Turkey has recently gone through a highly competitive local election process and the campaigns, alliances and results tell us many things about the newly established presidential system and new electoral behaviors and political culture in the country. The Turkish governmental system shifted to a presidential system from a parliamentary system with the 2017 referendum and two elections after this shift – the 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections and the 2019 local elections – mark significant shifts in political competition and the nature of Turkish politics.

Turkey’s political culture and competition emerged within the era of the parliamentary system. During this system, besides long eras of coalition governments, the country witnessed single-party governments of the leading parties that received very low rates – such as when the AK Party obtained 33% of the general vote in 2002 and formed government. However, the presidential system changed the system radically and the threshold to winning an election has become at least 50% of the votes. With this shift to a presidential system, it means a harder target to reach and thus encourages and even forces political parties to form alliances with each other in order to pass the threshold.  

The presidential system in Turkey has changed the game of politics radically and the threshold to winning an election has become at least 50% of the votes.

In both the presidential and local elections in 2018 and 2019, two alliances were formed. The first was the People’s Alliance, made up of the AK Party, the MHP and BBP (Great Union Party). The second alliance was the Nation’s Alliance, which consisted of the CHP, Iyi Party and the SP (Virtue Party). In addition, the HDP – the political wing of the PKK terrorist organization – supported the Nation’s Alliance in certain regions. The People’s Alliance presents more inner integrity than does the Nation’s Alliance due to conservatism and nationalism going well hand-in-hand in Turkey, both historically and socially. These two political movements formed two coalition governments in the 1970s (Nationalist Front Governments) and made an electoral alliance in the 1991 general elections. However, this is not the case for the Nation’s Alliance.

CHP, a leftist and Kemalist party came together with SP, an Islamist party. Moreover, the Iyi Party, which claims to be a Turkish nationalist party, did not reject support from the HDP, which is a separatist and pro-PKK political party. Although vast inner contradictions among the parties of the Nation’s Alliance, these parties met in the same electoral alliance. These need to be analyzed in the context of the political blocs that emerged after the new presidential system.

The right and left-wing electoral balance among Turkish voters has been around 65% to 35%. But the politics of alliance blocs has changed this.

The common assumption about the right and left-wing electoral balance among Turkish voters has been around 65% to 35%. This balance seems to transform into a new form within this new politics of alliance blocs. Although the Iyi Party and SP are relatively small right-wing parties, considering their total votes in the last general election, they achieved in motivating their voters to vote for the CHP candidates, which, it is fair to state, is a hard job. Considering its highest rate of votes in the last 30 years was 25%, the electoral bloc pioneered by the CHP managed to reach the rates of 47% with the external support of the HDP.

New centralizing and de-centralizing dynamics in Turkish politics

This new wave of electoral alliances is an important dynamic to change the traditional balance of right and left among Turkish voters. This alliance might increase the chance of the CHP for winning the government, while there was a much lower chance. However, this also enforces the CHP to meet the demands of other parties for determining a more right-wing candidate to convince non-left opposition voters. For instance, in two metropolitan cities, Ankara and Antalya, which the CHP won from the AK Party, CHP candidates were politicians that came from a different political tradition. Mansur Yavas had been the MHP mayor of Beypazari and Muhittin Bocek started his political career after being elected as the mayor of Konyaalti, from the Homeland Party (ANAP) – a former center-right political party.

Moreover, Ekrem Imamoglu, CHP’s Istanbul candidate, was also a previous member of ANAP and coming from a conservative, non-leftist background helped him to obtain the support of conservative, right-wing voters in Istanbul. The CHP administration even tried to pursue former AK Party member and former President Abdullah Gul as their presidential candidate. However, Iyi Party opposed this idea since its leader did not accept withdrawing from candidacy.

Considering its highest rate of votes in the last 30 years was 25%, the electoral bloc pioneered by the CHP managed to reach the rates of 47% with the external support of the HDP.

The fact that the necessity for winning an election is gaining at least 50% of the votes enforces political parties to compromise and reach common candidates with other parties and receive their support. This triggers a new dynamic in Turkish politics: centralization. The candidates, their discourse, campaigns and teams, regardless of political membership, are selected among moderate and central figures. The co-existence of different ideological and political movements in the same alliances also causes the decrease in ideological identities and the replacement of ideologies that were constructed in the Cold war era with non-ideological figures. This trend is also a case in some European countries, such as France, where Emmanuel Macron became a common political figure to counter the “threat” of far-right governance as a non-ideological figure. This centralizing dynamic of electoral politics is the first important dynamic in the context of bloc politics.

Second, because of the 10% threshold to gain seats in the parliament in the old parliamentary system, smaller parties were not counted as significant and tended to be ignored. However, as we can see in the examples of SP and BBP, even if their votes remain at around 1%, they have become key figures in Turkish political life. These parties emerge as “negotiator parties” in order to change the game where the voters of two blocs are close and electoral volatility among alliances is very low. We can also consider the HDP in this context. Even if its support to the Nation’s Alliance is considered as external support, receiving the HDP’s support was of crucial importance for the CHP and allowed it to gain major votes in big cities. This second dynamic rises as the ‘de-centralizing dynamic,’ which can open the gates for acceptance of relatively small, marginal groups that used to remain outside the political periphery in Turkey.

New game of politics 

These both centralizing and de-centralizing dynamics existing side-by-side create a complex situation for the present and future of Turkish politics. This complex situation is also valid for Turkish voters. As we witness among the strategy of formation of alliances and their tactics of selecting candidates, the Turkish electorate have also pursued tactical voting. The behavior of the Turkish voters has become to oppose something rather than to support it. It can be argued that the majority of voters within the Nation’s Alliance display attitudes of anti-Erdoganism, rather than supporting a CHP government and vice-versa for the People’s Alliance. This arises from the political polarization of the country.

