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or decades, the Ninth Symphony by the world-renowned Austrian composer Ludwig van Beethoven (1770–1827) has been a source of inspiration for European artists and art movements. Over the years, the piece gained political significance and was performed across continental Europe as a symbol of freedom after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The symphony became the anthem of the European Union (EU), an umbrella organization representing European values after centuries of war and power struggles. The anthem was inspired by the words of the German poet Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805), who was influenced by the French Revolution.

With its rhythm and the feelings it evokes, the anthem reflected the sentiments of the 1980s and ’90s, when it was officially declared, symbolizing the EU’s creed, which is built on democracy and European values. However, the optimistic picture created by new members joining in waves of enlargement over the years has given way to a more pessimistic climate due to recent regional developments. Perhaps Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, familiar for its “tat-tat-tat-tam” sound often used as a suspenseful backdrop in films, better reflects the union’s current mood.

The irony in the union’s relations with Turkey begins at this point. Developments that strain the political atmosphere in Europe can also bring about rapprochement in the dialogue established with Turkey. Currently, the negative attitude toward Turkey seems to have given way to a more pragmatic framework and vital priorities.

EU touch in Turkey’s struggle for democracy

After years of war and attrition, the EU project emerged as a stabilizing umbrella within European borders. Since the 1960s, Turkey has officially expressed its desire to be part of the project. As the expansion processes gained momentum, particularly following the collapse of the Soviet Union, European countries gained moral superiority in line with the liberal free market creed. From the 1990s onward, peripheral countries, including Turkey, also steered toward this democratic standard. The opening of new channels and the reforms implemented have raised Turkey’s democratic standards and facilitated the activation of channels that could not be opened through internal dynamics. In particular, the influence of the concept of “guardianship,” which gained political significance over the years and impacted various areas, has been eroded by reforms carried out under EU guidance.

Difficult years began in 2007, despite positive progress on the EU roadmap. As Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan emphasized in recent interviews, this positive momentum gradually reversed after Nicolas Sarkozy came to power in France. The Sarkozy administration blocked five of the 35 chapters that needed to be opened within the framework of the EU acquis. Encouraged by this, the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) blocked the opening of six more chapters. Currently, only 16 of the 35 chapters have been opened, and the remaining chapters remain politically deadlocked. Fourteen chapters cannot be opened for negotiation at present due to the Cyprus issue, even if the technical requirements are met. (Note: Technically, negotiations are being conducted on 33 chapters. Chapters 34 and 35 will be introduced after all other items have been closed.)

The longest year in Turkish-EU relations: 2019

The developments in Turkey’s EU accession process are taking on new forms and shifting axes. This is due not only to factors between the two parties, but also to regional developments. One of the most significant developments was the EU’s decision to collaborate with Turkey to reduce the influx of migrants, which was a direct result of the war in Syria. The visa liberalization agreement that followed the Turkey-EU Summit in March 2016 was an important step in this context. The agreement not only addressed irregular migration management but also established parameters that could revitalize relations. However, following the attempted coup on July 15, the parties’ priorities changed, resulting in different positions. The real deterioration in relations began during this period.

In 2019, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean dragged Turkey-EU relations to their lowest point, despite a positive start to the year. The Eastern Mediterranean crisis and the EU’s categorical opposition to the Maritime Jurisdiction Agreement signed by Turkey and Libya caused relations to reach a new low. The decisions made on July 15, 2019, led to the suspension of high-level dialogue channels, including the “Partnership Council,” and the withdrawal of the European Investment Bank’s credit support. Ultimately, the mechanisms for monitoring the process were disabled.

Does it matter that Cyprus holds the rotating presidency?

As is customary, one of the 27 EU countries holds the rotating presidency for six months at a time. As of January 1, that country is Cyprus. Interestingly, Cyprus has assumed this role at a time when relations with Turkey, the country that has caused the most headaches during the candidacy process, are positive. Although rotating presidencies do not play a particularly decisive institutional role, they can set the agenda for the Council. Progress can be made in micro-scale policies where members share a common view. In practice, it seems unlikely that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will facilitate or complicate matters regarding Turkey.

However, the GKRY will make some moves with the aim of cornering Turkey. According to reports, the GKRY’s foreign minister plans to invite Hakan Fidan to the informal European Union Foreign Affairs Council (Gymnich) meeting to be held in southern Cyprus in spring 2026. Turkey was invited to the 2024 meeting after a five-year hiatus (another aftershock of the 2019 incident). It seems unlikely that Turkey will respond positively to this invitation. The Leaders’ Summit usually takes place in Brussels every term, but it is also common practice for the term presidents to organize an additional summit in their own countries.

It has been suggested that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus could organize an additional Leaders’ Summit within this framework and invite President Erdoğan to attend. It would be nearly impossible to expect Turkish officials to participate in summits that take place in a territory Turkey does not recognize. Conversely, it is reasonable to assume that the GKRY would exploit these invitations for political gain, concealing its maximalist objectives regarding the TRNC and the Eastern Mediterranean. Within the union, it is accepted as established practice that the rotating presidencies traditionally take a neutral position. It is also important to note that no significant crisis occurred during the GKRY’s last presidency in 2012.

