraine with troop movements and a war of words, the question being raised is “Will Russia invade Ukraine?” Considering Russia’s strategic priorities and current regional and international calculations, it is unlikely that Russia will dare to do so. Multiple aspects of the issue show that Russia’s primary aim is not to capture or to control Ukraine, but to keep the West away from its borders.

Similarly, Russia prefers to utilize private security companies as, for example, in Africa and in the Middle East instead of risking its own soldiers. Moreover, as unrecognized republics, the DPR and LPR have precedents in the examples of Abkhazia and Transnistria. Therefore, even if Russia decides to escalate the conflict, a covert operation with plausible deniability instead of a large-scale military operation fits the Russian playbook.

Ukraine has vowed to resist the invasion to make such a scenario as costly as possible for Russia.

Third, a Russian invasion of Ukraine will be very costly for Russia. Ukraine has vowed to resist the invasion to make such a scenario as costly as possible for Russia. Invading a country with a 41 million population that is likely to help the Ukrainian troops wage a guerilla warfare on a terrain bigger than France can cost Russia immensely.

Having criticized the U.S. for the invasion of Iraq for years, it is unlikely that Putin would fall into the same trap. In the latest talks between Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin on December 7, the U.S. threatened Russia with economic sanctions, which might be useful in getting Russia to rethink its actions. Sanctions could cost Russia billions of dollars of future revenue and a loss of share in the European gas market. Earlier this year, Biden waived sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project between Russia and Germany.

Since invasion is unlikely, Russia’s end game should be giving the message that all options are on the table if the West does not comply with Russia’s demands over Ukraine. Based on Lavrov’s words, Russia demands the reduction of NATO’s military presence around the Russian border, particularly in Poland and Romania.

Russia’s ultimate aim seems to be to secure its Western front with legal guarantees for the renunciation of further NATO expansion towards the east. Such a guarantee could enable Russia to create a new regional order in Europe. However, the United States, which Russia wants to see at the negotiation table, refuses to give any guarantees to Russia, and Ukraine maintains its intention to join NATO and the European Union. Russia’s threatening posture towards Ukraine adds insult to injury by making Ukrainians rally round their flag and reminding the U.S. of Russia’s projections. In the end, such acts of brinkmanship will not benefit Russia in achieving its strategic goals.

With all the scenarios considered, the most viable one for the near future is an escalation without a full-scale Russian military invasion of Ukraine. Russia will continue to take measures to keep Ukraine in its orbit while Ukraine and the West will be careful not to corner Russia. An escalation in the conflict zone is possible but only through covert means in accordance with the Russian playbook.

Russia’s “foreign agent” law has provoked a serious debate in the country and abroad – and for good reason. As it is amended on a regular basis, there are new interpretations of the “foreign agent” definition and new categories of legal entities and persons that could become potential targets of the legislation from mass media outlets to ordinary Russian citizens.

A recent update of the “foreign agents” list published by the Russian Ministry of Justice on October 8, 2021, has added twelve more legal entities and citizens bringing the total number of personae non gratae to 85. But are things on the ground as bad as they are on paper? As a former journalist of Russian state-controlled media, Russia Today, and a current independent political and economic observer, I’ve looked at both sides of the coin and tried to provide an objective overview of this controversial law.

“They started it”

It all started in 2017 when the U.S. branch of RT (former Russia Today) media outlet was forced to register as a foreign agent under FARA law. RT’s editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan said this decision was the only choice to keep RT operating. “Our lawyers say that if we don’t register as a foreign agent, the director of our company in America could be arrested, and the accounts of the company could be seized. In short, in this situation the company would not be able to work. Between those consequences and registering as a foreign agent, we are forced to choose registration,” she said.

Shortly after the U.S. requirement, Russian President Vladimir Putin asked the State Duma to prepare a “mirror response.” The result was the law which was supposed to enable the Russian Ministry of Justice to force some (at first only) foreign media outlets to enter the register and mark their materials with a specific note. The adopted bill had nothing to do with Russian media outlets at all and was a response to the U.S. pressure on RT.

Common sense and absurdity

However, one year after another, the bill was amended. While its main target – the foreign media outlets – had to register as legal entities in Russia to be able to report to the Russian Ministry of Justice, the law now also applies to individual journalists and bloggers who receive funding from “foreign agent” organizations or third parties affiliated with them.

The amendments raised a serious debate across media circles while international organizations like Amnesty International and the OSCE claimed the law was a violation of fundamental human rights. The latest version of the law also applies to Russian media outlets and journalists that are suspected of receiving funds from “foreign agents” or parties affiliated with them — a move that has provoked outrage among Russian media outlets, mainly among those supporting the opposition.

In Russia’s “mirror version” law, there are specific definitions of who exactly and under which circumstances can be placed under the “foreign agent” label, while there is a very specific description of the “foreign agent’s political activity.”

Yet, the Russian “foreign agent” law is also far from being perfect and requires revisions. Being amended in order to control the activity of foreign media outlets based in Russia and to suppress any foreign interventions in the national political elections system, its targets could be ordinary citizens who intentionally or unintentionally post provocative content on social media or support “foreign agent” organizations or people, or take part in activities where “foreign agents” are noticed.

Media at risk

The biggest concern of the Russian “foreign agent” law is, of course, expressed by journalists and media outlets. Once labeled a “foreign agent,” the company is limited in its commercial and advertisement activities, which are often the main source of income for most media outlets in Russia.

