One of the main outcomes of the Sochi Summit between Turkey and Russia was the joint patrols along the Syrian-Turkish border with a depth of 10km. Since then, northeast Syria has witnessed many important developments, and joint patrols between Russia and Turkey commenced at the moment of writing. The future of Turkish-Russian joint patrols faces an important challenge due to the gap between the agreed mechanism and the capacities of Russia in Syria. Even if the Russians increase their military presence, they might still be incapable of maintaining joint patrols with the Turkish Armed Forces. The only possibility of such patrols for Russia would be to accept Turkish superiority in the region and to use Turkish strength against the YPG.

Going with the premise that Russia and Turkey are fully interested in conducting the ongoing joint patrols and fulfilling the deal, the main reason why joint patrols in northeastern Syria is a difficult task is quite similar to the reason why both nations could not conduct joint patrols in Idlib. Armed groups on both sides are of essential threat to one another. If the Russians enter Idlib, Turkey would have a hard time ensuring their safety and vice-versa. If Moscow wants to conduct joint patrols with Turkey and ensure the safety of such patrols, Russian forces accompanied by the Assad regime would need to convince the YPG terror group first. However, the latter is not so interested in this, especially after the Turkish-Syrian joint military operation against them. Even the Americans who were trusted by much of the YPG had a very hard time convincing the YPG for the temporary entry of the Turkish army in a much smaller area in depth and length. It is impossible that the YPG will accept Turkish patrols willingly along the entire Turkish-Syrian border strip.

The only option for Russia to facilitate the joint patrols would be to implement the Sochi agreement fully. Only if Moscow enforces the withdrawal of the YPG to 30km south of the Turkish border will joint patrols with Turkey be safe and durable. Some patrols might happen without the full withdrawal, but the risks are too high and it won’t be sustainable, especially when both sides enter non-rural areas. Therefore, the Turkish demand of joint patrols which was agreed upon in Sochi can be seen as a guarantor mechanism for the real withdrawal of the YPG from the safe-zone. There seems to be no way of having joint patrols with Turkey and providing camouflage for the YPG to remain in the zone simultaneously.

And it is exactly at this point that Russia may reach its limits in Syria. As the situation in Idlib is still fragile, the Assad regime is incapable of sending its battle hardened forces to northeast Syria. The Russian military assets are located at the west side of Syria. To build up a strong military presence in northeast Syria would be a huge task for the Assad regime and Russia’s logistics. For instance, the S-400’s air protection system does not cover the Russian forces in east Syria and the financial resources of the regime are limited.

Even if the regime and Russia could manage to build up a strong presence in northeast Syria, it seems that the enforcement of the YPG’s withdrawal from the safe-zone would almost be mission impossible for Russia. Vladimir Putin may have made promises he is incapable of keeping. The only way out for Russia would seem to be letting Turkey weaken the YPG to an extent which is manageable for the Russian military presence in Syria, or to clearly threaten the YPG with the strength of the Turkish Armed Forces.

The Turkish Armed Forces commenced its third cross-border military operation against the PKK/PYD in northern Syria on October 9, 2019. As the first incursion into the eastern part of the Euphrates River, this operation began in the wake of a series of fruitless bilateral negotiations between the US and Turkey over a projected safe zone in northeast Syria. Turkey’s security concerns grew considerably following US assistance to the PYD, which had strengthened its ability to build a potential PKK/PYD-led statelet on Turkey’s borders. The vast majority of Turks and Kurds (except in HDP circles) regard this as an existential threat.

It is once the PKK/PYD’s strategy is analyzed that Turkey’s security concerns can be better understood. Firstly, the PKK/PYD should be regarded as a holistic threat and did not separately emerge. For this reason there is no distinction between the YPG (the armed wing of the PYD) and the PYD, and between the HPG (the armed wing of PKK) and the PKK. The threat facing Turkey comes from the combination of the PKK and PYD (PKK/PYD) emanating from their shared ideology, organization, and methodology.

Over the past few years, the PKK/PYD approached the Syrian Civil War in a pragmatic way to achieve its objective of securing a vast area in Syria and Turkey. This involved a new strategy composed of four different elements: affiliating with state actors in Syria by leveraging the fight against Daesh (ISIS), achieving territorial aspirations in Syria, radicalizing youth, and increasing violence in urban areas across Turkey.

The PKK/PYD’s first strategy was to seek out military and political support in order to gain international sympathy and legitimize its territorial aspirations. The rhetoric of fighting against Daesh was instrumental in putting diplomatic pressure on Turkey and causing a postponement of a possible military offensive against the PYD in Syria. The PKK/PYD has managed to maintain the U.S. support until Turkey conducted Operation Olive Branch in Afrin in 2018. This operation signaled for the first time that the PKK/PYD could not be too certain of the future longevity of its tactical relationship with the US.