The centralizing figures that lead the candidacy of right-wing figures from the CHP aims to break the opposing pole and gain votes from the conservative-nationalist bloc. This strategy could be regarded as successful in the cases of Ankara and Antalya. Moreover, in the future, we might see both the AK Party and MHP attempting to change their discourse in order to break the other bloc and to gain votes from it. The recent ‘Turkey’s Alliance’ discourse displayed by President Erdogan could be considered in this context. President Erdogan expressed his new concept of ‘Turkey’s Alliance’ after the recent local elections as an umbrella for all different political groups to unite the nation against the threat to Turkey’s security and independence. This could be an example of the centralizing dynamic that leads political leaders, from both sides, to influence and attract the public in the political center.

The presidential system has led to a de-centralizing dynamic, which can open the gates for acceptance of relatively small, marginal groups that used to remain outside the political periphery in Turkey.

The emergence of new blocs also pushes both sides to position in the political center and gain small political figures at the same time. Positioning in the political center is also about satisfying the demands of the social center. For instance, the necessity of gaining votes from the conservative majority of society enforces the CHP to sway away from its orthodox Kemalist discourses and practices, which could be perceived as anti-religious. Similarly, this new bloc politics pushes the AK Party and MHP to persuade young voters, who are mostly middle-class, educated and live in major cities. This is the demographic in which the People’s Alliance gains the least votes. These dynamics mean point to a change in political figures, discourses and campaigns. Since the political atmosphere and criteria of winning has totally changed in this new bloc politics after the establishment of the presidential system in Turkey, the rules and tactics of the game have also changed.

Turkey’s local elections will be held tomorrow. After long-lasting heated debates among political parties, voters will go the polls to select local governors in 30 metropolitan districts, 51 provinces, 922 countries, 32.105 neighborhoods and 18.306 villages. Beyond that, the March 31 local elections will be one of the main determinants of Turkey’s political, social, and economic order for the next 5 years.

Since there is less than 24 hours left to the elections, it is crucial to discuss possible future scenarios that may occur after the results are displayed. Which dynamics will be effective in the post-election period in Turkey and will these dynamics be determinant on national and international political issues? Answering these questions requires analyzing possible scenarios on post-election Turkey.

Turkish voters go the polls to select local governors in 30 metropolitan districts, 51 provinces, 922 countries, 32.105 neighborhoods and 18.306 villages.

The first scenario depends on the shift of power dynamics in two prominent cities – Istanbul and Ankara. These cities have been at the core of the election campaigns of all political parties. Members of the Nation Alliance aim to gain Istanbul and Ankara from the AK Party in order to weaken the AK Party and the People’s Alliance in the long term in order to increase their own sphere of influence in politics. Since the quality of local administration in these provinces also reflect the success or failure of political parties in parliamentary and presidential elections, the motivation of the Nation Alliance is quite understandable.

Because of this, winning the mayoral races in Ankara and Istanbul will provide an enormous advantage for political parties. More, members of the Nation Alliance are also trying to prevent the re-emergence of intra-party opposition in the post-election period. The leaders of the CHP and Iyi Party faced serious opposition after their failure in the June 24 elections. Opposition groups within both parties postponed their activities until the local elections. Thus, winning the mayoral race – even in one of these cities – will enable Aksener and Kilicdaroglu to re-consolidate their power.

The second scenario depends on the future of Turkey’s presidential system. One of the hot topics of the local election campaigns was the future of the government system in Turkey. Even a former politician, Husamettin Cindoruk, claimed that this election would be the revenge of the presidential system from Turkey’s previous parliamentary system of government. The main aim of the CHP and Iyi Party is switching back to the parliamentary system by weakening the AK Party-MHP bloc in politics. If the AK Party and MHP lose any power or authority, the Nation Alliance may try to question the legitimacy of the presidential system after the elections.

The results of the March 31 local elections will be a determinant on the future of speculative economic attacks on the Turkish economy.

The third scenario is on the main dynamics of Turkey’s foreign policy in the aftermath of the local elections. As President Erdogan underlined, Turkey will continue to conduct cross-border military operations after the elections in order to provide domestic and border security. Nonetheless, the Nation Allies has been trying to delegitimize Turkey’s cross-border operations and the leader of CHP re-iterated his stance against these operations during the election campaign. If the Nation Alliance broadens its electoral sphere, they will be more determined to present a critical stance against cross-border military operations.

Last but not least, the results of the March 31 local elections will be a determinant on the future of speculative economic attacks on the Turkish economy. Especially in recent days, there has been some rumors on the devaluation of the Turkish Lira after the local elections. Opposition parties also claim that Turkey’s economic indicators will get worse after the elections. Thus, if the AK Party and MHP consolidate their power in local elections, they will manage to tackle these speculations after the elections.

Turkey is heading towards the final phase of its local elections, which will be held on 31 March. With no doubt, Turkey’s policymakers called for a new system of government due to various difficult experiences in the past, as building adequate and strong governments was not that easy. It was quite understandable that parties, which heavily criticized each other and even defamed one another, came together in order to find a common base for the country. As a consequence, citizens supporting each party casted doubt on the sincerity of politicians.

Nevertheless, the new presidential system entailed not a totally new, but a rather structural and stability oriented phenomenon, namely pre-election alliances. These alliances have been firm enough to be continued even in the local elections.

Turkish politics nowadays has established the roots of a two-block political landscape, although not both blocks have concrete political ambitions and systematic preferences. As is known, the “People’s Alliance,” consisting of the AK Party and MHP was established right before the 16 April, 2017, referendum and continued during the parliamentary and presidential elections last year. On the other hand, parties around the main opposition party, the Kemalist-secular CHP, made efforts to bring together entirely different, and indeed ideologically conflicting groups, such as the Kurdish-ethnic HDP, the conservative SP and the Turkish-nationalist-oriented Iyi Party.

