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ince gaining independence in 1956, Sudan has been the scene of long and destructive internal conflicts. The conflict between the wealthier northern region, predominantly Arab and Muslim, and the less developed southern region has been the fundamental cause of chronic civil war and instability affecting millions of people for nearly half a century. It is possible to say that the foundations of this conflict, which has been decisive for Sudan’s future, were laid during the British colonial period.

As a result of the Closed District Policy (Southern Policy) implemented by Britain, particularly between 1930 and 1946, ethnic and religious divisions between the north and south deepened. These deepening divisions became apparent during London’s preparations to withdraw from Sudan as part of the disintegration of the British colonial empire after the Second World War. As a reaction to the transition to independence being managed by the Arabs and the systematic exclusion of the south from this process, demonstrations that began in August 1955, a few months before independence, quickly turned into a civil war.

Civil wars

Although Sudan’s first civil war ended with the Addis Ababa Agreement signed in 1972, which granted limited regional autonomy to the southern region, the failure to reach a resolution between the parties on issues such as resource sharing, political power and cultural recognition led to a new environment of conflict. President Gaafar Nimeiri’s decision in 1983 to revoke the agreement and return the south to its former status triggered Sudan’s second civil war. The establishment of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in 1983, which would become an important actor for South Sudan, and its central role in the civil war process, was an important step in the south’s organisation and institutionalisation process.

Sudan’s second civil war, which lasted for more than twenty years, ended in January 2005 with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between the Sudanese government and the SPLM, and the process of the south seceding from Sudan and becoming independent became clear. The agreement granted the south a six-year period of autonomy, paving the way for a referendum at the end of this period to determine the region’s future status. As a result of the referendum held in January 2011, South Sudan gained its independence.

Sudan has witnessed yet another new and devastating internal conflict in recent years amid the ongoing conflict in the south. Tensions between Arab and non-Arab communities in the Darfur region in the west of the country, which had existed for decades, gave way to conflict in 2002 when non-Arab ethnic groups such as the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit responded to their continuous and systematic exclusion by the Khartoum government in Darfur by attacking the government’s military and security institutions. With the Sudanese army focused on the ongoing civil war in the south, President Omar al-Bashir turned to Arab tribes in the region to establish control in Darfur.

Accordingly, the Khartoum government began supporting militia forces known as the Janjaweed, formed by approximately thirty Arab tribes in the region. With the aim of ending the conflict and influenced by international mediation efforts, the Abuja Agreement was signed in 2006, the Doha Agreement in 2011, and the Juba Agreement in 2020 between the Sudanese government and rebel groups. Hundreds of thousands of people have died in this civil war in Darfur, while millions have been displaced.

The impact of the RSF

In addition to the devastating effects of the civil war in Darfur, another significant impact on Sudan was that it initiated the process leading to the establishment of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which would become an important actor in the ensuing period. The RSF was established in 2013 as a result of the Khartoum administration’s aim to give this force an institutional structure in order to make greater use of the Janjaweed militias, fighters mostly of a common ethnic origin who helped bring Darfur under control. Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), one of the leading figures of the Cancavid militia and someone who had developed good relations with the al-Bashir regime, was appointed commander of the RSF.

Viewing the RSF as strategically important for the security of his regime, al-Bashir mobilised political and financial resources, enabling the RSF to rapidly grow in strength. Despite efforts to integrate it into the Sudanese army, the RSF managed to maintain its independent structure. The rapid growth of its members, whom it employs as mercenaries, and the rapid expansion of its economic power through revenues from the gold mines it controls have also contributed to the rise of the RSF.

Al-Bashir’s removal from office in April 2019 following months of protests, carried out by the Sudanese army in a coup, has plunged the country into an unstable environment that could lead to a new civil war. The main actors in this civil war, which continues with full force today, are the Armed Forces and the RSF. During Al-Bashir’s overthrow, the two actors collaborated, with Armed Forces Commander Abdulfettah Al-Burhan chairing the Transitional Sovereignty Council and Hemedti serving as vice-chairman.

This collaboration was short-lived, however, as disagreements over the future of the RSF became the main source of tension between Al-Burhan and Hemedti. Al-Burhan sought to integrate the RSF into the army in order to control Hemedti’s rapidly growing power, while Hemedti sought to legitimise the RSF presence within Sudan’s political structure. The increasing tension and power struggle between the parties turned into open conflict on 15 April 2023, plunging the country back into civil war.

The first year of the conflict, which quickly spread across the country, saw the RSF gain military superiority, but 2024 brought changes in the course of the civil war. The Sudanese army’s offensive to retake the capital, Khartoum, launched in September, signalled this shift, and the capture of the city in March 2025, after a hiatus of nearly two years, marked a significant turning point. Meanwhile, as the civil war raged on, another significant turning point occurred when El Fasher, one of the major cities in the Darfur region, was captured by the RSF in October 2025 after an eighteen-month siege.

In February 2025 , the signing of a political charter by the RSF and its twenty-three allied groups to establish a parallel government, and the subsequent declaration of the Government of Peace and Unity on 15 April, the anniversary of the civil war, raised concerns that the country would experience renewed division as a result of the civil war, which began as a result of the disagreement and power struggle between the Armed Forces and the RSF.

Interventions

The ongoing civil war in Sudan has also been the scene of interventions by many regional and non-regional actors. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is the RSF’s biggest supporter. The rapprochement between Hemedti and the UAE, which began during the Yemen intervention, has continued and intensified during the civil war. Egypt, Turkey, Iran and Russia are also important supporters of the Sovereignty Council.

As a result of the search for international support in the early months of the civil war, Sudan and Iran reached an agreement in October 2023 to resume diplomatic relations, which had been severed in 2016. Russia, although it was a significant supporter of the RSF in the first year of the civil war, particularly through Wagner, changed its policy towards Sudan from 2024 onwards and began to support the Sovereignty Council.

The ongoing civil war in the country shares similarities with past civil wars, but there are also differences. The most fundamental similarity is its social destructiveness. As in previous wars, the ongoing civil war is marked by severe human rights violations, with tens of thousands of people killed and millions displaced. One important difference lies in the causes of the conflict. The main cause of previous civil wars was largely the discontent of different ethnic groups with the policies of the dominant group. The current civil war, however, has emerged as a result of a power struggle within the dominant group.