The security threats of a potential PKK/PYD statelet in northern Syria were brought to the forefront after rocket and mortar attacks on Turkish territory from PKK/PYD held areas in northeast Syria. These attacks targeted the Turkish border towns of Suruç, Akçakale, and Ceylanpınar in Şanlıurfa, and Kızıltepe and Nusaybin of Mardin provinces over the last few weeks. Moreover, modern weapons, ammunition and explosives sourced from the U.S. forces in Syria were said to be smuggled into Turkish territory. Furthermore, as part of their territorialization project, the PKK/PYD caused a demographic change in northeast Syria, forcing local non-PKK affiliated Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens to flee to Turkey as refugees.

The third strategy of the PKK/PYD is to achieve self-determination by using intimidation and coercion tactics in southeast Turkey. The PKK committed violent acts both in rural areas and urban centers with the help of municipalities run by pro-PKK political parties. Despite the fact that the PKK’s urban atrocities, which were clearly manifested during the “trench wars” in 2016, were crushed by Turkish security forces, and pro-PKK municipality mayors and staff were jailed, but the PKK’s desire for a future resurgence in Diyarbakır, Mardin, Van and Hakkari remains. These strategies and the U.S. support for the PKK/PYD made Turkish intervention in northeast Syria inevitable.

Tactical aspect of Operation Peace Spring

Unlike the deployment of numerous fighter jets for intensive airstrikes as was the case during Operation Olive Branch in Afrin, Operation Peace Spring began with a limited number of aircrafts providing constant airstrikes, which forced the PKK/PYD to hold on to their positions.

Meanwhile, Turkish artillery shelled predetermined target locations in order to render the PKK/PYD’s ability to use in-depth defensive tactics impossible. Turkish and Syrian ground forces were also supported with precise airstrikes from combat drones while they maneuvered to encircle the urban towns of Rasulayn and Tal Abyad.

The high fire power and mobility capability of the maneuver forces helped the Turkish Commandos and Syrian National Army break through the PKK/PYD defense lines easily. Under this continuous fire and with the quick maneuver of Turkish operation forces the PKK/PYD could not succeed, and eventually failed to confront the Turkish operation forces. In retaliation, the PKK/PYD fired a series of mortar shells in Turkish border towns.

As of October 17, the Turkish Armed Forces have operated in the area between Rasulayn and Tal Abyad, an area around 120 km in length and 10 km in width. The area captured reached 30 km in width with a total area of approximately 1200 km2. Following Turkey’s military advance, U.S. forces withdrew from Ain Issa, 700 Daesh (ISIS) members were released from prison in Ain Issa by the YPG terror group, 702 PKK/PYD members were killed and 24 others surrendered to operation forces according to Turkey’s Defense Ministry.

In response to the operations, many European countries including Germany, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, declared a ban on weapons sales to Turkey. In a speech by President Erdogan, Turkey’s reaction to Europe’s hostility towards the operation might be to open the borders to allow Syrian refugees to enter Europe. The fear of hosting further refugees could urge European countries to have greater cooperation with Turkey and encourage the return of refugees back to their homes in northeast Syria. The area between Rasulayn and Tal Abyad was not chosen randomly by the Turkish government. Turkey aims to clear the PKK/PYD from an overwhelmingly Arab populated area. This was the first area where the demographic change was carried out by the PKK/PYD terror group when they seized the territory in 2015.

The US-Turkey deal over Northern Syria

While the operation was in the process of capturing Ain Issa, Rasulayn and the surrounding areas, an agreement was reached between the U.S. and Turkey in Ankara on the evening of October 17. The agreement meets Turkey’s operation objectives and there will be no further military push except for emerging contingencies that may develop. Although, the US handover of Manbij was anomaly in the western part of the Euphrates River, the race to control Manbij caused no major security instability in the region, and expected to result in further cooperation by Turkey with Russia in northeast Syria.

The deal with the U.S. has surely helped Turkey keep the U.S. involved in Syrian geopolitics in a manner that might give Turkey an upper hand to balance Russian influence in Syria’s constitution-making process. Beyond that, the successful implementation of the deal might pave the way for the dissolution of the PKK/PYD. However, a set of technical preparations are needed for the implementation of the deal. The technical elements of the deal are expected to relate to the following:

Withdrawal of PKK/PYD members in a timely manner: the locations of the withdrawal and re-location destinations should be determined.

Rules of engagement: this is related to Turkey’s disengagement rules.

Arms collections: this requires a technical study of the designation of the weapons, platforms and systems to be collected. In this regard, a concrete designation of the types of ammunition, explosives and vehicles and military systems is needed.

How to implement the safe zone: Turkey may need to re-calibrate its military missions in Syria for bringing quicker stability in the region. In this context, new recruitments and a changing power composition may cause a contention between the US and Turkey, as a further attachment of Syrian National Army and non-PKK SDF fighters to the Turkish forces is expected.

Sub-military missions: the missions may include patrolling, observation, surveillance, supervision, investigations of complaints and other implied tasks.

Turkey should focus on its legitimate cause of its counter-terrorism operation while also implementing its plan for a safe zone. It is expected that the PKK/PYD might try to shift its focus of violent acts to other areas amid the disorientation of the withdrawal process. There is the likelihood that Operation Peace Spring might be resumed in the projected safe zone area if the PKK/PYD withdrawal is not successfully implemented as promised by the U.S.