The second bloc has less of a chance and more difficulty to persuade and broaden its electorate. This is due to their lack of a coherent election program and the lack of a shared future projection. While the People’s Alliance refers itself to a set of compatible ambitions and narratives, the Nation Alliance is based on incompatible narratives and only has one common objective – to get rid of President Erdogan.

Despite the actual alliance-seeking efforts by the CHP and other parties, they have oddly come to refuse the existence of such an alliance, even in provinces where it is obvious that the candidate is an umbrella one. If a CHP-led alliance does not have the courage to openly conduct a campaign, then political engineering will be an option, and this option will fail on election day. As a stark comparison to the Nation Alliance, President Erdogan and Devlet Bahceli have openly stressed the main framework of the People’s Alliance with regard to the local elections.

The People’s Alliance was established on the night of the July 15, 2016, coup attempt, when the AK Party and MHP leaders took a strong position against the Gulenist putschists. In addition to this, these two parties had previously come together to get work done in Turkish politics. For instance, the MHP did not boycott Abdullah Gul’s bid for presidency in the parliament in 2007 (despite strong opposition from both the pro-tutelage Kemalist officers within the CHP and the Turkish Armed Forces). More, in 2007, both parties came together to lift the headscarf ban, which resulted in a closure trial against the AK Party in 2008. Both party leaders also resisted the violent Gezi Protests in 2013.

Today, the People’s Alliance describes its main character as standing for the “people’s will,” with the only aim to “serve the nation.” However, the Nation Alliance does not seem to have any concrete political position or self-description. This ambivalence and blurriness leads to a lack of transparency. And because of this situation, the People’s Alliance has described the CHP-led alliance as the “product of secret bargaining and political engineering.”

Kemalist-secular authorities and traditional Kemalist voters are unsatisfied with a quasi-alliance between the CHP and HDP due to the fact that the latter is the political arm of the PKK terrorist organization. Senior CHP figures have announced their candidacy from the Democratic Left Party (DSP) as a protest against CHP’s alienation. This has therefore caused dispute between the CHP and DSP, and the CHP has accused the DSP for dividing votes. However, DSP Chairman Onder Aksakal has rejected such accusations and stressed that the CHP is the only actor responsible for the success of the AK Party. Aksakal also underlined the CHP’s previous efforts that failed and that were not compatible with its traditional values. These were, namely, nominating a non-CHP politician as CHP’s presidential candidate in 2014, supporting the ultra-nationalist Iyi Party with 15 CHP MPs in 2018, and of course, not accepting any electoral defeats since 2010 after Kilicdaroglu became chairman.

The 31 March local elections will most likely contribute to the transformation of Turkey’s political landscape. By this, it can be inferred that a two-bloc system will be entrenched in the future. The continuing efforts of the People’s Alliance are reinforcing this trend, while the CHP-led alliance lacks a sincere and concrete narrative. While it lacks a concrete narrative, this does not exclude the actual existence of the Nation Alliance. Time will show whether this alliance will transform in the long-run due to the political pressure felt from the electorate.

The heat of the upcoming critical local elections of 31 March, 2019, is getting warmer. The local elections are the most important item on the political agenda of Turkey nowadays after the international turmoil.

President Erdogan is expected to meet with Devlet Bahceli, head of the MHP, in order to continue the ‘People’s Alliance,’ which was formed in the last parliamentary and presidential elections held on June 24.

The former part of the deal between the AK Party and MHP is clear: in every province where the opposition parties form an alliance, there will be a common candidate under the People’s Alliance.

Both Erdogan and Bahceli will decide about the details of the union between the AK Party and MHP as well as finalizing ‘common candidates’ in certain cities. The former part of the deal is clear: in every province where the opposition parties form an alliance, there will be a common candidate under the People’s Alliance. For the latter part, according to Abdulkadir Selvi, a political journalist from Hurriyet daily newspaper, the deal between the two parties is “sealed” in Isparta and Kars and there is some “discomfort” in Adana and Mersin.

Speaking at his party’s meeting on Monday, Devlet Bahceli declared that if Binali Yildirim becomes candidate for Istanbul, the MHP will give him full support.

Last week some Turkish newspapers wrote about the details of the alliance and called it a “gesture model,” which is being described as both parties being “considerable” to their “sensitivities” in certain cities and districts. There are some rumors that there will be a change of candidates in Adana and Aydin. MHP has declared to support the AK Party’s candidates in Denizli and Erzurum, after recalling its candidates in these cities. This support is said to spread to other cities that are expected to be won by the AK Party. On the other hand, in 60 centers where the MHP won the local elections in 2014 and where they are still leading the polls, the AK Party is expected to support the MHP candidates. In three major cities – Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir – the MHP will not declare a candidate and will support the candidates of the AK Party.

Meanwhile, the leader of the main opposition, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, met with Iyi Party leader Meral Aksener a couple of times last week and are expected to meet again this week in order to finalize the negotiations on an alliance.

Kilicdaroglu is said to have decided the name for Istanbul: Ekrem Imamoglu – the current lead of Beylikduzu. Therefore, Aksener has not much to do with the candidate of Istanbul. According to Selvi, the race for Istanbul will be between Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu.

The major issues between these two parties are the common candidates to be shown in Ankara and Istanbul. This is because there are certain obstacles as both parties are competing for the leading role in the opposition camp. Kilicdaroglu is said to have decided the name for Istanbul: Ekrem Imamoglu – the current lead of Beylikduzu. Therefore, Aksener has not much to do with the candidate of Istanbul. According to Selvi, the race for Istanbul will be between Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu.