Another difference relates to the scope of the conflict. While previous conflicts were largely regional in nature, confined to the southern region or Darfur, the current conflict has had a devastating impact on most of the country, including the centre. Consequently, it poses a much greater risk than previous conflicts in terms of the collapse of state mechanisms. Although this risk has been relatively reduced by the Sovereign Council’s capture of Khartoum and the RSF’s retreat to the west, the RSF remains a powerful threat. Finally, the warring parties’ search for military and diplomatic support has led to intense external intervention.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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ast April, war broke out in Sudan between the Sudanese National Army and the Rapid Support Forces. Thousands have been killed and millions displaced, raising fears that the country could descend into full-scale war.

While there is a confluence of factors driving this war, such as the UAE backing the militias with military support and funding to secure its economic and political interests, on many occasions, the militias have proven that this is also their war to target and annihilate specific groups of different racial backgrounds.

The Rapid Support Forces were created in 2013 through the restructuring of the notorious Janjaweed militia to support the central government’s counterinsurgency operations in Darfur and South Kordofan.

In 2017, the Sudanese parliament passed a law legitimizing their activities, even though the militia has reportedly committed countless crimes and atrocities during the ongoing war, including killing protesters, unlawfully detaining citizens, and targeting hospitals, churches, and media facilities.

Looting homes

Most recently, during the storming of the city of Wad Madani, militiamen engaged in large-scale looting of homes and markets, as well as the UN World Food Programme’s warehouses which provide life-saving food and malnutrition assistance to 20,000 children and pregnant and lactating women.

As a result, tens of thousands were forced to leave the city to escape the ensuing hell with the militias trying to prevent their flight. In a serious development, the militias offered to protect villages in exchange for young people joining their ranks.

In many other cases, crimes and violations were motivated and committed on the basis of ethnicity.

In Darfur, the Rapid Support Forces and the Arab militias they support launched an attack against the African tribes, specifically the Masalit; innocent civilians were raped and buried in mass graves in Ardamata and El Geneina. Reports have documented that the victims were labeled “slaves” by the militia fighters.

The excessive use of force was deliberate, forcing the tribes to leave their territories, and amounted to ethnic cleansing. The militias’ campaign against the Masalit was led by six key commanders of the Arab-backed militias, who gave orders to carry out the attacks without mercy.

Executions

In a related heinous incident, the militia also kidnapped and executed the governor of West Darfur, who was a descendant of the Masalit tribe, after he publicly called for international protection of the Masalit people.

It was reported that when the militias stormed the town of Wad Madani, their fighters were heard saying that they were looking for “Zurga” (a name for those who come mainly from Black communities), used in this context as an act of humiliation.

Disturbingly, the RSF militia has also resorted to the use of rape as a tool of terror and punishment. In August 2023, a UN expert was quoted in a statement as being alarmed by the increasing number of rape cases in Darfur. The expert showed that some rape cases were racially and ethnically motivated, despite the Rapid Support Forces’ stated zero tolerance policy for sexual and gender-based violence.

Targeting groups from the north

This ethnic hatred does not appear to be limited to Darfur’s African tribes, which the militias have historically viewed as an inferior race: northern groups have also been targeted. In a viral social media video, one of the militia leaders threatened to extend the war to the north and kill northerners who belong to certain ethnic groups.

When it comes to the militias’ campaigns of repression and killing of non-Arab tribes, the phrase “history repeats itself” applies. For years, the militias have systematically targeted these local communities, committing crimes and massacres against them. In 2015, a Human Rights Watch report titled “Men with No Mercy” explained how militia soldiers, then acting at the behest of the central government during counterinsurgency operations, raped girls in groups, burned villages and livestock, and executed villagers.

The Rapid Support Forces’ militia’s tribal formation justifies these heinous actions, as most of the militia’s leadership and advisors come from a particular family or ethnic background, namely the Arab tribes of Darfur. For example, the militia is headed by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, with his brother serving as deputy head and chairman of the Al Junaid company, the militia’s main gold export arm. Dagalo’s brothers lead a team that wages his social media war. The militia’s top political advisor, who defends its criminal activities in the international media and tours Europe to legitimize its existence, also comes from the same background.

Submissive to the militia?

In fact, not all of the Arab tribes have been completely submissive to the militias. In some cases, there were internal divisions over the course of the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces militias into the homelands of the tribes west of Kordofan.

One of the worst and most serious consequences of the fascist calls of the militias is that the rebel groups, mainly drawn from the Black and African communities in Darfur, who have chosen to remain neutral since the outbreak of the war have declared their intention to join the national army and have consolidated their power in El-Fasher to defend it against the imminent attack of the militia. This development threatens to plunge the whole country into a full-scale civil war.

The Rapid Support Forces militia has worked relentlessly through its public relations campaign to convince the world that it’s a national force that wants to bring peace and democratic transformation to the entire country. Thus, in August 2023, the militia shared what it called a vision for a new state and the need to build the country on the pillar of justice and equal rights for all. They appointed a political committee tasked with coordinating with political parties and other stakeholders, recruiting senior commanders from different parts of the country; however, their influence on the decision-making process within the militia remains weak. Meanwhile the facts on the ground fully expose the falsehood of all these disinterested and patriotic claims.

The looming danger is that if the militia emerges victorious in this war, the whole of Sudan could be turned into a fascist state, and more and more genocides and massacres based on ethnicity will take place. The ongoing investigation by the International Criminal Court into the crimes committed by the militias in Darfur is a crucial step in the right direction and will help deter the militias from targeting local communities.

The international community should put more pressure on the UAE, which funds and supports the militias. Countries that invite representatives of the Rapid Support Forces militia to propagate their lies and deceptions should know that this is a step towards legitimizing a war militia and prolonging the devastating war in Sudan.

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n a grave turn of events, Wad Madani, Sudan’s second-largest city and a previous haven for the displaced, has become the latest battleground in the ongoing conflict between the national army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Reports from the AFP news agency have confirmed a mass exodus as the RSF established a base in the east of the city, prompting the flight of thousands who had sought refuge there.

The RSF’s aggressive maneuver has effectively initiated a new front in the eight-month-old war, destroying one of the few safe zones left in the nation, as observed by William Carter, the Sudan director for the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).

Social media footage shows distressing scenes of residents, many of whom had previously fled violence in Khartoum, hastily evacuating their homes with their possessions. Amid the chaos, 45-year-old Ahmed Salih disclosed to Reuters his desperation to find transportation for his family to escape what he describes as “living in hell.”

RSF reinforcements

The conflict, which has been simmering since the army, under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and RSF, led by General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, clashed over political transition issues, has led to airstrikes and artillery exchanges in the city. Witnesses have reported RSF reinforcements moving towards the conflict zones and RSF presence in surrounding villages, signaling a worrying escalation.

