Military assistance to Ukraine and its NATO membership are two separate matters. In fact, there is almost complete consensus among Alliance members to provide military assistance to Ukraine. Although some NATO members, such as Germany, were initially reluctant, they have come around to Washington’s line under pressure from their domestic public opinion, Europe, and the United States.

In the early stages of the Russia-Ukraine war, Berlin was only prepared to provide Ukraine with troops, but it has now supplied the country with Leopard 2 tanks and advanced air defence missiles. From this point of view, NATO, which has organized itself very quickly and decisively to support Ukraine militarily, will continue this support until it achieves its goals with regard to Russia.

There are already problems with the production of ammunition for certain weapons due to their intensive use on the Ukrainian front, yet, one of the most important factors determining the course of the struggle between NATO and Russia will be the production of weapons and ammunition, given that Russia is experiencing similar problems to a much greater extent.

The issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership, which is expected to be one of the main items on the agenda at the Vilnius summit, has caused serious disagreement between member states. Some, particularly the Baltic and several Eastern European countries, argue that Ukraine should become a member of NATO quickly, while others, such as the United States and Germany, where there is intense internal debate on the issue, oppose such a quick decision.

Those in favor of a more cautious approach suggest to wait until the end of the war to decide on the issue, fearing that Ukraine’s possible NATO membership during the war would draw them into direct armed conflict with Russia and would also complicate peace negotiations with Russia. They are considering postponing a decision in the hope that, at the end of the war, there will be a weakened Russia unable to oppose Ukraine’s NATO membership. Therefore, it seems unlikely that a decision on Ukraine’s NATO membership will be taken at the Vilnius summit.

However, given the establishment of a NATO-Ukraine Council and the strong likelihood that Ukraine will not be required to meet the preconditions of the Membership Action Plan for the accession of new members, such as the fight against corruption, which was previously included in the Membership Action Plan adopted at the Bucharest Summit, the door will be left open for Ukraine’s membership in the medium term. This issue will be closely linked to the development of NATO’s Russia policy and the outcome of the war. Moreover, Russia’s policy towards the West will be crucial to Ukraine’s NATO membership.

For NATO members, such as Italy and Spain, which have not yet resolved their economic problems caused by the Euro debt crisis, increasing their military spending from 1.5% to more than 2% would mean additional problems for their budget balances. In addition, the military spending of NATO members such as Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Ireland remains well below the Alliance’s target. It should be recalled that NATO has set the 2% limit as a minimum target, and Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has persistently called for more than 2% military spending in the member states he has visited.

While Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has created a strong motivation for NATO to increase military spending, the disruptions it has caused to energy and food supplies, and prices, and the resulting economic challenges have left many members struggling to find the financial resources to increase their military spending. It is worth noting that NATO members, especially those with growing economic problems, will find it difficult to meet the Alliance’s targets for increasing military spending.

Meanwhile, the U.S. administration wants to see its NATO allies on its side in the fight against China, just as it has done with Russia. Yet, it is no secret that there are members who have reservations about this; Germany, France, and Turkey are among such countries, albeit for different reasons.

In the aftermath of the Trump era, European NATO members are struggling to trust the United States, making it difficult for them to follow Washington’s lead, especially when it comes to a policy towards China. The same reluctance was also present about a policy towards Russia; however, the Russia-Ukraine war helped to remove this reluctance and align countries behind the U.S. Now Washington wants to capitalize on this shock momentum and rally its European allies behind its line against China.

In addition to the shock effect of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the U.S. has another advantage in rallying the Europeans behind it: “American friends” in Europe. These “American friends,” commonly known as Atlanticists, are everywhere in Europe. They are in power in countries like Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland, and are partners in coalition governments in countries like Germany.

Given that China has not made a mistake similar to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, but instead is trying to create a sphere of influence for itself through economic cooperation, and given its close economic ties with some European countries, it will not be as easy for Washington to rally NATO members behind its fight against Beijing as it has been to rally them against Moscow.

