When Turkey purchased the S-400 missile defense system from Russia it created a diplomatic furor among some NATO allies, primarily the US, that saw the decision as a threat to NATO solidarity. On the other hand, the purchase decision was regarded domestically as a sign of Turkey’s increasing confidence to pursue its own domestic defense agenda, particularly in the face of an unreliable and even hostile international partners. But what can we understand of the relationship between defense trade and foreign relations, and in what way do economic and political requirements dictate a state’s defense and foreign policy agendas. Dr. Merve Seren spoke with Ruslan Pukhov, Co-founder and Director of the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), a leading defense industry and arms trade think tank to answer some of these questions.  

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Mr. Pukhov, do you think todays’ export policies are largely shaped by economic and commercial gains?

During the Cold War, arms exports and sales were not a matter of foreign trade but of foreign policy. The U.S. was the only country that considered the arms trade as a tool of arms policy while other states considered this in commercial terms, especially France, Israel and Russia. It was for Russians mainly foreign trade. But the situation changed with the arrival of Donald Trump, who is the first U.S. president who considers the arms trade as a business not as foreign policy. That’s why the American share in the arms trade market is rapidly growing. The U.S. is taking the shares which formerly belonged to Israel, Russia and France. This is happening at a time when the global market for arms trade is becoming denser as countries such as Turkey and South Korea, which were importers 20 years ago, but are now successful arms exporters.

Turkey bought the Russian-made S-400 air defense missile system. Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian system provoked reaction in the West, as this system is not a tactical one, but rather a very sophisticated, strategic and deterrent one. Do you agree that Turkey’s NATO allies are right to be fearful about this?

When we are speaking about procurement within NATO, we should always remember the phrase by the Former Secretary of Defense General Jim Mattis, who was basically defending Turkey. Every NATO member decides for itself what to buy. Slovakia and Greece already have the previous generation of this defense system, the S-300. It would be a double injustice to Turkey since there are other NATO members having this system. I believe it is just a pretext that Turkey’s purchase can harm NATO security, it is very anti-Turkish and has nothing to do with NATO solidarity.

But Slovakia and Greece that use Russian missile defense systems say that they are not strategic or operational. Furthermore, the NATO members who use former Soviet and current Russian technology are trying to replace them with newer European or American technologies.

All defense technologies we can speak of can be divided, roughly into a black and white picture, into two big categories: high-tech and lower-tech. For the time being, Turkey is doing very well with the lower-tech products, such as Yonca-Onuk boats. But their propulsion comes from Germany. The design is Turkish, the integration is Turkish, but certain key items are not. So, if Germany decides to punish Turkey for some reasons, they might stop selling the propulsion. Like you used to have problems with the Fırtına howitzers, their propulsion is also German.

The same is true with air defense and the missiles. Missiles themselves do not require extremely sophisticated technology, but when we speak of an air defense system, yes, it is sophisticated and the states producing such defense systems are limited. These systems vary from MANPADS like Stinger, and IGLA up to strategic ones like Patriot and the S-400. We don’t know how effective the European’s SAMP/T system is, but if you want to have a strategic system which protects your sovereignty in the skies, you only have two options: Patriot and S-300 or S-400.

A friend of mine, a former pilot from Australia told me that the only thing you can do without Americans in their fighter jets is to send mayday signals! Because America uses sophisticated equipment, full of magic black boxes which can basically stop and deactivate your equipment. 

If the U.S. deprives Turkey of the F-35s, Turkey will not be losing that much. Turkey is not desperately in need of buying fighter jets now. Turkey can wait and see.

From this point of view, the F-35 is very good if you know that you will be fighting as an ally of the United States. But if you want to challenge the U.S. or if you pursue an independent foreign policy, they will basically have you in a grip. There is no doubt the F-35 is the best aircraft on the market but only under the condition that you’re a country like Poland or the Czech Republic. But if you are a country like Brazil, Turkey, Malaysia, even India, and you pursue an independent foreign defense policy and if you do not follow the Washington party line, American systems are not always the best choice.

So, if the U.S. deprives Turkey of the F-35s, Turkey will not be losing that much. There are other options. But before that we have to look at who really can challenge Turkey. When I speak about supersonic aircrafts, Armenians don’t have them but only subsonic aircrafts. Assad regime is in ruins in many respects. Iraq has a limited number of F-16s. Greece has a limited number of F-16s and they are the previous generation. When we look at your neighbors, Turkey is not desperately in need of buying fighter jets now. Turkey can wait and see. If you would get it, let’s say within five to seven years, it is not a catastrophe for your military buildup.

There is an expression “You don’t only buy arms, but also buy the friendship of the exporter country”. Do you believe that arms trade can create a long-term engagement, and perhaps a strategic cooperation between customers and their suppliers?

Twenty years ago we developed a theory at our center which turned out to be true. It was just an intellectual exercise before it was proven. When analyzing the arms trade, understanding the motivation of the buyer is important. Because people buy weapons with different motivations. One motivation is exactly as you describe, you are buying “friendship”, and you are buying “security guarantees”. When, for example, Saudi Arabia is massively buying from the United States, a little less from Britain, less from France and little bit from Russia, it is exactly that, they are buying security guarantees. They wish to please the seller.

When countries such as China or Brazil buy weapons, they buy them because they wish to get a technological leap. Brazil bought supersonic aircrafts, because Sweden offered Brazil a great “offset opportunity” within the framework of the “Technology Transfer Program”, which started in 2015. Today, the Brazilian Embraer became a world class aviation firm thanks to the education and production they joined in these offsets, and the firm has now teamed up with Boeing. So, the initial motivation was technological, Brazilians bought these aircrafts for a technology and skill transfer.

Sometimes people buy to fight, but not very often. To tell the truth, nowadays, this is not the predominant motivation. As the Cold War is over, the purchase of sophisticated military equipment came to an end. Sometimes people buy to replenish the pockets because corruption often goes together with the arms trade. Because the same tank can cost, let’s say, two million dollars or five million dollars, it depends on the kickback and on the commission. That is why sometimes the arms trade is an excellent opportunity to steal public funds. Because weapons are not oil, not food, not metals. There is no price stock for a main battle tank, there is no price stock for a fighter jet. It can differ a lot and depends on the client.

So, when we look at Turkey, I think in the beginning it started as a pure military decision. Because Turkey became a very influential actor in the Middle East and in Eurasia, in 20 years but especially in the last 15 years. But this Turkey was not the master of its own sky. It had almost zero air defense. A little bit on the Bosphorus but all of it tactical. That is why starting from neighbors who can intrude, up to unmanned aerial vehicles, Turkey needs to protect its sovereignty in the skies. It started more as a technical decision but then many political things ended up happening.