The United Nations has reported that the war, fueled by the fallout from the ousting of former ruler Omar al-Bashir, has already resulted in the displacement of nearly 6.8 million people and conservative death toll estimates stand at over 12,000.

The humanitarian crisis is deepening as 14,000 individuals have reportedly fled Wad Madani, with the United Nations having to suspend all humanitarian missions in al-Jazirah state due to the violence. The city, which shelters over 86,000 displaced people, has more than 270,000 residents reliant on humanitarian aid, now facing disruption.

UN calls for halt of hostilities

United States Ambassador John Godfrey has called for a halt to the RSF’s advance, citing the potential for mass civilian casualties and further impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The situation has reached a critical point with families, already traumatized by previous displacements, finding themselves in a relentless cycle of flight, with transportation costs soaring and few safe destinations left. The NRC has expressed grave concern for those in Wad Madani, particularly the vulnerable families with no means to escape the encroaching violence.

The Sudanese doctors’ union has labeled the situation as “catastrophic,” with essential services like pharmacies closing down. Meanwhile, skepticism clouds the prospects of an East African mediation initiative to resolve the conflict, which has been marked by reports of human rights abuses in areas already seized by the RSF.

As the international community calls for restraint and a peaceful resolution, the reality on the ground in Sudan remains dire, with the echoes of conflict leading to an uncertain future for millions.

Source: Aljazeera

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n April 2023, a war broke out in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia. Thousands have been killed and millions have been displaced, not to mention the massive destruction of buildings and infrastructure.

With the world turning to social media to follow up on the news, the RSF militia started using X to deceive the public about the unfolding events and evade responsibility for the committed massacres and atrocities.

It’s time to deprive the RSF militia of the X platform and stop providing it with a megaphone to spread its lies.

The RSF militia was formed in 2013 after the restructuring of the notorious Janjaweed militia, which primarily supported the government’s counterinsurgency operations in Darfur and South Kordofan. In 2017, the Sudanese parliament passed a law legitimizing its activities.

According to several ​​independent reports, the RSF militia has committed countless crimes and atrocities, including destroying villages, killing protestors, sexual violations and rape, mass killings, unlawful detention, targeting hospitals and churches, ethnic violence, and restricting civilian movement during the ongoing war.

Reliance on social media

For years, the RSF militia has relied on social media to sway public opinion and wage its propaganda war. Most recently, after Facebook removed its official pages, the militia started to rely on its X accounts as its primary tool of misinformation.

In November, the RSF militia allied Arabia militias launched an attack on Ardmata, an area located in Darfur, Sudan, and populated by the Masalit people. According to the testimonies of the survivors and reports by international organizations such as the UN, more than 800 individuals were executed and killed based on their ethnicity. Despite the mounting evidence against it, the RSF’s official X account released a media statement falsely claiming the area was shelled by the Sudanese army forces and former regime members.

The militia provided no proof to back their concocted story. In June 2023, the RSF militia unabashedly tweeted condemning the assassination of the West Darfur governor, whom the militia themselves had killed. This crime pushed the U.S. to place sanctions against senior commanders of the militia.

Allegations of attacking churches

In other cases, despite confirmed reports and the official statement of the Sudanese Council of Churches that militia members had attacked several churches in Khartoum, the militia insisted on rejecting the allegations and described them as diverging attention from military losses.

During the ongoing war, the RSF members have engaged in large-scale looting of residential areas to the degree that several “Dagalo” markets, named after the militia leader, have been established across the country dedicated to the stolen goods. Contrary to all reports and eyewitness affirmations, the RSF responded with its usual tactic, tweeting that violations were a disinformation campaign by the Sudanese Armed Forces.

In a bid to boost engagement with their content, the militia has resorted to fake accounts and networks. For instance, in August 2023, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) revealed how more than 900 potentially hijacked accounts are copying and pasting positive replies to the RSF’s and its leader’s official accounts on the platform to make them appear more popular.

A similar and recently created network was also exposed by Beam Report, a local Sudanese fact-checking organization.

Violation of X rules

The X platform is also utilized to disinform the public about the militia’s activities and its ties to infamous groups such as the Wagner Group so as to avoid any repercussions from this hidden relationship. Both the militia and its political advisor categorically denied the CNN report that the Ukrainian special forces attacked the Wagner Group, which is allied to the RSF in Sudan and supports it with military equipment. It is worth mentioning that the U.S. State Department later accused Wagner of supplying the RSF militia with surface-to-air missiles.

The existence of the RSF militia on X clearly violates two of the social media platform’s rules: the crisis misinformation policy that does not sanction sharing false and misleading information, and the content policy that prohibits violent and hateful entities. X should adhere to these rules and protect its users from the harm the RSF militia has been causing.

X should also listen to the Sudanese people who have created the hashtag #removedaglo requesting X to remove the RSF militia accounts, citing its extended violations and crimes against the country’s citizens.

Continuing to give the RSF militia an online platform will have a dire outcome: it aids it with a powerful tool to legitimatize its existence and, even worse, to cover up its impending genocide in the region.

The RSF militia and its affiliated accounts also utilized X to attack the Sudanese National Army. A recent analysis by Beam Report exposed a network of accounts that praise the RSF militia leader, spreading disinformation that claims Iran is backing the national army to have a foothold in the Red Sea region.

Following international outcry and strong condemnation of its ongoing massacres in Darfur, the official RSF militia account shared a fake meeting for the leaders of the Masalit tribe to show their support for the militia, the same tribe whose members the militia has executed and targeted on the basis of their ethnicity. In fact, no known leaders of the tribe appeared at this purported gathering.

To deceive the world about its ongoing genocides in Darfur, the RSF militia is using the big lie tactic employed during Nazi Germany; it’s simply that if you tell a lie big enough and then keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it; the underlying premise, according to Adolf Hitler, who used it to justify the Holocaust, is that no one will think anyone is insolent enough to distort the truth to such a degree.

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he war that broke out in April between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia has killed and displaced thousands of Sudanese, in addition to massive destruction in buildings and infrastructure, with many fearing the whole country could descend into a full-scale civil war.

While some international powers and countries are choosing to remain neutral, France, with its long-term interest in Sudan and the region, should pick a side and push for the militia to be defeated and removed from the scene.

The RSF was formed in 2013 by restructuring the notorious Janjaweed militia with the goal of backing up the counterinsurgency operations in Darfur and South Kordofan. In 2017, the Sudanese parliament passed a law that organized and legitimized the militia’s activities. Several independent reports have exposed the militia’s countless crimes and atrocities, including destroying villages, killing protestors, sexual violations and rape, and unlawful detention, in addition to targeting hospitals and churches and ethnic cleansing during the ongoing war.