The world is in an era of permanent low-level conflict. Traditional conflict has largely left its place to grey-zone warfare and hybrid war. States have always used unconventional and non-military ways to acquire leverage or attain victory; however, the increasingly complex and interconnected current nature of the world has made interdependence the battleground.

From sanctions to competing for and buying influence abroad, warfare has taken a more subtle, sly, undeclared, unending, and, most importantly, unrestricted, form. Nowadays, this has blurred the line between war and peace.

While traditional war is very expensive, unpopular, and often too difficult to manage, this new way of war is groundbreaking and does not shy away from any tool available. War is all around us, in everyday life, culture, economics, law, and information. Even something as innocuous as cute cat pictures online can become a ploy.

Mark Galeotti takes us through the weaponization of everything, from disinformation, cyberattacks, and espionage to subversion and crime, in order to understand the changing landscape of war and what it might bring.

Gone are the days of “stable” warfare! The subtle components of martial and everyday civilian life are blending, leading to instability within countries and a legitimacy crisis across the globe. However, this development does not need to be a solely negative one. As Galeotti points out, conflict is democratized, meaning the people are not just bystanders and can take positive action to avoid zero-sum situations. The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War equips the reader with ways of surviving, adapting, and taking advantage of the opportunities presented by this new reality.

When everything is weaponizable, why would the distinction hold any meaning? Where do we begin to look? How can civilians be mindful of this development? Many of the weapons used are often abstract but their effects are very much tangible and jolting. As it turns out, some things are more weaponizable than others.

Luckily, The Weaponisation of Everything lays bare how this warfare takes form all around the world with examples and a future trajectory. While this form of conflict may be vague and confusing, Galeotti makes the topic apprehensible for all readers.

Even though technology advances in leaps and problems seem to be constantly evolving, Galeotti’s approach invites the reader not only to face the emerging reality, but also to learn to adapt to the new permanent, bloodless war. The Weaponisation of Everything, first released in February 15, 2022, is now available in paperback as of February 14, 2023.

Mark Galeotti, The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War (Yale University Press, 2022) ISBN 9780300253443, 256 Pages

Robert H. Latiff’s Future Peace, a sequel to Future War, specifically brings to attention a subtle, yet potentially destructive effect of technologies such as autonomous systems, advanced weapons, and AI: the provocation to violence. Against the backdrop of the brewing power rivalry between the U.S. and its adversaries, technology aggregates tension and catalyzes violence.

Future Peace touches upon the ethical, security-related, behavioral, and technical aspects of technology and warfare. It consists of four chapters: “A Giant Armed Nervous System” (referring to the military), “Urge to Violence,” “Stumbling into War,” and “Avoiding War.”

Latiff’s book comes as a warning to practice caution when adopting new weapons technology, and aids in understanding human and technical behaviors to attenuate its harms and decrease the chances of war. Not only does technology make war easier and speedier, hence enabling the rush to war, but hinders human reasoning. Such technical changes make the process of sound judgement difficult; for example, thinking and acting in a diplomatic manner. Furthermore, these changes enhance the potential for human error to get out of hand.

Latiff argues that it is vitally important to avoid entering conflict in the first place. He highlights the importance of the cooperative efforts of many segments of society, from the public and technologists to militarists and decision-makers. He implies that it is criminal negligence to leave everything to automation processes or politicians. Therefore, Future Peace also lays out long to short term recommendations to maintain peace and reverse the rush to war.

A

utonomous features are not a matter of the future; they have been used in warfare for years. However, it is quite evident that with the advancement of technology and the weaponization of artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons systems are swiftly adapting and becoming accepted.

As these changes emerge, the question that is often raised by international organizations such as the UN, which set the norms of conduct in an effort to control and regulate the use of autonomous weapons, is “How will human beings maintain control of the use of autonomous weapons?” In their study, Ingvild Bode and Hendrik Huelss flip the script to reveal another perspective of this dynamic.

