I

n Eurowhiteness, Hans Kundnani, Associate Fellow in the Europe Programme at Chatham House, challenges a sanitized and linear history of the EU, prompting the reader to rethink Europe’s peaceful image against its imperial past. He goes on to tackle myopic assumptions about the European project throughout the book.

Kundnani argues that pro-Europeans, who cradled cosmopolitanism and renounced nationalism, have failed to perceive the reality of European regionalism. This provocative critique dissects both the civic and ethnic elements that shape European identity by highlighting Europe’s interaction with the “Other” and linking “Europeanness” and “whiteness.” 

Eurowhiteness may come off as unpalatable to many pro-Europeans, but it raises valuable questions against a backdrop of a rising far-right in Europe. Especially in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis, the complex relationship between European identity and race demands urgent reflection.

Q. What are some of the myths that cause blind spots in understanding the European identity?

I would mention two in particular. The first is the idea that the EU is a cosmopolitan project. Cosmopolitanism usually has something to do with the whole world, and Europe is not the whole world. There’s a tendency by pro-Europeans and the EU to mistake Europe for the world. For example, when they talk about European integration, they sometimes seem to think that they’re talking about global integration, but they’re not.

Similarly, when they say “I’m a European or I’m a European citizen,” they seem to think they’re saying I’m a citizen of the world, but they’re not; They’re saying I’m a citizen of this particular region that has a very particular history and relationship with the rest of the world.

This is what I call in Eurowhiteness “the of myth of cosmopolitanism in Europe”, and related to that is the idea to think European integration is good for the whole of the world, but that may not necessarily be the case; It may be good for Europeans or may not be good for Europeans, arguably. But even if it is good for Europeans, it’s not clear if it’s good for the whole world.

The second myth would be that the EU is a peace project, and that is not entirely wrong. However, the way that pro-Europeans talk about it is sometimes simplistic; that after 1945 Europeans rejected war, and since then Europeans stand for peace. In reality, Europeans did not reject war in general in 1945. They only rejected war with each other.

In 1950 as the Schuman Declaration, which can be seen as the beginning of the idea of the EU as a peace project, is made by France’s then-foreign minister Robert Schumann, France is simultaneously fighting a brutal colonial war in Indochina.

Similarly, seven years later, when the Treaty of Rome is signed, France fought a brutal colonial war in Algeria. This demonstrates that Europeans are continuing to fight colonial wars until they’re defeated or exhausted.

Europeans like to think of themselves as being uniquely peaceful. The real story is more complicated, and in particular, as I say, to the extent that Europeans have rejected military force, it is military force within what has become the European Union, not even within Europe at large, that is being rejected.

Q. Has the EU’s focus shifted from peace to power?

I wouldn’t say it has shifted from being about peace to being about power. I think it was always about power as well as peace. In particular, it gets to what I was just saying about the idea of the EU as a peace project.

If you go back to the interwar period pan-European movement, which is the inspiration for the post-War European integration project, it is very clear that at that time already that the European integration project is about power and the perception of European decline accelerated by fighting one other.

The idea is: If we want to maintain our position in the world – and at that time this is a position of colonial domination- we have to stop fighting with each other. Not so that we can end European colonialism, but so that we can continue it. So in other words, European integration would take the competitive element out of European colonialism, allowing its practice collectively.

Part of the point of European integration in 1950s was for France and Belgium to consolidate their colonies in Central and West Africa at a time when they were no longer able to on their own. In particular, they needed an injection of West German capital.

The idea of geopolitical Europe goes back to the 1920s. It only seems new because pro-Europeans like to tell a story of Europe through the aforementioned myths. It only seems like a shift because we’ve forgotten the real history of how European integration began.

Q. Does the EU still export the European social model and the general welfare state?

Social market economy and the welfare state are no longer what the EU can to claim export anymore. It may have done once, but even in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War we observe that this is not the case. In fact, the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe had much more generous welfare states when they were communist countries.

What happened as they joined the EU during the enlargement process is that those welfare states were dismantled as part of their transition to democracy. There are obviously lots of things that you can criticize about the communist systems in those countries, such as the lack of political freedom and so on, but they did have welfare states.

