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n Europe, Hungary and Serbia have always been lukewarm towards Russia. The two countries’ foreign and domestic policies have led them to have an ambiguous relationship with Moscow. Ukraine, however, has managed to rally them around a single goal. This maneuver has to do with Ukraine’s historical and legitimate claims that Crimea, a melting pot of different ethnicities and religions, be part of its nation again.

The third summit of the Crimea Platform, which took place on August 23 in Kyiv, was triggered by Russia’s decision to withdraw from the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The year 2023 has been important for grain importer countries in Europe, namely Serbia and Hungary, which used to import grain from the Black Sea ports of Ukraine. The ongoing war and Russia’s withdrawal from the grain agreement are forcing some actors to change their allegiances.

Being unable to export grain, Ukraine founded the Crimea Platform in August 2021 as a plea for Crimea’s liberation. Russian occupation of Crimea grants Russia strategic access to the Black Sea; whenever Ukrainian cargo ships try to transport grain, they become the targets of Russian warships. If Ukraine can liberate Crimea from invading Russian forces, the grain market would thrive once more.

Crimea’s importance for Serbia and Hungary

Serbia and Hungary’s declaration of support for Ukraine goes beyond grain. Hungarian President Katalin Novák argued that the war can only end by the liberation of Crimea. Serbian President Alexandar Vučić also stated that Crimea should be liberated as it is a part of Ukraine’s national territories.

The support from Serbia and Hungary works against Russia’s aims in the war. Both Serbia and Hungary would suffer from a Russian Crimea. First, Serbia wants to keep Kosovo as an unrecognized entity. While the world is divided on the issue, Ukraine has a clear position of not recognizing Kosovo. So, in turn, Serbia does not recognize Crimea as Russian. This transactional relation keeps both sides happy on geopolitical issues.

Hungarians, too, have a soft spot for Crimea. Since 2014, Hungary has been one of the countries that have continuously protested the illegal annexation. President Novák pushed Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to reset relations with Ukraine and build a common stance against illegal invasions. Moreover, Novák held talks with the Crimean Tatar leader Abdülcemil Kırımoğlu. Both leaders value the historic Tatar-Hungarian connection with regard to the Turan and Turkic history.

Crimea to be populated by its natives

The Crimea Platform is not exclusively about grain though. Ukrainian officials have effectively employed cultural and ethnic values for the project by highlighting the ethnic and religious richness of Crimea. Ukrainian officials present Crimea’s native inhabitants as Muslim Crimean Tatars, Jewish Crimean Karaites or Krymkarayrla, and Orthodox Ukrainians. Meanwhile, Russia has been using domestic policies to populate Crimea with Russians.

Thus, Ukraine uses the Crimean Platform as a tool to stop Russia’s repopulation attempts. Russia has already employed repopulation attempts in order for Eastern Ukrainian territories to secede from Ukraine, resulting in numerous referendums for secession. Ukraine wants to put an end to such policies by promoting the natives of the region.

The public opinion of the local inhabitants of Crimea is also important. The political bodies of Crimean Tatars are exiled from the region, and Russia refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tartar People, the chief Crimean political body. Moreover, the Mejlis has been defined as a terrorist organization in Russia because of its desire to reunite with Ukraine. As a result, Crimean Tatars and other inhabitants of Crimea shun Russia’s expansionary policies in the region.

Turkey’s efforts in Crimea and regarding grain

The platform on Crimea managed to increase European support for Ukraine. However, there is one more actor who has elicited support for Ukrainians from the beginning of the war. At the Crimean Platform, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent a video message to all participants. He reiterated the Turkish of not recognizing the Russian annexation of Crimea. He also vowed to keep the Black Sea Grain Initiative on its track.

Two days after the Crimea Platform, the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Hakan Fidan visited Kyiv to meet Zelenskyy. There, he assured Zelenskyy on re-instating the Grain Deal.  Afterwards, President Erdoğan also visited Russia to negotiate a new grain deal. Erdoğan even managed to use the G20 as a venue for discussing the grain deal. Thus, Turkey managed to stand out as a country that can reach numerous actors to resolve humanitarian problems.

Turkish participation in the affairs of the Black Sea and in negotiations for food security and regional peace has increased Turkey’s international credibility. In fact, Serbia and Hungary’s participation in the Crimea Platform can be associated with Turkey’s proximity to the aforementioned countries. As Serbia and Hungary strive for closer relations with Ukraine, Turkey proves its diplomatic prowess by uniting different countries under a single platform.