As a result of Turkey’s decisiveness, the White House announced that the U.S. forces in Syria will withdraw in expectation of a Turkish military operation into the region, opening the way for Turkey and the Syrian opposition to go after the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK terrorist organization. Since then, many experts have been discussing the potential scope and implications of the operation, but it is most likely that the operational plan of the joint Syrian-Turkish military operation will occur in Arab areas between Tal Abyad and Rasulayn and in the region of Manbij west of the Euphrates.

Immediately before and since the announcement by the White House, many developments have occurred on the ground in Syria and Turkey. Most notably, the U.S. soldiers evacuated their bases along the Turkish-Syrian border and left the area. With this move, the U.S opened the way for a joint Syrian-Turkish military operation between Tal Abyad and Rasulayn. A second development is ongoing on the Turkish side of the border where Turkish Armed Forces are amassing troops and equipment between Akcakale and Ceylanpinar, which are on the other side of the border from Tal Abyad and Rasulayn. This Turkish preparation also includes the buildup of howitzer and artillery positions suitably located to shell the strip between Tal Abyad to Rasulayn. The armed Syrian opposition, the Syrian National Army, has sent reinforcements to Jarablus to cross into Turkey and take position along the Syrian-Turkish border strip between Tal Abyad and Rasulayn.

On the other side, the region of Manbij is seeing an intensive arrival of reinforcements by the Syrian National Army and the Turkish Armed Forces. The Syrian opposition has sent massive reinforcements to the frontlines of Manbij chanting that they will liberate Manbij from the terrorists occupying the area. Additionally, the Turkish Armed Forces have been sending heavy armory and Special Forces through Jarablus towards the region of Manbij.

The region of Manbij is crucial as the Assad regime in the south and the Syrian opposition in the north are of equal distance to Manbij city, and both sides have ambitions to control this strategic area. This includes the Tishreen dam, which is located at the Euphrates in Manbij and is the second most important dam in Syria after the Tabqah dam. In case of a military operation, both sides may race for control over this area, and the YPG is likely to hand the region to the Assad regime which will improve its speed of advance. In this regard, the Syrian opposition may try to cut the advance route of the regime as they are stationed west of Manbij and received training on air-landing with Turkish helicopters. By cutting the route of the regime to Manbij, the Syrian National army can guarantee its control over the region. However, if they cannot act fast enough, the region will fall to the regime, opening its way towards the east of the Euphrates. From the Turkish perspective, Manbij is also of upmost importance as its liberation will enable the return of the Sulayman Shah tomb to its original place by the Euphrates River.

The joint Syrian-Turkish operation will firstly aim to liberate Arab areas from the YPG. By doing so, the operation will in its initial phase contradict critics who state that the main goal of the operation is demographic engineering. Additionally, by liberating Arab areas first, the number of recruits in the Syrian National Army may increase massively as the local Arab population and tribes are strong supporters of the Syrian opposition. The scope and possibility of a second stage towards Arab areas in the south or towards mainly Kurdish populated areas in Ayn al Arab and Qamishli may most likely be decided after the Trump-Erdogan summit on November 13.

After long-lasting negotiations between Turkey and the United States, a cross-border military operation in Syria has been decided. Although President Erdoğan emphasized many times that Turkey would conduct a military operation in Northern Syria for the creation a safe zone, the conditions of the operation and the US’s role were ambiguous. That ambiguity ended on Sunday night when the White House Office of the Press Secretary announced that “Turkey is preparing to launch a military operation in Northern Syria, and the United States will withdraw its troops in the area ahead of the long-planned attack”. Thus, the US will not join the military operation and will not intervene, contrary to pro-YPG claims.

Since the operation was announced, there has been a lot of debate about how it will impact regional dynamics and Turkey’s foreign policy in general. How will ongoing alliances among political parties be affected by the operation? Will the operation deepen the current conflicts between the CHP and Iyi Party? What will be the early responses of political parties to the operation?

It seems that there are two different approaches to the upcoming military operation among political parties in Turkey. The AK Party, the MHP, and the Iyi Party support the military operation in Northern Syria but the CHP and the HDP are clearly against it. Three parties supporting the military operation see it as an obligation to provide regional security and protect Turkey’s interests in the region. As the members of People’s Alliance, the AK Party and the MHP already had a consensus on this issue for a long time. However, the Iyi Party, contrary to its partners in the Nation Alliance, also supports the operation. Meral Akşener, leader of the Iyi Party, has often underlined that Turkish military should take the necessary steps in Syria and Iraq to overcome threats against Turkey’s security.

When it comes to the CHP and HDP, both parties are against the military operation in Northern Syria. Indeed, the CHP’s approach towards the operation can be seen from the outcomes of their recently-conducted conference on Syria. As I stated in my latest column, the CHP regards Turkey’s efforts to create a safe zone on the border as a “demographic engineering” project and underestimates the threat of the YPG against Turkey. For the CHP, Turkey should negotiate with the Assad regime rather than conducting an operation. Despite this, the CHP does not offer any roadmap to overcome the existing threat or how the involvement of the Assad regime in the negotiation process will help to overcome these threats. The CHP’s early response to the operation also demonstrated this. CHP Group Deputy Chairman Engin Özkoç stated that Turkey should get out of the “Middle East quagmire” rather than conduct a military operation for political interests of the government.