What has happened now is a further stage in which the EU is putting pressure on member states to dismantle the welfare state. For example, during the euro crisis, the austerity Germany imposed on Greece dismantled what was left of the Greek welfare state.

Q. Your book suggests that civic ideas of Europe are being replaced by ethnic-cultural ones. What is the connection of the neoliberalization of Europe to identity politics?

What I try to show in the book is that there have always been both of the elements of civic and ethnic-cultural idea in the history of what I call European regionalism- which is similar to nationalism on a larger continental scale. I’m suggesting that we can think of the history of ideas of Europe in the way we think about the history of nations. Therefore, regionalism is like nationalism.

The earliest ideas of Europe are predominantly ethnic-cultural. For example, in the medieval period, Europeanness is synonymous with Christianity. From the modern period onwards, you begin to get civic ideas of Europe. Then, in the post war period is when the EU came closest to evolving into a purely civic regionalism. Particularly, in the period from the 60s to the 90s-2000s, there was an idea of Europe centered on the social market economy, the welfare state and depoliticized mode of governance which European integration had produced.

I think what’s happened is that the social market economy and the welfare state have been hollowed out by neoliberalism in the EU. Meanwhile, there has been a backlash against the depoliticised mode of governance where the older civic idea of Europe is no longer persuasive in the same way it was before.

The way I understand neoliberalism is not just financialization, but it’s also the depoliticization of economic policy. In other words, it’s taking economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation. Although, to some extent, this has happened in the whole world in the last 30-40 years through things like the World Trade Organisation rules, the EU has taken it further through the creation of the single market, and also the Eurozone and the fiscal rules. Therefore, it’s very difficult now to pursue a left wing economic policy in the Eurozone because the fiscal rules don’t allow you to do it.

My argument is basically that when you take economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation and no longer have big fights between left and right about economic policy, your democratic politics shifts to cultural questions.

The point of democratic politics is to reconcile different interests and to have fights about questions where people in your society have different ideas or different interests. I think a healthy democratic politics is one where you do that about economic issues because there are real differences between the interests and different ideas as well.

What has happened now is that the center left parties and the center right parties converged in the center around neoliberal economic policy, which the EU has constitutionalized. Therefore, the way parties can differentiate themselves from each other now is around cultural questions.

In terms of what Europe says to the rest of the world, there was a time it would say it stood for the social market economy and the welfare state and now it says it stands for European civilisation.

A good example of this is the phrase “the European way of life,” which used to be used by French socialists, specifically, to refer to the social market economy and the welfare state and the idea of solidarity that it was meant to embody, saying “that’s what we in Europe stand for as opposed to the United States.”

Now when you look at the way that the phrase is used, it is in more civilizational terms. In the current European Commission, the Commission of Ursula Von Der Leyen since 2019, a European Commissioner for promoting the European way of life and his job is to keep migrants out, which makes it very explicit that migrants- only migrants from the South, not migrants from the east- are a threat to the European way of life. That is a very explicit expression of civilizationalism where the European way of life is defined in terms of culture and civilisation, not in terms of the social market economy and the welfare state.

Q. In your book you imply that the center right is increasingly mimicking the far right. Is there a pro-European version of the great replacement theory, if so, what is it?

There is an idea that the EU represents a European civilisation which is being increasingly threatened. This is basically a far right idea that has now been taken on by the center right in Europe.

For example, a couple of weeks ago, Eric Zemmour was doing a rally in the South of France with the young far right leader Marion Maréchal, and the slogan on the lectern at which he was speaking was ‘Defend our civilization.’  The way the far right is thinking about Europe is there’s a European civilisation that is threatened right now. The far right tends to talk about this in the context of migration. That is, it’s the migration of non-white and non-Christian people that is threatening European civilisation.

For example, Valérie Pécresse, the Republican candidate in the French Presidential election in 2022, was talking about white replacement theory or alluding to it in terms of migration. However, in addition, what the centre right tends to do is not talk so much about migration as a racial threat, but more in foreign policy terms as a threat to European civilisation. Macron has given speeches where he’s quite explicit about this.

In other words, international politics is a clash of civilizations, like how Samuel Huntington argues, and Europe is a distinct civilization. Moreover, for someone like Macron, the West is not one civilization, which is what Huntington thought but that Europe is a distinct civilisation, separate from the United States as well.

Where I see a connection with great replacement theory is that this is almost the international political equivalent of the great replacement theory. It’s not about migration but it’s that if Europe does not unite and defend itself, it will be also replaced by other civilizations. Macron has basically said that.

Q. What are some key takeaways from history regarding Europe’s interaction with those who it sees as the “Other”?

I try to show in Eurowhiteness that there’s a long history of defining Europe against various different “Others” at various different times and it’s constantly shifting. But roughly, I would say, in the medieval period when Europe is pretty much synonymous with Christianity, Jews are defined as the primary internal other and Muslims as the primary external other, excluding the divide between Western Christendom and Eastern Christendom.

Then, in the modern period, I try to show how there is a new complex modern idea of Europe, which is partly to do with the European enlightenment and the scientific revolution. It is a rationalist, secular idea of Europe rather than a religious one. At the same time, the idea of Europe also emerges in the context of the encounter of Europeans with the populations of Africa and Asia, and especially the Americas, and that’s the context in which the idea of whiteness emerges.

So, the modern idea of Europe is not just a rationalist one as opposed to a religious one, it’s also a more racialized idea of Europe that is closely connected to the idea of whiteness. What I think happens in that context is that non-white people around the world are the “Others” against which Europeans define themselves.

In the 20th century and particularly after World War I, you have the new idea of Europe as a geopolitical bloc, which I mentioned earlier. European civilisation or the European spirit, as they talked about it at that time, is being threatened by the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other hand. In that context, Russia and also the United States are respectively an “Other.” What I think we’re seeing today is a mixture of all of those “Others.”

L

atin America’s recent “left turn” was triggered by a growing discontent with entrenched inequalities, social injustices, and perceived disregard for the marginalized segments of society. This resurgence of left-wing politics is by no means uniform, as the diverse nations of Latin America each have their own unique narratives and experiences. The region has emerged as one that bears witness to the ebb and flow of democratic ideals, often under the shadow of powerful elites.

Often times, right-wing forces have repeatedly dethroned elected governments that challenged the rich and accepted democracy only after removing the Left and widespread market reform. In this context, a question worth considering is: how would the Right react if democracy threatened elite interests?

Gabriel Hetland’s thought-provoking book, Democracy on the Ground: Local Politics in Latin America’s Left Turn, delves into the confluence of the Left and the Right shedding light on the dynamics of political power through the prism of local politics in Venezuela and Bolivia.

Hetland’s work is the culmination of two years of immersive fieldwork, during which he meticulously observed and analyzed the attempts at participatory reform in cities governed by both the Left and the Right in each of these South American nations. He sets out to unravel a compelling puzzle: what drives political elites to embrace participatory democracy within select Latin American cities while neglecting it in others? The fundamental inquiry at the heart of this book is whether democracy can truly flourish when elite interests are at stake.

Democracy on the Ground presents an essential grassroots examination of two ‘populist’ experiments conducted in Venezuela and Bolivia. One of the central findings of Hetland’s research is that participatory reform measures were more successful in Venezuela compared to Bolivia, regardless of the party in office. Hetland posits that Venezuela’s ruling party achieved a unique form of hegemony, wherein it presented its ideology as a shared vision for all citizens. This political maneuvering forced the Venezuelan Right to operate within the Left’s political framework, ultimately compelling it to implement participatory reforms with surprising vigor.

B

razil has been at the center of speculations between Western expectations towards a renewed regional leadership and the increasing ties with BRICS. In April 2023, Lula da Silva, or simply Lula, Brazil’s president, visited China, welcomed Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s minister of foreign affairs, in Brasilia, and sent Celso Amorim, his closest foreign policy advisor, to meet Volodímir Zelenski. While Lula is showing democratic credentials and holds hard feelings towards Washington, Brazil’s  new international strategy looks to take advantage of the great power competition with an active nonaligned perspective. Latin America seems to be going in the same direction but not necessarily due of Brazil’s new active diplomacy.

Brazil is back

After overcoming a judicial process that included serving a period in prison and returning to the political arena, Lula’s 2023 electoral victory allowed him to resume an active foreign policy with an autonomist orientation that seeks a balance between developed Western powers and revisionist visions of the global order. As Ryan Berg, director of the Americas Program at the at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), argues, Brazil is hedging among great powers and pursuing an agenda of nonalignment, as exemplified in Lula’s visit to Beijing.

Lula has made clear that his priority is to focus on Brazil’s international reinsertion, strongly criticizing the Bolsonaro era both for its authoritarian attitudes domestically and for its erratic foreign policy. Among the main priorities of his new international agenda are the search for peace in the Ukrainian conflict, the establishment of a new regional leadership, and an active and determined projection in the Global South. Special attention has been given to regions where Brazil had regressed in the Bolsonaro era, such as the Middle East and Africa.

However, the new administration faces significant challenges due to the current international landscape, which differs considerably from when it left power. Back then, Brazil was considered a rising star and major powers had a generally positive perception of its role in the global governance agenda—at least until the signing of the tripartite agreement with Iran and Turkey. Today, however, strategic competition among major powers imposes constraints on pursuing a more autonomous foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis traditional partners such as Washington or new strategic partners such as Moscow.

Autonomous decisions have a higher cost. Moreover, the regional context has changed. During the Bolsonaro era, Brazil became a major non-NATO ally (MNNA), which increased its degree of strategic interdependence with the U.S., while the growing presence of China forces Brazil to have a more balanced position given the existing tensions between China and the U.S.

Finally, Lula intends to rebuild the Union of South American Nations (USAN, or UNASUR in Spanish), but South America is less ideologically and politically homogenous than it used to be, which in some ways hinders plans to relaunch this regional body that was deactivated during the previous administration.

Latin America and the Russo-Ukrainian War

The Russian presence has not gone unnoticed in discussions in Latin America. The war in Ukraine is the focus of foreign policy debate in most of Latin America; the discussions are framed in a context of how the region should navigate the rise of China and the emergence of new global actors such as Russia. Among academics, experts, and decision-makers, there are broadly two perspectives on Latin America’s place in an increasingly multipolar world: on the one side, to side with the U.S., or China and/or Russia in the new great power competition, or, on the other, to remain outside of the competition.

The alignment calls for a choice between the United States and China. This option is generally marginal in Latin American foreign policy discussions, and often has a strong liberal ideological component. The strong pro-democratic and liberal affinities generally favor a special closeness with the United States and the Western world, but there are also growing pro-China sympathies, for example, in Venezuela and among some of Latin America’s left-wing movements.

Across the region there is a near consensus not to engage in the new great power competition, while seeking opportunities for economic development and strategic alliances with other countries. The second option has different expressions but can be summarized as a form of nonalignment. The recent book “Latin American Foreign Policies in the New World Order: The Active Non-Alignment Option” edited by Fortin, Heine and Ominami reunites different voices which call for an equidistant position between the White House and Beijing while seeking to deepen regional integration and more active diplomacy both with rising players and in the Global South.

For example, facing the Russo-Ukrainian War, the major Latin American regional players—Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico—have shown a more pragmatic and less forceful stance with respect to condemnation, with a mixture of balanced positions and a search for compensation. Thus, no country in Latin America adopted sanctions against Russia. The case of Brazil is particularly interesting since it shows an important degree of continuity between Bolsonaro and Lula except for the new “peace coalition” project which has been at the core of the current presidential diplomatic maneuvers. Although Bolsonaro’s and Lula’s diplomatic responses offered different nuances within and across different regional players, they signaled an autonomous perspective facing global pressures.

What does active nonalignment mean for Latin America?

Are Brazil and Latin America nonaligned? The answer is yes. Neutrality and nonalignment have been at the center of Latin America’s external choices both in relation to the Russo-Ukrainian War and the U.S.-China strategic competition. However, only to stand aside in a changing global environment is not enough to strengthen agency in world politics. Latin America suffers from a structural relevance deficit in the global scenario, so a more active and prompt approach towards global affairs is needed. Diversification, open regionalism, multilateralism, and soft power are optimal routes to increase regional presence and relative weight in international affairs.

While nonalignment is a fact in current times, the active side of the equation seems to be far behind regional needs. Regional fragmentation and stagnation have been increasing in recent years and the multilateral position does not mean that the regional players coordinate their policies—even those related to the Russo-Ukrainian War— while diversification and soft power policies fluctuate in relation to the importance that governments give to international issues. The relations between Turkey and Latin America are a vivid example of the lack of continuity, with the initiative usually coming from Ankara. In the end, Lula’s new Brazil offers an opportunity to put the region back on the international stage, although it will most likely be following Brasilia’s and not a collective agenda.

Last Sunday, May 29, the first round of the Colombian presidential elections took place. In a country of slightly more than 50 million people, out of 39 million who are eligible to vote, more than 21 million exercised their right in a relatively calm environment, despite the high polarization and the permanent paranoia. All sides accuse their opponents of fraud and foul games, and are all together responsible for the tense atmosphere. None of the candidates reached the 50% +1 percentage required for victory.

Yet, leftist Gustavo Petro won 40.32% of the votes and Rodolfo Hernández, an engineer turned businessman and former mayor of Bucaramanga, Colombia’s sixth largest city, won 28.15% of the votes. The two will move on to a runoff on June 19.

The main surprise was the defeat of Federico Gutiérrez, the establishment’s man to maintain the status quo. Current president Iván Duque has a disapproval rate of 70%, leaving the country now highly economically vulnerable, with an inflation rate near a two-digit high, an unemployment of 12%, a high crime rate in cities, and an increase in violence in the rural areas.

Meanwhile, hundreds of community leaders and former guerrilla combatants who signed a peace deal with the government in 2016 were murdered by paramilitary factions as deep unrest hit several social sectors due to the Colombian government’s mismanagement of last year’s general strike.

Against this background, the message of the Colombian people was clear: we want change. Gutiérrez got 23.91% of the votes and immediately announced that he will support Hernández for president, confirming what many Colombians think, namely that Hernández is the establishment’s Plan B for clinging to power.

Petro, whose campaign has elapsed mainly in massive public appearances in Colombian cities and towns, proposes a government program focused on social issues. An increase in taxes for the 4,000 richest citizens, a cut in certain tax reliefs for big companies, financial support for the education and health sectors, a social approach to the war on drugs, strengthening the peace process which the current government shows contempt for, and a climate agenda that contains the exploration and production of oil—Colombia’s main source of income—in the midterm.

Petro, a militant of the leftist nationalistic guerrilla organization M-19 back in the ’70s and ’80s, is seen by almost half of the country as the “Colombian Hugo Chávez,” the late Venezuelan Marxist leader. Even though Petro showed support for Chávez in the past, he has distanced himself from his successor, Nicolás Maduro in recent years. Also, in a clear attempt to soften his image, Petro has met with entrepreneurs while he has been consistent in calling for the unity of alternative social and political forces in the country.

Hernández’s approach targets the bureaucracy. He promises cutting public spending (even announcing that he will donate his salary for social causes), and introducing a tax cut that could increase consumption and strengthen people’s purchasing power. Although his daughter, Laura, was kidnapped and murdered in 2004 by the leftist guerrilla ELN, he assures voters that he will seek peace negotiations with them, and give support to the Colombian agricultural sector.

Similar to Petro, he announced his plan to reestablish diplomatic ties with Venezuela, opposes the use of chemicals in coca and marijuana crops and the use of fracking during oil exploration, and endorses same sex marriage and adoption.

His critics view him as a demagogue or a populist, but this seems not to impact the view of the people he governed in Bucaramanga, where he overwhelmingly won on May 29. His claim that he is independent from the traditional political class does not appear to have completely convinced certain voters. He has also been involved in several controversial statements; on a radio show, years ago, he said, “I’m an admirer of a great German thinker named Adolf Hitler.”

Later he said he meant Albert Einstein. He also was filmed slapping a councilman who denounced him and his son for corruption while he was Bucaramanga’s mayor. His vice-presidential pick is the Afro-Colombian academic Marelen Castillo from the same Western region as Márquez.

Both candidates say their policy towards the United States will be based on friendly ties and mutual respect. Colombia was named “a strategic ally for NATO” during Ivan Duque’s presidency. Being its best “friend” in Latin America, the United States will be closely watching what happens in the June elections. Yet, whatever the outcome is, the U.S. will make sure it does not essentially harm Colombia’s traditionally submissive attitude.