The recent rapprochement between Israel, Greece, and the GKRY is also being closely monitored. At the tripartite summit in Jerusalem on December 22, Turkey was the hidden subject, and future plans centered on a strategy that would sideline Turkey. Although Israel is not a member, its Eastern Mediterranean agenda resonates at both ends of the Aegean.

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he presidential election in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) concluded with Tufan Erhürman, the leader and candidate of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), securing 62.76 percent of the vote and winning the election. Erhürman’s confident rhetoric, evident in his pre-election statements, was thus confirmed. On election day in Nicosia, where I was present, a close race was anticipated. A second round was not expected given the low potential vote totals of the remaining six candidates. However, the contest between Ersin Tatar and Tufan Erhürman was expected to remain uncertain until the very end. That was not the case.

The outcome was clear from the first ballot box announced. The clearest indication of the difference observed in almost all ballot boxes was that Erhürman received more votes in six different provincial electoral districts. During normal elections, the first votes announced in cities would go to the CTP or its candidate; then, the votes coming in from the countryside would change the balance. This time, however, the votes did not differ in geographical distribution. For the first time since the 1990 election, a candidate exceeded 60 percent, and general projections were inaccurate.

What did Erhürman promise his electorate?

The Cyprus issue, with its geopolitical dimensions, has been one of the dominant topics on Türkiye’s foreign policy agenda for decades. The ethnic conflict and its legacy, similar to the Palestinian issue, brought about by years of British rule (1878-1960), complicated the problem. In this context, the Turkish and Greek sides have met on various platforms for years. However, the unresolved marathon talks with the Greek side in recent years reduced interest in the process in Türkiye.

The issue has been assessed in terms of its proximity to regional and geographical conflicts, as well as energy exploration, rather than the current problems facing the Turkish Cypriot people, who are isolated. This election marks a turning point in the context of the “Cyprus Issue,” which has been on hold for a long time and is now back on the agenda. Erhürman believes that gains can be made, particularly in the negotiation process. During the election campaign, he promised to build on the progress made on issues such as the establishment of the Immovable Property Commission (2005), a key tool in resolving the property issues of Turkish Cypriots.

The candidates’ differing positions on solutions to the Cyprus deadlock led to a tense election campaign, with tensions rising periodically. Erhürman’s support for the federal roadmap was portrayed, particularly by the Tatar camp, as a declaration of surrender. However, the Erhürman camp emphasized that the “two-state solution” formula was “devoid of content” and that such an argument would mean Türkiye relinquishing its guarantee rights over the entire island.

Erhürman gained prominence during the election campaign due to the government’s failure to address basic humanitarian services and the informal economy. In particular, Turkish Cypriots have complained that structural transformation has lagged behind, as confirmed by our observations on the ground. During his campaign, Erhürman pointed out that the Cyprus negotiations had been frozen for five years, emphasizing that there had never been a similar “climate of apathy” during any other TRNC leader’s term. The deepening of the “deadlock in the current status quo” to the detriment of Turks resulted in the Greek Cypriot side walking away from the table after the Crans-Montana talks in 2017. This turned into negative sentiment among Turkish Cypriots, making the anti-Tatar sentiment more visible.

Erhürman’s campaign slogan, “I promise seriousness,” was not merely a criticism of Tatar’s rhetorical politics. It also referred to the failure to implement policies that affect citizens’ lives, beyond the vicious cycle of foreign policy. Complaints that the government formed after the 2022 political crises was inadequate were also among the factors that paved the way for Erhürman’s victory. It should be noted that the Tatar camp also observed that the current government’s performance negatively affected them.

Sociological fault lines on the Island

A key factor in the Erhürman-Tatar rivalry and the National Unity Party (UBP)-CTP competition is the sociocultural differences between Turkish Cypriots who lived on the island before 1974 and those who migrated from Türkiye after that date. This difference in identity and historical heritage has led to conflicts over the decades and is reflected in voting trends during elections. Tatar, who is in the UBP, experienced one of his disappointments in these elections when he found that the voting preferences of those who came from Türkiye did not turn into a block voting practice, as they had in previous elections. The previously polarized masses showed a more heterogeneous distribution this time. Moreover, the turnout rate in the first round was higher than in previous elections (64 percent).

Erhürman promised to grant the right to obtain a Cyprus-EU passport to children born to couples in mixed marriages (i.e., marriages between children of families who lived on the island before 1974 and Turks who migrated there afterwards). Emphasizing this issue from a human rights perspective, Erhürman took a convincing stance, arguing that gains could be achieved at the negotiating table. He promised that, as a result of negotiations with the EU, favorable mechanisms for Turks could be established with the support of the Greek Cypriot side. This approach addresses the issue as a human rights issue rather than a matter of “confidence-building measures,” which could ignite a restoration process that spreads to other issues.