Bode and Huelss aim to explain how testing, developing, and using weapons systems with autonomous features shapes ethical and legal norms, and how standards manifest and change in practice. The authors also examine the consequences of autonomous weapons for international relations.

Bode and Huelss acknowledge the fear and risks that these developments bring but adopt the approach that autonomous weapon systems may push people away from taking immediate decisions on the use of force as norms adapt to the appropriate use of force.

In short, Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Norms analyses the normative repercussions of weaponizing artificial intelligence by examining them not as tools used by the military but as shaping forces. Chapters include “Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Relations,” “New Technologies of Warfare: Emergence and Regulation,” “International Law, Norms, and Order,” “Norms in International Relations,” and “How Autonomous Weapons Systems Make Norms,” and contain assisting tables and figures.

As the trend and debate of autonomizing weapons systems continues, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Norms equips the reader with an understanding of the relation of human-machine interaction and the process of integrating new technologies into war.

I

n War Virtually, Roberto J. González takes the reader behind the scenes to expose how scientists, programmers, and engineers developed technologies that automate war, predict conflict, and regulate human thought and behavior. Does this sound utopian? Not so when you factor in the persistent drive to arm for virtual warfare. In this quest, data comes a valuable commodity.

González evaluates autonomous weapons, robotic systems, predictive modeling software, advanced surveillance programs, and psyops techniques. He examines the foundation of the latest version of warfare in order to explain how it has taken its current form through contemporary military operations and their high-tech and cultural underpinnings.

However, War Virtually transcends the design, innovative, and transformative aspects of technology and warfare, and touches upon human engineering. González reveals the relations between U.S. intelligence agencies and Big Tech, and its implications. It is no secret that algorithms construct behavioral models for anticipating or even predicting human behavior, and, therefore, all of us risk having our digital lives become part of the military-industrial economy.

Adopting a critical approach, González examines how the U.S. military is weaponizing technology and data for new kinds of warfare, and questions the notion that technological advancements will lead to more efficient and less destructive warfare. In fact, he implies that such an aspiration comes at a great cost, and argues that in this world, there is little room for hubris.

War Virtually covers a large array of topics including automated battlefield robotics, social scientists’ involvement in experimental defense research, the blurred line between political consulting and propaganda in the internet era, and the military’s use of big data to craft new counterinsurgency methods based on predicting conflict.

I

n Proto-Algorithmic War, Stefka Hristova offers a unique perspective on the Iraq War and the history of algorithmic and digital logic that came to be a crucial element of today’s warfare. She examines the military policy of the United States going into the Iraq War: the U.S. approached the war with the logic of digital and emerging algorithmic technology alongside the preceding numerical logics of the British Mandate in Iraq. In a sense, the Iraq War became an experiment in the early stages of development and utilization of such technology in warfare, and moreover war culture.

Hristova provides a case study of a comparative historical framework reaching back to the quantification techniques harnessed during the era of Mandatory Iraq (1918-1932) and analyzes the parallels and diversions between the numerical logics in both cases.

The author further evaluates the logic that moved beyond the British mandate for Iraq and reduced culture, society, and the physical body and environment into visual data-driven, sterilized, reproducible warfare, highlighting that it lacked cultural and historical context. Indeed, the actual experience of the Iraq War resulted in massive-scale death and destruction.

Proto-Algorithmic War offers an insight into the digitization and automation of war. Hristova aptly scrutinizes the ways in which the Iraq War attempted and often failed to see and incorporate population and territory as digital and further proto-algorithmic entities.

B

en Buchanan and Andrew Imbrie use fire as an analogy to showcase how AI has a dual nature: destructive and constructive. Just like our distant ancestors learning to operate their newly discovered, full of potential tool, our responsibility is to understand and use AI potential wisely. With AI revolutionizing the world, democracies have a responsibility to harness that power constructively and come out on top. Transformation is on its way—can humanity use AI to light the way? Or will the fire burn wildly and ignite a new type of war?