While the meetings between the opposition leaders have been ongoing, they have not yet reached the clarity that the AK Party and MHP have. The major differences on who will be common candidates in the important provinces will remain a problem. Aksener has already stated that “if we are leaving Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, and Mersin, then the two major cities – Ankara and Antalya – shall remain with us.”

Since there is less than four months until the 2019 local elections, all political parties are busy nowadays trying to finalize their candidate selection process and election manifesto. Nevertheless, as a new phenomenon in Turkish politics, the issue of pre-electoral alliances are at the top of the agenda of all political parties. Even though the People’s Alliance, which consists of the AK Party and the MHP are about to finalize their negotiation process, the opposition block of the CHP, Iyi Party, and HDP are still discussing the boundaries and limitations of forming an alliance.

It is crucial to make process-tracing in order to understand the roots of problematic issues within this block. It was announced that the Nation Alliance that was formed between the CHP, Iyi Party, and Felicity Party had been terminated after the June 24 elections. These parties made harsh criticisms against each other and about the failure of this alliance in the parliamentary elections. It was a well-known fact that the opposition parties formed an alliance solely to stand against the People’s Alliance.

The parties that formed the Nation Alliance have different ideological orientations and political agendas about the future of Turkey. Nowadays, there is an ongoing discussion on whether differences in their ideological orientations prevent the formation of pre-electoral alliances in local elections within this opposition bloc. Even prominent political figures of this block pay attention to the danger, which may bring more destruction to their own parties. How will these parties manage to form a balance between their ideological orientation and the interests of the opposition block? The answer of this question reflects the main crisis within this bloc.

How will the opposition bloc in Turkey manage to form a balance between their ideological orientation and their interests? The answer to this question reflects the main crisis within this bloc. 

It is obvious that the main aim of the opposition parties is preventing the success of the People’s Alliance in local elections. In accordance with this purpose, the parties are trying to form an alliance, especially in critical provinces such as Istanbul, Ankara, Adana, and Mersin. The parties in the opposition block face a conflict of interests for these provinces and therefore negotiations fail to be carried forward.

The Iyi Party, which was established almost a year ago, sees these local elections as a springboard for its future. Since the party experienced a serious existential crisis after the June 24 elections, the local elections are perceived as a way of overcoming the crisis. Due to this, the Iyi Party wants to win the local elections especially in Ankara, Adana, and Mersin. The party claims that there is a significant number of voters in these provinces and that CHP should not nominate any candidate in these provinces. Nevertheless, as Turkey’s main opposition party, the CHP is not open to withdrawing from these provinces in favor of the Iyi party. This issue is the main reason of the conflict of interest within the block.

The Iyi Party, which was established almost a year ago, sees the 2019 local elections as a springboard for its future. Since the party experienced a serious existential crisis after the June 24 elections, the local elections are perceived as a way of overcoming the crisis.

Moreover, these parties have different opinions on the boundaries of the alliance. While the CHP is willing to include the HDP in this alliance, the Iyi Party is against this. At the end of the day, the HDP’s position within the opposition block becomes a serious problem for the future of this opposition block. Even though the leaders of the CHP and Iyi Party will have a meeting this week, it seems difficult to overcome all these problems in the short term.

Although the AK Party and the MHP announced that they were not going to form an alliance for the upcoming local elections last month, the latest incidents forced them to come together under the People’s Alliance. The leaders of both parties held a meeting last week in order to discuss the possibilities and limitations of forming an alliance, and both leaders reflected positively on forming one.

The leader of MHP, Devlet Bahceli, stated that the MHP would not nominate its own candidates in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, the most critical provinces for the People’s Alliance, and that the MHP would support the AK Party candidates in these provinces. Thus, the People’s Alliance has once again emerged as a game changer in Turkish politics.

Before evaluating the reasons behind the re-emergence of the alliance, it is crucial to remember the reasons why the parties failed to form the alliance a couple of weeks ago. The AK Party and the MHP experienced a clash of interests on two issues. The first was on granting a partial amnesty for some prisoners, which the MHP fully supported and the AK Party was critical of. The second issue was the Council of State’s decision on the Student Oath. While the MHP applauded the decision, the AK Party harshly criticized it. As a result of these two crises, the parties announced that they were not going to form an alliance in the upcoming local elections.

The leaders of the AK Party and MHP have once again agreed on forming an alliance in the local elections in Turkey. Thus, the People’s Alliance has once again emerged as a game changer in Turkish politics.

Nevertheless, due to the latest mobilization within the opposition block, the parties had to change their stance in forming an alliance. The leader of the CHP started to seek for an alliance and had a meeting with high-ranking officials in the Iyi Party and HDP. Even if the reflections of the meeting with the HDP are still not clear, it is almost certain that the CHP and Iyi Party will form an alliance. As it was underlined in the press, both parties will pursue limited cooperation and collaboration in the local elections by nominating joint candidates in 9 provinces including Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Eskisehir, Antalya, Mersin, and Adana.

The mobilization of the opposition block might damage the success of the People’s Alliance in the upcoming elections and in its aftermath. If the opposition block ensures to form an alliance in critical provinces while the members of the People’s Alliance join the elections separately, the People’s alliance may lose some votes in critical provinces. Moreover, since the main aim of the members of the Nation’s Alliance is making Turkey’s presidential system a controversial issue, they will try to destabilize Turkey’s presidential system and impose their false agenda after the elections.

The fact that the AK Party and MHP joined around the same table again proves that the consolidation of the People’s Alliance has already provided and that parties in this alliance can make any sacrifice to serve the principles of the alliance. 