The current status quo in Cyprus forces Turkish Cypriots to live in undeserved isolation woven with embargoes, as well as commercial and cultural isolation. Recently, one of the significant indicators of the international discrimination faced by Turkish Cypriots occurred. Jordan announced that it would not import halloumi cheese from the TRNC. While the Greek Cypriot administration welcomed the decision, the Turkish side opposed it. Such developments directly affect the lives of Turks and influenced the elections.

The narrowing regional pincer: the shadow of the Israel-Greek Cypriot alliance

Although the Cyprus issue has not been as prominent in Türkiye’s calculus in recent years, geopolitical tensions have drawn attention to developments on the island and in the surrounding area. Notably, the escalating military cooperation between Israel and the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) violates the “Cyprus Agreement” and bypasses Türkiye, the island’s guarantor. This cooperation also endangers the security of Turkish Cypriots, who have an inherent right to live on the island. Israel’s aggressive expansionism has resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians in recent years.

Ignoring the negative impact of this reality on regional countries and deploying Israel’s air defense systems at Baf Air Base constitutes a further violation of the guarantee framework. The Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus Defense Minister’s announcement that they have opened their air and naval bases to Israel creates a situation that poses a threat in the short, medium, and long term. It should be emphasized that the new president, Erhürman, also has a sharply critical perspective on the Greek Cypriot side. He stresses that Israel, France, and the US usurp the “founding partner rights” by including the Greek Cypriot side in their security umbrella. In the current rhetorical analysis, it is important to note that Türkiye and the new TRNC president share the same perspective on this issue.

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he United Nations Security Council unanimously voted on January 30, 2023, to extend the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus for another year. The resolution calls on all parties involved, including the rival Green Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, to take measures to de-escalate tensions in and around the buffer zone that divides the Mediterranean island.

The Security Council strongly encouraged all parties to seize the opportunity presented by UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ appointment of a new personal envoy for Cyprus. María Ángela Holguín Cuellar, a former Colombian foreign minister, is the new personal envoy tasked with assessing the conditions for a resumption of peace talks.

Cyprus has been divided since 1974 into a breakaway Turkish Cypriot north and an Greek Cypriot south, following a Turkish intervention triggered by a coup aimed at union with Greece. Numerous rounds of UN-mediated talks have failed, with the most recent attempt in July 2017 concluding in acrimony.

Back to the negotiating table

María Ángela Holguín Cuellar, on her first visit to Cyprus, expressed her belief in working with both Greek Cypriots in the south and Turkish Cypriots in the north to bring them back to the negotiating table after years of deadlock.

The Security Council resolution emphasizes that the current status quo is unsustainable and that the lack of an agreement heightens political tensions and deepens the estrangement of both communities. It stresses the risk of irreversible changes on the ground and a reduction in the prospects of a settlement.

The resolution calls on the leaders of the two Cypriot communities to improve the public atmosphere for negotiations, explicitly encourage contact and cooperation between the communities, support grassroots initiatives, and refrain from actions and rhetoric hindering a settlement.

Extension until 2025

It condemns continued violations of the military status quo along the cease-fire lines, encroachment into the buffer zone, and an increase in the number and severity of military violations and unauthorized construction. The Security Council urged all parties to respect the authority of the UN mission (UNFICYP) and the delineation of the buffer zone, halting unilateral violations.

Expressing concern over unauthorized or criminal activities in the buffer zone, the resolution highlighted the risks they pose to peacekeeper safety and security. The UNFICYP mission, consisting of 1,000 personnel, has been extended until January 31, 2025.

Source: Anadolu Agency.

Citizenship, a pivotal determinant influencing various facets of our lives, dictates our rights, travel privileges, and, fundamentally, our life prospects. While the process of obtaining a new citizenship poses a formidable challenge for many, for the affluent, including numerous anonymous multimillionaires, the pursuit is often reduced to a matter of price. With sufficient financial resources and the right connections, one can navigate negotiations for citizenship in various places.

In her comprehensive work, The Golden Passport: Global Mobility for Millionaires, Kristin Surak, Associate Professor of Political Sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science, delves into the expanding global market for citizenship, conducting an exhaustive examination of the dynamics surrounding the acquisition and sale of passports and citizenship. Her meticulous on-the-ground investigation sheds light on the intricate network involving wealthy elites, states, and brokers, revealing the transformation of a once clandestine practice into a prevalent and significant phenomenon.

Beyond exploring the less scrupulous practices of the affluent, Surak delves into Citizenship by Investment (CBI) programs. These programs offer a transparent and expeditious route to citizenship, requiring a defined financial investment that is within reach of anyone who can afford it. Notably, these programs adhere to legal processes that undergo thorough scrutiny and due diligence procedures. But is this too good to be true?

Drawing from six years of extensive fieldwork across four continents, Surak unveils the evolution of passport sales from a dubious enterprise to a thriving citizenship industry concentrated in over a dozen countries, particularly small islands in regions like the Mediterranean, Caribbean, and South Pacific. She systematically breaks down the diverse motivations behind these investments and identifies trends within the industry.

The annual issuance of citizenship to 50,000 individuals underscores the magnitude of this global phenomenon. Individuals opt for these schemes for various reasons, including:

Global Mobility: Seeking increased visa-free travel options for business, leisure, or personal reasons.