A year ago today, Russia launched its “military operation” in Ukraine which has not only caused ongoing suffering to the Ukrainian people but has also turned global politics upside-down. Since then, many books have been written about Russia’s war on Ukraine. From the personal accounts of a young Ukrainian girl, journalists on the ground, and soldiers to insightful analyses compiled by experts, this month’s book bundle provides diverse and outstanding sources of information to understand and summarize the important milestones and dynamics leading to and occurring during the war as well as its devastating effects on the world.

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ussia’s 2022 attack on Ukraine saw confrontation between Moscow and the West spill over into open conflict once again. Hostile acts abroad, from poisoning dissidents to shooting down airliners, interfering in elections, spying, hacking, and murdering, have long seemed to be the Kremlin’s dealings. But what is it all for?

Keir Giles, who works as a senior research fellow at the Russia and Eurasia program at Chatham House, explains how and why Russia pushes for more power and influence wherever it can reach, beyond Ukraine; what this means not just for governments, but for ordinary people across the globe; and how its effects may be more damaging than we realize.

Keir Giles, Russia’s War on Everybody and What It Means for You (Bloomsbury Academic 2023) ISBN: 9781350255081, 264 pages

R ussia’s brutal February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has attracted widespread condemnation across the world. Government and media circles present the conflict as a simple dichotomy of good and evil. War in Ukraine: Making Sense of a Senseless Conflict brings together a balanced look at the events leading up to the conflict and surveys the different parties involved.

Medea Benjamin and Nicolas J.S. Davies show how the picture is more complicated. While recognizing that Russia’s aggression is ultimately indefensible, the authors argue that the West’s eastward expansion of NATO, the U.S. involvement in the 2014 Ukraine coup, and Ukraine’s failure to implement the Minsk peace agreements prompted Putin to act.

Medea Benjamin and Nicolas J.S. Davies, War in Ukraine: Making Sense of a Senseless Conflict (OR Books 2022) ISBN 9781682193716, 198 pages

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nvasion: The Inside Story of Russia’s Bloody War and Ukraine’s Fight for Survival is the firsthand reporting on the Russian invasion of Ukraine from Luke Harding, New York Times bestselling author and Guardian correspondent. Harding writes about the astounding resilience in Ukraine and devastating atrocities in Bucha and elsewhere. With a focus on human stories and portraits of the leaders on both sides of war, Invasion captures a crucial moment in history that was the biggest news event of 2022 and an inflection point in international politics.

Luke Harding, Invasion: The Inside Story of Russia’s Bloody War and Ukraine’s Fight for Survival (Vintage, 2022) ISBN: 9780593685174, 336 pages

Yeva Skalietska, a young survivor of the war in Ukraine, shares her memories of the war in Ukraine through her diary entries. She began writing the diary when her grandmother and her found shelter in a bunker when the city where she lived came under Russian attack on February 24, 2022.

Skalietska describes the bombings she endured and her desperate escape journey from the conflict. From endless train rides and an overcrowded refugee center to settling in Ireland to put together a new life, You Don’t Know What War Is: The Diary of a Young Girl from Ukraine is an inspiring and intimate story of a survivor hoping to be able to return home one day.

Yeva Skalietska, You Don’t Know What War Is: The Diary of a Young Girl from Ukraine (Union Square & Co., 2022) ISBN: 9781454949695, 128 pages

No one has been more surprised by Volodymyr Zelensky’s power to inspire and mobilize his compatriots and the world than Vladimir Putin. Outfoxed and isolated, Putin is not the first person to have underestimated the former comedian.

Who is Volodymyr Zelensky? How did he become the international hero of our time? Zelensky: The Unlikely Ukrainian Hero Who Defied Putin and United the World tells you everything you need to know about this inspiring leader, covering his childhood, family history, and his career as a TV celebrity to the president of Ukraine.

Andrew L. Urban and Chris McLeod, Zelensky: The Unlikely Ukrainian Hero Who Defied Putin and United the World (Regnery Publishing, 2022) ISBN: 9781684513789, 192 pages

Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine is an overview of the conflicts in which Russia has been involved since Vladimir Putin became prime minister and then president of Russia starting from the First Chechen War to the two military incursions into Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, and the eventual invasion of Ukraine itself. Mark Galeotti delves into Putin’s recreation of Russian military power and its expansion to include a range of new capabilities from mercenaries to operatives in a relentless information war against Western powers. Putin’s Wars provides an engrossing strategic overview of the Russian military and its successes and failures on the battlefield.