The AK Party and the MHP made a clever move in coming together to discuss the possible outcomes of this failure. Both parties founded their own delegation in order to maintain healthier discussions. The MHP’s support to the AK Party’s possible candidates in three major provinces increased mutual sympathy and tolerance again. President Erdogan thanked Bahceli for his commitment to the alliance. As a result of this, it is possible to broaden the boundaries of this alliance in the following days.

Consequently, after facing a serious crisis and handling it successfully, the AK Party and MHP are at the same table once again. This process proves that the consolidation of the People’s Alliance has already provided and that parties in this alliance can make any sacrifice in order to serve the principles of the alliance based on the country’s national values, unity, and solidarity.

Almost ten days ago, the AK Party and the MHP announced that they were not going to form an alliance in the upcoming local elections. This announcement switched Turkey’s agenda from international issues to domestic concerns. Indeed, the AK Party and the MHP have been in conflict on some policy issues such as granting a partial amnesty for some prisoners and canceling the earlier arrangement on the Student Oath by the Council of State. These two issues have increasingly deepened the divide between the two parties, hence the reason why they will be participating in the elections without forming an alliance.

After the announcement of this decision, some circles claimed that the alliance between the AK Party and the MHP had completely come to an end. However, as was explained, the decision is limited only to the upcoming local elections and the People’s Alliance, which was formed last February, will continue to be active – especially in Parliament. Since there has been a latent alliance between the AK Party and MHP since the July 15 failed coup attempt, both parties have similar concerns on Turkey’s problems and the country’s position in the international arena.

In the light of this information, it is clear that the AK Party and the MHP have been acting responsibly in order to protect the country from internal and external threats, and to consolidate Turkey’s presidential system. These critical issues function as a connection between the two to act together in parliament.

How will the AK Party and the MHP manage to protect the People’s Alliance in parliament when they become rivals in the local elections?

How will the AK Party and the MHP manage to protect this alliance in parliament when they become rivals in the local elections? This is a serious question and an uphill struggle in front of them. The latest statements from both sides show that both parties will design their election campaign to provide this power balance between them. Even if they run to gain municipalities, they will not make concessions from the principles of this alliance.

Thus, it is possible to see that both parties will protect the core principles of the alliance, which was formed around the country’s national values, unity, and solidarity. These principles, of course, will also be settled at the core of the election campaigns of the two parties. Since the alliance was formed around these principles beyond of daily politics, the parties will be careful not to exceed certain boundaries.

If the AK Party and MHP are able to balance between “being rivals” in the local elections and “being partners” in the parliament, the People’s Alliance will continue to go forward.

Indeed, the serious problems brought to the fore by the AK Party and MHP have not been solved yet. Turkey still faces terrorist threats and is maintaining its fight against terrorist organizations such as FETO, the PKK, and Daesh. Even if the domestic activities of these organizations have been minimized, they are still very active abroad. Furthermore, the presidential system of Turkey still needs time and dedication to be consolidated. These issues require strong cooperation between the AK Party and MHP in order to be solved.

For all these reasons, cooperation and communication between the AK Party and the MHP will continue in the parliament, especially on critical issues for the country’s sake. The relatively long-term rapprochement between the AK Party and the MHP after the coup attempt positively reflected on the solution to Turkey’s security problems and the switch from a parliamentary to a presidential system of government. If the parties are able to balance between “being rivals” in the local elections and “being partners” in the parliament, the People’s Alliance will continue to contribute to the solution of Turkey’s serious problems in the future.

Since 2013, Turkey has been experiencing deeply traumatic events one after the other. The country has chosen to deal with these events with a new constitution and elections, preferring something new rather than old in order to address the trauma. We are now in the final stretch of a marathon of elections that have been going on for the last two years.

After the local elections in March 2019, we will enter a 3-year period without elections, which will last until 2022. Considering the fact that we’ve continuously been under an atmosphere of elections since March 2014, which have been pretty fierce, this 3-year period will certainly feel different for the country.

Since the previous local elections held in March 2014, the nature of politics, political sociology, and voting behavior in Turkey have changed significantly.

What makes the upcoming local elections more important than a simple vote to determine local administrators is the fact that the opposition is trying to make it ‘a referendum vote’ for the Turkish government. And this effort may lead to the most critical stage of a struggle in voter sociology, which has been long ongoing.

I will attempt to explain the reasons for this.

Now that Turkey has fully transitioned to the presidential system, the government is stable and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will rule the country until June 2022. However, the situation is not the same in Parliament. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AK Party) does not hold the majority. Thus, the AK Party needs to maintain good relations with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) – its electoral ally during the 2018 elections. (The opposite also holds here, meaning that the MHP needs the AK Party as well).

The continuation of the alliance that was established prior to the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2018 had become a political necessity. Leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahceli, was the first to state this, arguing that for a presidential system to be truly established, the success of the People’s Alliance must continue in the local elections, since the opposition would rekindle discussions regarding the presidential system in case of a decrease in votes.

Bahceli was not wrong with this opinion. Similar to the efforts between the AK Party and MHP, the Nation Alliance, which was first established for the 2018 elections, between the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Iyi Party and Felicity Party also seems interested in employing a strategy of cooperation and alliance for the local elections.

While the Felicity Party does not yet appear to be a part of this equation, CHP and Iyi Party have begun flirting with the idea of an alliance. In my opinion, Bahceli’s analysis still carries its validity. However, the dynamics have significantly changed when the AK Party and MHP publicly declared following the Student Oath debate that they will not form an alliance in the local elections.

Political scene after the parliamentary elections in July 2015

To recall the last parliamentary elections, Turkish voters were roughly divided into two major blocs. The first and majority bloc represented by the People’s Alliance consists of 54% of the voter base. The Nation Alliance received 34% of the vote. The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), which entered the elections outside of any alliance, fortified its position in the Turkish political landscape with 12% of the vote.

