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fficials, diplomats, analysts and industry leaders from Türkiye and across Europe convened in Istanbul on Wednesday to assess growing vulnerabilities in two of the continent’s most critical maritime energy regions — the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea — amid escalating hybrid threats and intensifying geopolitical tensions.

The conference, titled “Maritime Dimension of Energy Security in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea – Shared Challenges, Shared Horizons,” was co-organized by the Embassy of Poland in Ankara, the Polish Consulate General in Istanbul and the Turkish Economic Development Foundation (IKV). Discussions emphasized that Europe’s maritime space has become increasingly contested as both traditional and emerging risks reshape the strategic environment.

Opening the event, IKV Secretary-General Çiğdem Nas underlined the rising strategic importance of maritime domains for regional and global energy security. Her remarks set the tone for a conference focused on the intersecting pressures of hybrid warfare, energy diversification and the accelerated transition away from Russian hydrocarbons.

‘Shared risks demand shared responses’

Poland’s ambassador to Türkiye, Maciej Lang, said security would be one of Poland’s central priorities during its EU Council Presidency between January and July 2026. He highlighted the need to reinforce the resilience of energy supply chains and the protection of critical infrastructure, including undersea cables and pipelines.

“As old friends, solid partners and reliable allies, Poland and Türkiye can contribute significantly to strengthening connectivity and interoperability along NATO’s eastern flank,” Lang said.

IKV Chair Ayhan Zeytinoğlu warned of escalating hybrid activities — from airspace incursions and cyber intrusions to undersea cable disruptions — that have reshaped the threat perceptions of states bordering both seas. He cited recent incidents involving Russian tankers near Türkiye’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as “a dangerous escalation.”

Baltic Sea: ‘A chessboard for disruptive hybrid operations’

In a video message, Gustav Lindstrom, director general of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), described the Baltic as “a chessboard for disruptive hybrid operations.” He listed shadow fleets, GPS jamming and cable sabotage as growing concerns, stressing the economic stakes: a single damaged pipeline can cost up to $87 million (€75 million) per day and take months to repair.

Lindstrom also noted that World War II-era munitions continue to complicate offshore wind expansion, illustrating the wide range of non-military hazards affecting the region.

Representing Poland’s Economic Cooperation Department, Rafał Hryniewiecki emphasized the deep and historic nature of Poland–Türkiye relations, describing the partnership as “remarkable and resilient.” He outlined Warsaw’s maritime energy strategy — expanding LNG capacity, scaling offshore wind and strengthening coordination with NATO and the CBSS.

Poland’s new Secure Baltic Act, he said, enhances the Navy and Air Force’s authority to defend essential offshore assets. “Shared risks demand shared responses,” he added.

From the EU Delegation to Türkiye, Maja Urbańska detailed the EU’s tri-pillar Black Sea strategy — resilience, connectivity and environmental protection — including work on a regional Maritime Security Hub combining satellite imagery, vessel tracking and coastal radar. She said the EU is tightening restrictions against the 556 vessels identified as part of Russia’s shadow fleet.

Baltic and Black Seas as Europe’s new strategic core

Maciej Filip Bukowski, head of the Energy and Resilience Program at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation, argued that the two seas have become “the center of Europe’s strategic map.”

He warned that threats to pipelines, cables and offshore platforms “are evolving faster than institutional reflexes,” and stressed the strategic interdependence of the Baltic and Black Seas, which together support roughly half of Europe’s energy security.

The first panel, moderated by Karol Wasilewski of the Center for Eastern Studies, explored parallels between the two basins.

Zuzanna Nowak of the Opportunity Institute for Foreign Affairs noted Poland’s growing dependence on Baltic energy infrastructure, now at 48% and projected to surpass 60% as offshore wind and nuclear projects develop. “The Baltic has transformed into the densest energy-infrastructure hub,” she said, warning that a single cable failure could destabilize the entire EU-linked grid.

From Türkiye, Mitat Çelikpala of Kadir Has University said the Black Sea’s vulnerabilities cannot be understood without considering active conflict dynamics. He pointed to Russian interdiction risks, drifting mines, drone warfare and the exposure of ports and pipelines. “Policy for the region cannot be shaped without Türkiye and other littoral actors at the core,” he stressed.

Aylin Ünver Noi of Beykoz University outlined Türkiye’s evolving maritime posture, noting that recent natural gas discoveries now account for 10% of domestic consumption. Protecting subsea assets, she said, is becoming “a top priority” due to the proliferation of naval drones and hybrid operations.