The HDP is also clearly against the operation. According to the official statement of the party, this operation will not bring stability and peace to the region. Since the party perceived the previous military operations as “ethnic cleansing” against the Kurds in the region, it is obvious that they will have the same reaction to the recent operation, too.

How will the operation affect the alliances between the parties in Turkey? As Burhanettin Duran stated in his latest column, the variation of approaches towards the military operation of Turkey in Syria will escalate ongoing conflicts among political parties in Turkey. Thus, if the CHP choose to show the same reaction as the HDP against the military operation, it will deepen the current conflicts in the Nation Alliance since the Iyi Party has underlined that cooperation with the HDP is the Iyi Party’s redline. And the party will not stand for the rapprochement between the CHP and HDP anymore. Because of this reason, the military operation will potentially be a significant determinant for the future of political alliances in Turkey.

The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) introduced geographical depth and diversification to its military operations against terror by initiating Operation Claw against elements of the PKK in the Hakurk area in northern Iraq on May 27, 2019. This operation carries critical importance in the creation of a wide and integrated zone for fighting the PKK in Iraqi territory through proceeding in the direction of Mount Qandil, which is the headquarters of the PKK, and expanding towards the Iran border with the regions of Avashin-Basyan and Zap. As such, Operation Claw is the continuation of the cross border operation that started in northern Iraq on March 11, 2018, and is a precursor for subsequent ones.

Operation Claw serves as a bridge in Turkey’s fight against terror in two ways: Firstly, it combines the structural, methodological and technological changes in the fight against terrorism. And secondly, it unifies the cross border operation started by Turkey in 2018 with operations to be conducted in the future. To understand the effects of Operation Claw, its scope must be analyzed. Thus, it is beneficial to briefly review the region, and the goals and concept of the operation along with the capacity of the threat. Following the review, the procedure of the operation, which is the main topic of discussion, and its place in Turkey’s fight against terrorism can be examined.

Operation Claw’s scope

The operation is being conducted in a mountainous region roughly 30 kilometers deep from the Turkish border and 25 kilometers wide parallel to the Turkish border, starting from the south of Derecik district of Hakkari province, including Iraq’s Kani Rash region and reaching to the rural surrounding area of Chubkan village of Soran district. The distance between the southernmost front of the operation and the PKK’s headquarters Mount Qandil is roughly 55 kilometers, and the distance to Asos Mountain, which is also used by the terror organization and lies further south, is 150 kilometers.

The operation geography makes it possible for elements of the terrorist organization to hide in the terrain, and constitutes a natural obstacle for the troops conducting the operation. Unlike Syrian territory, the region of Hakurk, with its many mountains, hills and deep valleys stretching from east to west, peaks ranging from 1.700 to 3.200 meters and low population density makes it hard and sometimes impossible to conduct armored and mechanized operations. Thus, the horizontal advance made by commando units in the mountainous region needs to be constantly supported by vertical engagement from the air. The low number of settlements in the region significantly reduces the likelihood of civilian casualties during the conduct of the operation.

The tactical aims of the operation are the destruction of the caves and shelters used by the terrorist organization in the Hakurk region along with the neutralization of the terrorists in the region, and the strategical aim is extending and deepening the region for fighting the PKK in Iraqi territory. These actions are motivated to eliminate the PKK’s military capabilities and reduce the terrorist organization’s area of operations. The operation also prevents the PKK’s tactical elements from infiltrating into Turkey over the Hakurk region and makes the detection and engagement of terrorist elements easier by limiting them to a smaller region. The region of the operation is in a position that can be expanded towards the Iran border to the east and Avashin-Basyan and Zap regions to the west, which makes tactical and operative engagement of the PKK targets outside of the Hakurk region easier.

Operation Claw serves as a bridge in Turkey’s fight against terrorism through combining methodological and technological changes in the fight against terror and through unifying with Turkey’s former cross border operations.

In order to carry out the fight against the PKK deep in the territory of a foreign country and over a large front, the TSK has determined a proper operation concept and chose the elements of the operation accordingly. The field conditions, tactical capabilities of the terrorists and the lessons learned from the operation that started in 2018 can be said to be the main factors in choosing the operation concept. The geographical conditions of the Hakurk region, along with the terrorists moving in small groups of four to five people, make the detection of terrorist elements harder. Due to this, the use of electronic intelligence devices for instantaneous target detection and the use of technical means for instantaneous engagement both increases success and reduces the casualty risk of maneuvering elements.

The operation is being conducted according to a concept that relies on the combined use of maneuvering elements composed of units from the Special Forces Command and commando units alongside tactical elements from the air force with UCAVs and UAVs from the land forces, combat helicopters of the army aviation units and land combat support vehicles providing constant combat support via high firepower and precise engagement. The maneuvering elements that have the capability to capture critical field locations via surprise attack landings are entirely composed of professional soldiers.