When examining these results, we see that the percentage of votes received by the AK Party has decreased to the levels obtained during the 2015 July elections. This is when the party failed to receive a majority in Parliament for the first time (since coming to power in 2002). The only consolation for this was that President Erdogan was selected as the first president of the presidential system in the first round, with 52.6% of the vote. The AK Party now cooperates with the MHP in order to achieve a majority in the parliament, meaning this is a de facto legislative coalition.

MHP’s key position

In comparison to the number of votes it received, this situation gives the MHP disproportionate influence. This is how, despite being the fourth largest party in Parliament, with only 50 members, the MHP could suggest for a general pardon for prisoners convicted of certain crimes.

MHP is evidently trying to use this position as a “leverage.” The last of such cases is the recent Student Oath debate, which has been the last the straw that broke the camel’s back causing the two parties to break up and follow their own ways during the local elections of 2019.

Likewise, the slowdown of the Turkish economy, along with the rising levels of inflation and unemployment, seems to have increased public discontent regarding the AK Party prior to the election. The general election held in June 2018 has shown that while the MHP lost a significant amount of votes to the newly formed nationalist Iyi Party, it has retained its significance by drawing a similar amount of votes from the AK Party. MHP now intends to recapture the nationalist vote it lost by employing its public perception.

Some recent polls reveal a remarkable trend among voters: voters continue to switch from the AK Party to the MHP. Some studies even conclude that this dynamic may have led to the MHP gaining 20% of the total votes. These studies and polls may be the reason behind the increased confidence Bahceli has shown in his relations with the AK Party and with Erdogan.

In both the constitutional referendum and the June 2018 elections we saw that with respect to opposing FETO and defending the country from future threats of terrorism, voters tend to hold the AK Party and MHP, Erdogan and Bahceli, in the same regard. The voter base of both parties constitute a “common pool” of 53% of the total vote, and the transition of voter preferences between the two parties takes place only in that pool.

The ongoing economic turbulence in Turkey gives a golden chance to the opposition parties at capturing votes from the 53% “common pool.” The CHP and Iyi Party are working hard to claim symbolically important victories against the AK Party.

Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality undoubtedly carries the utmost significance for the AK Party in the local elections. Recalling that the elected mayor of Istanbul, Kadir Topbas, was made to resign by the AK Party and President Erdogan, Istanbul emerges as a possibly problematic area for the AK Party. Formerly to negotiate with the AK Party, MHP had suggested that it would act in favor of the AK Party and not nominate a candidate in Istanbul, expecting a similar act in a different place for their benefit. However, there was not much that the AK Party could gain from the MHP in Istanbul; for the AK Party to win Istanbul, instead of MHP, the party should have focused more on the Kurdish electorate. The same is also happening between the Iyi Party and CHP, in the lines of “We should give Istanbul to them and they should give us Ankara.”

CHP’s HDP deadlock

CHP wants to gain the majority in Istanbul but whether the Iyi Party alone would achieve this is uncertain. Thus, the CHP needs to attract HDP voters as the HDP does not have a meaningful chance of winning the city. However, getting closer to the Kurds has become the biggest taboo of Turkish politics in recent years. If CHP were to name a candidate that would draw the support of Kurdish voters, they would distance themselves from Turkish nationalist Iyi Party voters. But without the support of Kurdish voters, it is highly unlikely for the CHP to win.

AK Party and MHP have both been accusing CHP of “allying with terrorists” and saying that HDP is a direct extension of the terrorist organization, the PKK. This discourse is very effective among voters. Non-Kurdish voters, regardless of which party they vote for, do not have any doubt regarding the HDP’s close relationship with the PKK. All research confirms this striking political reality. Now, seeing that the People’s Alliance is in some kind of coma, will there be a change in this discourse? Will the AK Party adopt a more soft approach to Kurdish politics? We’ll see.

While search for an alliance during the local elections has ended for the AK Party and the MHP, these efforts are likely to continue between the Iyi Party and the CHP. If the opposition parties, including the HDP, manage to form a block despite their substantial differences in micro and macro policies and gain vote from the ruling bloc of the AK Party and MHP in the elections, for example reducing the 53% total vote of the two parties to around 45-47%, Turkey might enter a discussion of legitimacy that might last until 2022. The opposition may claim that President Erdogan and the AK Party-MHP majority in the Parliament have lost their legitimacy on the following morning of the elections.

Scramble for symbolically important municipalities

The fact that the MHP and AK Party will not form an alliance in the local elections will prevent others from calculating the votes of the two parties and saying “look, this is the state of the People’s Alliance.”

On the other hand, due to the complex system of local elections in Turkey, it is hard to determine the percentage of votes a given party has received nationwide. Therefore, the real result of the election will not be determined by vote percentages but by which parties win the symbolically important municipalities and which party wins the most municipalities in total. This is why the AK Party losing metropolitan areas such as Istanbul and Ankara means a lot to the opposition.

In previous elections, the AK Party used to run a serious election campaign in Izmir, which traditionally strongly votes for CHP, but in this election it seems like the AK Party will act more defensively and prefer to focus on retaining its previous majorities. It will be interesting to watch the AK Party’s efforts to retain its popularity not only in Istanbul and Ankara but also in cities such as Antalya, Bursa, and Balıkesir.

All these constitute the reasons why this election will be decisive for AK Party’s future. If the party shows that it has retained its influence and popularity, it will prove that it has successfully emerged from the dangerous turbulence Turkey has experienced since the last months of 2013 as the “founding” party, and will continue to carry Turkey to its future. If it experiences a significant decrease in votes and fails to rejuvenate after such a loss, it will enter a period of very hard days.