Mark Galeotti, Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine (Osprey Publishing, 2022) ISBN: 9781472847546, 384 pages

T his collective work analyzes the ongoing conflict in Ukraine beyond simplistic media interpretations that limit the analysis solely to Vladimir Putin. The War in Ukraine’s Donbas: Origins, Contexts, and the Future gives voice to different social groups, scholarly communities, and agencies relevant to Ukraine’s recent history.

The authors reveal the deeper roots linked to the autonomy and history of the Donbas as a region, exploring local society and traditions, and the alienation from Ukraine caused by the events of Euromaidan. The book also takes a close look at the Minsk Accords in 2014 and the impact of the new president Volodymyr Zelensky with his efforts to bring the war to an end by negotiations.

David R. Marples, The War in Ukraine’s Donbas: Origins, Contexts, and the Future (CEU Press, 2022) ISBN: 9789633865972, 244 pages

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Economic Challenges, Embargo Issues, and a New Global Economic Order presents a cutting-edge analysis of the economic effects and challenges of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, touching on the EU sanctions on Russian energy, the global effects of an EU energy import boycott on Russia, and Ukraine’s political relationship with the EU in a global context. The book also explores the challenges to relations between the EU, China, and Russia caused by the invasion, the effects of the unfolding refugee crisis, military and humanitarian aid pledges to Ukraine, and the risks of reduced multilateralism within the world economy as a direct result of the war.

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine provides a broader picture of the international effects of the conflict and its potential implications for policy design as we enter a new global order marked by the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Paul J.J. Welfens, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Economic Challenges, Embargo Issues, and a New Global Economic Order (Springer International Publishing, 2022) ISBN: 9783031191374, 387 pages

In Ukraine’s Unnamed War: Before the Russian Invasion of 2022, the authors argue that Russia packaged the conflict in Crimea and Eastern Donbas as a “civil war” to claim non-involvement and lay out social science literature on civil wars to help understand why no political solution was found between 2015 and 2022.

Drawing on Ukrainian documentary sources, the book explains how Russia, after seizing Crimea, was reacting to events it could not control and sent troops only to areas of Ukraine where it knew it would face little resistance. Kremlin decision-makers misunderstood the attachment of the Russian-speaking population to the Ukrainian state and failed to anticipate that their intervention would transform Ukraine into a more cohesively “Ukrainian” polity.

Dominique Arel and Jesse Driscoll, Ukraine’s Unnamed War: Before the Russian Invasion of 2022 (Cambridge University Press, 2023) ISBN: 101316511499, 320 pages

Diary of an Invasion is a collection of Andrey Kurkov’s writings and broadcasts from Kyiv documenting the shocking impacts of the Russia-Ukraine war. Kurkov has been a consistent satirical commentator in Ukraine and became an important voice for his people throughout the Russian invasion. He spends the sleepless nights of continuous bombardment of his city delivering the truth about this invasion to the world, and has also been able to fly to European capitals where he has been working to raise money for charities.

Diary of an Invasion is a remarkable record of a brilliant writer at the forefront of the war. It provides political and historical commentary and accounts from Kurkov’s personal journal, exploring Russian and Ukrainian history and their complicated coexistence, and describing how Ukraine defies its occupation.

Andrey Kurkov, Diary of an Invasion (Mountain Leopard Press, 2022) ISBN: 9781914495847, 304 pages

The award-winning Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar provides a history of Ukraine, scoping from its emergence as a post-Soviet state to a country with increasing economic, cultural, and political ties to Europe and the United States, leading to Putin’s invasion.

As soon as the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, Zygar circulated a Facebook petition that led to a new law in Russia criminalizing criticism of the war forcing him to flee Russia. In his time as a journalist, Zygar has interviewed President Zelensky and has had access to many prominent politicians and oligarchs. As an expert on Putin’s moods and behavior, he has spent years studying the Kremlin’s plan regarding Ukraine, and in clear, chronological order explains how we got here.

Mikhail Zygar, War and Punishment: Putin, Zelensky, and the Path to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine (Scribner, 2023) ISBN13: 9781668013724, 320 pages

ZOV: Inside Putin’s Corrupt War in Ukraine – A Dissident Soldier’s Story is a detailed, voluntary account by a Russian soldier participating in the invasion of Ukraine. Pavel Filatyev was a paratrooper in the invasion force that shelled the city of Kherson in February 2022. He grew sickened and angry with his part and posted a shocking exposé on social media of what he had witnessed. After his injury, he evacuated from the conflict and gave a day-by-day description of how the Russian army crossed into Ukraine and captured the city of Kherson.