I thought President Erdogan wanted the United States and Brussels to focus their attention on the Turkish contribution to NATO and European security. The burden of the refugee crisis is so high and Turkey is not a free-rider as many other NATO members. Turkey is really sharing the burden but getting much less. So, by purchasing the S-400, Erdogan wanted to raise this problem. Basically Turkey is saying we are a loyal supporter of the United States and the NATO alliance but what do we get? We only contribute without getting anything in return. That is why they wanted to raise the value of Turkey in NATO, so that people will not take Turkish loyalty for granted. I think this was the idea.

So, you build up your relationship according to the motivations of the buyer.

Yes. It depends on what the buyer wants.

Could you give your thoughts on the capabilities and the vulnerabilities of the Russian defense industry? 

When we look at Russia, there are areas where Russia is traditionally good and probably the best such as the air defense systems. In contrast, Russian fighter aircrafts were not that potent, we were always one step behind the West. 

Pakistan is a great example of this. In 1982, Pakistan got the first F-16 in their inventory, but the Soviet Union and Afghanistan were still operating with aircrafts of the 4th generation. At that time the MIG-29 and SU-27 were still going through test flights. The Soviet air forces didn’t have it in their inventory at the time. That is why Pakistan had air superiority over the Soviet Union in tactical fights over the Pakistani border. 

Russia’s aviation was always behind the schedule of delivery. Look, why is the SU-77 so big in size? Or let’s compare our Black Shark helicopters on the one hand and the Airbus’s TIGER helicopter on the other. Our Black Shark helicopter is 1.5 times heavier. Why? Because the quality of Russian Kevlar is not as good as the quality of German or French ones. It is similar to the Russian full metal jacket, ours weighs 10 kilos while the European one weighs five kilos, because the materials are not that good. 

This question was related to why the Russian aircrafts were so big. Because our chipsets were not that good and our radars were heavy and big. So, we are lagging behind in combat aviation. Because of that the Soviet political and military effort massively invested in air defense. That is why Russia’s air defense is really a gem, a real diamond. For this reason, Turkey is buying the best. 

Or look at Russian ship building if you like. It is in a very poor state. Turkey is now building helicopter landing docks, right? Yes, this is a Spanish project but Turkey developed it indigenously. We [Russia] were basically obliged to go and buy the Mistral from France. At the end of this story we haven’t got the Mistral but our industry is unable to produce, at least in the foreseeable future and for reasonable money, things like Mistral type helicopter landing docks. That is why, in certain areas we are really not that good. 

If you could speak about possible criticisms, what are the vulnerabilities of the Russian defense industry? Especially from the perspective of Russian defense bureaucracy. 

I’m not an expert on bureaucracy but I can tell you that one area is chipsets, like all these microelectronics. Why do you think that Russian satellites are not that reliable? Because we are not producing the chips of space quality, which can deal with the radiation. That is why American satellites and European satellites are in orbit for years but ours only for months. Because in the Soviet Union, we were behind with all of this microelectronics. And when the Soviet Union collapsed, we became even more behind. So there are areas where we were behind the West, and still behind. You [Turkey] already have combat Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and apart from ANKA you have from President Erdogan’s son-in-law’s firm.

Yes, you are talking about Bayraktar. 

You have two types of UAVs, not only observation ones but also attack ones too. We have only observation ones, and these are Israeli Searcher MK-2. And our UAVs are still under the test flights. In the area of UAVs, we are not only behind Turkey, we are also behind Iran. Because China, Iran, and Turkey are in the club of countries which produce their own attack UAVs with missiles. But great Russia with nuclear weapons do not have UAVs with missiles, it’s ridiculous. 

When I was asking about vulnerabilities in the Russian industry, I was also asking about the defense eco-system. Do all the defense companies in Russia belong to national companies or are there support mechanism for private companies in order to increase Russian arms export? For instance what is the level of government control in joint development? 

I can tell you that, we used to have strong and privately owned national champions. We have, yes, a state agency such as Rosoboronexport, which is almost the state’s Ministry of Armament. If it is in final production, Russia uses Rosoboronexport to export, but if it is not, you can do it without Rosoboronexport. For example, if a Russian and Turkish firm jointly develop something, like for example the BrahMos – Russian Indian Cruise missiles, there is no Rosoboronexport. It is a joint venture between Indian and Russian companies. Because it is not pure trade and is a joint development. If it is a joint development and it is not within a seller-buyer paradigm, it is in another basket, another regulation. 

The government is controlling everything, but there are different ways of controlling. There are direct and indirect ways of exercising control over the production process. For example, Russia may or may not give the export license. There are cases where the government is a direct shareholder, like in your case ANKA, but sometimes the government is not a shareholder. 

This is a complicated and a long story. Now in Russia, they are trying to favor state run firms, which are very often not that efficient and rights and licenses to export are not given to private firms which are efficient. For example, they prefer to support inefficient state-run yards, but not to support like the Russian Yonca-Onuk successful champions. We also have this problem. 

What is your analysis about the current security policies and defense strategies of Putin’s Russia in regards to its regional involvements and deployments? Do you think President Putin has started to adopt a much more offensive and expansionist posture, considering the Russian intervention in Georgia, Ukraine, Crimea, Syria and even Afghanistan (through negotiations with Taliban)? 

I view it differently. It is not because Russia became more assertive or aggressive, but because when we look at world leaders there is no serious leadership initiative. In this environment, Emmanuel Macron, for example, looks like a serious leader because there is no leadership either in Germany or in Britain, even in the United States. People may like Erdogan or not. People may like Putin or not, but there is no doubt both are national leaders. They exercise leadership. Although I’m not a big fan of President Erdogan, I should also say that every time people attacked him he faced it and responded. He went and meet the challenge just like Putin. So, in the absence of other leaderships, some leaders like Putin may act more assertive or aggressive, respond challenges and don’t hide behind problems. I don’t think Russia is more active or more assertive. I think Russia is defensive, but it looks like this because of the absence of leadership elsewhere. 

Lastly, as a security and arms expert, I want to ask what your assessment about the future characteristics of warfare is. From the point of “Gerasimov Doctrine”, are we moving towards “hybrid warfare”, what states should invest or develop in order to encounter hybrid threats? 

To answer to this question in a coherent way, I will provide you with three snapshots. First of all, I don’t like the term “hybrid warfare” because every warfare is hybrid by definition. Since ancient times, every war is hybrid and there is always a mix of linear, nonlinear, open, and covert operations. 

Secondly, it is obvious that the next wars would be different from the previous ones. You already experienced this when you lost your soldiers, your proxy fighters and main battle tanks in al-Bab. Because humanity lives in big and crowded cities and metropolises such as Istanbul, Damascus and Moscow. So future wars will be like the battle of Aleppo, it will be tough and different. And the people, warfare, and equipment must be adapted to an urban war theaters which are essentially different.

And thirdly, apart from classical war threats, there is the issue of growing population. Imagine that in 20 years, there will be half a billion population in Europe, two billion in Africa in 20-30 years. Many people from Africa would like to move into Europe, and some of them will move to Europe through Middle East. So, how to combat huge flows of immigration will be of grave significance. So, the main issue will not be an assertive Russia or Turkey, but possible demographic challenges. 