Business Opportunities: Opening new avenues for international trade and investment.

Political and Economic Stability: Mitigating risks associated with political or economic instability.

Education and Healthcare: Accessing superior education and healthcare systems.

Tax Planning: Exploring more favorable tax environments and managing tax liabilities.

Personal Security: Ensuring personal safety amid security concerns in the home country.

Diversification of Assets: Viewing a second citizenship as a strategy to diversify personal and financial assets.

Quality of Life: Enhancing overall quality of life through better living standards and improved social services.

H

istorically, Cyprus has always been a complicated place. For more than 3,000 years, the island has been caught up in disputes between opposing powers. When Britain took control of Cyprus in 1878, the island was once again thrown into turmoil after more than three centuries of stability under Ottoman Turkish rule. Apart from a few hiccups, the island’s Turks and Greeks had largely lived peacefully side by side, with the Greeks enjoying a degree of socio-economic autonomy within the millet system. But the day the British flag was raised over Nicosia, everything changed.

Britain became the new power broker in the region, but it wasn’t necessarily peace and stability that the British had in mind. Their priority was to secure their trade routes and supply lines to India, the “Jewel in the Crown” of the British Empire, at the expense of Russia, which had its own designs on the region in its search for warm waters. The problem for Britain, however, was that when it took control of Cyprus, it wasn’t quite sure what to do with it once the Russian threat had subsided. While London was still considering what to do with its newly acquired asset, many factors on the ground were changing.

The Ottoman Empire collapsed, leaving a void that invited various rival factions, each with their own dreams of glory, vying to become the next regional superpower. All the while, Britain acted as a mediator, ensuring that the region didn’t descend into complete chaos, but also making sure that no nation rose to such prominence that it could survive without Britain’s blessing. Britain could not leave the region to any single power that was strong enough to tell it to step aside, nor could it leave a vacuum that might allow the Russians to creep in.

So, a delicate balance of power had to be struck in places like Cyprus. Even when Russia decided to abandon its Mediterranean campaign in 1917, Britain had no choice but to remain on the island, if only to prevent Turkey, Greece, or any other claimant from taking it. But this was never going to be a long-term solution, as sooner or later Britain would have to reduce its overseas presence across its vast empire. By the end of World War II, as Britain began to bring most of its forces home, the spread of Soviet-inspired communism meant that the Russian threat was back.

Only this time, the Russians were not just a foreign invader from a distant land. They had managed to hack into the minds of locals who had become disaffected with British rule. In the case of Cyprus, communism affected both the Turkish and Greek populations of the island. Communism was fast becoming the ideology of peaceful coexistence that would unite the two communities in a future without Britain, and one that, had it succeeded, would probably have turned Cyprus into a Soviet vassal.

On the other hand, there were two opposing nationalist movements on the island, one calling for the annexation of Cyprus to Greece (enosis), the other for a divided Cyprus with the Turkish Cypriot community having closer ties with Turkey. Another problem was that, despite being at loggerheads over Cyprus, Turkey and Greece were both members of NATO, a military bloc formed in 1949 to keep the Soviets at bay. Direct conflict between these two allies had to be avoided at all costs, as this would lead to the collapse of NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean, opening the door for the Russians to enter the region from the Caucasus and the Balkans. So, despite the underlying tensions, it was absolutely vital for Britain that the right balance be struck in Cyprus before it lowered its flag there, and that balance had to be protected by some kind of guarantee.

After the Greek Cypriots joined the EU in 2004, the dynamics changed. There was no longer any incentive for the Greek Cypriots to recognize the Turkish Cypriots as their long-lost compatriots and equals at the negotiating table. With the EU’s support, the Greek Cypriots began to see the peace process less as a solution-oriented discussion and more as a conversion on the terms of Turkish Cypriot surrender. Even the UN, which is as guilty as the EU of legitimizing the Greek Cypriot regime despite the obvious collapse of the Republic of Cyprus in 1974, is now struggling to get a word in, with UN-backed models of reunification being spat on after having been agreed, and UN representatives who criticize the Greek Cypriots for doing so being all but banned from the island.

So, with very little to persuade the Greek Cypriots to compromise with the Turkish Cypriots, where does this leave the Treaty of Guarantee? As far as Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are concerned, the treaty still stands. Britain, as always, continues to send mixed messages about it. Meanwhile, Greece and the Greek Cypriots argue that the treaty has expired because it is not appropriate for an EU state to be bound by such an agreement. But the situation in Cyprus remains delicate, and Russia is as much a threat to regional stability today as it was during the Cold War. The EU has no unified army to defend Cyprus if it were ever attacked, and without the Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus has no NATO members to protect it in a worst-case scenario. Ultimately, what the EU has done is to destabilize Cyprus further and cast a shadow over its only real international security agreement.

As a member of the EU at the time, Britain should have recognized the threat that Greek Cypriot accession would pose to its interests in the region, and London should have used its veto to block it. Even then British foreign secretary Jack Straw, now an advocate of a two-state solution in Cyprus, admitted in a recent article in Politico that the EU “could and should have put Cyprus’ accession on hold at this stage and made clear to both sides that only a united island would be allowed to join the EU.”