Representing the Polish Institute of International Affairs, Tymon Pastucha described the Baltic as a zone of “continuous hybrid confrontation,” where Russia uses shadow fleets, cyber tools and autonomous drones to raise insurance costs, disrupt investments and sustain uncertainty.

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ATO leaders scrambled Thursday to confront the implications of a major escalation in the war in Ukraine after multiple Russian drones violated Polish airspace during strikes on Ukraine, deepening fears of a broader regional conflict.

The incident, which left damage in the Polish village of Wyryki near Lublin, marked the most serious airspace violation of NATO territory since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Authorities in Poland said clearance operations continued Thursday, with troops securing debris from downed drones.

European leaders reacted with alarm, describing the breach as a deliberate provocation by Moscow. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer held urgent talks with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, while Germany pledged to “extend and expand air policing over Poland.”

“It was clear that Russia was continuing to ramp up its aggression, systematically stepping up its attacks through a campaign of increasingly belligerent actions,” Starmer’s office said.

NATO’s supreme commander in Europe, U.S. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, acknowledged that it remained unclear how many drones crossed into Poland or whether they were deliberately fired there. “But we will learn lessons. We will learn of things that we need to enhance our posture, to handle these limited incursions,” he said in Vilnius, Lithuania.

Poland strikes defiant tone

Polish leaders vowed a strong response while urging calm. Prime Minister Donald Tusk, addressing troops at an air base in Lask, praised NATO’s rapid deployment of allied jets, including support from the Netherlands.

He pledged to push forward with an ambitious military modernization program, highlighting Poland’s plan to take delivery of its first F-35 fighter jets next year under a U.S. support package.

President Karol Nawrocki, visiting a base in Poznan-Krzesiny, dismissed the incident as an intimidation attempt. “Poland doesn’t get scared by Russian drones,” he said. “This was an attempt to test our abilities, the ability to react.”

Poland also announced temporary air traffic restrictions in its eastern regions and will close its border with Belarus at midnight, citing Russian-Belarusian war games starting Friday. Officials said some drones may have entered Polish airspace from Belarus.

NATO and global repercussions

The foreign ministers of Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania issued a joint statement calling the drone incursion “a deliberate and coordinated strike constituting an unprecedented provocation and escalation of tension.”

Finnish President Alexsander Stubb, after meeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv, said, “The line between war and peace has been blurred. We now live in an age of uncertainty.”

The U.N. Security Council scheduled an emergency session for Friday at Poland’s request.

Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump offered an ambiguous response on social media: “What’s with Russia violating Poland’s airspace with drones? Here we go!” His administration has pledged to maintain a strong U.S. military presence in Poland, reaffirmed during Nawrocki’s recent visit to Washington.

The Kremlin denied targeting Poland, repeating claims from its Defense Ministry that Russian forces struck only Ukrainian territory and were open to discussions with Polish officials.

Expanding drone war

The incursion highlights the growing reliance on drones in the conflict. Ukraine said Thursday it had intercepted 62 out of 66 Russian drones overnight, while also expanding its own fleet of interceptor drones. Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal announced a new deal with Britain to co-produce advanced drones for the battlefield.

But analysts warned the clash over Polish airspace underscored the war’s dangerous spillover potential. A report by the European Council on Foreign Relations concluded that Russian President Vladimir Putin was testing Europe’s resolve, betting on political divisions and wavering commitments.

“Inconsistency between words and deeds seem to have eroded Europe’s credibility in Russia’s eyes,” the think tank wrote.

While Poland has reported previous airspace violations since 2022, officials said Wednesday’s incident was unprecedented in scale and seriousness. For many NATO capitals, it raised the specter of the alliance being dragged closer to direct confrontation with Moscow.

“Russia is probing NATO’s defenses and our willingness to respond,” said one senior European diplomat. “This is no longer just Ukraine’s war — it is a security challenge for the entire alliance.”

(Source: The Associated Press)

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ormer Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, now holding the position of deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, issued a strong warning to NATO member state Poland. In an expansive 8,000-word article on Russian-Polish relations, Medvedev labeled Poland as a “dangerous enemy” and hinted at serious consequences if Poland continues its current course.

The warning comes amid the backdrop of escalating tensions in the region. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has already strained relations between Poland, which supports Ukraine, and Moscow. Poland’s accusations against Russia, pointing to its attempts to destabilize Ukraine through disinformation campaigns and espionage, have further heightened the animosity.