My last question is about military spending, because it is said that military spending is decreasing, even now Russia is the second largest arms exporter country but is actually shrinking a little bit. What do you observe in Russia’s military spending? Are there any reactions from society? I am asking this because Europe has to spend at least 2% of their GDP in defense spending. Is there a limitation on Russia to spend this kind of a percentage or is there any reaction from the society on military expenditure? 

In fact, the Russian political and military establishment understand very well that if infrastructure like roads, pipe-lines, and electricity lines are not renewed, then the security of Russia will not be better if people are not satisfied with the quality of their lives. There is a balance between let’s say how much fighter aircraft we are buying and how much and how many new bridges we can build. Russia is different than the Soviet Union and the country now gives its military and defense industry the minimum they need, but expecting the maximum return they can deliver.

Today, in the eyes of U.S. and most European countries, Putin’s Russia is more interventionist, aggressive and expansionist which has allegedly been the case in Georgia, Crimea, Ukraine, Syria and once again Afghanistan. While the Russian presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and especially across Southeast Europe provoked the political and military concerns of western allies, Ankara’s decision to purchase Russian military technology triggered even greater pessimism and a new round of fears at NATO. However, despite Turkey being key to the defense of NATO’s southeastern flank, the same kind of fear and concerns have long existed in Ankara subjected to many negative experiences from its NATO allies.

Nevertheless, even though Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952 and has contributed to the NATO alliance in many respects, such as storing American nuclear weapons in its İncirlik Base for many years, as well as hosting NATO’s Missile Defense Radar at a military base in Kürecik, it is obvious that Ankara will be facing numerous challenges in the next few years as a result of the decision to procure S-400s.

On the other hand, Ankara was already aware of the likely scenarios and possible negative outcomes of its choice to purchase a strategic weapon system from Russia, even if it is for “defense purposes”. In this respect, the cost of Turkey’s preference to buy the “best all-around” missile defense system will include both “direct” and “indirect” sanctions. The probable costs that Ankara will bear from the acquisition of Russian advanced weapon capabilities can be classified under five headings:

1. Shift in Washington’s attitude towards Ankara

Whether implicitly or explicitly, the first type of sanction will presumably be the significant changes in Washington’s political, economic, military and diplomatic attitudes towards Turkey’s foreign, security and defense interests. The American stance might be more challenging for Ankara on a wide range of topics such as: the PKK/PYD/YPG, the Syrian Civil War, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean and Cyprus issue, Palestine, refugees, and the currency crisis among other topics. From Washington’s perspective, the purpose would be to show that anyone – even a NATO ally – who partners or cooperates with “America’s adversary” (namely a “strategic rival”) will have to pay the price. Therefore, the price expected to be paid by Turkey will not only be in military measures, rather it will be across a broad landscape of issues that may lead to serious consequences. Such as diminishing Ankara’s political and legal position in growing regional disputes. For example, the rising tension because of natural gas discoveries in the region.

2. Formal Sanctions

The second cost will appear after imposing sanctions on Turkey under Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) (Public Law 115-44). While Section 235 of CAATSA lists 12 sanctions, the President can impose five or more of the sanctions described in the section. Additionally, the president can delay the imposition of the sanctions up to 180 days. Accordingly, if Trump would like to take a softer approach on Turkey then he can select five sanctions from the list which are the least costly and least harmful ones. Trump can also ask for flexibility in order to suspend the imposition of sanctions for a couple of months.

3. Cancellation of the delivery of F-35 Fighters

The third sanction is canceling the delivery of 100 F-35 fighters to Turkey. Some allege that Turkey’s military strength would be severely weakened in the absence of a fifth-generation multirole fighter that provides a greater performance on today’s battlefields with its high levels of survivability, awareness, readiness and effectiveness. In other words, it is assumed that a Turkish Air Force without F-35s in its inventory will not be able to achieve full operational capability. Besides, there are also other probable negative scenarios, F-16s which are currently used by Turkish Air Forces might fail to show operational performance in the near future if the U.S. does not provide the equipment required to perform specified maintenance tasks.

4. De facto implementation of sanctions 

The fourth sanction might be a de facto implementation of sanctions by Washington through defense export and procurement processes. Even if Trump does not select to impose the “export sanction” (Section 235/2) or the “procurement sanction” (235/6) in CAATSA, Washington might implicitly apply these two types of sanctions in order to punish Ankara by its defense companies. In this regard, the U.S. would continue to apply two basic punishment methods: (i) not to procure or enter into any contract for the procurement of any goods or services from the sanctioned person”, (ii) not to issue any specific license and not to grant any other specific permission or authority to export any goods or technology to the sanctioned person.

5. Removing Turkey from the F-35 fighter program 

The fifth and last sanction is removing Turkey from the F-35 fighter program and so altering the program’s supply chain operations. The Pentagon has already called for the discontinuation of Turkey’s participation in the F-35 program on July 17, 2019. As a result, Lockheed Martin stopped exporting goods from the Turkish supply chain. It is a fact that Turkey’s removal from the F-35 project will not only bring military disadvantages but will also lead to economic, technical and intellectual losses. 

Calculating the costs to Turkey’s defence industry

First and foremost, it is not a correct approach to make a net analysis on profits and losses by comparing the money paid by Ankara for purchasing 100 F-35’s with the amount of money expected to be earned by Turkish defense companies contributing to the construction of F-35s. The first reason is the total cost of acquiring F-35s does not finish when Ankara pays for the selling price. On the contrary, the cost of the F-35 program gradually increases over time as Turkey keeps investing in them so that they remain in service for decades, starting from the “Concept Demonstration” till the end of “Disposal” phase. Thus, the total Life Cycle Cost (LLC, also called as Total Ownership Cost) of F-35s would be very high even when you think Turkey pays through the expected service life of more than 100 platforms. Clearly, whether a program partner or a customer, the sustainment costs of F-35s will be very expensive for any buyer.

Turkey’s preference of buying the “best all-around” missile defense system will include both “direct” and “indirect” sanctions.

On the other side of the coin, Turkish defense companies would benefit for several decades as contributors to the F-35 supply chain. However, the estimated “10 billion for both the direct and indirect costs of sanctions on the Turkish defense industry” is neither an accurate calculation nor a rational way to declare a prediction. Initially, how the shifts in the F-35 supply chain will affect small and medium-sized national companies is a more important problem than the impact on the main contractors involved in the project who are the big companies in which the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation is a shareholder. In this sense, it is necessary to take into account the domestic debt in the defense industry and its losses. Especially for these small and medium-sized firms which may not survive and will be forced to undergo a winding-up process.   In contrast, TAI, HAVELSAN, KALE Aerospace, ROKETSAN, TUBİTAK SAGE, TUSAŞ Engine, ALP Aviation, AYESAŞ and FOKKER ELMO which have been producing different parts of the F-35s are the big companies of Turkish defense industry and can survive either way.