Now that Britain has left the EU, its vital military bases in Cyprus are at the mercy of a Greek Cypriot regime drunk on the political leverage handed to it by Brussels. There is even talk of France, arguably the EU’s most powerful nation, now seeking to establish its own military presence in Cyprus. President Emmanuel Macron, who has long called for a unified European army that would make Europe less dependent on NATO for its defense, is undoubtedly using the EU as a mechanism to project French soft power onto Cyprus. France may even be seeking to replace Britain in Cyprus, trying to make London subservient to Paris when it comes to securing British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

But Britain can reverse this. It could call for international recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state, thereby securing an alternative ally in Cyprus that can protect its bases if the Greek Cypriots fail to do so. Alternatively, Britain could work with Turkey to sideline the EU in the peace process. By ratifying the 1960 treaty, Britain would cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Greek Cypriot regime, which openly violated Article I of the treaty when it joined the EU in 2004. If Britain cannot ratify the treaty, it should work with Turkey to establish a new arrangement that will secure a future reunification agreement in Cyprus.

One possible way forward is the establishment of a joint peacekeeping force on the island made up of soldiers from Turkey, Britain, and Greece. This could take the form of a new force set up by the three nations or under the auspices of NATO, of which they are all members. This force would replace the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus and work to ensure stability on the island, in the same way that NATO forces have worked to stabilize Kosovo since 1999.

Another option, which could actually go hand in hand with the first, is to put Cyprus on the road to NATO membership. This is a process that would take many years, if not decades, but if there is genuine will and cooperation, it can be accelerated. Turkey has shown good will towards other countries’ bids for NATO membership when they have taken the necessary steps of rapprochement, as in the case of Sweden and Finland. There’s no reason why Ankara shouldn’t do the same for Cyprus if it feels that Turkish Cypriot rights on the island are guaranteed. Perhaps if Cyprus were to join NATO, there would be no need for a treaty between Britain, Turkey, and Greece, as the existing policies of the military bloc would provide that protection instead.

For there ever to be a chance of reunification in Cyprus, a path to NATO membership must be charted, and it must be Britain that takes the first step to make this happen, if only for its own interests. Britain must stop parroting EU and Greek Cypriot rhetoric on the Cyprus problem and make its own voice heard. British spokespeople, diplomats, parliamentarians, and cabinet ministers all need to be briefed to this effect. An open invitation to begin discussions on a new approach to the Cyprus problem should be extended to all relevant parties. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots would no doubt welcome such a proposal. Greece, if convinced of its strategic merits, would probably also welcome it. The EU would thus become irrelevant to the peace process, and the playing field would be levelled for a resumption of talks based on a newfound mutual respect.

Of course, all this depends on how willing the Greek Cypriots are to go down this road. For them, it would mean giving up the leverage offered by the EU. It would also mean diluting their ties with Russia. If they are serious about ending the island’s division, these are sacrifices they should be prepared to make. If they prefer to continue on their current path, with no foreseeable end to the island’s current status quo, then they should be prepared to accept a two-state solution. London needs a reliable partner in Cyprus, and if the Greek Cypriots do not fulfil this requirement, Britain must seek to protect its interests there by other means. With Turkey acting on its own, the Turkish Cypriots may only ever get limited recognition from friendly nations such as Azerbaijan, but if Britain gives the green light, many more countries are likely to jump on the bandwagon.

The Eastern Mediterranean is a relatively narrow strip in the Mediterranean Sea surrounded by the coasts of ten different states, making coastal relations between these countries a technically complex issue. In addition, the area contains islands including the island of Cyprus and numerous Greek islands, which further complicate the maritime delimitation.

Such technical matters, however, do not represent the whole picture. There are fierce political confrontations in the Eastern Mediterranean such as the well-known Palestine issue, the Cyprus issue, as well as the uneasy political relations between Greece and Turkey, Egypt and Turkey, Syria and Turkey, Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon.

All these difficulties make maritime delimitation quite complicated. Although some maritime delimitation agreements have been signed to date – such as the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus [GASC]-Egypt Agreement of February 17, 2003; the GASC-Lebanon Agreement of January 17, 2007; the GASC-Israel Agreement of December 17, 2010; the Turkey-Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC] Agreement of September 21, 2011; the Turkey-Libya Agreement of November 27, 2019; and the Greece-Egypt Agreement of August 6, 2020 – there are many matters yet to be settled.

Firstly, all these agreements have been objected to by one or more of the other concerned regional states making the agreements another source of friction. Secondly, there are maritime areas that are yet to be delimited; some of them directly concern Turkey such as the delimitations between Turkey, on the one hand, and Greece, the GASC, Syria, Egypt, and Palestine, on the other.

The Legal and Political Challenges of a Delimitation Agreement between Turkey and Egypt

Legally, Turkey and Egypt have opposite coasts in the Eastern Mediterranean, which do not involve complicating geographical features such as islands. Establishing maritime borders seems a relatively straightforward matter between the two countries. However, there are legal and political elements that adversely affect this process.