“A historical enemy”

Medvedev’s rhetoric in the article was stark. He stated, “We will treat Poland precisely as a historical enemy,” emphasizing that if there is no potential for reconciliation, Russia’s stance would be firm and unyielding. He reminded Poland of historical instances where their ambitions led to dire consequences.

The statements have drawn attention from the international community, with many awaiting an official response from Poland. As of now, there has been no comment from the Polish side regarding Medvedev’s remarks.

“Stalin’s gift to Poles”

However, these comments are not isolated. Russian President Vladimir Putin, earlier in July 2023, made controversial remarks about Poland’s western territories, referring to them as “Stalin’s gift to Poles.” Putin further alluded to Poland’s alleged intentions towards Ukraine’s western territories and warned against any “expansionist plans.”

The situation remains precarious, with both sides showcasing firm stances. Observers and diplomats see these developments as an indication of the prevailing mindset at the highest echelons of Kremlin leadership. The international community watches closely, hoping for de-escalation and a return to diplomatic dialogue.

The fire of war is being strenuously kindled

Russian President Vladimir Putin voiced his apprehensions over the proposed formation of a joint Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian military group. He stated that while the purported objective of this collaboration is to ensure the security of Ukraine’s western territories, the real intent might be more expansionist in nature.

Drawing on historical precedents, Putin pointed out that during Russia’s civil war in 1917, Poland had annexed some of Russia’s historical regions. He also mentioned the participation of part of Lithuania, the Vilen Krai, in the partitioning of Czechoslovakia, facilitated by the Munich agreement with Nazi leader Adolf Hitler in 1938.

The Russian president warned, “The fire of war is being strenuously kindled.” He attributed this escalation to the West’s encouragement of some Eastern European states’ anti-Russian sentiments. Putin described the intense Russophobia exhibited by these states as both a major export and a tool for domestic policy. He further commented that these nations might be looking to capitalize on the ongoing Ukrainian crisis.

Expanding on his concerns regarding the joint military group, Putin remarked, “After all, the prospect is obvious – if Polish units enter, for example, Lviv or other territories of Ukraine, then they will remain there. And they will remain forever.” Such statements underline Russia’s suspicions regarding Poland and Lithuania’s intentions towards Ukraine and highlight the increasing geopolitical tensions in the region.

The formation of this military group and the associated concerns signify the complexities of the European political landscape, with historical events playing a role in shaping contemporary perspectives and actions.

Sources: Reuters, Anadolu Agency and the Economic Times

Interest in the history of statehood arose in the minds of the intellectual elite of the Russian society in the second half of the 18th century, largely under the influence of the French Enlightenment, the ideas of which Empress Catherine II tried to apply locally in the first decade of her reign. However, faced with the rebellion of the non-Russian population of the Lower Volga region and the Southern Urals, which is known in Russian historiography as the “Peasants’ War” or “Pugachev’s Rebellion,” led by Yemelyan Pugachev (1773-1775), Catherine II quickly curtailed all research efforts in the area, and made all the results of studies obtained at the time public but only to a narrow circle of academic professors.

This does not mean that other Russian monarchs were not interested in the origins of their power or the historical heritage of the country over which they ruled. At the end of the 17th century, Tsar Pyotr Alekseyevich (Peter the Great), a quarter century before his proclamation as emperor, ordered Andrei Lyzlov, now called the “father of Russian historiography,” to conduct the first special study on the history of Russia. Only the tsar himself and a dozen of his close and most trusted persons read this study.

Naturally, under such conditions, in the decline of the Middle Ages in Russia, free academic thought could exist and develop, the fruit of which could become actual scientific knowledge, independently determining or forming the state’s ideology and policy.

At the end of the first third of the 19th century, for the first time in Russian history, the state used science as a tool for the institutionalization of domestic policy. More precisely, immediately after the suppression of the Polish uprising of 1830-1831, the question of Russian origin was raised by Russian professors at the highest level: where does Polish nationalism come from and how to counter it?

The work of the Vilno Archaeographic Commission did not have much political success, since the nobility of the provinces of the Russian Empire, on whose territory Belarus and Lithuania are located today, considered themselves descendants of the chivalry of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

They saw themselves as an integral part of the Commonwealth, connected by family and legal ties to the Polish gentry. The work of the Kiev Archaeographic Commission was much more successful—it fully managed to formulate and promote the notion of ​​the Little Russian Cossack (Ukrainian) people, ethnically, culturally, and religiously opposed to all manifestations of the sociocultural tradition of Polish statehood and nationalism.