The air force elements that directly provide support for the operation can strike PKK targets outside of the operation region as well as meeting the instantaneous firepower needs of the maneuvering units, preventing terrorist elements from making consolidated defenses. Within this context, the importance of precision guiding kits that are developed by national resources, used by the air force and integrated with general-purpose munition must be emphasized. Mini smart munition used by unmanned aerial vehicles have also contributed greatly to the success and tempo of the operation both due to their capabilities allowing them to be used against precise targets and the close air support they provide for maneuvering units. It has also been observed that multiple-launch rocket systems used in the operation to prevent the terrorist organization from moving in large groups have been effectively integrated with the firepower support elements of the operation.

The geographical extent of the operation is not restricted and has the potential to expand in response to new conditions that may arise in the future. Within this context, the main factor that affects the success of the operation is the flexibility of its mission. The underlying reason for this is the compact and mobile capabilities of the units conducting the operation. Alongside the control of the operation area, in the regions outside, the TSK’s mobile air and land platforms can continuously maintain their effect on the PKK, blocking the terrorist organization’s action capabilities on a tactical and operative level.

Against this, the terrorist organization attempts to conduct low risk activities, meaning activities such as long-range mortar attacks and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). And these activities fail to have a large effect due to not being supported by other action tactics. Moreover, the mortar detection radars used by the TSK make it possible to respond to the PKK’s long range attacks even in cases where the attackers are not visible to the eye, and this capability of the terrorist organization is instantaneously defused. Another action practice of the terrorist organization is the deployment of anti-air weapons and land to air portable missile systems against aircrafts. While the PKK attempts to use DSHK series anti-air weapons and SA series portable missile systems against the TSK’s engagement from the air, thanks to the continuous electronic surveillance capabilities of the TSK and the human-sourced information provided by the intelligence agency, the locations of these weapons can be easily determined, targeted and neutralized.

The importance of Operation Claw

The operations Turkey conducts against the PKK within its borders and the intelligence and military operations conducted against terror elements in northern Iraq and northern Syria continue simultaneously. The continuity and integrity of these operations have led the terrorist organization to lose power and become unable to conduct certain organized attacks within Turkey, while causing the erosion of its military capabilities and the loss of the areas under its control abroad. Operation Claw is also a result of Turkey’s integrated approach in the fight against terror, technological transformations in the military and structural reforms. The operation must be evaluated separately from previous cross border anti-PKK operations that had limited extent, and must be seen as part of Turkey’s political and military strategy in its fight against terror. The operation is being conducted in a manner in accordance with Turkey’s strategy of reducing the areas controlled by terrorist elements and addressing the problem at its source in its fight against PKK and with a tempo that lays the groundwork for subsequent operations.

With Operation Claw, Turkey both defends Iraq’s territorial integrity and strives to increase Iraq’s capabilities of fighting terrorism.

In 2017 and before, PKK had, by diversifying its action capabilities and expanding its fields of operation, forced Turkey to constantly develop strategies focusing on its internal security, and the terrorist organization maintained its presence across the border via this manner. The PKK diversified the locations of its activities within a region in Turkey bound by Tokat-Giresun-Gümüşhane to the north, Kars-Ağrı-Van-Hakkari to the east, Hakkari-Şırnak-Mardin-Şanlıurfa-Hatay to the south and Osmaniye-Adıyaman-Elazığ-Tunceli to the west, and kept the TSK and law enforcement forces occupied in different sectors within the country. But the concept of fighting terrorism that developed and started showing its effects after 2017 drastically changed the situation for the PKK.

The TSK has turned the PKK into an easier target by restricting their operations to a variety of sectors in small spaces in Syria and Iraq, and has ensured that the fight against the terrorist organization within Turkey changed from simply being limited to active PKK members to including all social circles of the organization such as its underground members, passive supporters and political extensions. While the fight against the PKK within Turkey has evolved towards fighting the ideology of the organization, the fight across the border is aiming to eliminate the last armed active members and the leaders of the organization.

As part of Operation Claw, 61 terrorists have been neutralized as of July 14, 2019, and a great deal of equipment, munition and materials belonging to the PKK, including advanced weapons such as the SA-14 portable anti-air missile system, have been captured. Alongside this, PKK’s action capabilities have heavily been suppressed and the region of Hakurk, 500 square kilometers in size and previously used for the purposes of logistics, training, smuggling and indoctrination by the terrorist organization, has been cleared of terrorist elements. Moreover, the operation is being conducted with national resources with a focus on intelligence and operation aspects. Neither is intelligence being received from allies nor are local forces supporting the operation.

Operation Claw entered a new phase on July 12, 2019, by expanding its territorial scope into the east towards the Iranian border. This phase is called Operation Claw 2.

The diplomatic relations between Turkey and the federal government of Iraq as well as the Kurdistan Region of Iraq have raised Turkey’s leverage in terms of intelligence and operations, increasing the country’s level of impact in the region. The diplomatic efforts of Turkey in its fight against the PKK in Iraqi territory both search for common ground in the fight against the terrorist organization and aim to prevent Iraqi territory from being occupied by another terrorist organization again. Thus, the country both defends the territorial integrity of Iraq and fights in the field to increase Iraq’s capabilities of fighting terrorism.

