The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held a referendum for independence on Monday despite the objections of many capitals including Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara. Israel’s overt support for the vote was only one among many other developments that cast a shadow on the referendum.

A considerable part of Iraqi Kurds were among those objecting to the vote, which demonstrated concerns surrounding the possible problems that could arise. The main reason for the concerns is the fear that the quest for independence would bring more conflict, instability and suffering to the Kurds instead of bolstering peace and welfare.

Some Kurds and regional countries with a significant Kurdish population were also apprehensive that the appeasement of Kurds for the sake of independence might render them increasingly dependent on some regional and global actors, causing their manipulation for the global powers’ Middle East policies.

Furthermore, it is feared that having included disputed areas, such as Kirkuk, in the referendum could convert the disagreements between Kurds and other peoples in the region into conflict. Iraq, which has already been ravaged by Daesh terror, could therefore be dragged into another civil war. Such concerns surely reflect the realities of the geography.

Past experiences make it clear that drifting the region into conflict and war brings serious consequences for the peoples and countries of the Middle East. Above all, the region surrenders to the activities of terror groups since conflict and war disrupt the states in the region. It must be noted that the wars experienced in the Middle East have constituted the main determinant that keeps the outlawed PKK active in the region for almost 40 years now. We know that the authority gaps seen in Beqaa following the Lebanese Civil War, in northern Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War and in the north of Syria as a result of the Syrian Civil War created convenient spaces for the PKK to improve and expand. Likewise, it is more than obvious that the terror groups including al-Qaeda and Daesh took advantage of the conflicts in the Middle East.

Another consequence of the conflicts in the Middle East is that they enable global actors to employ pretexts to intervene in the region. Global powers, particularly the U.S. and Russia, become a party to the conflicts in the Middle East in order to consolidate their positions in the region, which is very rich in terms of natural resources. Catastrophes befall the peoples of the region as the conflicts are manipulated for the power struggle between global actors.

Therefore, it can be argued that the referendum will start an excruciating period for all the peoples in the region, especially the Kurds, if it foments large-scale conflicts through the independence schemes of the disputed areas in Iraq. As occurred in all the other conflicts in the region, the global actors will surely take up positions in accordance with their own interests. So, the referendum poses a high risk of causing a long-standing atmosphere of chaos.

When viewed through the lens of Ankara, the extent to which the KRG administration, after a possible independence, will cooperate with Turkey in its fight against the PKK is seriously questioned. This is due to the fact that despite the extensive support of Turkey, the KRG has already failed in this matter so far. Considering that the Barzani administration, which had amicable relations with Turkey is far from satisfying Ankara even in this issue, it is predicted that an independent state of Kurdistan, where political actors have close links to the PKK and where the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Goran are influential, could possibly pursue policies that would upset Turkey.

For Turkey, who accomplished a great deal in her fight against the PKK within domestic territory, it is unacceptable for this terrorist group, which seeks to find a de facto state in northern Syria with the support of the U.S., to enhance its influence towards northern Iraq.

As a matter of fact, the Barzani administration has already acquired autonomy to a considerable degree against the unjust impositions of Baghdad and Tehran. The KRG was supposed to prove its sovereignty in its territory through solving the PKK question and this is still true. Barzani and the KRG are required to give the actual fight for independence against the PKK and the actors siding with the terror groups.

The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) referendum on independence is no great news for an already fractured country and a destabilized region. Independence is an openly stated goal of the Iraqi Kurds who consistently declare it is only a question of when, not if. However, the only outside support for KRG independence is confined to the Israeli promise to recognize a potential Kurdish state. Most stakeholders, including the U.S. and Turkey, oppose the referendum and support Iraq’s territorial integrity. Iraq has monumental challenges ahead including terrorism, reconstruction, refugees and internally displaced persons, and regional proxy wars being fought in its territory. A potential declaration of independence would most likely exacerbate these problems and lead to further destabilization of the country.

Some analysts have argued that Turkey might be open to or even embrace a declaration of independence given its close ties with the KRG. Turkey’s reaction so far has been anything but. A recent RAND Corporation report argues that Turkey might be open to Iraqi Kurdish independence especially if the declaration is not sudden and comes after negotiations with the Baghdad government over the long term. The reality is that the referendum is unlikely to lead to a declaration of independence and the KRG will seek an amicable divorce through talks with Baghdad. The most recent agreement between Erbil and Baghdad to fight against ISIS was supported and brokered by the U.S. In the case of independence, however, there is no such common ground and there does not seem to exist any available U.S. or Turkish patronage.

Iraq is fractured and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Unaddressed grievances in the country will likely exacerbate political instability despite the most recent military defeat of ISIS in Mosul. The most important reason for the emergence of ISIS was the failure of the Iraqi political system that left Sunnis out of the political system. Even in the very unlikely scenario where the KRG successfully negotiates Kurdistan’s exit from Iraq, the lack of Sunni say in the matter will continue to destabilize the country and the broader region. An Iraqi Kurdish exit will also be tested by the struggle over disputed territories and the lack of a political agreement.