Secondly, if U.S. or any other NATO country like the United Kingdom, Germany or Italy cancel future exports to Turkey such as for T129 attack helicopters, then Turkey might prefer another supplier outside the NATO market. In addition to this, the technical and intellectual costs would be higher than sanctions imposed through licenses and exports, since “know-how” and “expertise” remains as the most critical investment for the future of the Turkish defense industry. However, it is also an option for Turkey to join as a partner to acquisition programs as well as cooperate on joint production facilities with various countries from different continents. Keeping in mind that the global defense market is becoming aggressively competitive for the top arms exporter countries. That is to say, there is a wide spectrum of suppliers searching to cooperate with the Turkish defense industry.

In brief, Turkey’s choice to acquire S-400s was not an instant and reactionary decision. As a matter of fact, Ankara’s decisiveness has long been recognized by its western allies. For this reason, the Ankara government had already foreseen the possible reactions given by its western allies. Thus, the possible sanctions were already voiced in official circles in Washington. Since the possible U.S. sanctions are not surprising, the likely scenarios such as the loss assessments and probable negative outcomes, have already been discussed within the Turkish defence bureaucracy. Now all eyes are on Washington which is still weighing the implementation of penalties and security measures against Turkey, and on Ankara’s response with a roadmap based on possible options varying from reconciliation through diplomacy to the use of counter-measures. Preparing for the worst, the Turkish defense industry might have to bear the burden of losses from being removed from the F-35 program and supply chain, but it should continue prioritizing the intellectual investment in the defence industry and learn how to become a “competitive supplier” rather than a “contributing customer”.

Deliveries of the Russian air defense systems S-400 to Turkey, which began on July 12, 2019, claim to be a historic event that marks the beginning of a new stage in the development of the Republic of Turkey. But not many people immediately realized the significance of this Turkish-Russian arms contract in modern Turkish history.

Full awareness of the significance of the deal began to occur in the last few days. In both Russia and Turkey, the public witnessed televised images of Ruslan aircrafts—the largest Russian transport aircrafts— ­­­landing at Mürted air base near Ankara.

The importance of the purchase of S-400 system by Turkey goes far beyond that of a single purchase of military equipment. It can result in large scale deals in the defense industry with impacts across all its segments: space, rocket production, aviation industry, shipbuilding, machine building, small arms, and so on. Moreover, we can talk not only about the purchase of these weapons by one party from another, but about a full-fledged partnership in the development, production and marketing of the manufactured equipment.

Moreover, such a long-term strategic deal may create further channels of dialogue between Turkey and Russia which have not previously existed or extensively used until now. By the S-400 deal, we may speak about the dialogue between the military structures and defense companies of the two countries. The significance of these new channels for Turkish-Russian relations is difficult to overestimate.

But, in all our discussions these days in Russia, questioning where relations between Russia and Turkey can move towards, there was always a question— if the S-400 deal will be brought to its logical conclusion.

The importance of the purchase of S-400 system by Turkey goes far beyond that of a single purchase of military equipment.

Let’s be honest: until July 12, 2019 a significant share of Russian observers and experts were skeptical and expressed serious doubts that something would not happen at the last moment to prevent the deal. This “something” however, did not happen, which broke all the patterns at the end of 2017. So, for the Russian experts footage on Turkish TV screens of the Russian Ruslan aircrafts landing at Mürted Airbase became both a refutation of their fears and a pleasant surprise, showing Turkey’s determination to cooperate with Russia in the defense industry.

Russian President Putin has a habit, regardless of relations with certain foreign countries or leaders, to call everyone “our partners”. As a result, his usage of “Western partners” or “American partners” in recent years when relations between Russia and the West have been particularly difficult, have acquired a completely definite meaning for everyone. When the Russian president is broadcasting, listeners understand what kind of partnership he is talking about.

So, for Russian observers, the practical implementation of the Russian-Turkish agreement on S-400 became a pleasant surprise. But, in the terms of President Putin, the “Western partners of Turkey” responded in a manner akin to the stages of grief recognized in modern psychology: denial, anger, bargaining, depression; and now the “Western partners” are about to move on to the fifth and final stage— the stage of acceptance. One does not even have to be a very attentive observer to identify the drift through all these five stages in the West, first of all, in the leaderships of both the USA and NATO.

In the first stage of “denial”, which lasts for a long time, the “Western partners” did not want to believe that the purchase of S-400 by Turkey might have taken place. In the foreign press and media, it was often possible to read and hear about “Turkish blackmail” as a strategy aiming to get something from the West. In the West, they got used to thinking that trade and bargaining is a kind of national sport for Turkish diplomacy. Accordingly, in the eyes of the West, Russia appeared to be a kind of “scarecrow”, which is used by Turks to scare Western politicians so that they “behave better towards Turkey”.

In the second stage of “anger”, Turkey started to hear reminders about the importance of bloc solidarity under NATO, which, after some time, turned to threats to apply measures and even sanctions against Turkey. In particular, through the framework of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) adopted in 2017.

It is not known who was more surprised with the word “sanctions”: the Turks, who were loyal allies of the North Atlantic Alliance for many years, or the Russians, who were watching what was happening like some kind of a fantastic movie. Moreover, the United States quickly stepped out of bounds when it declared the exclusion of Turkey from the joint development and production of F-35 fifth-generation fighter aircrafts, given that Turkey is a full-fledged participant in this project and fulfilling its obligations.

At the beginning of this year, we began to observe the third stage— “bargaining”. After many years of negotiations with the Turkish side, the Americans, finally proposed Turkey purchase their own “The Patriot” systems instead. However, “The Patriot” is outclassed by the S-400 System. When comparing the range of destruction of aerodynamic targets and ballistic missiles, target height, radar coverage range, deployment time, target speed, the reaction time of the complex, rocket launch angle and other measurements, the S-400 case is superior, and much more less expensive than the American system. It would be right to say that S-400 is a step forward and newer generation system than “The Patriot”. The S-400 was first introduced in the Russian army in year 2007, while “The Partiot” has been used by American military forces since 1982. At the same time, despite this proposal, technology transfer to Turkey by the Americans was not envisaged, and a positive decision of the American Congress was not guaranteed in advance.

The short-sightedness of the US in the past led to their loss of arms markets of India and Egypt to Russia. One which the Americans have been trying to get back for many years.

Ankara quite quickly figured out the issue for itself and the whole world during the G-20 Summit in Osaka. Where it observed the fourth stage –“depression” of the United States. Just remember how the American President Trump said to President Erdogan that he “understands Turkey” and that the Obama Administration, while being in power, “behaved badly” when it refused to sell “The Patriot” to Turkey. What the whole world saw cannot be called by other word then “depression”. Because America had nothing to offer to Turkey today to persuade it or force it to abandon the S-400 deal.

And depression is followed by the final fifth stage, “acceptance”. Throughout this time, America tried to talk to Turkey not as a regional leader but as a third world country. As a result, the Americans had to change the tone of their communication with Turkey and even delay the imposition of sanctions. However, it is not clear for how long this will last. Maybe the Americans remembered how their short-sighted moves in the past led to their loss of arms markets of India and Egypt, and how Russia took the place of the United States in these countries. One which the Americans have been trying to get back for many years.

Today, a very similar situation occurs for the United States with Turkey. Turkey has shown itself to be a truly independent state, making a decision and bringing it to its logical conclusion. This is despite the unprecedented pressure that was exerted on Turkey to force it to abandon the S-400 deal, and speaking more broadly, to abandon Turkey’s possible cooperation with Russia in the defense industry.

After S-400 case, we saw the new Turkey. One which the West and perhaps even the whole world will now have to accept. This is quite painful for the West. But if, for example, the United States exclude Turkey from the F-35 program, doubtless, Russia will be happy to begin negotiations on the sale of its fighters Su-35 or even Su-57 instead of the F-35.

By coincidence, it was on these days that Turkey celebrated the third anniversary of the failed coup attempt, organized by Fetullah Gulen and its criminal cult with their headquarters in the United States. Today’s Turkey has enough power to make its own decisions and defend them regardless of external pressure. And, it seems, that the S-400 deal became “two in one”: a solution for Turkey, which is strengthening its defense capacity, and an important test for true independence in the international arena. Nowadays, we are witnessing how the fifth stage begins —the stage of acceptance of such a Turkey by the West and by the whole world.

Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missile system continues to prompt debate in Ankara and Washington. The United States maintains that Turkey’s use of the Russian system will subject American F-35 fighter jets to potential exploitation by competitors. At the same time, Turkey has stressed that the missile defense system is key to preserving its sovereignty and security. In the past few weeks, tension over the purchase has reached new heights. As the first delivery of the the Russian system arrived in Turkey, many in Washington were eager to respond. In a statement released by the White House, the Trump administration announced Turkey’s removal from the U.S. F-35 program. Several U.S. government officials have argued that Turkey should also face sanctions. However, in contrast to Congress and many of his own appointed officials, President Trump has refrained from offering condemnations. His comments on the S-400 dispute have led many to consider the President as a wild card, who may choose to protect Turkey from a harsh domestic backlash.

Over the past month, President Trump has demonstrated a clear reluctance to draw lines in the sand over the S-400 issue. After meeting with President Erdogan in Osaka, the President differed from his Turkish counterpart in how he recounted their bilateral meeting. President Erdogan’s post-meeting comments suggested that a resolution had been reached on this critical point of tension. He called Turkey’s S-400 purchase “a done deal” and stated that he received personal assurance from President Trump that the United States will not impose sanctions on Turkey. On the same day, President Trump painted a much less detailed picture. When asked if the United States will impose sanctions, the President failed to directly respond. In his response, he commented on the Kurdish issue in Syria, the release of American Pastor, Andrew Brunson, from Turkish detention, and on his personal rapport with President Erdogan—and yet he failed to provide any clarification on the U.S. sanction threat.

The one main point of presidential agreement President Trump did elaborate on centered on shared criticism of the Obama administration. Under President Obama, Turkey had first attempted to purchase the U.S. Patriot missile system, but several attempts at negotiations stalled and a deal was never struck. President Trump explained, “But, honestly, I’m all for our country, but [President Erdogan] got treated very unfairly. He was told you can’t buy it, you can’t buy it.” While calling the situation a “problem” and “a mess”, he concluded that both leaders would continue to work on the issue. Overall, the President provided little insight into any concrete developments that may have been achieved in Osaka. Instead of listing U.S. expectations for the future, his comments focused on how Turkey’s Russian purchase could have been avoided in the first place.

With Turkey’s expulsion from the F-35 program affirmed and talk of sanctions buzzing in Washington, all attention has turned to President Trump.

In direct contrast, members of Congress and the national security apparatus have been eager to criticize Turkey and many have clearly advocated for a hardline response. As recently as this past week, congressional action has targeted Turkey: Republican Senators Rick Scott and Todd Young proposed a resolution that condemns Turkey’s S-400 purchase and calls on the President to issue retaliatory sanctions. Additionally, before the system’s delivery, five other major pieces of legislation circulated in Congress with the objective to exclude Turkey from the F-35 program. Moreover, over the past month, comments made by officials from both the State Department and the Department of Defense have sought to push the administration towards the sanctions option. In a letter to Turkey’s defense minister, the former U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense proposed that Turkey would face both sanctions and disassociation from the F-35 program if the country activated its purchased missile systems. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo commented, “The law requires that there be sanctions and I’m confident that we will comply with the law and President Trump will comply with the law.” Particularly in this presidency, rarely have issues brought together both sides of the aisle and members of the administration. However, instead of supporting recommendations that might satisfy his appointed officials and win him political points in Congress, the President has not embraced calls for severe reprisal.

In fact, President Trump has continued to utilize talking points similar to those he employed in Osaka. In a cabinet meeting, when speaking in reference to Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program, he stated, “It’s a very tough situation that they’re in, and it’s a very tough situation that we’ve been placed in the United States … we’ll see what happens. But it’s not really fair.” Though he denied he was “sticking up” for Turkey, the President once again highlighted his good relationship with President Erdogan. Last week, in a response to a question inquiring about sanctions, he told reporters that the administration was not currently looking at the sanctions option. When the President met with a group of Republican Senators to discuss the topic further, it was reported that he advocated for negotiations with President Erdogan. His reportedly pointed discussion with Senator James Risch on the matter suggests the President’s intent to make headway in the closed-door meeting, but it remains unknown if Senators have altered their positions. Considering the extent of congressional criticism over the past two years, it may take President Trump more than one meeting to inspire a change of mind.

While President Erdogan and President Trump agreed in Osaka on the importance of the U.S.-Turkey alliance, the arrival of the missile system in Turkey foreshadows difficult times ahead for the strategic partnership. With Turkey’s expulsion from the F-35 program affirmed and talk of sanctions buzzing in Washington, all attention has turned to President Trump. Will he convince Congress to change course? Or, if unsuccessful, will he utilize his power as president to delay or waive sanctions? If the President chooses to risk political controversy on Turkey’s behalf, a greater question remains: how will U.S.-Turkey relations fair as a result?

During the Cold War period and the decade following its ending, Turkey experienced a phase in which its defense policies were integrated to the policies developed by NATO, while terrorism was fought in line with the military’s foresight inside the country.

Regarding decision-making mechanisms and politics, dominated by the military and the bureaucratic elite at the time, solely as structures to obtain funds remained under the veil of the sacredness attributed to the subjects related to defense.

In the present situation, it has become a requisite for the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), which has successfully remained as a ruling power by overcoming all kinds of tutelage mechanisms since the early 2000s, to confront this problem. Particularly in the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt, the politically and institutionally autonomous spaces developed within the security mechanisms of the country by the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ) and the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) as from the 1960 coup attempt became visible and showed the necessity of holding the TSK under a democratic monitoring.  

The need for air defense systems

Although countries’ needs for air defense systems have been evident since the Germans used the V2 missiles that could hit targets within 250 kilometers of distance during World War II, an air defense system that offers solutions with an integrative perspective has never been established in Turkey, where NATO’s defense policies were complied with until the 1990s. Even though low altitude air defense systems and radar systems were set up in order to protect some critical facilities and cities during the Cold War period, it is obvious that these systems are unable to avert threats today. This becomes even sharper as the air defense systems owned by Turkey and the threats surrounding the country are contrasted.

Turkey has many different air radar site commands and radar systems deployed in critical zones for the monitor and control of its air space. Within these systems, four E737 airborne early warning and control aircrafts comprise a significant monitoring and warning mechanism as they can control more than 3 thousand targets within the range of 350 kilometers and the altitude of 12.200 meters. However, these radar systems do not have the ability to trace enemy air components from beyond 600 kilometers unlike S-400 radars. Also, a defense system that is integrated to these radar systems and that can eliminate enemy air components (aircraft and missile systems) in medium or high altitude is unfortunately not present in the TAF inventory.

The air defense systems registered in the TAF inventory, which are considerably less advanced and more effective against low altitude components rather than ballistic missile threats, are listed below:

• Bofors L60 and L70 anti-aircraft gun system (manufactured in 1934 and currently used in order to protect the base areas in certain sizes within 4-kilometer effective range)
• Oerlikon anti-aircraft gun systems (manufactured and registered in the TSK inventory in 1956, and used against low altitude components with its 4-kilometer effective range)
• Rapier missile systems (included in the TSK inventory in 1983 and still used by the TSK in low altitude air defense with its 8-kilometer effective range)
• Stinger shoulder-fired air defense system and pedestal mounted systems (first manufactured in 1978 and effective in low altitude, these systems are used by the TSK both for the purpose of shoulder launch and as a pedestal mounted model)
• Korkut air defense system (used as low altitude air defense system in 4-kilometer effective range)
• Hawk air defense system (first manufactured in 1960, this system entered the TSK inventory in 2001. It is actively used with its 18-kilometer effective range)
• Nike Hercules air defense system (entered in the TSK inventory in 1964, this system is no longer used and about to be removed from the inventory)

The threats and S-400 systems

As can be seen, the air defense systems owned by Turkey are designed for low altitude and remain much less developed considering the current ones. Turkey confronts a major threat stemming from both its neighbors and allies. Although Turkey initially tried to close this gap with the air defense batteries it requested from NATO, the experiences revealed that this method is not always effective.

During the 1991 Gulf War, it turned out that Turkey did not have the means to protect itself from Iraq’s Scud missile systems, which had limited media coverage at the time.

During the 1991 Gulf War, it turned out that Turkey did not have the means to protect itself from Iraq’s Scud missile systems, which had media coverage at the time, albeit to a limited extent. However, the issue was forgotten until the Second Gulf War due to Ankara’s focus on the fight against terrorism.  

During the Second Gulf War, the issue was remembered again due to the possible missile attacks on Turkish territory that could stem from the possibility that Turkey might lend its bases to the U.S. When the necessity to urgently meet this deficit was brought to NATO’s agenda, Germany, France and Belgium strictly opposed this support, which inevitably added a political character in the debates on Turkey’s air defense system. It can be remembered that then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, issued an array of statements to NATO and European capitals and endeavored to convince these countries.

Between the Second Gulf War (2003) and the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, the Turkish government ran a busy schedule to meet the deficit in the national air defense system. When the purchase of Patriot missile systems from the U.S. was hindered by the U.S. Congress, Turkey announced in 2008 that it would go out to tender to close the gap in its air defense system and made a call to the companies that could possibly join the tender by releasing a request for proposals in 2010. Although Chinese, Russian, American, French and Italian firms placed bids, Turkey announced to public that the best offer was made by the Chinese firm as a result of the tally conducted on the basis of certain criteria such as technology transfer, costs, delivery time etc. Following this announcement, Turkey confronted serious pressure about purchasing an air defense system from China, and the tender, whose winner was not officially announced, was postponed with a political decision due to all the pressure.

Following the atrocious coup attempt Turkey went through on July 15, 2016, the West displayed a hypocritical approach and covertly sided with the coup organizers, which showed the Turkish government the diversity of the military threat sources it confronts. Turkey, which sought to urgently close the gap in its air defense system after that, made an agreement with Russia for the procurement and financing of the S-400 air defense system since Russia made the optimum commitment on the subject whereas NATO allies, particularly the U.S., refused to agree with Turkey on many aspects such as the delivery date, technology transfer and overall cost.

Russia made the optimum commitment on the air defense system issue whereas NATO allies, particularly the U.S., refused to agree with Turkey on many aspects such as the delivery date, technology transfer and cost.

Turkey’s air defense area

Currently, Turkey is confronted by several fait accompli policies since the country’s influence area is tried to be limited to İskenderun and Antalya Gulfs and it is attempted to revoke the rights of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Turkish Cypriots. Besides, both the EU and U.S. Congress are openly threatening the country on this matter.

Meanwhile, despite being Turkey’s ally, the U.S. continues to provide all kinds of weaponry and equipment to the terror groups in our region and openly supports the terror corridor that will besiege Turkey. In addition to all these threats, the threat of medium- and long-range missiles based in Iran, Israel, Armenia and Syria is growing each day. Considering the possibility that the West might also intervene in a conflict that might emerge due to the Eastern Mediterranean issue, it becomes more obvious that Turkey needs to make up the deficiencies in its national air defense as soon as possible.

The most urgent and essential strategic step in Turkey’s defense policy is to establish an effective high altitude air defense system in the Anatolia region.

Undoubtedly, the procurement of S-400 air defense systems is not sufficient for an air defense mechanism that requires a multi-layered system, which is surely within the knowledge of the political will that develops defense policies. Those who argue that purchasing S-400s are unnecessary for Turkey and that the country should not turn to groups other than NATO use the fact that the S-400 is not sufficient for air defense on its own as an excuse. They seemingly wish to see the continuity of the volatilities in Turkey’s defense system.

Leaving the country’s air defense to the mercy of NATO is another matter of debate that requires a thorough analysis. But in light of the developments, the most urgent and essential strategic step in Turkey’s defense policy is to establish an effective high altitude air defense system in the Anatolia region. After this step, Turkey will undoubtedly establish a multi-layered defense mechanism that will be able to rule out missiles and other air threats with medium and low altitude air defense systems in short and medium terms.

Since it is the government’s responsibility to defend the country against all kinds of attacks according to the Constitution, the political powers should lend an ear to the voice of those who can fight for their country and should pay attention to their constitutional responsibilities instead of listening to those serving the West.  

The year of 2019, and especially its first half, will go into the history of Turkey-U.S. relations as a critical turning point. At no point during the 70 years of bilateral relations, there existed such a strong opposition towards Turkey in Washington, as there is today. Within the first five months of the year, almost 10 bills and resolutions regarding Turkey were introduced in the U.S. Congress. Turkey’s plan to purchase the S-400 air defense systems has brought all groups in the U.S. opposing Turkey together, with Congress coming first. From the Armenian lobby to the Greek lobby, from the Jewish lobby to Neo-con think-tanks and the Central Command (CENTCOM), a wide range of actors are working to block progress in politics and diplomacy by using anti-Turkish propaganda. Statements made and the bills that are introduced show that the common point of all this propaganda is Ankara’s purchase of the S-400 systems.

Upon a brief examination of the latest developments in relations between Turkey and the U.S., a difference in discourse between Ankara and Washington on the subject of the S-400 can be clearly observed. Turkey defines the S-400 agreement as one that is complete and finalized. It must be noted that despite this, statements made by U.S. authorities portray the situation regarding the S-400 systems as one where Ankara can still be convinced. Within the last few weeks, reports citing anonymous sources emerged in the U.S. stating that Turkey was offered to indefinitely delay the purchase of the S-400s and that Ankara was evaluating this option. But these claims were dismissed by Turkish authorities.

At no point during the 70 years of bilateral relations, there existed such a strong opposition towards Turkey in Washington, as there is today.

A statement pushing the boundaries of diplomacy regarding the Istanbul elections was published by the U.S. Department of State. The expression in the statement that the U.S. “took note” of the decision to cancel the election is one that is hard to understand diplomatically. On the other hand, it has been expressed that regarding Syria, the meetings between the two countries are positively progressing. The 50% tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum exports to the U.S. introduced during the Brunson crisis were also reduced to 25%. Beyond these topics, anti-Turkey propaganda and the pressure applied on the administration in regards to the S-400 issue continues.

Anti-Turkish sentiment in the U.S. Congress

On the subject of Turkey, most of the pressure applied on the administration comes from Congress. It’s no secret that whenever Trump closes his doors and starts engaging with Turkey, members of Congress come forward with statements, bills and resolutions opposing Turkey. It must be emphasized that this anti-Turkish sentiment in Congress causes great damage to bilateral relations. Attempting to keep Ankara on Washington’s side by applying pressure on the subject of defense while Turkey is trying to overcome national security matters is not an attitude that is possible to explain in strategic terms. Due to the fact that there is a “diffusion of power” in the global arena against the U.S., the administration is planning a national security strategy that prioritizes rivalry between great powers. In such a situation, the approach of applying pressure on an actor, especially one that has played a critical role during the Cold War era, should not be expected to serve the interests of the U.S. in any way.

Within the last three months, seven bills directly concerning Turkey were introduced to the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. All these bills had both Democrat and Republican representatives as their sponsors. This is important in illustrating the scale of anti-Turkish sentiment in the U.S. Congress. It is also worth mentioning that almost all of these bills referred to Turkey’s purchase of the S-400s. In other words, seven bills opposing Turkey were introduced to the U.S. Congress within a span of three months, of which all were supported by both Republican and Democrat representatives, and all of these bills included opposition to the purchase of S-400 air defense systems, whether relevant to the bill or not.

Anti-Turkey sentiment in the U.S. Congress is high. Within the last three months, seven bills directly concerning Turkey were introduced, all with the support of both Democrat and Republican representatives.

The first of these bills is the National Defense Authorization Act of 2019. This act is also known as the defense budgeting bill. While its general purpose is drawing the limits of Pentagon’s budget, it also contains many sections regarding foreign policy. Parts of this bill are dedicated to Turkey and request a report from the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense regarding Ankara’s purchase of the S-400s. The National Defense Authorization Act of the previous year also requested a report on the same subject and this was presented to Congress in November. However, this time it was requested for the report to be updated and that until this report was submitted, the delivery of F-35s to Turkey to be stopped. Prior to this bill, the temporary spending bill that ended the temporary spending crisis between Trump and Congress and allowed the Federal Government to reopen also requested the U.S. Department of Defense, in consultation with the State Department, to submit a report regarding the status of the Turkish-American alliance and Turkey’s purchase of the S-400s. Until the report is submitted, or until November 1, 2019, the transfer of any F-35 aircraft or equipment to Turkey has thus been banned.

The first bill that directly concerned Turkey was introduced on March 28, 2019, by Republican Oklahoma Senator James Lankford, Democratic New Hampshire Senator Jeanne Shaheen, Republican North Carolina Senator Thamos Tillis and Democratic Maryland Senator Chris Van Hollen. The bill titled “Protecting NATO Skies Act” states that no F-35 aircraft should be transferred to Turkey until the U.S. government confirms that Turkey will not receive any S-400 air defense systems. The bill also states that no intellectual property and data regarding the maintenance of F-35s must be transferred to Turkey and that no storage facilities for these aircrafts should be established in the country.

The bill also emphasizes that Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 systems is within the scope of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and states that “such a purchase would endanger the integrity of the NATO alliance, would adversely affect ongoing operations of the United States Armed Forces, including coalition operations in which the United States Armed Forces participate, would result in a significant impact to defense cooperation between the United States and Turkey, and would significantly increase the risk of compromising United States defense systems and operational capabilities.” A similar bill was also introduced to the House of Representatives. Of course, it must be expressed that the points of whether these bills will be considered alone or appended to another bill, or whether they’ll undergo changes, are not clear but they are important in reflecting the opinions of Congress.

Other bills suggesting to call the events of 1915 a so-called “Armenian Genocide” were introduced to the Senate and House of Representatives in April. These bills are non-binding. But the fact that Rashida Tlaib, a Muslim U.S. representative who is of Palestinian origin, was among the sponsors of one of these bills presents a situation that must be carefully considered. Another bill introduced to the U.S. Senate was titled “Defending United States Citizens and Diplomatic Staff from Political Prosecutions Act.” This bill directly targeted Turkey and was aimed at Turkish citizens working at U.S. diplomatic missions who have been found to be in contact with the Gulenist Terror Group, also known as FETO. But in this bill as well in the section regarding the outlook of Congress towards Turkey, it was stated that an agreement between Turkey and Russia regarding the S-400s would negatively impact relations between Turkey and the U.S.

There is also another bill that deserves special attention due to the potential it carries of creating many serious strategic consequences if passed into law. This is the bill titled “Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act” introduced by Democratic representative Bob Menendez and Republican representative Marco Rubio, both of whom are members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In the section titled “Findings”, the bill emphasizes the importance of cooperation with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), Israel and Greece, and states that it opposes behaviors and attitudes in the Mediterranean, Aegean and the Middle East (all but naming Turkey) that are one-sided, in violation of international law and against the principle of maintaining good relations with neighboring countries. It also draws attention to the statement made during the trilateral meeting held between Israel, GCASC and Greece on March 21 that any “ill-intentioned activities” would be defended against, and supports this sentiment. The same section also mentions that Turkey has purchased S-400 systems from Russia and could be subjected to CAATSA sanctions due to this.