Egypt has so far established delimitation agreements with the GASC and Greece, which Turkey objected to on the premise that they are “violating the continental shelf areas of Turkey in the region.” Turkey considers some parts of the maritime borders established by Egypt as partially infringing the Turkish continental shelf areas.

It should be emphasized that Egypt has so far preferred to proceed with the GASC and Greece when it comes to maritime arrangements despite Turkey’s continuous objections. There is, therefore, a possibility of Egypt not proceeding with Turkey so as to revise the existing agreements simply because it may not want to sacrifice the established relations with Greece and the GASC.

Egypt still seems sensitive about its relations with Greece and the GASC while handling the process with Turkey. When noting that the relations between Egypt and Turkey would improve steadily, the Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shukry also pointed to the fact that it will not be easy. Therefore, it is not appropriate to expect that Egypt will unconditionally support Turkey’s all desired moves in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Moreover, the historic rivalry or political competition between Turkey and Egypt over the Middle East will not disappear anytime soon. As a result, the improvement in the existing relations may take more time than expected.

Legal and Political Challenges to a Border Agreement with Palestine

Some argue that Turkey may establish a maritime border with Palestine as the coastal projections of the two countries overlap, which according to the international jurisprudence on maritime delimitation is the necessary legal element for two states to sign a maritime delimitation agreement.

Though technically possible, there are some legal and mostly political impediments to this proposal. As the potential delimitation will be based on the coasts of the Gaza Strip, the political division inside the state of Palestine creates the issue of who the “legitimate legal authority” is to sign such an agreement with Turkey.

Politically, the issue is even more complicated. The Palestinian Authority government has so far followed a policy which is closer to the Egypt-Greece forum on the Eastern Mediterranean maritime issues. Palestine is a member of EastMed Gas Forum along with the GASC, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, and Jordan. It would be immature to expect that the Abbas administration would sign a maritime delimitation agreement with Turkey at the expense of negatively impacting its relations with the above countries.

A similar attitude may be expected from Israel. Although the relations between Turkey and Israel are currently at an improvement stage – President Erdoğan congratulated Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and the two heads of state held a phone call recently –  there are no appropriate circumstances for Israel to support a possible Turkey-Palestine delimitation agreement. Israel is in a process of an accelerated application of the EastMed Energy Project to deliver its natural gas to Europe through an EastMed pipeline.

Israel, Greece, and the GASC have already signed a deal on January 2, 2020, to build a 1,900 km long subsea pipeline to carry natural gas from the Eastern Mediterranean’s rapidly developing gas fields to Europe. Moreover, Israel already ratified the agreement in July 2020. Therefore, one can expect that Israel would prefer to avert any possible delimitation agreement between Turkey and Palestine, which would further complicate the exiting issues.

Since the maritime area to be delimited by a possible Turkey-Palestine agreement has already been delimited through the Egypt-the GASC Delimitation Agreement of 2003, it is inevitable that Egypt may also oppose such a delimitation agreement.

Considering the above legal and political complications that emerge from both the Palestinian internal rift and the well-known positions of two closely related States, namely Israel and Egypt, a possible delimitation agreement between Turkey and Palestine seems not to be an easy one to conclude. The fact that such a delimitation agreement is legally appropriate does not therefore make it politically prospective in the near future.

On April 27-29, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Greece and Britain joined Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders in Geneva to discuss the future of the so-called Cyprus Problem. As promised, the Turkish Cypriot side, led by President Ersin Tatar, submitted a plan that envisions a two-state solution for Cyprus – a message very much different from the one presented by his predecessor Mustafa Akinci the last time the two sides convened for talks in Crans Montana some four years ago. To no surprise, the informal meetings concluded with no common ground to proceed with formal talks, with the prospect of any solution to the Cyprus Problem appearing further away than ever.

Back in 2017, both sides were in agreement with regards to the framework for negotiations. Both were touting a bizonal, bicommunal federal (BBF) solution that would have seen an autonomous Turkish Cypriot entity officially established in the island’s north, and an equally autonomous Greek Cypriot entity in the south. The two sides would have been ruled under a joint, rotational presidency while each side would maintain control over their respective internal affairs. Land swaps and compensation payments would have likely occurred to settle territorial disputes that arose when Cyprus was divided during a Turkish military intervention which came as a response to a Greek-inspired coup in 1974. Furthermore, a joint committee would have been established to ensure the equal sharing of the island’s natural resources.

There was strong momentum on both sides in the lead-up to those talks, which many considered to be the closest the two sides had ever come to a compromise, especially as all three guarantor powers – Britain, Turkey and Greece – had approved of these UN-endorsed proposals. But alas, it wasn’t to be, as the issue of guarantors itself became a point of contention.

There are conflicting reports as to why exactly the talks broke down in 2017. Some suggest that the Greek Cypriot side had insisted on tearing up the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, which grants the three guarantors conditional rights to militarily intervene in Cyprus. This was a demand the Turkish Cypriots were unwilling to accept. Other reports, however, suggest that Turkey was happy to negotiate a gradual withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island.