Turkey’s economic investments and security interests along with its political relations with the KRG make it a critical actor. However, Turkey-KRG relations are now deeply unsettled by what looks like the KDP leader Barzani’s bid to prevail over his rivals with the promise of an elusive independence. If Turkey had supported the independence referendum, the KRG would have overcome a major hurdle in terms of international legitimacy. However, from Turkey’s perspective, the independence bid is a deeply destabilizing move in an environment where, only a few months ago, ISIS held large swaths of Iraqi territory. Turkey has had close relations with the KRG but multiple statements by Turkish officials against the upcoming referendum illustrate the limits of Turkish support for the KRG. Turkish opposition to the breakup of Iraq is so strong that Turkey might take punitive steps, including imposing sanctions against the KRG.

Turkey’s argument against Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence is based on a variety of considerations. First, yet another chapter in the long Iraqi civil war would bring about another layer of instability to the region and adversely impact Turkish economic and security interests. Second, potential new conflict could open up space in Iraq for the PKK which has already gained ground in Syria due to the prolonged civil war and American support for the PYD. Third, Turkey continues to value its relationship with the rest of Iraq and is particularly invested in the fate of the Turkmen community. Fourth, unintended consequences of the breakup of Iraq promise a whole new set of complications that would threaten Turkey’s border security and might weaken its current influence in northern Iraq.

Turkey has enjoyed strong ties with the KRG leadership but it does not want to be the enabler of a breakup of Iraq. Turkey spent a lot of energy during the tenure of the former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to ensure Sunni inclusion in the Iraqi political system. In an environment where the Sunnis have virtually no say in the future of Iraq, Turkey would not want to contribute to their further alienation by midwifing an independent Iraqi Kurdistan. If the referendum leads to a new era of ethnic conflict, Turkey’s security and economic interests would be negatively, potentially empowering the PKK.

In many ways, the independence referendum has placed the horse before the cart, so to speak. There was already a referendum in 2005 with an overwhelming support for independence. Repeating a referendum with predictably similar results only indicates an effort to strengthen Barzani’s hand politically rather than a step in achieving “self-determination.” While the votes are yet to be tallied, Barzani has officially claimed victory in the referendum vote – an expected repeat of the 2005 referendum result. Yet, it is not entirely clear if this result will actually empower the KRG’s hand, as the Baghdad government has already ruled out negotiations labeling the referendum “illegal.”

The KRG President Barzani has called for negotiations with Baghdad for independence, however, the potential punitive measures and political alienation by Turkey and Iran may weaken the KRG’s hand in forcing such negotiations. In fact, Iran has already closed its border shared with northern Iraq and Turkey is mulling whether to close the border. The KRG’s referendum bid was clearly to prop up Barzani’s position against rival Kurdish parties who have been calling for a new presidential election. Having gone forward without the agreement and patronage of two neighboring powers, Iran and Turkey, the KRG has risked political isolation, not to mention potential for conflict.

Ever since the invasion of Iraq by the U.S., Iraq has gone through periods of crises and chaos with short periods of only “relative” calm. It is currently in a highly fragile state and the breakup of the country through the establishment of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would probably lead to yet another round of conflict in Iraq’s never-ending civil war. In the absence of any international backing and legitimacy, the KRG leaders will need to think long and hard before declaring independence.

Voting ended on Monday evening for the controversial referendum on the secession of northern Iraq’s Kurdish region.

The polls were due to close at 6 p.m. local time (3 GMT), but the Kurdish Regional Government’s Election Commission extended the operation by another hour in order to allow voters to cast their votes, with the exception of the Kirkuk province.

According to reports of the Anadolu Agency, the Election Commission also reported that the turnout stood at 76 percent.

While local authorities have urged the residents not to carry out aerial firing while celebrating the results, a shooting incident was reported in which a civilian was killed in the disputed district center of Tuz Khurmatu, Saladin province.

In wary of potential violence that may erupt due to the referendum, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu warned the KRG that the Turkish army will intervene if the Turkmen population are targeted.

UN concerned

As the count begins, many statements have emerged from countries condemning the KRG and underlining that the results will not be recognized.

The UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said Monday that he was concerned about the “potentially destabilizing effects” of the referendum held by the KRG in defiance of the international community.

A statement released by his spokesman Stephane Dujarric, highlighted that Guterres “respects the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Iraq” and recommends that all outstanding issues “be resolved through structured dialogue and constructive compromise.”

The statement further added that the UN Secretary-General expects UN-mandated activities to be allowed to continue, unhindered.

While the Kurdish Regional Government’s President Masoud Barzani has ignored and objected to calls from the international community to postpone the independence referendum, Turkish President Erdogan has asserted that Turkey will not recognize the vote “regardless of its outcome.”

The independence referendum, which has occupied the political agenda for some time now, is due to ask citizens of the KRG-controlled areas, including oil-rich Kirkuk, whether they want to separate from Baghdad.