France’s role in Sudan

France’s role, hitherto, has been confined to successfully evacuating Western citizens from Sudan, providing humanitarian assistance to the Sudanese and refugees in the neighboring countries, and condemning the war violations in general.

In a preemptive step to any reversal in France’s stance, the RSF militia launched a campaign targeting French leaders and society. The militia sent a political advisor to France to conceal its crimes against civilians, and bribe journalists and TV producers to polish the militia’s leader image as a European ally and the savior of Sudan from Islamists. Moreover, the militia reportedly hired a French PR company to help in its campaign.

Four main practical and moral reasons, analyzed below, should prompt France out of neutrality and make it pick the side of defeating the RSF militia.

Why France should stop being neutral in Sudan

First, the militia’s expansion in neighboring African countries comes at the cost of France’s historical political interest. For instance, most recently, news reports have exposed the fact that before the war the militia was receiving military support supplied via the eastern borders of Chad. Meanwhile an RSF leader has boasted about his intervention to block a coup in the Central African Republic, and UN reports have reported that the RSF has funneled arms into the country.

Second, this expansion also means more influence for Russia and the Wagner group, which is now supplying the militia with surface-to-air missiles in exchange for smuggled Sudanese gold. France is alarmed by the growing cooperation between Wagner and the RSF militia and is monitoring it closely. France needs to think strategically and never give an opportunity to Putin’s future man in the region to succeed. The RSF leader, it should be noted, has visited Russia and has defended its invasion of Ukraine.

Third, the scale of violations committed by the RSF and the destruction it has caused show that the militia leadership does not have complete control over its forces. If the RSF emerges victorious, Sudan will become a fragile state. This chaotic status, among others, will impact the supply of gum Arabic—half of the country’s production of gum Arabic is imported by France.

The RSF and the future of Sudan

Fourth, the country could also become a shelter for many terrorist groups that France is fighting in the Sahel region. This situation will also exacerbate the immigration problem at the European borders. Dagalo, the head of Rapid Support Forces, who previously threatened to overflow Europe with the influx of immigrants, will use this as a pressuring card.

Undoubtedly, dismantling the RSF will prevent the militia from committing its next massacre in Darfur and put Sudan back on the democratic transition path towards a country with one, unified national army. This is a fair demand that the militia leader not only rejected, but he threatened to take the whole country down an unknown path if he were forced to do so. This step will be another diplomatic win for France, which convened the international conference to support Sudan and assisted it with a $1.5 billion bridging loan.

France can practically engage in countering the RSF militia in many ways, such as publicly advocating the agendas to dismantle it. Now, it should move from calling for respect of the UN arms embargo in Darfur to pressuring its allies, such as Chad and the UAE, to abstain from supporting the militia or facilitating the transportation of arms and missiles. France should also motivate European countries and organizations to stop collaborating with the militia on the immigration issue and hiring its companies to provide security services.

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he popular uprising that started in late 2018 in Sudan, one of Africa’s most prominent countries culturally and geo- and socio-politically, has not only failed to bring the country out of its rut, but has dragged it to the brink of a major disaster.

Following the fall of the al-Bashir administration, the successive coup attempts have brought the Sudanese people face to face with a humanitarian crisis. In order to reveal the magnitude of the crisis, it is useful to briefly overview the process of coups.

The beginning of the chaos: The fall of Omar al-Bashir’s government

The desired recovery in Sudan’s economy was prevented by the division of the country in two in 2011 after years of civil wars, the fact that oil, the state’s most important source of income, remained in the southern region, the embargo imposed by the U.S., etc. Meanwhile, the embargo and the foreign trade deficit led to a major contraction in foreign exchange.

The economic distress in the country forced the Omar al-Bashir administration to raise the prices of basic consumer goods at astronomical rates. The hikes, coupled with widespread rumors of corruption, nepotism, etc., brought the anger of the Sudanese people to a peak. In April 2019, the people took to the streets and deposed al-Bashir.

However, the fall of al-Bashir’s regime did not lead to an economic recovery and plunged Sudan into one of the most critical instabilities in its history. Four years after the coup, the country has not recovered and the political and economic chaos has become unmanageable.

The main driver of the people who took to the streets in the capital Khartoum was the economic hardship and corruption that they had suffered for many years. There was no specific ideological ground driving the uprisings, and there was no foresight or plan for what would happen after the fall of al-Bashir.

Meanwhile, the army, which following independence has always been powerful position in the country after independence, did not want to let go of the reins. Realizing that it was no longer possible for the current government to remain, military officers took the lead and tried to seize power. The insistence of the protesters on civilian rule forced the military to back down, albeit to a limited extent, and a joint military-civilian transition administration was formed.

The Transitional Sovereignty Council, which was established to serve as a collective head of state, consisted of six military and five civilian members. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the commander of the army, was appointed as the chairman of the council, and Mahammed Hamdan Dagalu, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, was appointed as his deputy.

Although the Sovereignty Council is dominated by the military wing, the government formed under the leadership of Abdalla Hamdok is predominantly civilian. In a sense, the military and civilian wings were forced into a union. The discord among the members of the Sovereignty Council, the differences of opinion between the council and the government, the disagreements with armed groups, and the discomfort caused by Sudan’s cosmopolitan nature were the precursors of the current crisis.

The civilian wing’s ideological stance

Although the military dominated the Sovereignty Council, the civilian wing, which formed the government and received strong international support, had the opportunity to move the country towards democratic rule. There was an expectation that the newly formed government would prevent corruption and put an end to the high cost of living in the country.

With these expectations, the Sudanese people gave the government almost unlimited credit and strong support in the first period of the transition. However, instead of fulfilling these expectations, the Hamdok government turned towards the ideological aims of a small minority.

The overwhelming majority of Sudanese people are religiously conservative. It was clear that any adverse developments in this area would be met with a public backlash. Yet, Hamdok’s government, instead of laying the groundwork and taking the country to elections, turned to making radical changes with no constitutional basis.

Hamdok tried to close down the country’s well-established religious institutions and Quran courses. The private properties of many businesspeople were confiscated on the basis of links to the al-Bashir administration. All diplomats and bureaucrats who were appointed in the preceding period were dismissed.

A large section of the society was excluded from the political and economic spheres on the grounds that they belonged to the Islamic Movement. The government’s ideological attitude caused great discontent among the religious population. Moreover, during this period, there was no improvement in the economic situation, which, in fact, became much worse compared to al-Bashir’s era.