In The New Fire, Buchanan and Imbrie help us understand AI better by breaking it down into its “sparks,” which are data, algorithms, and computing power. They further explain the tangible and potentially destructive consequences of these sparks such as disinformation campaigns, new hacking tools, and military weapons.

On a larger scale, The New Fire shows the urgency of democracies to adapt to the powerful tool that is AI, as autocrats may use it for domestic centralized control and asymmetric advantages in combat. In that sense, they argue that harnessing the power of AI is crucial for holding democracy in balance in the world. The New Fire also acknowledges that democracies have a harder time adapting to the age of AI given ethical and civil concerns, but that new ways could be forged based on the advantages of democracy.

Drawing on examples from geopolitical competition and its analysis, Buchanan and Imbrie show how AI can work for democracy while respecting civil rights. In the age of AI, this crucial topic may determine the choice of course between war and peace.

Written by Dilara Özer

Russian Strategic Missile Force Commander Colonel General Sergei Karakayev announced on June 5 that the second regiment of intercontinental ballistic missiles equipped with the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles was preparing to go on combat alert. Karakayev stated that the first regiment is already on full alert and the second regiment is being prepared as per the “present-day realities.” Karakayev claimed that no anti-ballistic missile defense system is able to counter the Avangard hypersonic weapon system.

On May 31, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that on May 28 the Project 22350 class Admiral Gorshkov frigate performed a test fire for the Tsirkon missile from the Barents Sea. According to a report by Russian TASS news agency, the missile hit a target 1,000 km from the warship. The test marked the completion of the state trials, therefore concluding the development process of the weapon system, which was designed for launch from naval vessels.

Earlier this year, for the first time, the Russian Air Force used the Kinzhal air-launched hypersonic missile against targets in Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Kinzhals were fired from MiG-31K fighter aircraft on March 19 and 20 targeting an underground weapons storage in Ivano-Frankivsk and a fuel depot in Mykolaiv, respectively. These were the first instances of combat use of the Kinzhal hypersonic weapon system.

The Avangard, the Tsirkon, and the Kinzhal are three of the most advanced missile systems recently put into service by the Russian Federation. Categorized as “hypersonic missiles,” these weapon systems have become more prominent in the defense and security agenda. Their characteristics, most importantly their speed, make them strategic assets. The special emphasis on hypersonic weapons by the Russian political leadership and, consequently, the defense industrial base reflects Russia’s perception and assessment in the balance of power with its peer competitors.

Hypersonic flight

The speed of sound is one of the fundamental design parameters in aerospace engineering. The maximum and cruise speed of the air platform, whether or not it will fly faster than the speed of sound, profoundly affects the design characteristics. Based on the speed parameter, there are four main flight regime types of hypersonic missiles. These categories are determined according to Mach number, which is the ratio of the speed of the air platform to the speed of sound.

Flight at speed faster than that of sound is called supersonic, while speeds at least five times the speed of sound are called hypersonic. The design, development, and testing of aircraft flying at hypersonic speeds is one of the most advanced and complex issues in aerospace engineering.

The main advantage of hypersonic flight is the shortening of time required to reach the target. Several hypersonic passenger plane designs have been offered lately, promising dramatically short flight times over long distances. In terms of military aircraft, the hypersonic capability enables short reaction time and minimum time of exposure to enemy air defenses. But the main application area of hypersonic flight technology is long-range weapons.

There are three main types of weapon systems that fly at hypersonic speed: ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs).

Similar to the operating principle of a ballistic missile, in which the warhead section is carried towards the target with single or multiple stages, HGVs are carried to the upper layers of the atmosphere, mostly with an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). However, unlike ballistic missiles, the warhead is released at comparatively lower altitudes. Once released, the HGV flies along its route using the speed gained until that moment and executes maneuvers using control surfaces and thrusters.