Turkey, US, Iran and many Western European governments have strongly stated their opposition to the referendum and have called for Barzani to negotiate with the Baghdad administration in order to secure a new deal. These attempts have failed.

Speaking at the International Ombudsman Conference in Istanbul on Sept 25, President Erdogan reminded the KRG administrators that Turkey was “with them [the KRG] when others left them alone,” and that the Turkish state “kept them on their feet by helping with all its resources.”

Highlighting the diversity and integrity of Iraq, President Erdogan highlighted the wrongness of the referendum by stating that there are Arabs and Turkmens that also live in northern Iraq, emphasizing the need for Iraq’s territorial integrity.

Claiming that the independence referendum was an opportunity sought by the KRG President in order to secure his own opportunistic nature for himself and his family, Erdogan firmly stated that “we will not allow for a new chaos near our borders.”

Baghdad is the only ‘legitimate authority’ in Iraq

Echoing the view of his government, Prime Minister Binali Yildirim said on Monday that the only “legitimate authority” for Turkey in Iraq was the central government in Baghdad.

Speaking in a live TV interview, Yildirim stated that the KRG’s independence referendum was illegitimate and that its results would be null and void.

The Prime Minister, against arguments made by the KRG, claimed that “[The vote] will not contribute to regional peace and stability, but it will increase already-existing tensions and problems,” and stated that “from now on, we will speak directly to Iraq’s central government and decide accordingly.”

While it has been clear that the border with northern Iraq still remains open, the Prime Minister announced that Turkey will be in constant dialogue with Baghdad over “all border gates, airports and energy issues.”

Military intervention if Iraqi Turkmen are targeted

The Iraqi Turkmen population in the KRG-ruled provinces have long been against the referendum and have called for the international community to ensure Barzani postpones the referendum. As calls from various world leaders have been ignored, Turkish Foreign Minister warns the northern Iraq administration of a potential military operation.

Speaking during an interview with AHaber, Cavusoglu stated that the “Turkish army will intervene immediately if our Turkmen brothers [in the disputed Kirkuk province] are physically targeted.”

He said that Turkey would no longer provide “military training support for the [Kurdish] Peshmerga forces,” adding that Ankara would from now on be engaged primarily with the Baghdad administration.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has refrained from stepping back from the decision to hold a referendum on independence, where residents in KRG-controlled provinces are scheduled to vote on breaking from Baghdad on 25 September.

The oil rich province of Kirkuk is also among the contested areas where the vote is planned.

In spite of heightening tensions and calls from the US and Turkey to postpone the referendum, calls from Baghdad for further negotiations, the KRG President Masoud Barzani has not announced any cancellation of the referendum.

The statement provided by the Security Council added that the referendum risks detracting from the fight against Daesh, and that it could also disrupt efforts to ensure the safe return of over three million refugees and internally displaced persons to the country.

Council members “expressed their continuing respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Iraq,” urging all issues between the central Baghdad government and the Erbil administration to be resolved “through structured dialogue and compromise supported by the international community.”

International call for referendum to be cancelled

In addition to President Erdogan and the US President Trump who are both in agreement that the vote should not go ahead, French President Emmanuel Macron also stressed the importance of maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity.

During a phone call made with Barzani, Macron reportedly asked the KRG President to postpone the controversial referendum.

A statement issued by Barzani’s office stated that the two men discussed the “important role” played by the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in the ongoing fight against Daesh in Iraq.

Barzani nevertheless confirmed to Macron that the referendum would be held on schedule, while also stressing Erbil’s readiness to hold dialogue with Baghdad after the poll.

http://thenewturkey.org/the-kurdish-quest-for-independence-in-iraq-and-its-repercussions-for-turkey-and-the-region/

Turkey to debate military operation in Iraq and Syria

The ongoing developments in Iraq and Syria remain high on the political agenda.

In this regard, according to the Justice and Development (AK) Party’s parliamentary group deputy chairman, the parliament will hold an extraordinary session on Saturday to debate the extension of Turkish military operations in northern Iraq and Syria.

Mustafa Elitas stated that “the general assembly of the Turkish Parliament will hold an extraordinary session on Sept. 23 at 16.00 [4 p.m. local time] to debate the extension of the Prime Ministry’s motion that enables the government to conduct cross-border operations in northern Iraq and Syria.”

The motion had previously allowed the Turkish military to carry out cross-border operations from Oct. 2, 2016 until Oct. 31, 2017.

The independence referendum for Kurds in northern Iraq is set to take place on September 25 despite international disapproval. Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Regional Government insists on pursuing the referendum knowing that neither Turkey nor the United States support the decision.

Ankara and Washington

There have been many arguments as to why the two countries do not support the proposed independence referendum. While the US has been a long advocate of Kurdish autonomy, President Trump has stated that the timing of the referendum is wrong and that it will negatively affect the fight against Daesh. Moreover, he has called for the KRG to maintain diplomatic dialogue with Baghdad, something the US is willing to lead and observe.