Operation Claw’s main goal

Operation Claw has the quality of being an operation that makes use of the success of Operation Determination, which started in 2018, and due to its goal of removing terrorist elements from a large region of Iraqi territory, it is a first in Turkey’s anti-PKK fight. The operation may lead to many potential outcomes that can contribute to ensuring Turkey’s internal and national security. It can be argued that the existing tempo and success of the operation will contribute to the stability of Turkey and the region within the framework of the following assessments:

• The operation that began in 2018 is stabilizing the safe area created along Şemdinli and Derecik and serves as a preventive measure for the PKK’s terror attacks. Alongside this, the offensive threat of the organization is being kept at a distance of 30 kilometers from the border.
• The operation has laid the groundwork for subsequent operations and has a unifying role in other operation areas in northern Iraq.
• It has reduced the chances of PKK’s staying intact by directly threatening the organization’s living spaces.
• It has caused the PKK’s loss of territorial control in Hakurk, which breaks the terrorist organization’s “media defense field” perception.
• It prevents a potential power vacuum that may arise in northern Iraq following a possible US-Iran conflict and averts the PKK’s possibility of taking advantage of the instability created by such a situation.
• It creates an opportunity to develop a common approach against the PKK with the federal government of Iraq as well as the Kurdistan Region of Iraq by ensuring Iraq’s territorial integrity

Operation Claw entered a new phase on July 12, 2019, by expanding its territorial scope into the east towards the Iranian border that leads the operation’s right flank more active. The second phase of the operation is called Operation Claw 2 and it confirms the bridging role of Operation Claw for future operations. Though no conceptual or force combination change is reported, the number of soldiers in the operation increased in order to secure a larger area in the Khakurk region. Each and every phase of the operation is expected to target a new operational area in the form of a chain sequence until a vast safe area is established. An operation against the Qandil Mountain may be seen after a total establishment of a safe zone in northern Iraq.  

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced on Wednesday (December 12) that Turkey will carry out a military operation in the east of the Euphrates River in Syria in a few days. The operation will target the PYD – the PKK’s offshoot in Syria. There have been some news from the ground signaling that there is ongoing mobilization in Turkey right across the Syrian border. This is a sign showing that the operation can start anytime. Yet, some doubt about the likelihood of its occurrence given the possible American reactions.

The president’s announcement came shortly after the U.S. announced building observation posts near the Turkish border. This was felt like a slap on the face by some Turks. Yet for many, this is just a follow up to a consistent set of American policies that aim to strengthen the PYD, not only against Deash but with a broader agenda for a longer term.

The PYD under the American security umbrella has gained territory, American weaponry, American military training, and quasi-recognition by the West. In other words, the U.S. is building a state for its proxy force on the ground. The problem is, this proxy force is Turkey’s number one security threat. This is the organization that trains its armed personnel under the posters of PKK leader Ocalan. This is the organization that teaches school kids Ocalan’s ideas, which are merely about carving out territory from Turkey by the use of terror tactics.

All this time, American officials told Turkey that their support for the PYD is tactical and temporary while carving out a quasi-statehood for the PYD right across the Turkish border. This is not acceptable. No country will allow a terror organization to gain such capabilities and recognition.

The U.S. is building a state for its proxy force on the ground. The problem is, this proxy force is Turkey’s number one security threat.

American officials are still trying to convince Turkey that the PYD and the PKK are not the same, as Turkey is consistently fighting with PYD militias within its own borders, yes in Turkey. This is not just about the PYD authorities cheering up when the PKK carries out suicide attacks in Turkey. This is not just about the PYD teaching school kids the glory of killing Turks. This is literally about the PYD fighting Turkey. The PYD’s marketing face Zozan Cudi is one of many examples who were marketed to the Western media as pretty PYD girls fighting against Deash, but who happened to be killed within Turkish borders fighting against the Turkish army.

The U.S., sooner or later, has to find a way to do business in Eastern Syria without the PKK. This is hard given that the PYD/PKK left no other actor in the region to work with. But there is no alternative as Turkey will not watch the PKK build up its army in Syria only to hit Turkey harder.

After all, Turkey has no more patience as the PYD’s armed militias receive weapons and training from the U.S. and then infiltrate into Turkey to utilize such assets. There is no doubt that the American officials know what the PYD is, what it was formed for back in 2003 by the PKK, and what its priority is. Turkey will not allow a terror organization to get rooted right across its borders, even under U.S. protection.

What is next then? What is going to happen when Turkey carries out a well-deserved operation to its principal enemy? It seems like the American scenario is built on the impossibility of this option. Yet this can happen and will happen sooner or later. And when it happens, will U.S. forces fight against Turkey to back Turkey’s number one enemy? I doubt.