Military-civilian conflict deepens crisis

The active position of the administration’s civilian wing had bothered the military from the very beginning, but it stayed silent out of fear of international reactions. In a way, the attitude of the Hamdok government served the military wing the opportunity it had been waiting for on a silver platter.

The military claimed that the government was unable to manage the state and worsened the economy, and put pressure on Prime Minister Hamdok to resign. Hamdok’s resignation was not contested by the public in light of his government’s policies and economic failure. Thus, the country’s sovereignty passed into the hands of the military.

However, this change further isolated the Sudanese government in the international arena: foreign aid to Sudan was significantly cut, the pressure on the Sudanese economy intensified, and, the country declared bankruptcy. By taking an ideological stance, the civilian administration under Hamdok squandered an important opportunity.

Power struggle in the military wing

The military wing, which had completely seized the reins with the purge of the civilian wing, this time faced an internal power struggle. Although General al-Burhan was the head of the Sovereignty Council, Dagalu, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, which is said to have more than 100,000 mercenaries, was in charge of a huge, highly mobilizable, medium-weight armed military force that was loyal to him.

Dagalu’s maverick behavior, encouraged by his military and economic power, caused great disturbance within the military wing and led to a power struggle between him and the army commander al-Burhan. Al-Burhan had long wanted to integrate the Rapid Support Forces into the army and eliminate this dual structure in the security forces.

Dagalu, recognizing that this integration would destroy his power, strongly opposed it. The covert power struggle between the two began to be conducted openly with the military buildup in Merawi. The situation evolved into a civil war with an armed clash between the two forces in the capital Khartoum on April 15, 2023, spreading to other regions shortly afterwards.

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n Saturday, April 15, the residents of Sudan’s capital Khartoum woke up to sounds of gun fire as violent clashes erupted between the national army, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The surreal scenes of fighter jets flying over Khartoum and bombing RSF positions, and tanks rolling in the streets while dark plumes of smoke covered the city captivated the global news and social media platforms. How did the Sudanese peoples’ quest for a transition to a civilian democracy beget deadly clashes in Khartoum and a civil war that could engulf the whole country?

Since February, political tensions have been rising in the country between General Abdel Fatah al-Burhan, the county’s president and chairman of the Transitional Sovereign Council (TSC), and his deputy General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, commonly referred to as “Hemedti.” Hemedti is the leader of the RSF, a paramilitary unit of approximately 80,000 heavily armed and pickup truck-riding militiamen that have bases all across the country. Since the ouster of former president Omar al-Bashir in 2019, the RSF and its leader, Hemedti, have become a consequential political and security force to be reckoned with in Sudan’s political sphere.

After the Nile Spring revolution that ousted al-Bashir, the army had to “tame” and accommodate the RSF and its leadership by offering Hemedti the deputy leadership of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) in post al-Bashir Sudan. In the last decade, the RSF was a political lifeline to al-Bashir’s regime, acting like the regime’s Praetorian Guard against any threats from within the military establishment and as an efficient power against rebels in the frontier Darfur region.

Four years after the Nile Spring revolution, what has become of Sudan’s quest for a civilian democratic rule? Will Burhan and Hemedti come to their senses and seek a political truce that will save Sudan from a long civil war and state collapse? To understand the genesis of the current violence, one has to grasp Sudan’s fragile and dispersed security apparatus; the relationship between the military establishment and politics; and the new actors and elites from the margins, such as the RSF and Hemedti, who have “tasted” power and wealth in the capital. When al-Bashir left, the military, security, and economic crony system he held together for three decades came crumbling down. The current violence between the SAF and RSF is one such spatter from a bigger crumbling, metastasizing, and re-ordering of the system al-Bashir left behind.

Democracy aborted

Sudan’s attempted transition to a democratic civilian rule has been a near-impossible herculean task. After three decades of al-Bashir’s military rule and a long history of coup d’états and military dictatorships since independence, an abrupt civilian democratic rule was practically unachievable. Although al-Bashir was ousted by a popular uprising of the masses, still the post-Bashir Sudanese politics was dominated and overseen by a military and security establishment that had no stakes in handing over power to a civilian government. Sudan’s military and security establishment has been the “invisible hand” that guided the supposed transition to democracy—and no wonder it has failed, or, even worse, imploded with violence.

The unwillingness of the military and security establishment to hand over power to a civilian government was clear in the coup that ousted Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok in October 2021. When the transition timeline dictated that the military branch of the TSC was supposed to hand over power to its civilian counterpart, the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), instead the TSC ousted Hamdok and created discord amongst the different elements within the FFC. Hence, the military continued to consolidate its power and postponed indefinitely any possibilities of a transition to a civilian rule.

Why should the military and security elites risk losing their powers and interests by handing over government rule to civilians? Sudan is the third-largest producer of gold in Africa, and its military establishment is entangled in this lucrative enterprise. Moreover, to make matters more complicated, the Russian paramilitary group Wagner has joined the illicit mining and exporting of Sudanese gold.

More significantly, there is a new actor on the scene: Hemedti. Hemedti is an outsider to the military and security establishment, but he wields enormous powers and resources, and tilts the levers of power to his interests and advantages. The current war in Sudan is between two factions of the military and security establishment: the entrenched old cadres of the SAF and the newcomers, the RSF—this power struggle between Burhan and Hemedti and their foot-soldiers will either doom or reshape the future of Sudan.

Geopolitical ramifications

Sudan is geostrategically important in the Red Sea and the Sahel region. The current war will impact the region geopolitically and demographically as it will send millions of migrants into the neighboring countries. Egypt will be the most affected. Already hundreds of thousands of migrants have fled to southern Egypt and Cairo, and Sudan’s stability is crucial for Cairo. Moreover, Egypt has historically supported the military regimes in Khartoum. In this conflict, clearly General Burhan and the SAF are their primary interlocutors.

Hemedti is closely linked with the United Arab Emirates. The RSF took part in the Yemen conflict when it sent thousands of soldiers to fight alongside the Saudis and Emiratis in 2015. Nevertheless, Burhan and the SAF establishment also have strong relations with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. All regional powers have a vested interest in seeing a stable Sudanese state, but when push comes to shove, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are skeptical of Burhan since he never decapitated the remnants of the Islamists when al-Bashir was ousted.

Eritrea and Ethiopia are also geopolitically interested in the stability of the Sudanese state. Sudan has always played the balancing factor in the Ethiopia-Egypt Nile water dispute. If this conflict drags out, it could lead to a hydro-geopolitical conflict that affects the whole region. More significantly, South Sudan will be the most affected nation in this conflict. All the oil from Juba passes through South Sudan and is refined and exported from the Red Sea port.

Geographically, Sudan is a big country with a lot of oil and mineral resources. In the event that this conflict is protracted, there is the possibility of the mushrooming of diverse rebel groups and militias in the country and the involvement of neighboring countries in the conflict. Sudan could be the next Democratic Republic of the Congo, but our prayers are that peace prevails soon.

T

he parties engaged in the political crisis in Sudan and the root causes that led to the conflict in the country are relatively multifaceted and complex. In 2019, problems such as the economic crisis, corruption, and social injustice continued accelerating in the country. As a result, protests began in December 2018, and the country’s long-serving president, Omar al-Bashir, was overthrown on April 11, 2019.

While the political polarization in the country continued after the uprising, a temporary government was formed under military rule. Even though a civilian administration was established as part of the constitutional amendment in 2021, military forces continued to interfere in the country’s administration. This situation sparked protests and caused lasting political instability in the region.

The parties involved in the political crisis in Sudan are the civilian government, the military administration, political parties, and non-governmental organizations. Factors such as an economic crisis, corruption, social injustice, disruptions in the democratization process, and ethnic and religious conflicts are among the leading causes of the ongoing conflict in the country.

In order to have a better understanding of the recent developments in Sudan, it is necessary to look at the region’s existing parties and dynamics. In this context, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the leader of the interim government established after the uprising in 2019, serves as the head of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council and the army commander. On the other hand, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as “Hemedti”), who does not come from a military background, serves as the leader of the Sudanese Rapid Intervention Forces (RIF).

Playing a critical role in Bashir’s administration during the country’s political crises in 2005, Hemedti was regarded as one of the most influential figures in the government. Hemedti is a member of the Rizeigat tribe, based in the west of Sudan, and has maintained his critical position in Sudanese politics in the post-Bashir period as a military leader.

Recent developments in Sudan 

The current upheavals in Sudan indicate that the raging political conflict continues to accelerate in the region. On April 14, 2023, the Sudanese army raided the Rapid Intervention Forces headquarters. The prevailing view is that Hemedti’s units rather than being complementary to the Sudanese army are, in fact, a separate military structure. Presently, Burhan is trying to weaken Hemedti’s troops, but it seems too late.

The conflict in Sudan could further aggravate the political crisis and potentially destabilize the country. In particular, Hemedti commands a robust military presence in the region, and tensions between Hemedti and Burhan may evolve into a larger-scale military conflict, dragging the country into a civil war and harming the political process by further deepening the political deadlock.

What is more, the country’s geopolitical position may cause other countries, especially neighboring ones, to become involved in the political crisis, deepening the existing problems and further complicating the negotiation possibilities.

In order to avoid the prospect of political instability in Sudan affecting it, Egypt may intervene to alleviate its concerns about Sudan’s resources on the Nile which include the Roseires, Sennar, and Merowe Dams. These dams play an important role in Sudan’s hydroelectric power generation and provide irrigation for the agricultural sector.

Second, Egypt and Sudan have conflicting interests regarding the disputes in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, located northeast of Sudan. Third, disputes between Sudan and South Sudan continue to persist. The political crisis in Sudan can negatively affect the resolution process of these conflicts, and South Sudan may also become involved in the current crisis.

Regarding extraregional powers, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have close ties with some groups in Sudan. The crisis in the country may affect the interests of both countries and cause the UAE and Saudi Arabia to become more involved. Besides these countries, the African Union (AU), the League of Arab Nations (LAN), and other regional organizations will likely become involved in resolving the crisis.

A political process is needed

However, all interventions must be conducted peacefully, with respect to the country’s sovereignty, and in alignment with the interest of the Sudanese people. To ensure stability in the country, parties to the conflict must cooperate through dialogue and reconciliation to resolve the tension within the Sudanese administration.

A political process incompassing all parts of Sudan must be initiated and supported for a sustainable solution. Clearly, the conflicts in Sudan threaten the country’s stability, and serious political will and a negotiation process are required to resolve the crisis effectively. Otherwise, Sudan may become the “New Libya.

Meanwhile, Sudan is also engaged in conflicts with neighboring countries such as Egypt, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. The international community needs to support Sudan and make efforts to end the current conflict. At the same time, the economic crisis in Sudan, which deepens the political turmoil and complicates the solution process, should not be ignored. Although it is difficult to be optimistic about Sudan’s future, it is necessary not to give up hope for a peaceful resolution to the ongoing conflict.

I

n 2003, a brief civil war broke out in Sudan between the central government in Khartoum and tribal forces in Darfur underpinned by racism and for control of natural resources. The Sudanese army led by ousted President Omar al-Bashir fought tribal gunmen in the region with the help of the Janjaweed tribal forces, leaving behind some 300,000 dead and more than 2.5 million displaced.

Al-Bashir integrated the Janjaweed forces, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, which helped his government fight rebels, into the Sudanese Army Intelligence in 2013 giving them the name “Rapid Intervention Forces” (RIF).

Hemedti headed the force and was the right hand of former president al-Bashir. A former camel trader, Hemedti turned against al-Bashir after popular protests broke out against his rule. He joined the head of the Sudanese army Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and ousted al-Bashir.

The Rapid Intervention Forces, comprised of some 100,000 fighters, have light weapons and vehicles. In recent years, Hemedti came to the fore after talks between the Sudanese army and the RIF, on one hand, and Sudanese political parties and civil society, on the other, failed to form a civilian government.

The RIF controls most of Sudan’s gold mining industry, which is involved in trade with countries such as the United Arab Emirates. It has also been accused of committing a massacre against protesters in June 2019, leaving 120 dead.

Hemedti has served as the vice head of the Sudanese Sovereign Council, which was headed by al-Burhan. He has received support from the United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia while al-Burhan has the backing of the U.S. and Egypt.

The RIF has participated in the Arab Coalition forces in Yemen led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Infighting took place in Sudan between the RIF and the Sudanese army after the RIF deployed some of its forces around Khartoum on April 15. Clashes spread to the cities of Marawi, Al-Abyad, Omdurman, and Al-Fashir.

Differences over integrating the RIF into the Sudanese army

One of the main differences between al-Burhan and Hemedti is how they view the process of integrating the RIF into the Sudanese army.

The Sudanese army demanded that the Rapid Intervention Forces be affiliated to the Ministry of Finance, given that it controls the movements and deployment of these forces according to its needs.

Hemedti announced his support for the idea of ​​​​merging his forces into the Sudanese army, but he stated that it should take place according to agreed time frames, suggesting a 10-year period, where al-Burhan suggested that it should take place in two years.

The Rapid Intervention Forces also called for giving their officers the same privileges as those of their counterparts in the army, and demanded that the armed forces adhere to the Sudanese constitution that will be approved.

International efforts including by the EU, the African Union, and the Arab League have all failed to halt the fighting between the RIF and the Sudanese army.

The Sudanese Doctors’ Syndicate announced that 97 people have been killed and 365 others have been injured as of April 16.

Sudan has been witnessing difficult living conditions which saw a serious rise in food prices over the past years. So far, military forces and civil society have failed to reach an agreement that would improve the living conditions of the Sudanese.

Today, the RIF, which was founded to support the Sudanese army in Darfur, seems to be at war with it, making the lives of ordinary Sudanese even more challenging. Will the conflict between al-Burhan and Hemedti end as the conflict in Darfur ended? Only time will tell.

On January 2, 2022, Sudan’s Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok announced his resignation amid deadly crackdowns on on pro-democracy civilian demonstrations and a political deadlock that has compounded Sudan’s political stability and economic prosperity. The resignation of Abdalla Hamdok and his exit from the Sudanese political arena was anticipated; it was a matter of when not how.

On October 25, 2021, the Sudanese military had staged a coup and put then prime minister Hamdok under house arrest when political differences reached near-uncompromising positions while venomous accusations were traded. In a turn of events, Premier Hamdok struck a deal with the military and was reinstated to his position as prime minister in the transition government.

However, pro-democracy protesters continued to occupy streets all over the country despite horrific brutalities, rising death tolls, and documented use of rape and sexual assaults against female protesters. Clearly amid the decadence of the democratic transition in Sudan and the brutalities unleashed upon the pro-democracy protesters, Hamdok’s government reached its limits; his role in Sudan’s transition to democracy seemed untenable.

Now that Hamdok exited the Sudanese political scene, what is the fate of Sudan’s transition to democracy? What will the nature of Sudan’s anticipated democratic future be?

Sudan: A nation in constant transition

The current democratic transition in Sudan is not the first in the country’s history, and neither is the ruling military Sovereignty Council the first one overseeing a political transition. As a nation, Sudan leaps from one political transition to another while punctuated with military dictatorships. This has been the case since the nation’s independence.

Indeed, Sudan’s first transition was even before it gained independence from the British in 1952. Sudan’s first political transition was between 1953 and 1955: this was the era of the self-rule transition that was overseen by a governor general as head of state with an existing elected parliament, a cabinet, and a constitution. The next transition period was after the Revolution of October 1964 that brought down the government of Major General Ibrahim Abboud and replaced him with a ruling Sovereignty Council.

As a nation, Sudan leaps from one political transition to another while punctuated with military dictatorships.

Another Sudanese Sovereignty Council was instituted and ruled the nation after the military coup against President Gaafar Nimeiry. Hence the current ruling Sovereignty Council headed by Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and dominated by military generals is neither new nor unique in Sudan’s political history. However, the current Sovereignty Council (SC) has two options: either set the stage for substantial civilian democratic rule in Sudan or repeat Sudan’s past political history with different shades of dictatorship colors as intervals between ruling military Sovereignty Councils.

Moreover, political fractures – occasioned by military generals – appeared within the FFC. Different factions of the FFC seemed to have lost confidence in Premier Hamdok as the economic woes continued. Former rebel leaders, tribal political elites, and other political groups that felt marginalized within the FFC movement as well as Hamdok’s government outrightly challenged and criticized the premier. The FFC was crumbling from within. The military generals were subtly smiling. This was the right time to depose Hamdok and crumble democratic aspirations.

The basis of the dispute between the Military Council and the Forces of Freedom and Change lies on the lack of trust and the issue of accountability which have hampered the proper functioning of the transitional Sovereignty Council.

When in October of last year Premier Hamdok was removed from power, democratic protests continued. The military reinstated Hamdok to power but protests still continued to rage. Both the military and the FFC lost their credibility to transition Sudan to a civilian democracy.

The anxieties of the Military Council

The basis of the dispute between the Military Council and the Forces of Freedom and Change lies on the lack of trust and the issue of accountability which have hampered the proper functioning of the transitional Sovereignty Council. Who is responsible and accountable for the horrendous murders, mistreatments, violence, and sexual harassment of protestors in Sudan for the last three years? The Military Council, which dominates the Sovereignty Council membership and operations, is clearly aware that they will face justice – and even imprisonment – if they hand over power to the civilian Forces of Freedom and Change.

The Sudanese military and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which are commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the current deputy head of the Sovereignty Council, have committed gross violations of human rights during the democratic protests. The FFC and other political groups calling for the investigation and ultimate accountability for these human rights misconducts have rendered the MC paranoid and fearful of any civilian democratic rule. Indeed, the Military Council has undermined its junior civilian partner in the Sovereignty Council. The Forces of Freedom and Change has been powerless throughout the transition period, and functioned to legitimize the Military Council and facilitate its recognition in international politics.

Sudan is a weak state. There are paramilitary forces, tribal militias, and rebel groups that operate within its sovereign territories.

Moreover, Sudan is a weak state. There are paramilitary forces, tribal militias, and rebel groups that operate within its sovereign territories. All the political actors are armed and powerful, and their interests should be accommodated in the transition period to democracy. The incessant democratic protests and the Forces of Freedom and Change’s call for accountability instilled fears and anxieties into the military elites and establishment. Furthermore, the military itself needs to appease some of these paramilitary groups and tribal militias as in the case of the brutal paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces. This complicates the power dynamics in Sudan. Consequently, the transition to democracy seems a distant reality.

Now that Premier Hamdok has left power and politics, the Military Council will seek a civilian politician to lead the next government – one that would respect the council’s interests and concerns. Protests are raging all over Sudan, and the military is reacting with force and brutality. Sudan’s transition to democracy has hit a wall, but the protestors on the streets are adamant and willing to climb over that wall at all costs.

There are two options for the protesters: it is either a civilian democratic rule or recurring dictatorships and sovereign councils in Sudan. The people – and the streets – have spoken. Will the generals listen? Will there be what one may call “social disjunction” where the Sudanese would wish to extricate from the awkward feelings that come from long years of excessive conservatism to an open country that will be consonant with democracy and dignity?