But instead of this concession being welcomed by Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades, it was surprisingly rejected, much to the abhorrence of diplomats and observers who attended the talks. More detailed narrations about what happened in Crans Montana even suggest that Anastasiades himself indicated that he’d be open to discuss a two-state solution after Greek Cypriot elections in 2018.

Ersin Tatar has argued that a two-state solution is now the only way forward for Cyprus after 47 years of division.

Needless to say, the outcome of the Crans Montana talks rendered then-Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci redundant. For many Turkish Cypriots, the collapse of these negotiations was the last straw, and in October 2020, they elected Ersin Tatar into office. Unlike his pro-reunification predecessor, Tatar vowed to put forward a case for a permanent division of the island, with the currently unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) officially giving up on the UN-backed federal plan.

Tatar has argued that a two-state solution is now the only way forward for Cyprus after 47 years of division, not to mention the additional 11 years since Turkish Cypriots were forced to boycott the once shared Republic of Cyprus parliament due to Greek Cypriot violations of the 1960 constitution. He also claims that a two-state solution would solve many of the ongoing problems between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, and would allow them to establish warm diplomatic ties that would not only prove mutually beneficial to both communities on the island, but would likewise bring about greater prosperity to the entire Eastern Mediterranean.

Challenges to peace in Cyprus

President Tatar however has thus far failed to explain exactly how he plans to gain international recognition for the TRNC. He has repeatedly recited a timeline of unfortunate events to argue that Turkish Cypriots deserve sovereign equality, but even Turkish Cypriots themselves are not entirely convinced by his moral standpoint.

However, a lack of cooperation from the Greek Cypriot side would not necessarily spell ‘Game Over’ for the Turkish Cypriot campaign for recognition. As was recently seen in the Balkans, Serbia’s non-recognition of its breakaway neighbor Kosovo did not stop half of the world’s nations recognizing it as a separate state. Even EU member states were left divided over the recognition of Kosovo, and to this day five of the bloc’s 27 members do not recognize it.

When one looks at the Caucasus, the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia enjoy limited international recognition despite Georgia still claiming ownership of the enclaves. So, what have these states done right that the TRNC has thus far failed to do? Well, one thing that these nations have in common is that they all have at least one ally in the UN Security Council.

In the 37 years that the TRNC has been a self-declared independent state, it has only ever had one ally – Turkey. Pakistan and Bangladesh briefly recognized the TRNC in 1983, but they were quickly forced to back down after coming under international pressure. Despite its growing global influence, Turkey to this day has not been able to exercise enough soft power to get others onboard. So naturally, the Turkish Cypriots are looking for an ally in the UNSC to back their position – and what better an ally than Britain?

Lobby Efforts

Besides being a guarantor power in Cyprus, Britain, unlike the other four UNSC members, is home to a significantly large Turkish Cypriot diaspora. Census results are yet to be confirmed, but some estimates put the number of Turkish Cypriots in the UK as high as 400,000 – possibly three times more than the Turkish Cypriots living in the TRNC. A large proportion of Turkish Cypriots in Britain are British-born.

They hold British citizenship, speak English fluently, and some even hold influential positions. Many also maintain strong links to their homeland, and the majority can be considered to be relatively more conservative than their relatives back in Cyprus. They are perfectly placed to lobby local MPs to support the TRNC in the UK Parliament and even fight for wider Turkish causes such as Turkey’s military operations in northern Syria against the PKK, as well as Turkey’s maritime disputes with Greece in the Aegean. But again, it isn’t that simple.

There are believed to be just as many Greek Cypriots living in the UK as there are Turkish Cypriots, and both communities largely reside in the same constituencies as each other. The Turkish Cypriots in the UK therefore struggle to lobby their local MPs without being challenged by what is an arguably better organized, better funded and less polarized Greek Cypriot lobby.

It is also very difficult for British Turkish Cypriots to cooperate and coordinate their efforts with the migrant community from Turkey, firstly because of a lack of communication and understanding between them, and secondly because the mainland Turkish community is dominated by supporters of the HDP, which is claimed to have organic links to the PKK. Many of the migrants from Turkey to Britain prefer not to identify themselves as Turks, but rather as Alevis and/or Kurds, and they feel no affiliation with the Turkish Cypriot cause. As a result, Turkish Cypriots have only been able to elicit the support of a few politicians from a handful of constituencies that host a relatively uncontested community of Turkish Cypriots.

It seems, therefore, that the TRNC is not going to get Britain onside through lobby efforts alone. The TRNC is going to have to appeal to Britain’s sense of self by focusing on its geopolitical interests. A bottom-up approach through grassroots campaigning might be futile, but if the Turkish Cypriots can convince Britain that its own interests lie in recognizing the TRNC, a top-down strategy might stir enough MPs to switch allegiances.

There are already some big names who have signed up for the two-state solution, including former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw from the Labour Party, and former Conservative Party leader Iain Duncan Smith. The number of Turkish Cypriot allies in the British government could increase if the Turkish Cypriots are able to channel their voice through international bodies such as NATO so that they can be heard by strategic decision-makers in Britain’s security and intelligence circles. They would of course need Turkey’s help to do this.