The main advantage of HGVs over ballistic missiles lies in the capability to execute maneuvers, making it almost impossible to predict the impact point and therefore the target. Combined with the excessively high speed, HGVs become virtually immune to anti-ballistic missile defense systems, early warning, and tracking systems.

Russian hypersonic weapon systems

The Soviet Union started working on a hypersonic platform in the mid-1980s. After the economic recovery in the early 2000s, and the emphasis on modernization of strike capabilities, Russia started multiple projects to develop several types of tactical and strategic weapon systems, hypersonic missiles having top priority.

On March 1, 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin unveiled several strategic weapon systems during a televised address to the country’s political elite. Videos and computer graphics showed the operation and characteristics of several advanced weapon systems such as ICBMs, nuclear-powered cruise missiles, nuclear-armed underwater drones, and hypersonic missiles. The speech was widely perceived as a milestone in the new arms race during the heightened tensions between the West and Russia after the annexation of Crimea by the latter.

Among the weapon systems presented by Putin, two hypersonic weapon systems made the headlines in Western defense and intelligence circles: the Kinzhal and the Avangard.

The Kinzhal

The Kh-47M2 Kinzhal is an aircraft-launched derivative of the 9M723 tactical ballistic missile, which is used with the Iskander M system. The missile can be fired from the MiG-31K, which is a specially modified version of the MiG-31BM, which itself is the upgraded version of the MiG-31 (NATO code “Foxhound”) interceptor. The Tu-22M3M, a modernized version of the Tu-22M3 (NATO code “Backfire”) bomber, can also fire the Kinzhal.

Initial reports about an air-launched version of the Iskander missile first surfaced as early as the mid-2010s. The first fire tests took place in 2017, followed by a ship-launched test in January 2020 during an exercise of the Black Sea Fleet. In June 2021, Kinzhal-equipped MiG-31K fighters were seen at the Hmeimim Air Base in Syria, while participating in exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean. Kinzhal-equipped MiG-31Ks were also deployed to Kaliningrad this February, shortly before the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Russian sources claim Kinzhal has a range of more than 2,200 km when fired from the MiG-31K and more than 3,000 km when fired from the Tu-22M3M. The missile is capable of carrying a maximum of 480 kg conventional or nuclear warheads with an overall weight of 4,300 kg. After launch, the missile flies Mach 4 and is claimed to achieve speeds as fast as Mach 10. The Kinzhal is also reported to have maneuvering capability to disrupt enemy air defenses, but it is unclear how it performs this.

Weapons produced via three-dimensional (3D) printing technology first appeared in the United States in 2013. Since then, they remained a serious threat which was constantly ignored. These are real weapons, easy to use, and cheap to produce, and pose an uncharted threat. This paper serves to warn individuals and states of the serious threat posed by 3D-printed weapons if no action is taken against these dangerous 3D “toys.”

3D printing technology

To understand how 3D-printed weapons work, we need to understand 3D printing technology, which has been developing since the 1980s. 3D printing is the process of converting models designed by a computer device into solid forms. Unlike the traditional model of production, 3D printing technology creates very little waste material and provides high efficiency, and for this reason it is in high demand in recent years.

The raw material of production in 3D printing technology includes colored and hard thermoplastic or metal rolls known as “filaments” that are used instead of the cartridges in 2D printers that we use in our daily life. These filaments are usually obtained by the industrial processing of materials such as resins, polymers, or composites. Devices that perform 3D printing and reveal products are known as 3D printers.

The most important feature that distinguishes these devices from the printers used in daily life is that they can move along the vertical axis as well as the horizontal and right-left axes. With 3D printers technically based on a three-axis Computer Numerical Control (CNC) mechanism, many different products can be printed, from clocks to pens, sculptures to weapon parts, and shoes to car parts.