Being a neighbor, the independence referendum will have a highly significant impact on the domestic and foreign politics of Turkey. Not only due to regional stability depending on the territorial integrity of Iraq, the domestic fight against the PKK also has the ability to be shaped by the independence referendum in northern Iraq. While relations between the KRG and Turkish state have been maintained on stable levels, the potential fear of the PKK hijacking an independent Kurdish state has always remained salient. Continuous remarks and warnings have been issued against the KRG from both President Erdogan and Prime Minister Yildirim, urging the KRG to defect from their decision to hold the planned referendum.

United Nations

Other than Turkey and the US, the United Nations Secretary General has also warned against the Iraqi Kurdish referendum. Gutteres stated that the unilateral decision to hold the independence vote ‘would detract from the need to defeat Daesh,’ underlining the worries of Turkey and the US.

“The Secretary-General believes that any unilateral decision to hold a referendum at this time would detract from the need to defeat ISIL, as well as the much-needed reconstruction of the regained territories and the facilitation of a safe, voluntary and dignified return of the more than three million refugees and internally displaced people,” Stephane Dujarric said in a statement, referring to the Daesh militant group.

Iraq

With the unilateral territory and sovereignty of Iraq at stake, Vice President Nouri al-Maliki warned the KRG of creating a ‘second Israel’ in northern Iraq. Israel has been the most prominent country in support of the referendum, as it sees a Kurdish state as an end to its own isolation in the region.

With the latest developments, the Iraqi Supreme Court has ruled to suspend the Kurdish referendum on Monday 18 September until it makes a final ruling on the case at the request of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.

The office of the Iraqi PM Abadi said that he filed the court case against Kurdish President Masoud Barzani and the Kurdish parliament speaker Yousif Mohammed.

The statement said Abadi called on the court to not allow “any region or province to separate from Iraq.”

As the referendum day is coming closer, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) shows no sign of stepping back despite disputes within the region and a number of calls from the central government of Iraq as well as the major regional and global actors. From the perspective of the KRG, a delay is still possible if the West, particularly the US, guarantees recognition after a delayed referendum, but this still has not happened as the referendum day is approaching fast. As for the objections from the global powers, the United States, through the Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, has recently repeated its stance on the issue by calling the KRG President Masoud Barzani to postpone the planned referendum on September 25th.

Likewise, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov has also emphasized Russia’s stance on the issue by expressing Moscow’s support for the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq. While the two global powers are disunited on the politics of the Middle East, their concerns seem to be similar in respect to the planned referendum. Both sides show their worries for the possible negative repercussions of the planned referendum regarding the stability of Iraq and the ongoing war against DAESH.

In response to the arguments made concerning unity and the fight against DAESH, Regional President Barzani has retained a constant stance arguing that DAESH is a product of a unified Iraq and that the current state of the Middle East is far from unity and stability anyway. The picture for the position of the global powers does not change when we add Germany and China to the equation as well. They all seem to acknowledge the Iraqi Kurds’ right for self-determination but express their concern with the timing (aka “it is too soon”) and style (aka “talk to Baghdad one more time”) of it. While Germany seems to have had this opinion for quite a while, China seems to have shifted away from a fixed anti-separatism position to a more neutral one with the help of its developing economic ties with the KRG.

As we downsize the scale from global to regional actors, Israel and Iran seem to be the opposite poles of this issue. While Israel supports the KDP’s quest for independence, the toughest objection comes from Iran. Israel seems to view the KRG’s independence call as an opportunity, as it is eager to develop cooperation with an independent Kurdistan, particularly in order to end its own isolation in the region and further to contain Iran and limit its access to Syria. Furthermore, an independent Kurdistan would be a good distraction for Arab states by turning many hostile faces away from Israel.

As for Iran, the primary motivation seems to be its fear of being contained and losing its upper hand in Iraq and Syria. Iran has also reasons to worry from a diffusion effect of the independence seeking Kurdish nationalism, on top of the long legacy of violent separatism in the country, as it is currently facing serious protests in its heavily Kurdish populated cities.

What about Turkey? What is the driving force for Turkish politicians’ calls for caution and wariness to the KRG President Masoud Barzani? For one, Turkey, as expected, also feels threatened by a possible diffusion effect from the independence aspirations of Iraqi Kurds. While this is true, what drives the paramount Turkish approach is not a possible or even probable future scenario regarding popular aspirations, expectations or perceptions. Turkey’s understandable concern is real, tangible and current: the presence of the PKK camps and headquarters in Northern Iraq. The question I believe best summarizes Turkey’s primary concern is “what if the PKK hijacks the planned Kurdish state?” Turkey’s concern is far from a paranoia given the fact that the PKK currently de facto rules certain areas in Northern Iraq, has certain ties with the local actors such as the PUK and Gorran and even with the US through its Syrian branch, PYD. So therefore, Turkey’s concern is not a minor one, nor unsound. While this concern is significant, Turkey’s closest associate in its fight against the PKK at present and in the foreseeable future, is another Kurdish organization, the KDP.