Brexit Fever

There’s no guarantee that the aforementioned strategy would work, but it is certainly the right time to try. Britain has just exited the EU, and with Brexit fever still in the air, the UK and the EU are finding themselves increasingly at loggerheads with each other. Britain has two sovereign military bases in Cyprus – Dhekelia and Akrotiri. These bases are vital for securing British interests in the Middle East. But as the EU’s stranglehold on the Republic of Cyprus tightens and Britain’s influence in Cyprus becomes evermore irrelevant, the security of those bases comes under even greater threat.

Gone are the post-Cold War days where Western hegemony in the region was kept together by the United States. As the U.S. shows less and less interest in Mediterranean and its surroundings, a power vacuum is opening up into which various players are attempting to step in. France has particularly taken advantage of tensions between Turkey and Greece over hydrocarbon drilling to boost their presence in the area.

With its strategy in North Africa in tatters and its bases in Lebanon exposed to the dangers of what some may say is already a failed state, France is desperate to consolidate its standing in the region, and is doing so by riding the wave of European solidarity with Greece and the Greek Cypriots. France may even want to eclipse or replace Britain in Cyprus, a move that would leave Britain entirely dependent on Europe when it comes to securing its interests in the Middle East. This would leave Britain with no choice but to side with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to counter French attempts to wrestle its way to regional dominance.

But the question is, is Britain ready to take such an assertive stance? Sure, Britain will take any opportunity available to improve its relations and cooperation with Turkey, as recent trade deals between the two have indicated, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that it is prepared to go against the EU and its members so directly, at least not unless France’s hidden agenda becomes more overt. For the time being, there are just way too many geopolitical risks involved for Britain to challenge EU foreign policy in an aggressive manner.

The Biden Era and Cyprus Peace Talks

At the moment, Britain is grappling with its own domestic issues, primarily the economic downturn brought about by the coronavirus pandemic, as well as a lack of strong political leadership. Britain is also unclear about where it stands with its closest ally, the U.S. Former U.S. president Donald Trump was in no way a friend of the EU, and Brexit took place in a political climate of Trumpism, or neo-transatlanticism, as well as euroscepticism.

Moreover, even though relations between Turkey and the U.S. dropped to all-time lows while Trump was in charge, Trump as an individual was considered to be relatively more sympathetic to Turkey than others in his administration. But now that Joe Biden has taken over as U.S. president, the mood has changed.

In the U.S., the Democrats are seen as being more friendly to the EU than the Republicans are. Biden is therefore more likely to have a better relationship with his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron in comparison to the rocky relationship shared between Macron and Trump. Biden has also made no secret of his enmity towards Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his administration, having started off his presidency by giving Ankara a dose of silent treatment before then recognizing the so-called Armenian Genocide of 1915.

Britain may have freed itself from the strings of the EU, but in the era of Joe Biden, how far the UK can take its relationship with Turkey will be limited by U.S.-EU relations. Without firm assurances from the U.S., Britain cannot even begin dreaming of taking moves as bold as recognizing the TRNC to spite the EU.

TRNC and Limited Recognition

For now, it seems that Britain will continue to uphold a neutral stance when it comes to the Cyprus peace talks. As was demonstrated during the latest meetings in Geneva, Britain will remain committed to the UN-backed peace plan and, in the vague words of British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab, will continue to urge both sides to use “creativity and flexibility” in talks – whatever that’s supposed to mean. Britain remains aloof and uninterested in Turkish Cypriot demands for equal sovereignty, no matter how much they kick and scream about how much they deserve it.

To the contrary, instead of punishing the Greek Cypriots for their part in keeping the Turkish Cypriots internationally isolated for half a century, Britain continues to boost its diplomatic, trade and military cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus. Rather than risk having their bases in Cyprus shut down by the Greek Cypriot government, Britain prefers to earn its keep by constantly reaffirming its ties with Nicosia and reminding them of Britain’s strategic and economic relevance to the island.

If the TRNC is to get any kind of international recognition, it seems like it’ll have to do so without the backing of any UNSC members. The TRNC is completely dependent on Turkey exercising whatever influence it has in the international arena if it is to gain even limited recognition. This leaves only a handful of countries who may opt to take the leap of faith and establish ties with the TRNC – Azerbaijan being the main, and perhaps only one. But Turkey must be careful not to invite too many guests to the party, especially countries that can easily be swayed by the EU to become gateways of foreign interference in Turkish Cypriot politics, lest these nations work to undermine Turkey’s own interests in the TRNC. That includes non-EU states that currently have good relations with Turkey but are susceptible to being coerced by Brussels into becoming EU vassals.

In this writer’s humble opinion, asides from Azerbaijan, other potential candidates to recognize the TRNC include Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Somalia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Cuba, Libya and – perhaps as a real game-changer – Qatar. But that being said, the Turkish Cypriots will have their work cut out for them when it comes to convincing these nations to step out of their comfort zone for the sake of an estimated 150,000 people living on one-third of a semi-arid rock in the Eastern Mediterranean.