The founder of this idea was Vladimir Antonovich (1834-1908), a professor and dean of the Faculty of History and Philology of the Imperial University of St. Vladimir in Kyiv. He wrote On the Origin of the Cossacks, a monograph in which he formulated and scientifically substantiated the postulates of Ukrainian nationalism as opposed to Polish nationalism.

He was also the author-compiler and editor of 9 out of 15 volumes of the fundamental collection of published documents on the history of the territory of modern Ukraine in the Middle Ages entitled Archive of South-Western Russia. Antonovich can rightfully be considered the founder of the first Ukrainian histography and state ideology.

His successor and follower in the field was Dmitry Yavornitsky (1855-1940), who taught at Kharkiv, St. Petersburg, Kazan, and Moscow universities, and served as an academician at the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). He also worked as the permanent head of the Yekaterinoslav (Dnipropetrovsk) Historical Museum, and enriched the ideology of Ukrainian national statehood with a thesis about its origin from the medieval republic of the Dnieper Cossacks, the Zaporozhian Sich.

Prince Dmitry Vyshnevetsky, who entered the history of Eastern Europe as a personal enemy of the sultan of the Ottoman Port, Suleiman the Magnificent, under the name “Dmitrashka,” is considered the founder of Ukrainian statehood.

Mikhail Hrushevsky (1866-1934) was a professor at Lviv University; the chairman of the Ukrainian Central Rada, the first Ukrainian parliament, in 1917-1918; and an academician at the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. He is the author of a 10-volume monograph titled History of Ukraine-Rus and was the first in the academic tradition of historical science to oppose Ukrainian nationalism and the idea of an Ukrainian people not only in reference to Poland, but also to Russia.

Grushevsky should be considered to be behind all the existing basic ideological contradictions between Ukraine and Russia, and completed the creation of the main theses of the modern ideology of Ukrainian national identity.

Of course, in addition to these figures, one can also name other leading advocates of Ukrainian national thought who have contributed to the formation of the current worldview of Ukrainian society: Mykola Nikolai, Nikolay Kostomarov, Dmitry Bahaliy, Mikhail Lyubavsky, Alexander Skalkovsky and others. But it was the first three who had the most influence on Ukrainian nationalism in the collective memory of people.

Speaking of the content of the studies of the authors listed above, it should be said that they did not claim the continuity of Ukrainian statehood from any empire that existed earlier, a claim that was characteristic of most other European historiographic traditions, including Polish and Russian.

They were quite satisfied with the autochthonism and the Ukrainian national tradition in the formulation they proposed, free from the canons and postulates of feudal historiography, according to which the status and attributive significance of the state are largely determined by the antiquity of the origin of the ruling imperial or royal dynasty.

Unlike the official state ideology of the Russian Empire, which deduces the origin of Russia and the Muscovite kingdom that preceded it from the Byzantine Empire and the Palaiologos dynasty, the creators of the theory of the origin of Ukrainian statehood did not burden themselves with the concern of proving the legitimacy of their monarchs and dynasties from the previous dynasties.

Since, from the very beginning, the idea of ​​a democratic origin of Ukrainian statehood was postulated, the basis for the formation was made up of people from the North Caucasus who moved to the center of Dnieper at the end of the 13th century at the behest of one of the khans of the Golden Horde.

Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees are fleeing from their home country due to the Russian invasion. Many are still trying to leave Ukraine, filling the routes out with cars stretching for miles. But those who could cross the borders require help.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine began on February 24 and is ongoing, forcing more people to leave to the neighboring countries. The war has so far has cost tens of thousands of lives and can leave a war-torn Ukraine behind.

Valeria’s journey to becoming a refugee

Valeria, 21, a student who crossed the borders of Poland from Ukraine, is mourning the fact that she won’t return to her normal life in Ukraine. She never thought about leaving her country, even her village, when the war started. She told Politics Today, “We thought that it would be safer in villages; but it wasn’t.” Her father drove her to Kyiv, the capital, where she got on an evacuation train to Lviv on her way to Poland.