Right now, the best case scenario is the occurrence of Turkey’s military operation in a narrow circle such as Tel Abyad. After such a limited operation, Turkey can take a pause for the U.S. to finally see that a military conflict between the PYD and Turkey in Eastern Syria is not only possible, but also inevitable. As Turkey keeps its initial operation limited in scope, the U.S. can shift its policy to one that will not pose an existential threat to Turkey. The U.S., sooner or later, has to find a way to do business in Eastern Syria without the PKK. This is hard given that the PYD/PKK left no other actor in the region to work with. But there is no alternative as Turkey will not watch the PKK build up its army in Syria only to hit Turkey harder.

Reporting for Anadolu Agency, Levent Tok and Muhammad Mislo wrote in an article, “Excluding the west of the Euphrates, YPG sits at the top of a square that deepens 45 thousand kilometer square from the line between the east of the river and Iraqi border.” According to the article, this area is one-third of the total lands of Syria.

With the intense help of U.S. airstrikes and weapon support, the YPG/PKK has been able to spread to the east of the Euphrates River.

The article adds that the biggest settlements at the east of the Euphrates are Aleppo’s Ayn al-Arab (Kobani), Rakka’s Tel Abyad and Tabka, Al-Hasakah’s Qamishli, Amude, Rasullayn towns and the north parts of Deir ez-Zor; approximately 70% of the population in this zone are still Arab. Terrorist elements intend to control the occupied lands easier in the process of state-building by forcefully re-designing the demographic structure. The YPG has forced Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens from their lands and has prevented those that want to return as the Daesh threat has been eliminated.

According to the data provided by the High Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, the YPG/PKK has forced approximately 1.7 million people to migrate.

The U.S.-backed YPG/PKK has seized Syria’s richest energy sources in the name of ‘fighting Daesh.’ For example, YPG/PKK terrorists seized the biggest natural gas facility in Konoko in the north-east of the petrol-rich Dier ez-Zor in September 2017. The terrorists also captured the Jafra petrol field as well as the biggest petrol field in Syria – Al-Omar.

The article in discussion claims that the terrorist elements in the region have also taken control of the three biggest dams of Syria with the air support provided by the U.S. 70% of the total electricity need of Syria is provided by these three dams.

According to Joseph Dunford – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – “(In YPG area) We are estimating 35-40 thousand local force to be trained and equipped in order to provide stability.”

Abdulkadir Selvi provides some details from the operation. According to his sources, the operation that will be launched does not carry the same pattern as previous operations, and a different strategy will be applied. Regarding the question of ‘facing Americans,’ according to Selvi’s sources, the military presence of the U.S. is within the plan and that the U.S. military will not be a target.

The main goal of the operation is to pull 1.200 Free Syrian Army soldiers from the area of OES and placing them in Akchaqala, just across Tel Abyad. In addition to this, Turkish Armed Forces have sent reinforcement troops to the Ceylanpinar area across Ras al-Ayn. The main reason for the Turkish military to enter these is the fact that, like pulling Afrin apart from Ayn al-Arab, with the operations conducted from these two points, Ayn al-Arab will be pulled apart from the Jazira at the east. This will be a huge blast to the YPG’s attempt of state-building; while enhancing Turkish dominance in Syria, it will destroy the unity of YPG.

In response to President Erdogan’s announcement of the operation, the U.S. defense ministry has stated that a one-sided military operation towards the northeast of Syria is “worrying” and “unacceptable.”

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi 

President Erdogan recently announced that Turkey’s next military operation against the YPG/PKK in northeastern Syria might be launched “within a few days,” which became the top high-level statement made in Ankara most recently. The details such as time, particular target place and duration of the military operation are not precise yet, but Turkey’s strategic objective is clear: to de-territorialize the YPG/PYD alongside its Syrian border, fix relations with the U.S. in Syria and recalibrate its military presence.

More importantly, since Turkey previously conducted military operations in Syria, policymakers realized that without any military action Turkey could not reach any of its strategic objectives in Syria. Therefore, eliminating the PKK presence alongside Turkey’s Syrian border and maintaining an army presence there might provide Ankara with an additional political maneuver to consolidate its political stance within the Syrian crisis. This, especially, will be the case when the international actors begin to shape the future of Syria.

Turkey’s strategic objective is clear: to de-territorialize the YPG/PYD alongside its Syrian border, fix relations with the U.S. in Syria and recalibrate its military presence.

Although Turkey has an obvious agenda and strategic objective in the Syrian crisis and towards the PKK/YPG presence in Syria; others, especially the U.S., hold different strategic calculations and concerns regarding Turkey’s next military move in northeastern Syria especially a comprehensive military operation against the U.S.-backed YPG group. The U.S. attempt to establish observation points in the eastern part of Euphrates was clearly a strong signal to discourage Turkey to launch a military operation against the YPG’s strongholds such as Ayn El-Arab, Tal Abyad, and Rasulayn.

Following President Erdogan’ precise statement about Turkey’s next military operation, the Pentagon said that the military operation against the “SDG is not acceptable.” However, news coming from the ground shows that the U.S. began to withdraw its military forces from Tal Abyad. This development strongly demonstrates that Turkey’s military operation is underway.  Then two questions concerning Turkey’s upcoming military operation need to be answered. While the first one is the question of how Turkey is planning the military move on an operational level, the second one is the question of how Turkey’s next military action against the YPG will potentially reshape relations between Ankara and Washington.