The so-called People’s Alliance between the AK Party and the MHP has been in disarray. Relations between the two parties took a downturn with the disagreement on a couple of issues, such as issuing a general pardon and the Council of State’s decision to repel the earlier arrangement on the student oath. The MHP has been pressing hard for issuing a general pardon for convicts in the run-up to local elections at the end of March. The AK Party finds it inconvenient and refutes it for it might cause a loss of confidence in the public towards the law. Yet the MHP has not taken a step back and vowed to bring the issue to the Parliament.

The Council of State’s decision to repel the arrangement on the student oath and the disagreement between the AK Party and MHP on this issue has only caused further damage to the Alliance. The student oath, which was held obligatory for elementary school students to chant every morning before classes since 1933, had been removed in 2013 on account of ethnic discrimination against non-Turkish groups in the country. The decision was also taken on the basis that it carried a high dosage of ultra-secular nationalist ideology and that it may pedagogically harm students at such an early age.

The nationalist MHP has supported the Council’s decision to repel the arrangement by claiming that removing it was one of the notorious political mistakes made in the process of the democratic opening, which basically relaxed the state’s ideological control on ethnic and religious minorities in the country. The AK Party maintained its earlier reformist position on the matter and blamed the Council of meddling within the sphere of the executive. The party also warned the Council that the country could not be brought back to the times which were characterized by bureaucratic tutelage.

The uproar on the student oath case between the two political parties openly disclosed their ideological distance. This led to public debates, some claiming that the People’s Alliance might come to an end due to the noted notable ideological difference. The native-national ideological basis shared by the two parties might collapse under growing pressure and the parties may begin to move in different ideological directions defined by separate interests.

The Alliance was officially established in May this year in the run up to the critical June 24 general elections. Yet in an unofficial form the Alliance has been with us since the unsuccessful coup attempt by Gulenist army officers on 15 July, 2016. The two political parties vowed to fight against internal and external threats (including the PKK and DAESH) and to maintain the country’s survival. Besides, in the official document of the Alliance, the two parties declared that they will work together to institutionalize and consolidate the presidential system after the June 24 elections. In addition to this, the document states that they will pursue a strategy of making Turkey not only a regional, but a global power.

Some argue that despite apparent ideological differences the Alliance will maintain itself since the causes that initially led to its formation still stand true. Thus, the two parties might have taken a strategic decision to depart temporarily in the upcoming local elections in order to increase the chances of success of the Alliance in the future.

Some others contend that in both parties tension is growing among members out of fear of identity loss. Indeed, this might alarm party members since the presidential system forces the political parties into a two-party system. The temporary alliance might turn into unification in the long run. Similar tensions and concerns can also be observed in the opposition parties.

It is too early to talk about the future of the People’s Alliance. However, it is fair to state that unless the conditions that had formed the Alliance change, it will maintain its existence with periodical fluctuations.

In 2013, the Ministry of National Education abolished the administrative regulation that ordered the recital of the Student Oath, an oath that begins by stating “I am a Turk, honest, and hardworking,” which used to be recited in schools at the beginning of each day. A teacher’s union known for being close to the MHP had opened a case in the Administrative Court regarding this decision made by the ministry. During the time in which the oath had been abolished, Turkey was conducting a series of talks with the outlawed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in order to resolve the Kurdish question.

MHP was strongly opposed to this process calling it “Dissolution Process” that was indeed called by the government as “Reconciliation Process.” The Oath was considered racist by non-Turkish groups living in Turkey and MHP saw its abolition as a concession made to the PKK.

The Student Oath Case, which was opened in 2013, was concluded in October 2018 by the 8th chamber of the Council of State. The decision ruled that the Ministry of National Education cannot abolish its own administrative regulations.

This is a problematic decision for a number of reasons. First, the ministry abolishing an administrative regulation does not create a new legal situation, meaning that the Council of State has no ground for a decision concerning it. Second, the Council of State goes beyond matters of law in its decision by stating, “Sufficient scientific ground supporting the Ministry of National Education’s decision to abolish the oath does not exist,” meaning that the court is arguing whether such a decision is right on grounds of pedagogical science rather than legality. However, the Council of State does not have the authority to conduct examinations regarding the aptness of administrative decisions. Its authority is limited to examining and supervising legal matters.

In the “Old Turkey,” to use the term coined by the AK Party, courts often examined the “aptness” of government decisions and acted as if they were opposition parties, banning certain behavior. It has been a long time since this situation was named “judicial tutelage” and many efforts were made to end it.

The government has tried to change judicial cadres in order to end this practice by Kemalist and statist groups. However, these changes led to the rise of FETO in the judicial system, and this terrorist organization tried to establish its own practice of “tutelage.”

Following FETO’s bloody coup attempt on July 15, 2016, extensive crackdowns occurred in the judicial system in order to eliminate FETO members and prevent such attempts of establishing a “tutelage” from occurring again. More than half of the judges and prosecutors working at the time were dismissed. While all this was happening, the greatest supporter of President Erdogan and the AK Party was MHP and its leader Devlet Bahceli.

The Council of State’s decision discussed above thus raises questions as to whether or not those close the MHP among the judiciary came to power after the FETO crackdowns and whether they are prominent enough to show such strength against the government.

The strong open support Bahceli displayed for the Student Oath and his criticisms targeting AK Party’s former Minister of Justice Bekir Bozdag, who comes from an ethnic Kurdish background, makes the MHP’s stance on the subject very clear. MHP wants the oath back in schools.

All these together are issues that made it difficult to continue with the People’s Alliance during the local elections. Unlike MHP leader Bahceli, President Erdogan never brought these issues to the agenda until 23 October. However, the general atmosphere from Erdogan’s surroundings was that MHP’s demands in regards to the pardon of prisoners and the Student Oath was not going to be accepted.