One thing that unites Colombians is the general belief that the next four years will have to be revolutionary in terms of how the next president manages the country’s resources and politics. The Colombian people are very unhappy with the current administration. Life, beyond the pandemic, has become considerably harder for most Colombians: food prices soar, security deteriorates, and opportunities for a better future seem scarce.

The fact that Gustavo Petro and Rodolfo Hernández are in the home stretch in this crucial political moment is solid proof that Colombians are fed up with the political establishment. How this very same establishment will manage to maneuver in order to survive and perhaps even come out stronger from this juncture is yet to be seen.

The second pink tide in Latin America is ongoing as Mexico’s president Andrés Manuel López Obrador won the referendum on April 10, 2022.

López Obrador, who has been serving as president since his election victory in 2018, won the referendum conducted to decide whether he should step down or finish his six-year term in September 2024. In Mexico, presidents are limited to a single term of six years in office.

Although turnout rates were meager, López Obrador won almost 90% of the votes with only 18% of the eligible voters showing up on the day.

Before the referendum, his approval rating was 60%.

Opposition parties claimed that the president could use this landslide referendum to extend his six-year term. In a video message, López Obrador said, “I’m going to continue serving until the last day of my term. I’m not going to go past that because I’m a democrat, and I’m not in favor of re-election.”

Colombia turning to the left?

Colombia offered further proof of the rising left in Latin America with Gustavo Petro winning the primary presidential election with a landslide. Petro was defeated by Ivan Duque in 2018. Since then, the country has entered a complex phase, especially with economic inequality rising due to the COVID19 pandemic.

Colombia was shaken by mass protests in 2021. Polls show that many voters are dissatisfied with the current elected leader and Petro’s chances to be elected in the upcoming elections are increasing.

On May 29, 2022, the first round of Colombia’s presidential election will be held.

Will a former guerrilla member become a president?

Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego was born in a small town in northern Colombia in 1960. His family migrated to a bigger town, where he later studied at the La Salle public school. Petro studied economics at the Universidad Externado de Colombia and after his graduation, he continued his education at Escuela Superior de Administración Pública (ESAP). Later, he earned his master’s degree in economics.

While at school, he got involved in politics and became a member of M-19, a Colombian guerrilla organization. During the 1980s, he was tortured and imprisoned for being part of the organization.

Later, the organization evolved into a political party in which Petro participated as a member in the 1990s.

In 1994, he was appointed to the Colombian embassy in Belgium as a diplomatic attaché for human rights, a position he held until 1996.

In 2002, Petro was elected to the Chamber of Representatives of Colombia, representing Bogotá, the county’s capital. Later, in 2006, he was re-elected as a senator in an election that saw the second highest voter turnout in the country.

His aspiration to become president started with the 2010 presidential election, where he ranked fourth in the election race, receiving 9.1% of the total votes.

Between 2012 and 2015, he served as mayor of Bogotá. During his tenure, there was a significant reduction in homicide rates, reaching a number that had never been seen in the previous two decades.

In the 2018 presidential election, Petro came second and lost the election to Iván Duque Márquez, the current president. However, he received eight million votes—the highest number ever to be won by a leftist candidate.

Petro is currently serving as a senator (2018-2022). In the presidential primaries on March 13, 2022, he received almost four million votes, double the number of votes won by his opponents. The 61-year-old politician became the presidential candidate for the coalition Historic Pact for Colombia by public vote.

In 2021, a poll published by Invamer showed that at least 75% of Colombians disapproved of Duque’s leadership style, making him the most unpopular leader in the country’s history.

Duque’s popularity crashed when social unrest across the country evolved into anti-government protests, killing 43 civilians in 2021.

The end of right-wing politics in Latin America?

Experts argue that the left is re-emerging in Latin America, especially after the COVID19 pandemic, which saw living conditions worsen.

After years of right-wing neoliberal dominance, many Latin American countries are moving towards left-wing politics. The movement is often referred to as the “pink tide,” which speaks of the regional change towards the left in Latin America after Hugo Chavez came to power in Venezuela in 2000.