News coming from the ground shows that the U.S. began to withdraw its military forces from Tal Abyad. This development strongly demonstrates that Turkey’s military operation is underway.

Regarding the operational dimension of military intervention, it seems that Turkey’s military operation at this stage will not be comprehensive compared to the previous cross-border operations such as OES and OOB. Even though there are different operational scenarios in the hands of the Turkish Armed Forces, such as conducting a comprehensive and full-scale direct intervention including the infiltration of ground troops into northeastern Syria, Ankara’s first aim is to discourage the U.S. from continuing its observation points alongside Turkey’s Syrian border to protect the YPG. Ankara believes that it would be too late if the U.S. continues to establish observation points.

Ankara’s primary objective is to create a militarily protected safe zone which will be liberated from the terrorist entities and then open up a territorial zone not only to protect Turkey’s border against the terrorist infiltration but also to prevent the YPG’s territorial continuity in the eastern part of the Euphrates River. This will undoubtedly be a game changer for Turkey on the ground. The new operation, therefore, would focus on forming a region liberated from the YPG along the Syrian border and controlling critical points. The first signal coming from the ground is that Tal Abyad might be the initial target of Turkey.

Turkey will certainly use its legitimate right of self-defense or intervention. For Turkey, the YPG issue is not negotiable.

Regarding relations between Turkey and the U.S., there are many strategic domains that both sides have to rethink through. If there is an agreement over Turkey’s military operation, then one side should certainly step back. President Erdogan said that the U.S. forces would not be the target of Turkey by underlying the potential cooperation between Ankara and Washington in the fight against the remaining element of Daesh. Erdogan strongly underlined that Turkey could take full-responsibility to fight against Daesh. More importantly, Turkey will certainly use its legitimate right of self-defense or intervention, as President Erdogan stated two days ago in Ankara. For Turkey, the YPG issue is not negotiable. Under this circumstance, Turkey, one way or another, will want to keep its eyes over the YPG and northeastern Syria until a political solution is reached across Syria.

Therefore, the most likely scenario for Turkey’s upcoming military operation is a limited intervention to clean the YPG presence by holding a small piece of territory to prevent the terrorist organization from consolidating its territorial and political order. If Turkey and the U.S. can find common ground to mitigate Turkey’s security concerns over the YPG, then the two countries might be able to establish a new modality to work in cooperation for Syria.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared an expansion of Turkish military operations in Syria and pointed to the east of the Euphrates.

During his speech at the Turkish Defense Industry Summit yesterday, President Erdogan stated that a military operation will begin in the area controlled by the YPG in the west of the Euphrates River. Erdogan said: “While 80-85% of Manbij used to belong to the Arabs, at the moment there are terrorist groups there. In that case, we will take them out. It is our responsibility now.”

Further criticizing the U.S. administration, Erdogan stated, “We have not yet achieved any result in Manbij. Mr. President says that we will clear those (terrorist groups) in 30 days. We’ll see. We wish they would clear all the terrorists.”

“An undeniable diversion tactic has been carried out in Manbij. And at this moment it is still being carried out.”

Global media outlets have confirmed that the U.S. has taken a step to train 30,000 YPG terrorists in northern Syria. And President Erdogan asks the U.S. government “Is this true? Are you aware of what you are really doing?”

“The north of Syria is our south. They are trying to build a corridor there. We say ‘these are terrorists,’ but our strategic partners, especially the U.S., say that ‘they are not terrorists.’ These are (referring to the terrorist organizations) a branch of the PKK, and all the proof is exposed. Why don’t you act with us, but act with them?”

“While the Americans speak positively to our faces, they preferred to use elements of these terrorist groups on the ground. Recently, they have taken the step to train 30,000 terrorists in the area. They say ‘there is no such thing.’ However, the global media has confirmed this. They have this information. Is this true? Are you aware of what you are really doing?”

What will be the scope of Turkey’s operation to the east of the Euphrates?

According to Abdullah Agar, terror and security expert, the operation will involve an area of 20 thousand square kilometers and this time Sinjar – an area in the west of Iraq – will also be included.

Turkey’s new military operation to the east of the Euphrates will involve an area of 20 thousand square kilometers and this time Sinjar – an area in the west of Iraq – will also be included.

Regarding the possibility of Turkish and U.S. forces crossing each other, Agar highlighted the possibility of this risk but stated, “If the risk is big for Turkish soldiers, it is bigger for American soldiers. The U.S. has made a huge mistake by taking a path with terrorists.”

Confirming the importance of President Erdogan’s speech for reflecting the will of Turkey, Agar said, “An operation that will be executed in stages is ahead. We are talking about a process of 550 kilometers along the border and 40 kilometer square in depth. This means that the Turkish Armed Forces will conduct an operation in an area of 20 thousand kilometer square.”

The operation, announced yesterday by Erdogan could further damage the already tense relations between Turkey and the United States.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi