Ever since the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) signed an agreement with Egypt in 2003 on the delimitation of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean and declared concession areas for the purpose of oil and gas exploration in 2007, a high tension has grown over the possible maritime boundaries and related activities.

The tension has primarily been between Turkey, Greece, and the GCA, and escalated with further delimitation agreements such as those between Lebanon and the GCA (2007), Israel and the GCA (2010), Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (2011), Turkey and Libya (2019), and Greece and Egypt (2020).

Some of the actual tension has always been associated with the resource-related activities considering that there are not fully agreed maritime boundaries by all sides in the Eastern Mediterranean. The regional states have therefore confronted each other not only over the possible maritime boundaries but also other related activities.

The Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline Project, known as the EastMed Project, has been one of these activities ever since it was initiated. First pronounced in 2016 by Greece with the EU’s encouragement and funds to finance the preliminary works (the EU pledged 36.5 million euros for research and technical planning), the project gained an official status with an intergovernmental agreement signed between Greece, Israel, and Cyprus (GCA) on January 2, 2020 in Athens, Greece.

The pipeline was planned to run for about 1,900 km, starting from a midpoint between Israel and the island of Cyprus in the sea,  in the Israeli section of the Levantine Basin, and eventually reaching Italy via the island of Crete and Greece with the Poseidon and IGB pipelines, a gas interconnector pipeline which connects gas supplies coming from both Bulgaria and Greece.

It was said that it would carry at least 11 billion cubic meters of gas per year and cost around 6 billion euros to construct. It is being developed by IGI Poseidon S.A., a 50/50 joint venture between the Greek gas company Public Gas Corporation of Greece (DEPA) and the Italian gas company Edison. The project is aimed to be completed by 2025.

The IGB pipeline project was regarded by the related or supporting states as not only a means of transporting the extracted gas from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe but also a means of achieving strategic goals.

These strategic goals belong to Greece for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the IGB Pipeline Project is a means of establishing a partnership with regional states such as Israel and Egypt as well as non-regional states such as the United States and EU countries over the resources of the Eastern Mediterranean. The Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis made a statement upon signing the agreement saying, “Today we did not simply sign a beneficial agreement. We sealed our resolve for a strategic connection between our countries in a region that now more than ever needs growth and security.”

Despite Turkey’s objections, Greek efforts seem well approved as the project has been supported by regional states such as Israel, Egypt, Jordon, and the Palestinian Authority, and by some non-regional states such as the U.S. and France.

Egypt had already worked for the creation of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum on July 25, 2019 with the participation of seven countries, namely Egypt, Jordan, the GCA, Greece, Italy, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority, and further signed an agreement with the GCA on September 19, 2018 to construct a line linking Egypt and Cyprus’s Aphrodite gas field to Egypt’s gas liquefaction stations.

The Israeli reason for joining the forum seems to be commercial. On the signing of the agreement, former Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, “This is a historic day for Israel… Just days ago, we started pumping [the] Leviathan [gas field]… We have huge quantities there. This means a lot of money will come into the economy. That is good for peace because we have agreements with our Arab neighbors.”

For the EU, the reason for joining the East Mediterranean Gas Forum was also commercial alongside the aim not to depend heavily on Russian gas. Competition to provide gas to Europe is fierce, as the continent seeks to rid itself of coal and high greenhouse gas emissions. Despite the various pipelines coming to Europe such as the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) or the shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the U.S., there is still a gap in the market.

The U.S. had been supportive of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum from the very beginning. Frank Fannon, then assistant secretary for the Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR), was present at a meeting in Athens in August 2019 when the project was agreed upon. The primary reason for the U.S. supporting the forum seems to have been to diminish the European countries’ dependency on Russian gas. It is also alleged that the U.S. has used the EastMed project to counter Turkey for some “unproved acts” such as its relations with Russia.

The U.S. withdrawal of support from the EastMed project

Despite the above-mentioned compelling reasons for supporting the project, recently, the U.S. has officially withdrawn its support from the project. In a statement by the U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Greece, it announced, “The United States continues to strongly support regional efforts that enhance and promote cooperation and regional stability, including the 3+1 mechanism in which the Republic of Cyprus (ROC), Greece, Israel, + the United States participate… We are shifting our focus to electricity interconnectors that can support both gas and renewable energy sources. We support projects such as the planned EuroAfrica interconnector from Egypt to Crete and the Greek mainland, and the proposed EuroAsia interconnector to link the Israeli, Cypriot and European electricity grids.”

The U.S. State Department sources have been cited as saying that the EastMed pipeline project should be abandoned altogether. The inevitable question is why the U.S. decided to shift its focus away from the EastMed Project. To answer this, it is possible to identify a number of reasons.

The EU aims to reduce the use of natural gas in Europe by 25% by 2030 and for it to be abandoned completely by 2050.

One of the most frequently stated reasons is the fast-growing focus on green energy. Due to the universal trend towards green energy to meet the Paris Agreement on Climate Change targets (COP21), the future of fossil resources seems blurred beyond 2030. The abovementioned statement by the U.S. notes that “at a time when Europe’s energy security is–more than ever–a question of national security, we are committed to deepen our regional relationships and promote clean energy technologies. We are shifting our focus to electricity interconnectors that can support both gas and renewable energy sources.” The Biden administration is looking “critically at new fossil fuel infrastructure projects to ensure U.S. support is not directed to carbon-intensive sources and does not result in future stranded assets as we accelerate the clean energy transition.”

Similarly, the EU aims to reduce the use of natural gas in Europe by 25% by 2030 and for it to be abandoned completely by 2050. It is noted that even Israel announced that it will stop searching for natural gas and will focus on greater use of renewable energy sources (RES). In fact, Greece is doing the same, setting the production of 61% of its electricity from RES as a goal.

Despite its limited capacity, Greece assumes itself to be a major playmaker in regional politics, and thus follows an aggressive foreign policy towards Turkey. It’s worth asking why Greece pursues this strategy and what it hopes to achieve.

Neorealism, also known as structural realism in International Relations, offers a simple answer to this question: “Greece is trying to balance Turkey.” Drawing on Kenneth Waltz, the pioneer of the Neorealist School, states try to balance other states, which they lag behind, or try to limit others’ ability to some extent by resorting to internal balancing and/or external balancing mechanisms.

Internal balancing is the first and most common method of a balancing strategy. This happens as states strengthen their material capacity and power, and when they try to survive by their own means in the anarchic world system. If this is not enough, they resort to external balancing either to defend themselves or to minimize the threats they face. This generally occurs when states look to form alliances with stronger states. In this regard, Greece applies both internal and external balancing methods in order to counterbalance Turkey.

Initiatives for internal balancing

Following the Kardak (Imia) crisis with Turkey in 1996, Greece launched an armament program as part of an internal balancing against Turkey and came a long way towards this purpose. However, it temporarily paused the program due to the 2008 economic crisis and its effects.

Since Greece’s domestic and national defense industry is weaker than Turkey’s, the country needs the support of other nations.

Thanks to the relative economic recovery in recent years and due to the current high tension in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece resumed its armament program. In order to counterbalance Turkey, it launched a new armament and military modernization program. The Athens administration increased its armament expenditures fivefold in 2021 compared to 2020, and launched a 10-year armament program worth 10 billion euros.

Since Greece’s domestic and national defense industry is weaker than Turkey’s, the country needs the support of other nations. For example, Greece ordered a total of 18 fighter jets from France last year, with a cost of 2.3 billion euros. In 2021, it signed a contract to buy three frigates from France. Again in the same year, it purchased four warships worth $6.9 billion and signed an agreement with the U.S. for the modernization of its existing frigates worth $2.5 billion. These examples indicate that since Greece is incapable of modernizing its army by using its own sources, it needs outside support to activate its internal balancing elements.

Aside from the French and American military support, Greece uses its EU membership as a political and economic leverage against Turkey with the unconditional support of the GCA as its main ally in the region. So much so that Greece, acting together with the GCA, imposed sanctions on Turkey for its activities in the Eastern Mediterranean by using the EU’s legislative bodies, the European Parliament and the European Council. However, Turkey has not compromised its stance at the table and on the ground, and has insisted on protecting its rights in the region.

Can Greek counterbalance against Turkey work?

The question now is whether Greece will succeed in counterbalancing Turkey. In terms of internal balancing, Greece has almost no chance. There are two reasons for this. The first is related to Turkey’s current capacity which is incomparably greater than Greece’s. So much so that according to the rounded Armed Forces data, Greece, with a population of 11 million, has 100,000 active soldiers and an annual defense budget of $5 billion. Turkey, with a population of 85 million, has 350,000 active soldiers and an annual defense budget of $20 billion.

Greece has 1,300 tanks, 3,400 armored vehicles, and 1,200 artilleries whereas Turkey has 3,000 tanks, 11,500 armored vehicles, and 2,500 artilleries.

All of Greece’s land and air forces lag behind Turkey’s. For instance, in terms of ground power Greece has 1,300 tanks, 3,400 armored vehicles, and 1,200 artilleries whereas Turkey has 3,000 tanks, 11,500 armored vehicles, and 2,500 artilleries. Likewise, although Greece is rapidly modernizing its air power, it cannot compete with Turkey in this field either. In terms of the most important elements of air power, Greece has 600 aircraft, 200 multirole aircraft, and 270 helicopters whereas Turkey has 1,500 aircraft, 250 multirole aircraft, and 650 helicopters.

Moreover, while Greece does not have any armed unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) in its inventory, Turkey has 170 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and UCAVs, and almost all of them are produced domestically. These UAVs and UCAVs are Turkey’s strong trump card: they are battle-proven and have proven to be game changers in conflict zones such as Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Libya. As for naval power, Turkey and Greece have more or less similar numbers of warships, frigates, and submarines. Overall, it is not possible for Greece to compete with Turkey in terms of total military power – at least not on its own.

Turkey and Greece are members of NATO and therefore Greece’s repertoire of moves against Turkey is limited.

The second pillar of Greece’s balancing strategy against Turkey is a relatively more functional deterring capacity. Undoubtedly Athens enjoys a high-level military cooperation with the U.S. and also benefits from the advantage of EU membership vis-à-vis Turkey, which is an EU candidate country. However, both Turkey and Greece are members of NATO and therefore Greece’s repertoire of moves against Turkey is limited.

It should never be forgotten that relations between states are interest-oriented and may change according to new conjunctures. Although Athens seems to have “secured” the support of the U.S. and France, nobody can know how long this alliance will last. In fact, the “AUKUS incident” experienced by France recently stands out as an example of how states can act against their allies when their interests are in question. Accordingly, Turkey’s determined stance to protect its rights in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean can foil Athens’s attempts to counterbalance Turkey politically, militarily, and economically.

To summarize, the Greek aggressive foreign policy to counterbalance Turkey pushes the Athens administration toward an extensive armament project and the modernization of its army. Greece has strengthened its cooperation with the U.S. and France and secured the political and economic backing of the European Union.

However, given the fact that the Turkish army is getting stronger every year by relying on its own domestic and national capacity, and given that Athens’s cooperation with France and the U.S. is susceptible to change in the long run, Greece may face disappointment in the future. Greek initiatives carry the risks of creating further tension and serious consequences if the country opts to lead Turkey toward security dilemmas instead of looking for ways to cooperate and establish permanent peace.

The year 2021 has witnessed an escalated tension in the Middle Eastern and European security complexes. Early this year, Saudi Arabia and Greece strengthened their bilateral cooperation. Simultaneously, France encouraged Greece to increase its armament while blaming its European partners for turning a deaf ear to the threats the European Union is facing.

France, Saudi Arabia, and Greece seem to have twofold gains from this cooperation. They could both better materialize their energy cooperation and target Turkey’s gas explorations as well as challenge Turkey’s maritime superiority in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean.