Turkey has long suffered from PKK terrorism and has lost thousands of security personnel, hundreds of teachers and civil servants, politicians and random civilians at the hands of the PKK over the 33 years long history of the conflict. Turkey at times benefited from its Western partners in its struggle with PKK terrorism as in the case of Öcalan’s capture in Kenya in 1999. However, not only are Turkey’s longtime allies now officially providing weapons to the PKK’s Syrian branch, PYD, the PKK’s enlisted members can freely travel in Europe and the PKK are freely publishing death orders in its newspapers printed in Europe.

While Turkey is being left alone by its Western partners, Masoud Barzani’s KDP seems to be the closest ally for Turkey’s fight against the PKK. On top of the violent past of the KDP and PKK in Iraq, the PKK has also accused the KDP for providing ground intelligence to Turkey for its recent military operations and blockage of the passage used by PKK members between Iraq and Syria. On the other hand, the KDP has also condemned the PKK attacks on the Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS, the KDP affiliate organization in Syria) offices in Syria amidst the rivalry in Sinjar, Iraq.

Given that the PKK is a destabilizing actor not only in Turkey but also in the KRG-ruled areas, the Turkish government and the KRG have mutual interests in the fight against the PKK. Moreover, Turkey and the KRG’s trade deals are now well-known and ever growing as Turkey is the top investor and trading partner in the region, a situation that has been preserved despite the PKK’s efforts to spoil it. This is why the Turkish official reaction to the planned referendum is not as loud as Iran’s.

It appears clear that any actor wanting to cooperate with Turkey in the region needs to show its commitment to Turkey’s fight with PKK terrorism. Turkey has no means to tolerate neighbors who host, or “partners” who arm its number one security threat, the PKK. Hence, in reference to the referendum, Turkey’s choice seems to be of a conditional one – neither categorically fixed in favor or against the emergence of a Kurdish state. For Turkish interests, what matters most is not the name of the country across its southern borders, but its position vis-a-vis the PKK. Turkey seems to follow one single, straightforward goal: the termination of the PKK headquarters and camps in Iraq (and anywhere else across the region), for once and for all. Thus, Turkey’s choice is the option that enables this end.

There is an alarming rise in the tension between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil (KRG). From an approaching conflict between the two in Kirkuk, Turkmen will suffer the most. The oil flow from Kirkuk and KRG will be disrupted too. The clash could weaken both sides and the PKK will avail itself of the possible power vacuum. All these can severely harm Turkey and cause a serious foreign policy crisis. What has sparked the crisis and what options does Turkey have to prevent a clash?

The apparent reason in the rise of the intensity in the conflict is KRG President Masoud Barzani’s insistence on holding an independence referendum on 25 September 2017. A close scrutiny of the ties between the two parties, however, reveals that there is a wide range of issues keeping them apart. The Baghdad government’s preoccupation with the war against Daesh has delayed the inevitable clash. With the battle of Mosul approaching its end, the political and military resistance of Sunni Arabs has been severely dealt with. There have been numerous recent calls from Baghdad to end the only defiant Shiite -dominated regime Iraq faces, that in the north from KRG. Should Turkey remain inactive and unable to defuse the tension, Iraq may soon witness its worst civil war and the Iraqi state could melt away. The consequences can be ruinous for all Iraqis and regional actors, especially for Turkey. Iran will avail itself of this new round of violence to assure its total dominance over Iraq and the building of a Shiite crescent will be completed.

Rising Tension

During the last decade, the relations between Erbil and Baghdad have been plagued with numerous contentious issues. This became apparent with the departure of US forces from Iraq in late 2010 when the former Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki inaugurated a sectarian policy which alienated and marginalized both Sunni Arabs and Kurds. Although the current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi promised to undue his predecessor’s policies and make the regime inclusive, al-Maliki’s followers and pro-Iranian Shiite militias have hindered his efforts. The Iraqi regime is now more exclusive than ever. Only two weeks ago Ibrahim al-Jafaari, the foreign minister, issued a decree which removed several Sunni individuals from Iraq’s foreign diplomatic corps.

Recently the US has failed to convince al-Abadi to allow several Sunni politicians, who have been forced into exile by al-Maliki, to attend a conference in Baghdad to build a credible Sunni leadership in Iraq. On July 20, 2017, the Shiite militias in Mosul clashed with the Nineveh Guards which is a further indication that Shiite militias are determined to re-establish their pre-2014 exclusive security rule in Mosul.

The ongoing conflict with KRG should be also viewed within this context. The KRG arguably feels that the partnership in government, which Kurds feel that the post-Saddam era will present to them, is all but an illusion. On 19 June 2017, in a response to al-Abadi’s statement which described the referendum as illegal, Barzani said “the Iraqi constitution, which was intended to create an inclusive government ruling by consensus of its major components, is dead in letter and spirit. Why is Article 140 of the constitution, which was supposed to be implemented in 2008, not implemented and neither is it on the agenda of the government in Baghdad?” Barzani pointed out that the Kurds have been gradually forced out from most important security, military and political positions, and al-Malik’s slogan to establish a government of the “political majority has been completely established in reality.”

Lately Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that the referendum in northern Iraq is unacceptable. There is a heated exchange in the media and political statements made in Baghdad, Tehran, and Erbil. Although al-Abadi has been generally accommodating, recently his language became more threatening to the Kurds. Even Ammar al Hakeem, who has been in the past a close ally of Barzani, has recently threatened him with dire consequences should he proceed with the referendum. On 20 July 2017, the all-powerful bloc of State of Law in the Shiite Alliance issued a call in a statement to put Barzani on trial for charges of treason and collaborating with Israel and Turkey against Iraq. The Iranian regime too is threatening Barzani.

Having failed to dissuade the leaders of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan from supporting the referendum, on 18 July 2017 Muhammed Baqri, the of Chief of Staff of the Iranian armed forces, reminded the Kurds of Iran’s punitive and powerful weapon capacities.

 The Possible Clash in Kirkuk

Kurdish sources allege the Baghdad government has deliberately delayed the expulsion of around 2,000 Daesh militias from Haweja district, south west of Kirkuk, in order to use it as a pretext to attack Kirkuk. Peshmerga sources have recently detected the arrival of hundreds of Iranian revolutionary guards in areas adjacent to Kirkuk.

Unless the US and Turkey deliver a strong message to Iran, one can expect Qasem Suleimani, the head of Quds Corp, to soon appear in the ruins of Kirkuk to boast of victory over the so-called pro-Israeli and Saudi agents among the Kurds. The attack on Kirkuk can make tens of thousands of Turkmen homeless and asylum seekers at the frontiers of Turkey. The toothless Turkmen National Front and its followers can be caught in the middle of a devastating conflict. One of the possible consequences of an attack on Kirkuk is that it can also deepen the crisis between the Shiite and Sunni Turkmen groups. It is noteworthy that Iranians have already mobilized 12,000 Turkmen as part of the Shiite militias in Iraq for a possible attack on Kirkuk. There is also a potential for the Baghdad regime to use the old rivalries between Kurds and Turkmen and this might hurt Turkmen who have no military power to match that of the Kurds.

What can Turkey do to rescue Kirkuk?

Barzani and all other Kurdish parties have put too much stakes on the referendum and Kirkuk to retreat from their decision to hold the referendum. Forcing Barzani to give up the referendum will be a serious blow to his standing among the Kurds and will only help his foes, especially the PKK. Regardless of the stated objection of many Western countries to the referendum, Barzani appears to have received some assurances from many circles in the West to go ahead with the referendum. It suffices to say that on 28 June 2017, The Washington Post, which is close to the circles of decision making in the US, had Barzani write an op-ed to sell the idea of the referendum.

Turkey can still use its economic and political leverage with Barzani to delay the declaration of independence after the referendum. Donald Trump’s administration and several European Union countries prefer to enhance al-Abadi’s position in Baghdad in order to enable him to curtail the drastic Iranian influence over his country. This policy requires KRG not disrupt al-Abadi’s work. Barzani can be pressured by the US to be content with the de-facto annexation of the disputed territories and more independence using its current policy of selling its oil and gas abroad.

Being aware of this realty, Turkey can seek US support to defuse the situation before the current tension goes out of control and gives Iran access to Kirkuk. In addition, Turkey should give clear signals to both al-Abadi and Iran that Kirkuk is an issue that touches its national security and it will not stand by watching if things deteriorate. Besides, Turkey could use its leverage with Barzani to safeguard Turkmen rights if the referendum is held in Kirkuk. Hosting a meeting with both Barzani and Turkmen leaders in Turkey is long overdue. Shortly, Turkey needs to engage both Baghdad and Erbil in a more vigorous and foreword policy to spare Kirkuk from the destruction which has been inflicted on Mosul.

The densely Kurdish populated areas of Iraq obtained political recognition and autonomy from the central government of Iraq with the 2005 Iraqi constitution. This is how the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), originally established in 1992, and Kurdistan Region Presidency, formed in 2005, came to this day. Since then, Masoud Barzani, the president of the KRG, along with many other local political actors, has occasionally stressed the need for the region’s independence. Hence, independence calls are not new for the KRG. They have been made before, but never this loud, never this close. On June 7 Masoud Barzani, after a meeting with the major political parties of the region –with the exception of Gorran (Change Movement) – set the date for the referendum as September 25.

The referendum is planned to be held not only in KRG provinces such as Erbil (Hawler), Duhok, Suleimani, and Halabja but also in areas still claimed by the central government such as the oil-rich province of Kirkuk. The planned referendum will be a cornerstone not only for the KRG but also for the broader region. Nevertheless, there are pressing concerns and conflicts of interests on the referendum, its aftermath and political consequences at the local (KRG), national, and international levels. Here, concerns of the local actors in the KRG-ruled areas are of vital importance.