She added that “it was horrible. Too many people were on the train, there was no place. We stayed on the train for 12 hours, and sometimes we got a chance to sit on suitcases or the floor.” After she arrived in Lviv, she stayed there for a few days. Her friend drove her to the border, which she crossed on foot. Later, a volunteer took her and drove her to Warsaw. She notes that “it was quite amazing how people in other countries volunteered and helped us get to places, have food or somewhere to stay.”

EU Open-Door Policy

EU countries opened their doors to Ukrainian refugees from the first day. However, many host states are ill-prepared for this scale of mass displacement. In many countries, locals have opened their houses while many NGOs and governmental agencies are trying to protect and assist the refugees by providing for their basic needs.

Filippo Grandi, the United Nations high commissioner of refugees, recently identified the refugee crisis in Ukraine as “the fastest-growing refugee crisis in Europe since World War Two.” The UN reported that there are over two million refugees according to data published on March 8, 2022. Many of the refugees landed in Poland, which shares a border of 428 km with Ukraine. According to a UN report, the government of Poland has accepted over 1.2 million refugees, and the Poles have shown a warm reception to their neighbors.

Over the past few weeks, many other countries have also accepted a significant number of refugees. Moldova, a country with a population of four million, has taken 82,000 refugees. The country bears a great importance in terms of its long border with Ukraine, which stretches for 939 km, the longest after Ukraine’s border with Russia.

Ukraine’s neighbor in the Black Sea, Turkey, is one of the countries that is watching the conflict with alarm. According to Turkey’s Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu over 20,000 Ukrainians arrived in Turkey by March 6.

At the same time, many people had to leave their homes to flee to safer cities within Ukraine. The UNHCR has reported that over one million people have been internally displaced in Ukraine. Lviv, a city located in the northwest of Ukraine, is a destination people are trying to reach. The city had a population of 720,000 people before the war. Tens of thousands of people flooded the city, especially those who escaped the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv. The city is a passage point for those who want to cross to Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary.

Apart from the Ukrainian refugees who have managed to flee, many are still trying to cross the borders to European countries. Most of them are women and children since men aged between 16 and 60 have been banned from leaving the country by the Ukrainian authorities.

The war in Ukraine has brought about a significant change in the politics of alliance between Russia and Belarus. Alexander Lukashenko provided the territory of Belarus for Russia’s deployment of its military equipment, which allowed for missile launches and the deployment of ground forces heading towards Ukraine. The Belarusian regime was condemned for its decision to support Russia, eventually becoming the target of further sanctions due to the “support for, and facilitation of, the invasion” of Ukraine by Russia, which were introduced by the United States on February 24, and followed by the UK and Japan shortly after.

The alignment of the Belarusian position with the Russian one has been unprecedented. Prior to 2020, both allies had concerns about the other’s reliability, producing a tension known as “intra-alliance security dilemma” that is underpinned by a combination of two internal forces: the “fear of abandonment,” which refers to being deserted or losing support (including political) based on the perception of a risk that the partner will defect in the face of significant costs emerging from prospective actions; and the “fear of entrapment,” which refers to the possibility of being dragged, via one’s alliance commitments, into a conflict over interests held by an ally, even though one might not be a party to those interests.

Considering the state of the Russia-Belarus alliance politics in 2022, the Russian fear of (political) abandonment was mitigated given the mutual solidarity of the two authoritarian countries’ leaders shifting into dictatorship. When Vladimir Putin’s extended support to Lukashenko in the aftermath of mass social protests and the political crisis in 2020, he guaranteed Lukashenko’s political survival, at a time when the West, responding to mass human rights violations, repressions, and torture in Belarus, started to adopt sanctions.

Russia and Belarus: Mutual support

Russia’s unwavering support continued in May 2021, after the forced landing of Ryanair Flight 4978 and during the 2021-2022 migration crisis at Belarus’s borders with its Western neighboring countries (provoking a ban on EU aircraft flying over Belarus in addition to further, and more extensive, sanctions packages).

Lukashenko’s alignment with the position of Russia on the war in Ukraine may not be fully surprising, but it does stand in stark contrast with the previous policy. Prior to 2020, and especially following 2014 Russia’s annexation of Ukraine, the Belarusian regime was highly conscious of the implications of Moscow’s growing control over Belarus, including via the rapid exploitation of unrest. Back then, Belarus’ active Western diplomacy and Belarusian divergence from the Russian position on a number of points earned Belarus the title of Russia’s “containing ally.”