Since early 2021, Turkey is voicing its concern over the Saudi F-15s to be based in the Souda air force base in Crete. The first quarter of the year signaled a potential escalation regarding the military drills to be conducted in the Aegean Sea. Turkey’s chief objection was to the Saudi F-15s that would be piloted by Greek lieutenants during military drills.

In February 2021, the Philia Forum brought Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain together to integrate into the pre-established Greek-Egypt-Cyprus cooperation. The main actor behind this initiative was Saudi Arabia. France conducted the White Shark 21 maritime drills, which symbolized the new hawkish stance against the Turkish energy pivot in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Military drills jointly conducted by France, Greece, Israel, Cyprus, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in the heart of the Aegean Sea are obviously a significant development. The dynamic of this alliance is issue-specific and narrow-scoped; however, it has a potential to attain short-term goals.

In the last three years, one of Turkey’s most important advantages has been its natural gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In the last three years, one of Turkey’s most important advantages has been its natural gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean, which created political complications with states such as Greece, Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, and France as well as with institutions including NATO and the European Union. The current balance of power created room for maneuver for Turkey which is now being constrained by rival energy-seekers such as France, Italy, Greece, and Israel.

Nevertheless, this alliance has been forged to preserve the status quo, and an stalemate might be an actual gain for the guarantor states such as France. There are two interrelated motives behind the French foreign policy: defense exports and international prestige. France is a leading actor in defense exports and tries to be an alternative to the United States.

Greece and Israel try to increase their political influence to protect or obtain bargains from the European search for more reliable energy sources.

In the last three years, France has been the second-largest defense exporter to Saudi Arabia after the U.S. For the last 5 to 10 years, only the UK has been able to compete with France. Besides, Greece and Israel try to increase their political influence to protect or obtain bargains from the European search for more reliable energy sources. There are a lot of pull factors of entering such a dynamic such as increased resolve to engage in conflict, better military resources, and the higher chance of deterrence, etc.

Such circumstances create a potential conflict on the Turkish maritime borders in the Eastern Mediterranean. It seems like the age-old Turco-Greek debate on the naval border is going to evolve into a bitter rivalry over the control of the Eastern Mediterranean energy flow. Certain stakeholders such as energy providers like Egypt, Algeria, and Israel will set the tone for which side will have the wind at its back.

Turkey can become a trendsetter by discovering natural gas reserves. It might also play a transmitter role with a plan that bypasses Cyprus and Greece, and transfers the Eastern Mediterranean gas directly to the EU. In this context, the problem for the gas alliance builders in the Eastern Mediterranean seems to be Turkey’s potential to be simultaneously a trendsetter and a transmitter.

Turkey’s potential to attain this power is perceived as a threat by its rivals. From an international relations perspective, such conflicts are quite natural; the most formidable alliance will once again force the other to succumb to its demands.

No doubt, Turkey’s relationship with the European Union has not been a rose garden. The first contact dates back to the 1960s and the Ankara Agreement, and over time led to the establishment of a customs union. The gradual institutional rapprochement culminated in 2005, when the negotiations for full Turkish membership began.

The process immediately exposed fractures within the European block, attributable for the most part to the existence of a certain criticism towards Ankara. The admission process introduced significant issues to the political debate in Turkey, aiming primarily at a more democratic governance.

However, from the very beginning, the accession path has been affected by a lack of cohesion and a lack of a joint perspective from the European side, mainly due to the divergent stances of some member states.

Hence, the negotiations progressed only slowly, and the unresolved Cyprus issue in conjunction with the double standards by member states led by Germany and France contributed to undermining the principle of pacta sunt servanda.

Though since 2004 Ankara has continued to support the solution offered by the Annan Plan, it has faced not only the intransigence of the Greek administration, but also the full annexation of Cyprus as a member state of the European Union, which, in turn, has vetoed most of the significant chapters by causing to halting the negotiation process.

If those were the assumptions, nowadays the relations with the European Union experience growing tensions leading to a mutual crisis of confidence. What we have witnessed in the recent months in the Eastern Mediterranean and over the main European negotiation tables are nothing more than the products of those unresolved issues and stances that have little to do with realpolitik.