The upcoming independence referendum seems far from uniting the local actors in the KRG controlled areas. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has come first in all the parliamentary elections up to now and is the party of both the regional president Masoud Barzani (since 2005) and the regional prime minister Nechirvan Barzani (since 2012 and previously from 2006 to 2009). While the party is the leading Kurdish political actor of Iraq, it is not uncontested. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran, disappointed with the KDP’s governance in the KRG and Masoud Barzani’s ruling beyond his legally constrained presidential term, made an agreement in May 2016 to join forces for a number of causes, but most importantly for the reactivation of the regional parliament and counterbalancing the KDP. The two parties have more or less stuck to this deal so far despite occasional dissent from within the parties.

The PUK and Gorran, combined, make up 42 seats in the deactivated regional parliament, outnumbering the 38 seats held by the KDP. While the PUK and Gorran seem to embrace the idea of Kurdish independence from Iraq, the two also declared that “complete preparations” for a referendum on independence should be made after the normalization of the parliament, which has not sat since October 2015. Although the PUK and Gorran are concerned about the KDP’s hijacking of an independent Kurdistan, they are also not without problems given that Gorran split from the PUK as a result of internal rifts and has long charged both the KDP and PUK with corruption, on top of its tough rivalry with the PUK, particularly in Suleimani, which both see as their stronghold.

The PUK and Gorran’s deal to act as a bloc is not without problems. Moreover, both of the parties are going through a succession crisis to replace former Iraq president and PUK leader Jalal Talebani, who is in the midst of severe health problems, and the recent death of Gorran leader Nawshirwan Mustafa. Suffering from the absence of such charismatic and experienced leaders, the two parties seem to be far behind Masoud Barzani’s influence over the people of Iraq Kurdistan, the official name of the region according to the 2005 constitution. That’s also the primary reason why the tougher of the two, Gorran prefers a parliamentary system over the KDP’s presidential system proposal. And that is just part of a long list of disputes between the major political parties in the region.

While the three major parties in the Kurdistan Region have serious trust issues and problems on the table, the politics of the region is further troubled with the longstanding existence of the PKK in the region. The PKK has long struggled against the KDP’s authority across the Turkish border and could maintain its own areas up to this day. Yet now it is on the move again to expand at the cost of the KRG’s, particularly, the KDP’s interests.

Since breaking an over two-year long ceasefire with Turkey in July 2015, the PKK has also become more aggressive in Northern Iraq. The PKK could exploit DAESH’s presence to the best of its interests both in Syria and Iraq and now will likely destabilize the region further as the deadly clashes between the PKK affiliated forces and KRG Peshmerga in Sinjar in March 2017 showed. While the KDP and Turkey have had ups and downs in the course of their relationship since the Gulf War of 1991, the KDP, compared to other local actors, has remained the closest entity to an ally for Turkey. Once again Turkey and the KRG under the rule of the KDP are in a win-win game, deepening their commercial ties to an unprecedented degree while cooperating against the PKK. The two governments on the two sides of the border have allied against the PKK’s terror activities against Turkey and ambitions of expansion in the Iraq side of the border.

With its terror camps in Northern Iraq scattered from Metina to Qandil and its relentless use of violence against any adversary, the PKK is a real threat for the KRG’s move towards independence and what comes after. Any definition of statehood makes reference to Max Weber’s classical definition with its emphasis on the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and the PKK has repeatedly shown that it has no intention to stop challenging the KRG or any other government’s claim on this.

Given the parameters, President Barzani’s call for independence will not be a smooth path. The upcoming referendum on September 25 is likely to exacerbate the existing tensions amongst the Kurdish actors settled in Northern Iraq. Of course, no local actor could directly object to Masoud Barzani’s referendum call, which would threaten the mass support they have. Nevertheless, all the relevant actors in the region, with the natural exception of the KDP, question the timing and aftermath of the expected referendum and express their concern that the referendum is not genuine but a political card being used by the KDP to extend and expand its rule of the KRG.

On the other hand, Masoud Barzani seems to be aware of the risks and opportunities that the post-DAESH Iraq will pose and he is eager not to leave the ground to the endless claims of the PKK while the PUK and Gorran are also trying to counterbalance his de facto supremacy. The referendum and possible independence process gets even more complicated when the non-Kurdish actors –both within and out of Iraq- are taken into account but Masoud Barzani is not naive enough to start a game that he has no chance of winning. Either way, the referendum is a fair game that Barzani dares to play.

The recent decision by the Manbij Military Council to hand over territories in western Manbij to the Assad regime to prevent attacks from Turkish-backed Syrian rebel brigades will have its long-term effects on the YPG dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. In the eyes of Kurdish opposition groups, Syrian Arab allies of the YPG and the Arab population in Syria the credibility of the YPG dominated SDF will be questioned.

Syrian rebel forces captured the strategically important city of al-Bab from DAESH with the essential support of Turkish Armed Forces. After capturing the city, the regime and allied militias captured the town of Tadif and some other villages to the east. By doing so, the regime blocked further attacks by Syrian rebel forces against DAESH. After Turkey and Russia reached a ceasefire agreement between the Assad regime and the Syrian rebels, the focus of the Euphrates Shield Operation shifted towards the YPG controlled city of Manbij. Facing this threat, the YPG has taken huge steps to avoid any offensive towards Manbij.