Today, however, the Belarusian regime is endorsing Moscow’s controversial decisions, including, a de jure recognition of Crimea as a part of the Russian Federation (which took Lukashenko over seven years). And in the days that marked the beginning of Russia’s invasion, Lukashenko, while reiterating that the Belarusian soldiers were not fighting in Ukraine, stated that they could be deployed in the future.

Who will pay a high price? 

Finally, Belarus and Ukraine are two Slavic nations that share a special affinity, and this makes a label of an aggressor towards a brotherly nation especially difficult to bear. The leadership and the population of Ukraine feels betrayed by Lukashenko who has been personally reassuring Kyiv for years that Belarus would not become a platform for aggression against Ukraine.

Even though the Belarusian society has no influence over the Belarusian regime, the war in Ukraine has been casting a shadow over the Belarusian people as a whole. Sudden mistrust and even ostracization have been reported by Belarusian volunteers in their contacts with the Polish and Ukrainian border guards and the Ukrainian population as a whole.

Prominent Belarusians who paid a high price for their position of openly condemning the Belarusian regime in 2020, such as  Melitina Staniouta, have also noted a distinctive treatment “due to the passport.” Reflections of such a changing position towards Belarusians as a whole have emerged, paradoxically, as anti-war protests have been spreading in Belarus – a country where any dissenting voice is a crime by definition, and where it takes no more than a retweet for one to be imprisoned.

Belarusian protesters are certainly aware of the mass and ongoing repressions in their country that have produced 1,076 officially recognized political prisoners as of March 1, 2022; of severe human rights violations; and of torture in prisons and detainment facilities. However, they have not stopped raising their voices, even after 800 protesters have been detained as of February 27.

As the war in Ukraine continues, the world needs to be reminded: the Belarusian regime and the people of Belarus are not the same. As suggested by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borell, Belarusian protestors have to be applauded for their courage and support for Ukraine.

With hundreds of thousands of refugees trying to enter Europe since 2015, a common European Union policy on refugees has become an undeniable necessity. However, the EU has failed in dealing with the refugee crisis particularly in terms of carrying the burden equally among all member states. The crisis continues to this day and is dividing Europe above all other issues.

As no solution has been found by the EU countries, the crisis leaves thousands of refugees trapped at borders. The most recent example is the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe at the border between Belarus and Poland, where thousands of refugees are waiting to cross into Europe.

In recent years, it has become more and more difficult to enter Europe through Italy and Greece, and refugees have been searching for alternative routes into Europe. Poland, a member of the European Union, has become the new doorway to the EU, a route to build a better future.

Refugees are using this comparatively new migration route by way of Belarus. Refugees sell all their property in their home countries in order to afford the journey expenses to the Belarus border, while others are allegedly encouraged by the government of Belarus and given tourist visas and plane tickets to Minsk. As a result, in the last few months, nearly 2,000 refugees, mostly from Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, have been trapped between Belarus and Poland.

Desperate refugees have tried to breach the Polish border with Belarus, and Polish troops have used water cannons and tear gas to stop them. Meanwhile, Poland has significantly increased its border security. Even though some managed to make it into Europe, most refugees tried to survive in these dire conditions until November 17, 2021, when they were moved into a refugee camp provided by the Belarusian government at the Kuznica-Bruzgi border crossing, only a kilometer from Poland.

The conditions in the shelters are very harsh with limited access to water, food, and medicine. The weather is freezing: below -10 degrees Celsius. There is no social distancing in light of the COVID19 pandemic and people claim to get one meal a day. Toilets and showers are housed separately from the shelters, and around 1,200 refugees live and sleep on blankets. Some have even lost their lives in these freezing conditions. At the same time, since Poland has strengthened its border fence, it seems nearly impossible to enter Europe.

Yet another political game is being played between Russia and the EU via Belarus. While Russia supports Belarus in the migrant crisis, it denies the involvement of Belarus in the migration cirsis and blames European countries for imposing sanctions on Belarus.

Even though by inviting migrants to enter the EU, Belarus is using them as a political tool, these desperate people flee their countries not because of Lukashenko’s invitation but because they have no other option. If they did not flee to Belarus, they would flee somewhere else. Rather than focusing on the humanitarian crises and on possible solutions, countries are blaming one another for political gains while the EU continues not to accept migrants.

At this very moment, there is a humanitarian catastrophe unfolding at the EU border and a critical question remains unanswered: what is going to happen to the migrants on the Belarus and Poland border? What will happen to them if they refuse to return to their home countries?