Now in hiding, Filatyev bears witness to Ukraine’s battlefields, shelled cities, and the Russian conscripts’ inescapable choice of fighting in a senseless war or facing imprisonment back home. His story provides a chilling insight into life behind enemy lines and a powerful account of the people caught in Putin’s war. ZOV: Inside Putin’s Corrupt War in Ukraine will be published on July 6, 2023 and is a forthcoming title to keep an eye on.

Pavel Filatyev, ZOV: Inside Putin’s Corrupt War in Ukraine – A Dissident Soldier’s Story, Random House, 2023) ISBN: 9780593597385, 208 pages

The Russian invasion of Ukraine will have a tremendous impact on all European countries. Nations that are heavily dependent on Russian energy are expected to suffer particularly hard if the Kremlin, for whatever reason, eventually halts gas supplies to Europe. What will be the implications of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the Balkans?

Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees have already entered the European Union. It is believed that more than seven million people will soon be forced to leave the war-torn country and go westward. Not all of them are expected to stay in the EU member states. According to reports, a few hundred displaced people from Ukraine have already arrived in Serbia – a Balkan nation that played a significant role during the 2015-2017 migrant and refugee crisis. The country’s officials estimate that the southeastern European country will eventually host more than 10,000 refugees from Ukraine.

Serbia, as well as other Balkan nations, is facing a large-scale emigration and brain drain. A significant influx of refugees from Ukraine could potentially reduce the consequence of a mass exodus that the so-called Western Balkans has been witnessing for years. It is highly uncertain, however, if displaced Ukrainian citizens have a desire to settle permanently in the region, or if they see the Balkans only as a temporarily shelter from the tragic events in Ukraine.

Politically, all Balkan nations that are not members of the European Union have already voiced their support for Ukraine’s territorially integrity, either voluntarily or under pressure from Brussels. The only country that has still not imposed any sanctions on the Russian Federation is Serbia. Moreover, to this day, Air Serbia continues to fly to Russia, being one of a few European carriers allowed to operate in Russian airspace.

Belgrade relies on Russia for its energy needs, and has developed close political relations with Moscow. At the same time, there are reports suggesting that the EU is demanding that Serbia immediately harmonize its foreign policy with that of Brussels, which means joining anti-Russian sanctions.

“Serbia is in an exceptionally difficult situation, there is less understanding than ever for the position of our nation. We are facing huge pressure,” said the country’s president Aleksandar Vučić.

In reality, Russian political and economic influence in the Balkans is not nearly as strong as many Western pundits tend to portray it. The Kremlin effectively controls sections of Serbia’s and Bosnia’s energy sectors. Russia’s Zarubezhneft owns oil refineries in the towns of Brod and Modriča in Republika Srpska – one of two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina – while Russian state-owned energy giant Gazprom owns 51 percent of shares in Serbia’s NIS (Petroleum Industry of Serbia). In addition, in December 2021, NIS became the major shareholder in Serbia’s leading petrochemicals producer, HIP Petrohemija.

The problem for the Balkans is that many countries in the region remain heavily dependent on Russian energy.

Until recently, Russia’s Sberbank was operating in both Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but on February 28, the banking agencies of Bosnia’s two entities took control of the two local Sberbank subsidiaries. On the very same day, Serbian AIK Bank completed the process of acquisition of Sberbank Serbia, which will additionally reduce Russian economic presence in the region.

The problem for the Balkans, however, is that many countries in the region remain heavily dependent on Russian energy. Serbia, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia are reportedly 100 percent dependent on Russian natural gas. Croatia, on the other hand, has been purchasing liquefied natural gas from other producers – namely the United States, Nigeria, and Qatar – which to a certain extent could play a role in the process of cutting reliance on Russian energy.

However, the war in Ukraine could have an impact on a deal that Gazprom signed with Croatia and Hungary on deliveries of natural gas via the TurkStream pipeline. In other words, if the conflict in Ukraine turns into a wider “energy war” between Russia and the West, and Moscow eventually stops selling gas to Europe – be it as a potential retaliation to the anti-Western sanctions, or as a result of the EU’s potential decision to stop buying Russian gas – the Balkan countries will undoubtedly face severe disruptions in energy supplies.

In November, Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to peg Serbia’s current gas price of $270 until May. But after that, if Serbia joins anti-Russian sanctions, the country will unlikely be able to purchase natural gas from Russia below the market price, which is currently above $3,000 per thousand cubic meters, and has reached its historic maximum. In the short term, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for Balkan and other European countries to find an alternative to the Russian energy, which means that blackouts in Europe could eventually become a norm.

For now, both Russia and the EU are expected to refrain from such radical actions, given their mutual energy dependence. Politically, however, the process of “decoupling” between Moscow and the West has already gone very far, and sooner or later, all Balkan countries will likely find themselves on the western side of a new Iron Curtain.