Accordingly, it appears that two basic parts are required for a 3D-printed product: a 3D printer and filaments. While printers turn designs in the virtual environment into industrial products, filaments act as a kind of raw material for these products. In the pre-production process, a model of the part to be produced must be created with the help of computer-aided design (CAD) software or a scanner. Therefore, anyone who knows how to use CAD software or a laser or optical scanner, and has a 3D printer and filaments, can easily design and print a weapon. In fact, there is no need to know how to use CAD or a scanner because there are 3D-printed weapon models available for free on the internet.

Anyone who knows how to use CAD software or a laser or optical scanner, and has a 3D printer and filaments, can easily design and print a weapon.

A brief history of 3D-printed weapons and their use

Cody Wilson, owner of the U.S.-based open-source hardware (OSH) organization Defense Distributed, is known as the first person to make and use weapons with 3D printers. Adhering to the anarchist idea that everyone should produce their own guns, Wilson produced the first 3D-printed plastic gun named “Liberator.” In this manner, he initiated a new era in the arms industry with his first shot in 2013. In parallel, Wilson shared the 3D printable files for the construction of the gun, which were downloaded more than 100,000 times in two days. Following this, the U.S. government decided to remove the files from the site, fearing that these weapons could spread uncontrollably. However, the company filed a lawsuit for the annulment of the decision, and in a 2018 decision, the ban was found to be unconstitutional.

Thus, the model that allows the production of 3D-printed guns became once again an open source. Following this outcome, the number of 3D-printed weapons started to increase by the day in the United States. In addition, another U.S.-based company named Solid Concepts, inspired by Wilson’s “Liberator,” produced the first metal 3D-printed gun in 2013. These products, both of which have the appearance of toy guns, are known as the first products of 3D printing technology in the arms industry.

Another dimension of the threat is related to the diversification of the weapons produced. The first weapons produced based on 3D printing technology consisted of pistols with rather small dimensions. However, today, the product portfolio has expanded considerably. So much so that even 3D-printed models of the AK-47 infantry rifle, the AR-15 semi-automatic rifle, or the CheyTac Intervention sniper rifle can be made.

In addition, as stated above, individuals and micro-groups with marginal views in the U.S. and Europe have carried out attacks against civilians and compromised public security with 3D-printed guns. These weapons did not attract attention during the attacks, as they look like toys. The attackers prepared the weapons based on written and visual material available on the internet. If marginal or radical individuals or groups turn to these “hot toys” en masse, public security may face an irreversible threat.

What can be done against the growing 3D-printed weapons threat?

Strict regulation is urgently needed in order to prevent the threat from growing bigger. First of all, 3D printer circulation in the market must be taken under control and the persons or companies that own these printers must be licensed.

The most comprehensive legal regulation regarding 3D-printed weapons to date is in the UK. Early in 2013, when 3D-printed weapons were just emerging, the British government strictly regulated and criminalized the manufacture, purchase, and sale of these weapons in the UK and linked it to governmental permission. In Australia, the government restricted the production of weapons via 3D printers to governmental permission with a 2015 decision. However, there is currently no ban in the U.S., where 3D-printed weapons are most common.

In addition, access to models of 3D-printed weapons on the internet must be restricted as those who download these models can produce and reproduce weapons. Although it is difficult to implement such restrictions in a world of rapidly developing technology, there is no other way to control 3D-printed weapons. Heavy penalties should be applied to those who produce and purchase 3D-printed weapons without permission.

At the moment, countries that produce weapons with 3D printing technology are not investing in this technology with any sense of urgency. However, a number of countries, especially the U.S., are investing more in 3D-printed weapons every year. Certain countries may enter a race for low-cost, 3D-printed weapons in the future. The magnitude of such a risk must push governments to introduce plans to restrict the global spread of 3D-printed weapons. The United Nations could and should lead this cause.