Although the European Union acts and operates according to the principle of unity and solidarity in itself, a careful analysis reveals that the treatment of Turkey has been different.

On the one hand, there is a tendency by a block in the EU to dominate the European debate and its key issues with reference to a self-assumed political and moral superiority expressed chiefly by Emmanuel Macron who tries to monopolize the European rhetoric and represent France as the leader of the liberal world.

On the other hand, there are mediating attempts based mainly on strategic and consistent considerations. French President Macron, along the lines of the traditional anti-Turkish sentiment, has not skimped on granting support to Greece and Cyprus over the critical issue related to the delimitation of territorial waters, which recently has seen an escalation of tones and maneuvers in the Mediterranean.

Among the representatives at the table only Greece accepted the proposal to punish Turkey, while Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Malta opposed more severe sanctions against Ankara. Therefore, in preparation for the Special European Council on October 1-2, which convened specifically to assess the situation in the Aegean Sea, a more intense collaboration has emerged between Paris, Athens, and Nicosia, while the other coastal states opted for a constructive approach based on dialogue.

In this frame, Rome plays a key role by proposing a positive agenda towards Turkey. Since the very beginning, Italy has supported Ankara’s EU accession, which is considered of great importance from both a strategic and a political point of view. At that time, the so-called Friends of Turkey, including Italy, Spain, the UK, and Sweden, was established with the explicit aim of balancing the existing negative approaches.

However, more recently, in the resolution following the meeting of the Council of Europe on December 10-11, EU leaders reaffirmed the EU’s strategic interest in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey and stressed the importance of keeping channels of communication between the EU and Turkey open.

A positive EU-Turkey agenda is on the table, provided by Turkey’s readiness to resolve differences through dialogue and to act in accordance with international law.

The offer of a positive EU-Turkey agenda remains on the table, provided Turkey shows readiness to promote a genuine partnership with the union and its member states, and to resolve differences through dialogue and in accordance with international law. This approach confirms that Italy, Spain, and Malta – supported as well by Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Germany – have succeeded in prevailing a softer line towards Ankara.

The reasons behind this dialogue-based orientation are manifold. First, there is a subtle acknowledgement of the legitimacy of certain Turkish requests and of the importance of Turkey as a valuable partner, proving how much Europe and Turkey need each other. In a time of uncertainty and several crises, Turkey stands as a crucial gateway in the containment of threats and risks for Europe.

The fight against terrorism, arms trafficking, and human trafficking are some factors underlying the existence of a strong complementarity. Moreover, Angela Merkel on behalf of the whole EU, was one of the main architects of the Refugees Deal signed with Turkey in 2016, whose aim was to stem the irregular migratory flow across the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Despite the numerous vicissitudes and certain non-compliances on the European side, the agreement has been effective in containing irregular immigration, demonstrating once again that Turkey is a partner Europe can count on.

For the same reasons, a certain degree of support and sympathy are expressed by Hungary and Poland, whose relations with Turkey are very positive. In other words, a further deterioration in the relations and in the mutual trust could generate a snowball effect that the whole EU, considering the fragility of some internal mechanisms of control and on the migrants’ reception policies, would not be able to cope with.

As a matter of fact, the Mediterranean is an area of shared historical and strategic interest where Ankara as a smart power is acting in an increasingly assertive way. After all, the Turkish presence in scenarios that suffer from the decision-making vacuum left by the European powers, has led to a certain level of stabilization.

In Libya, alongside Fayez al-Sarraj and the government legitimately recognized by the UN, Ankara has effectively established itself as a peacekeeping force, protecting the interests of European countries as well. All EU states support the UN-recognized government of al-Sarraj with the exception of France which stands close to the warlord Haftar and therefore had to complain about the presence of Turkish soldiers in Tripoli.

In the frame of the Berlin Conference of January 29, 2020, Italy and Germany contributed toward mediating and channeling Turkish expectations to the European tables. Speaking of the alignments and divisions on the fields, Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio reiterated, “We must accept the Turkish presence in Libya.”