According to Dmitriy Migalin, a former political journalist of the Russian federal media outlet which is likely to get the “foreign agent” status, the game rules are not transparent.

“Everyone is aware that any media platform could get this unwanted status. On the one hand, it is banding together all journalists and media community like never before, even competitors: today it is them, tomorrow it will be us, we are all on the same boat after all. But on the other hand, the reaction of key investors of a media outlet is highly unpredictable nowadays. Everyone is afraid of shams and unexpected foreign cash inflows to an outlet’s account. As ironic as it may seem, all responsibility is on accounting departments: one ‘accidental’ thousand-dollar inflow not returned in time may get an entity a ‘foreign agent’ status,” adds Migalin.

While the United States focused on its domestic problems – primarily the sociopolitical consequences of the storming of Capitol Hill and Joe Biden’s immediate signing of executive orders and actions – Russian authorities detained the Kremlin critic Alexey Navalny upon his return to Moscow from Germany.

Western reactions to his arrest were relatively moderate, although in the future the “curious” case of Alexey Navalny could have a serious impact not only on relations between Russia and the West, but also on Russian parliamentary elections that should take place no later than September 19.

Throughout history, Russia has been ruled by tsars, monarchs, and boyars members of the highest rank of feudal aristocracies. That was even the case during the Soviet time when the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was a de facto tsar, while members of the Central Committee played the role of boyars. In modern Russia, President Vladimir Putin is often seen as a tsar.

However, Western journalists, analysts, and experts on Russia often neglect the significance of “boyars” – powerful oligarchs and members of the country’s security apparatus.

Alexey Navalny, who allegedly had been poisoned in August 2020 while on a flight from Tomsk to Moscow, hardly poses a serious threat to President Putin, especially given that his approval ratings are very low. However, his political activities may significantly jeopardize the positions of certain “boyars” who are centers of power within the Russian ruling elite.

Although the Kremlin accused Navalny of working with the CIA, Russian authorities detained the opposition figure over the alleged violations of his 2014 suspended prison sentence for embezzlement. In other words, the very fact that the Kremlin did not attempt to prove that Navalny is a “foreign agent” clearly suggests that the ultimate goal of the Russian elite may not be to completely eliminate the 44-year-old anti-corruption campaigner from political life.

This is not the first time that Navalny is behind bars. He already served several stints in jail in recent years for organizing anti-Kremlin protests. For instance, in 2015, he served 15 days for unlawfully distributing leaflets on the Moscow metro, while in February 2014 he was placed under house arrest and prohibited from communicating with anyone other than his family, lawyers, and investigators.

Unlike him, former Russian intelligence officer and the Kremlin critic Vladimir Kvachkov spent nine years in jail after he allegedly attempted to assassinate Russian politician and businessman Anatoly Chubais in 2005. However, given that Kvachkov has been very critical of the West, none of the world leaders have demanded his immediate release.

Vladimir Putin would unlikely benefit from Navalny’s murder, since in the eyes of the West and Russian opposition voters the Kremlin critic would become another “martyr,” or a “victim of the regime” such as whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky and the accomplished journalist Anna Politkovskaya. Still, for the West Putin will likely remain a political boogeyman, and Navalny’s arrest will be used as an additional instrument against Moscow.

New sanctions against Russia from the U.S. and the E.U. are inevitable.

In other words, new sanctions against Russia from the U.S. and the E.U. are inevitable. In the case of the United States, restrictions will be connected not only with Navalny but will likely be constantly expended, since sanctions are part of a permanent process generated by the ongoing new Cold War.

The Kremlin has already said that it will not take notice of calls from a number of Western leaders for the release of Alexey Navalny. Policy-makers in Russia are quite aware that Navalny’s release would mean his de facto victory over the system.

At the same time, it would mean that the Kremlin has succumbed to Western pressure. Thus, if the anti-corruption activist remains in prison, Moscow is expected to face a growing list of demands from the U.S. and the E.U., and it is not improbable that Russia will have to suspend or even cancel the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline due to U.S. sabotage.

Such actions will undoubtedly have an impact on Russian domestic affairs, although they will unlikely seriously affect Putin’s popularity. However, the ruling United Russia party is already widely unpopular, which creates possibilities and additional room for maneuver for Navalny’s Russia of the Future party and other so-called non-systemic opposition groups.

The two major systemic opposition parties – the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CP) – are expected to pass the five per cent election threshold easily and keep playing a role of the formal opposition that occasionally criticizes certain Russian officials, but never President Putin. In other words, the regime of “controlled democracy,” whose ultimate goal is elections without a change of power, will almost certainly remain intact.

On the other hand, if Navalny’s Russia of the Future party wins some seats in the Russian Duma (Parliament), Putin will have to make compromises and concessions to Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Gennady Zyuganov, the leaders of the LDPR and CP respectively, in order to neutralize Navalny’s influence in the Duma. However, there is still a long way for the Kremlin’s critic to become part of the Russian mainstream political life.

Since Russia is witnessing another Perestroika, Navalny, even imprisoned, can pose a serious threat not to Vladimir Putin whose approval ratings are still high, but to certain structures within the Russian elite – be they from the security apparatus or from powerful oligarchy – who may aim to redistribute power and wealth.