When Devlet Bahceli was at the lectern to speak before his party’s group meeting on October 23, as always, he looked angry and stiff. In this speech, Bahceli announced that the MHP had stopped looking for ways to form an alliance with the AK Party during the local elections. He also used ambiguous language about the future of the People’s Alliance. Due to the questions launched at him after he finished his speech, Bahceli stated that the “People’s Alliance is continuing.” However, it’s not difficult to suggest that the alliance had cracked.

President Erdogan spoke after Bahceli’s speech and his decision to end the alliance possibility during local elections and bluntly stated, “Everyone can go their own ways.” While Erdogan had stated this in regards to the local elections, I think the most important part of his speech was when he defended Bekir Bozdag against Devlet Bahceli and said that “We have no other oath apart from our National Anthem.” Erdogan’s disapproval of this type of Turkish nationalism was also an illustration that the President wanted to highlight the difference between the AK Party and MHP.

Now, it’s possible to see the People’s Alliance in some kind of coma or in the fridge. Although both sides suggest that the alliance is continuing, we’ll only see the reality of this when the MHP votes either in favor or against the 2019 budget formation, which is still being discussed in Parliament. If the MHP votes against the budget then not only will the People’s Alliance die, but the newly established presidential system will also enter a serious crisis due to its failure in processing its first budget. If MHP votes in favor of the budget, this will show that the People’s Alliance will continue.

Of course, the MHP can choose to abstain from voting. In this case, the budget will pass with AK Party votes. However, the People’s Alliance will maintain to sleep in a coma.

It’s highly likely that we’ll see whether this alliance will continue and what the new rules for the two parties will be after the local elections. After observing their votes, the AK Party and MHP will do a cost-benefit analysis in order to observe how the alliance suits them best.

Turkey will have one of its historic elections tomorrow. The elections will be the first of its kind in many ways in the history of Turkish democracy. To start with, the parliamentary and presidential elections will be held on the same day. Following the elections, the presidential system that was adopted in the referendum of April 2017 will be implemented in full scale.

Another novelty for this election are the pre-electoral coalitions. We will see two such coalitions and three individually running parties in the ballot for the parliamentary elections. As for the presidential elections, there will be six candidates.

For the parliamentary elections, we see two pre-electoral coalitions. The first is the People’s Alliance (Cumhur Ittifaki) of the ruling AK Party and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Ideologically, the former is a socially conservative, economically liberal, politically reformist party. The latter is known to be an ultra-nationalist party. The MHP will not run for the presidential elections and will support the AK Party’s candidate Erdogan. Another minor ultranationalist party, the Great Union Party (BBP) is also a part of the bloc but its banner will not appear on the ballot. Interestingly, Erdogan also has the support of another nationalist party, but this time a Kurdish nationalist one. The Free Cause Party (HÜDA-PAR) is not a part of the Cumhur Ittifaki but has declared that it will support Erdogan for the presidential elections.

On the other side, we see the Nation Alliance (Millet Ittifaki) of the center-left Republican People’s Party (CHP), ultranationalist Good Party (IP), and the Felicity Party (SP) as a moderate Islamist party. All three parties, nevertheless, will run separately for the presidential elections. The minor center-right Democratic Party is also part of the bloc but will not appear on the ballots with its banner.

Besides these pre-electoral coalitions, HÜDA-PAR, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), and Patriotic Party (VP) will also separately run for the parliamentary elections and the latter two will also compete in the presidential elections with their own candidates.

What makes the elections difficult is not necessarily the number of parties running in it but its novelties. The alliances make the electoral threshold irrelevant for smaller parties such as the MHP, IP and SP. Many SP supporters did not vote for the SP in earlier elections because their votes would be wasted with no chance of the SP passing the threshold. Now the party is free of this constraint and we can see its true potential. Further, this election will be the IP’s first test on the ballot, which also makes it hard to predict its votes. Since the IP has split from the MHP and we don’t know how big a slice it took with it, we also do not know the MHP’s current vote share.

As a further complication, it is also difficult to predict the HDP’s votes because a number of CHP voters on social media declared that they will vote for the HDP in the parliamentary elections. They call it strategic voting. This way, these voters want to push the HDP over the 10 percent electoral threshold. The logic is simple. Since the HDP and AK party are the only effective parties in the heavily Kurdish populated eastern and southeastern Turkish constituencies, HDP’s absence in parliament will give the AK Party at least 60 extra seats. Such CHP voters would rather see those seats occupied by HDP MPs.

Besides all these novelties and uncertainties, it is hard to predict the results of Sunday’s elections. Nevertheless, pretty much all public polls and the general expectation in the public opinion have an overwhelming consensus on some points. For one, nobody expects a change in the order of the parties compared to the previous parliamentary elections. This is true at least for the top two. The Turkish public is pretty sure that the AK Party will top the elections, followed by the CHP.

The third party will not be the MHP this time. Although the party received around half a million more votes than the HDP in  the November 2015 elections, the IP’s split from the MHP is likely to place the HDP in the third spot. While many can easily name the top three parties in the post-election parliament in order, we do not know whether the AK Party can have the majority in parliament. With the existence of pre-electoral coalitions, we will have a higher number of parties in parliament. In such a scenario, the only way for the AK Party to hold the majority is if the HDP does not pass the 10 percent threshold.

Hence, polls show that the AK Party will come first in both ballots but what we do not know whether it can hold the majority in parliament and whether it can get 50%+1 votes in order to win the presidential elections in the first round. Many would bet for a victory for Erdogan (after all, he has quite a reputation for winning elections) but with a divided parliament, which will make politics quite hot for the following months in terms of the relations between the executive and legislative branches.