On August 23, 2021, Kyiv hosted the first convention of the International Crimea Platform, which has been presented as a “consultative and coordination format with the aim of peacefully ending the Russian Federation’s temporary occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and to restore control of Ukraine over this territory in full accordance with international law.”

The event assembled representatives of 45 countries and international organizations leading many analysists and experts to name it as “the most notable international event ever hosted in Ukraine.”

Speaking about its history and background, it needs to be pointed out that the idea of carrying out such an event is all but new. At this juncture, part of the credit should go to Ukraine’s former president Petro Poroshenko (2014-2019), whose presidency coincided with, perhaps, the most gruesome period of Ukraine`s post-1991 history.

Poroshenko had expressed the idea in 2016, standing behind the creation of the unsuccessful (for a variety of reasons) Geneva+ format. Subsequently, Volodymyr Zelensky returned to the idea, seeking to make it one of the focal points of his personal meeting with Russia’s president Vladimir Putin in 2019.

Yet, Russia refrained from any dialogue on the subject, firmly stating that Russia’s “sovereignty” over Crimea is undeniable and will not be a matter of discussion. There is a very little doubt that Ukraine`s president seriously counted on a different response from Moscow, but nevertheless, Zelensky was not put off by this unsuccess and pursued the issues.

Russia refrained from any dialogue on Crimea, firmly stating that Russia’s “sovereignty” over Crimea is undeniable and will not be a matter of discussion.

In effect, given the lack of any serious domestic successes, he would make it one of his prime (foreign) policy goals. In September 2020, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly, Zelensky announced a plan to move on with a “Crimea Platform,” making it an instrument “for the coordination of international efforts aimed at securing Crimea’s return to Ukraine.”

Before addressing some event-related specificities and implications, it is important to outline the platform’s key goals and its structural framework briefly. With regard to the former, the main goals were explicitly voiced by the head of Ukraine`s diplomacy Dmytro Kuleba in five main points that include the following:

– Strengthening international efforts for the non-recognition of Crimea’s current status.

– Using – and potentially broadening – international economic, political, and social anti-Russian sanctions.

– Confronting violations of human rights in Crimea – see the suppression of Tatars and other minorities.

– Ensuring the freedom of naval transportation.

– Overcoming the economic and ecological consequences of Russia’s occupation of the peninsula.

Despite the “strategic nature” of its partnership with Kyiv and Kyiv’s explicit support during the recent conflict over Karabakh, Azerbaijan also refrained from participation. Similarly, Turkey was represented by Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, while the Ukrainian authorities had hoped for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s participation. On its side, China chose not to participate at all, allegedly ignoring the invitation.

Finally, the much-hoped-for appearance of the U.S. delegation also failed to meet expectations: instead of Joe Biden, the U.S. was represented by Jennifer Granholm, United States secretary of energy. For obvious reasons, neither Russia nor representatives of Crimea took part in the event. Quite predictably, Russian officials condemned the forum as an incarnation of Russophobia and a tool created to generate anti-Russian sentiments in Europe.

Second, while it would not be an understatement to argue that the platform has had some important informational meaning – as noted by Kuleba, the forum signified Ukraine’s ability to draw international attention to the issue of Crimea, returning it back from “oblivion” – it is not at all evident that the platform will ever be able to overcome awareness-raising status and achieve practical results by attaining the declared goals.

The forum also did not bring about any new developments: the international community, at least the largest part of it, did not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea even before the platform was launched; international sanctions on Russia have not been lifted; and no new solutions to the “Crimean problem” were voiced during the event.

The third issue is that of utility and reaping (potential) benefits. Despite the fact that some Ukrainian experts have contended that the platform could have the prospect of becoming the “most effective leverage against Russia” with a potential of going well beyond the de-occupation of Crimea and spreading to “Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and any other hybrid problem,” both the probability of this scenario and its value to Ukraine are rather dubious.

Even if the value is attained, and the status and international recognition of the platform go beyond what was observed at the end of August in Kyiv, there is serious doubt whether this development would be of major value to Ukraine. While it seems very dubious that Crimea is to return to Ukraine any time soon (or ever) given Russia`s military buildup and determination to strengthen its sway over Crimea, the best-case scenario is that the platform could transform into a major irritant for Russia.

This said, if this scenario indeed materializes, the Crimea Platform most likely will be used by more powerful parties/countries for their own purposes as a tool to apply pressure on Russia, if and when necessary. This will leave Ukraine as a bystander, at best, and, at worst, as a loser.