Firstly the YPG tried to gain US-protection against any military attack on Manbij. They threatened that they would retreat from front lines in Raqqa against DAESH to defend Manbij against Euphrates Shield forces. Knowing the strategic importance of the city for the new US administration, they thought this would convince Washington to protect their presence in Manbij despite the US’s promise of a withdrawal of YPG forces from that city. These threats may have some effects on the US’s trust in the YPG, but their partnership stays strong.

For a long time it seems that the US would protect the YPG from any attacks by Euphrates Shield forces on Manbij. The US sent new batches of armored vehicles to the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. It didn’t take long to see these new vehicles being used by YPG fighters. The military training of Manbij Military Council forces, which are also dominated by YPG fighters, also continued by the US. The CENTCOM Twitter account even cheered newly trained female fighters. YPG affiliated websites and sources started to publish visual confirmation of US troop’s presence in the area around Manbij. It seemed that the US would protect the YPG from any attack on Manbij despite its promise to Turkey, which designates the YPG as a terrorist organization because of its structural affinity with the internationally designated terrorist organization known as the PKK.

On 2 March 2017 the Military Council of Manbij published an official statement claiming they will hand areas west of Manbij over to the Assad regime and allied forces to prevent Turkish-backed rebel forces from taking the area, which means that the US’s ally on the ground is handing over territories to the Assad regime. This statement shows something important and will have many negative long-term effects for the YPG in Syria.

It firstly shows that the US didn’t agree to protect the YPG against Turkish-backed Syrian rebel forces. Despite a media campaign, which assumed US-protection for the YPG in Manbij, the Turkish and Syrian resolve to conquer Manbij prevented such protection for the YPG. US officials want to avoid an open escalation with its NATO ally, especially before the planned Raqqa operation. Therefore, the US will most likely pressure the YPG to withdraw and focus on Raqqa when the Manbij operation starts fully, to avoid a decrease in the fighting capability of the YPG and to secure the Raqqa operation.

The first soft attack of the Syrian rebels near Arima ended with the capture of three villages from the YPG. The videos of the battle clearly shows YPG fighters at the frontlines, showing that the area is dominated by the YPG as local sources claimed. The effectiveness of a possible Assad regime protection as border guards against Euphrates Shield forces is also very doubtful.

In addition, this might cause many problems for the YPG, and internal discussions are taking place over how they can hand over territories captured with the blood of their own fighters. The Kurdish National Council (ENKS) who are oppressed by the YPG started to question the goals of the YPG and how could they hand over areas to the Assad regime. The ENKS has traditionally strongly opposed the Assad regime, and they have good ties with mainstream Syrian rebels, the Turkish government and especially with the Barzani-government of the Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq.

In the same day of this statement, the Syrian Rojava Peshmarga that operates in Iraqi exile started an operation in the Sinjar Mountain to push the PKK and allied forces out of the area in cooperation with the Barzani-government and Turkey. The PKK refused to withdraw from the area. Supporters of the ENKS are questioning the reasons behind the YPG handover of territories to the Assad regime and not to the legitimate government of Kurdistan in Iraq. The YPG’s credibility among the Kurdish population will suffer with this agreement with the Assad regime. Tensions between the pro-Barzani and pro-PKK Kurds are rising. These tensions could also cross over to the Kurdish areas in Syria.

Hemin Hawrami , a senior adviser and assistant to President Barzani, and member of the KDP Leadership Council has officially asked the question of why the PKK handed over territories to the Assad regime, but not left Sinjar.

Another long-term effect for the YPG will be its relationship with Arab forces in the Syrian Democratic Forces who mainly oppose the Assad regime. The Arab allies of the YPG in the SDF will surely question the future of the organization and it will damage the credibility of the SDF. This action will be seen as proof of its collaborating with the regime.

The weakening of the alliance between the YPG and the Arab forces inside SDF could lead them to some kind of negotiations with Turkey and rebel forces who work with Turkey. Or at least, rebel forces who attack areas controlled by the SDF could argue that it would just be turned over to the regime later. Therefore, the SDF/YPG might have prevented an attack this time, but it has done more damage over the long run. The population in areas controlled by the YPG-dominated SDF could fear that their villages will be handed over to the regime in the future, so they could work with the Syrian rebels. In reality, this already happened in some areas which supposedly should be handed over to the Assad regime.

This latest action of the YPG dominated and controlled Manbij Military Council of the SDF will probably not prevent an attack on Manbij. Turkish authorities and Syrian rebels signaled that they will go for the city and it is not for sure if the Assad regime and Russia will risk an escalation with Turkey or if they would give up the YPG-control over Manbij like the US. But it is certain that the YPG lost credibility among the Kurdish population and its opponents in the ENKS. They have also lost credibility with their Arab allies in Syria.