The year 2021 is seeing regional repositioning of power, competition, and strategic alignment. A series of normalization moves have taken place between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Egypt and Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Turkey and the UAE, and Turkey and Sudan, which would have been impossible a few months back. Since 2011, whoever is in the White House has been focusing more on U.S. primacy than the concerns of Washington’s traditional allies. This U.S. policy has directly affected the Middle East and Africa.

Sudan, which has been affected by these transformations since 2019, is not an exception. Even though Sudan suffers from economic challenges, primary among which is inflation, the administration in Khartoum is decisive in diversifying foreign policy alternatives and intensifying cooperation with regional actors. In this manner, the chairman of Sudan’s Sovereign Council Abdel Fattah al-Burhan visited Turkey on August 12-13 to expand the cooperation between the two countries. Official Sudanese statements show that Khartoum is eager to cooperate with Ankara. It is the first-ever visit of Sudan to Turkey at the head of the state level since the country witnessed popular protests against the ousted president Omar al-Bashir in 2019.

Gradual Coherence

Turkey-Sudan relations had reached advanced stages during the term of ousted president Omar al-Bashir. However, after the dismissal of al-Bashir, there was a decline in this relationship, especially politically. What is more, Ankara-Khartoum relations were adversely affected by developments in Sudan. As for regional issues, the two countries had adopted opposite approaches. For example, whereas Turkey supported the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya, mercenaries from Sudan fought for Khalifa Haftar. Later, a gradual coherence was observed between the two parties.

Turkish President Erdoğan paid three visits to Sudan in 2006 and 2017. Whether during his prime ministership or presidency, Sudan remained in Erdoğan’s geopolitical vision of Africa. During these visits, the bilateral relations were strengthened by the signing of several agreements. In 2020, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the vice president of Sudan’s Transition Council, visited Turkey. In April 2021, Vice President of Turkey Fuat Oktay visited Niger where he met with Dagalo.

The photos of the meeting indicate that the Oktay-Dagalo meeting took place in a very warm atmosphere. In his statement, Vice President Oktay reiterated that Turkey wishes to deepen and broaden the two countries’ bilateral relations. Moreover, Turkey’s President Erdoğan talked over the phone with Burhan many times to discuss potential cooperation, and successive visits followed.

Possible Cooperation Areas

During the latest visit of Sudanese officials to Turkey, six memoranda of understanding and agreements from energy to media were signed. As a result, we can expect intense bilateral cooperation between the two countries in the near future. During my field research in Khartoum from March to June of this year, I encountered many Sudanese who are closely following Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa. Turkey has embraced almost every African country even though there is a strong anti-Turkey propaganda in the Middle East.

Strategic Calculations

The deepening of bilateral ties will provide several strategic benefits to both Turkey and Sudan. Right now, Turkey has been standing by the Sudanese transition government. Turkey refrains from addressing sensitive topics with Sudan like the overthrowing of Omar al-Bashir by non-democratic means. This policy paves the way for Sudan to reach out and reapproach Turkey. The recent visit by al-Burhan, the highest-ranking Sudanese official, to Turkey where he met with President Erdoğan shows that the Sudanese transitional government, which distanced itself from Turkey for a long time after the coup, has realized that it must diversify its foreign policy.

The visit of Sudanese officials to Turkey is linked to the recent Ethiopian official visit to Turkey. There is strategic strangulation in the Egypt-Ethiopia-Sudan triangle. Serhat Orakçı, an analyst of African politics, told Politics Today that there are three reasons for the increasing tensions between Egypt and Sudan on the one hand, and Ethiopia on the other hand. These are border disputes, the unsettled issue of water resources, and Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis.

None of the efforts by international or regional organizations to reconcile the parties of the conflicts and resolve these issues could lead towards a lasting peace and settlement. Therefore, each party is trying to maximize its material and diplomatic cooperation with relevant regional actors. With this view, Sudan views having good relations with Turkey as part of reinforcing its strategic capabilities.

It is well known that during Omar al-Bashir’s rule, Turkey-Sudan relations were strong. With the new government in Khartoum, though, bilateral relations suffered a setback. Now, it appears that Sudan is more interested in cooperation with Turkey. The latest visit by Sudanese officials to Turkey is an important indicator of this interest. It is most likely the heavy diplomatic efforts made by Ethiopia to approach Turkey might be behind Sudan’s increasing interest in Ankara.

Sudan Needs Turkey’s Support

The recent months have shown that Ethiopia, which is under pressure from the West, is eager to upgrade its bilateral relations with Turkey from an ordinary level to a strategic one. By deepening its ties with Turkey in terms of military cooperation, Ethiopia wants to strengthen its military power. Sudan hasn’t remained silent either. This atmosphere has forced Sudan to move closer towards Turkey. When we compare Sudan’s will to reach out to Turkey, it is Sudan that is more interested in increasing its bilateral cooperation. Sudan could also ask Ankara to play a mediator role in the deadlock between conflicting parties.

The political trajectory of Sudan shows that it wants to escape from the hold of the UAE. The UAE has been trying to build a new regional order in which there is no room for any democratic transition unless the political elite in the region obeys Abu Dhabi. Therefore, by upgrading its relations with Turkey, Sudan wants to balance its relationship with the UAE and Egypt without abandoning them. This policy could be described as a hedging game: Sudan is hedging itself against the UAE and Egypt by getting closer to Turkey. Therefore, Sudan wants to become more independent and exit its isolation by approaching Turkey. The recent visit by Sudanese officials to Turkey can be seen as a clear message from policymakers in Khartoum indicating Sudan’s will to maneuver its foreign policy.

Sudan wants to build an allyship relationship with Turkey. Since 2016, Turkey has conducted several successful military operations in Syria and Iraq. Ankara has contributed to changing the balance of power in the Middle East. The American political scientist Francis Fukuyama argued that Turkey’s drones are a game-changer and are transforming unconventional warfare into more complex ideas in the world. Sudan looks up to Turkey’s highly successful military industry. Furthermore, Turkey is not just powerful militarily, but also in terms of its democratic legacy and institutions. Therefore, if Sudan’s new political elites decide to transform the country, Turkey is the best example to look up to.

The latest visit of Sudanese officials to Ankara will leave a positive impact on bilateral relations, which could be upgraded to strategic cooperation. It seems that Sudan wants to turn a new page in its relations with Turkey; however, Turkey-Sudan relations should not be expected to reach the strength of the relations during the Omar al-Bashir era in a short time as a significant role will be played by actors, such as the UAE, who are uncomfortable with this rapprochement. Nevertheless, such a development can create a win-win situation for both countries. In the meantime, Ankara’s doors are always open for strengthening bilateral relations with Sudan.