The bill emphasizes that the U.S. must ensure energy supply security between its allies. In this section, which expresses that energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean will lead to the economic benefit of Europe, the importance of building the Southern Gas Corridor and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline in reducing Europe’s energy dependency on Russia is stressed. The bill suggests removing the arms embargo on the GCASC, the creation of a U.S. Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center to help energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean between Israel, GCASC, Greece and the U.S., providing Greece with 3 million dollars of foreign military financing assistance, and providing Greece with 2 million dollars and GCASC with 2 million dollars of funding for international military education and training support.

If the Menendez & Rubio bill on the Eastern Mediterranean passes, it will change the existing military status quo in the region.

There are two points that deserve extra attention in the Eastern Mediterranean bill: First, if the bill passes, the U.S. will have officially interfered on the matter of energy resources in the E. Mediterranean in favor of the interests of Israel, Greece and GCASC. Secondly, the U.S. will change the existing military status quo in the region by removing the arms embargo on the GCASC. The U.S. also enforced an arms embargo on Turkey following the Cyprus Peace Operation, but removed this without Ankara hanging its Cyprus policy. The arms embargo on GCASC was kept in place. Despite the fact that many bills put forward with pressure of the Greek lobby recommended the removal of the embargo, these attempts failed. The difference in this case is that alongside the subject of energy in the Eastern Mediterranean, this bill also mentions reducing Europe’s energy dependency on Russia and blocking the transfer of F-35 aircrafts to Turkey until it abandons its plans on the S-400s. This greatly increases the chances that Congress will pass this bill into law. Moreover, the fact that the main sponsors of the bill are Rubio and Menendez, two influential representatives from both sides of the aisle, shows the gravity of the situation.

It can be said that the Greek, Armenian, Jewish and all other anti-Turkish lobbies have found an opportunity to employ all their strategies against Turkey in Congress. There are almost no representatives with a favorable attitude towards Turkey, including Muslim representatives as well. The efforts of Congress to oppose Turkey today are severe enough to cause strategic cracks in relations between the two countries. And the subject of S-400s has been transformed from a technical matter to a political problem between Turkey and the U.S.

Turkey and F-35 

Turkey has repeated the same statements since the day it signed the S-400 agreement. Turkish authorities expressed that this was a finalized agreement and that Ankara urgently needed air defense systems. The administration also added that a joint technical study on the S-400 systems could be conducted with the U.S. in terms of assessing its risks. However, the discourse on the subject changed as the issue became more politicized in the U.S. The U.S. expected this issue to be resolved by Turkey accepting not to activate these systems. Concerns regarding the deployment and activation of these systems were being voiced, but with pressure from the Congress on the administration, the completion of Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 systems have become unacceptable. During budget meetings in Congress, both U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan stated that in the case of Turkey completing the purchase of S-400 systems, the transfer of F-35s will not be allowed. The nuance in the discourse shows how political pressure has affected the administration.

In addition to this, the U.S. has prepared steps that will be taken against Turkey, meaning, the plan to exclude Ankara from the F-35 program. Shanahan confirmed that they met with partners of the F-35 program regarding Ankara’s exclusion from the program after Pentagon stopped the transfer concerning F-35s to Turkey and the manufacture of F-35 parts by Turkish firms. However, the details of this process are even more interesting. In the report presented by the Pentagon to Congress in November, possible complications that may occur in Ankara’s exclusion and legal and judicial concerns along with all precautions that will be taken regarding these concerns are evaluated and plans for all possible scenarios on this subject are clearly described.

An official from the Pentagon stated, “In a letter on July, Secretary Mattis voiced the complications that may occur if Turkey is excluded. And following this the Congress told us to go and take all precautions for the possible situation. And that is what we worked on.” Talks are being held with partnering countries on this subject and strangely enough, more than whether Turkey should be excluded or not, these meetings focus on who will take on the business and production parts that the Turkish defense industry handles, along with where and how this production can be done, meaning its feasibility in the event that Turkey is excluded. In other words, the only worry for partners regarding Turkey’s exclusion is how countries and shareholders remaining in the project will slice up the pie of work that will be created.

One of the most important aspects of the S-400 crisis that must be emphasized is that for the U.S., this subject is no longer a technical matter that can be overcome, but one that is very much a political matter. The perception created in the U.S. is on such a level that it’s being said in meetings of the U.S. National Security Council that Turkey has purchased the S-400 systems especially to operate outside of NATO and that it intends to use these systems against the alliance.

The U.S. expected the S-400 issue to be resolved by Turkey accepting not to activate these systems. 

In meetings concerning national security, it is being discussed that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan believes the U.S. and NATO countries supported FETO’s failed coup attempt and that in case there is another coup attempt and NATO supports this, S-400s could be used against the alliance. The biggest factor in the creation of this perception has been the propaganda from think tanks known for their support for FETO and other terror groups such as the PKK/YPG and names that are well-respected in the U.S. with no tolerance against Turkey. For example, Turkey’s expectation towards Trump bringing sanity back to the U.S.’ Turkey policy by handling the S-400 crisis together with President Erdogan is being attempted to be nullified.

Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), Eric Edelman, who is known for his close relations with FETO and FDD Vice President Jonathan Schanzer discussed this subject in an article published in the Wall Street Journal. Both stated that Trump must not show any tolerance towards Turkey. The article is carefully written and penned as if to constitute a briefing for Trump, and describes Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 systems as a “serious national security threat for the U.S.” The article is almost an attempt to block any moves Trump can make on the subject of the S-400s. At the same time, propaganda about removing U.S. nuclear weapons under the authority of NATO from Turkey is being brought into public discussion by similar organizations and media institutions. Thus, it seems very difficult for the U.S. administration to escape this torrent of manufactured perceptions and focus on the long-term strategic interests of the U.S. These manufactured perceptions also make it impossible for Turkey to express its anxieties regarding its national security and explain its commitment to multinational partnerships such as NATO.

What in the aftermath?

It is not in the interests of the U.S. to pressure Turkey through its national security. Turkey lies in a circle of fire. There’s Russia on one end of the circle and the U.S. on the other. In an environment where global politics is evolving towards such a multipolar order, U.S. pressuring Turkey as if it is the absolute hegemon will not yield any results. Let alone an ally that has thousands of years of state tradition, the U.S. can no longer exert authority on small states such as Venezuela, Cuba, or North Korea, or a state that has been under embargos for years, such as Iran. Russians have taken the Assad regime in Syria at the verge of death from the hands of the U.S. and has revived it. It is unknown why the U.S., seeing Russia and China in every corner in international politics, expects the pressure policy that it engages in at the risk of alienating an actor such as Turkey to yield results.

It is not in the interests of the U.S. to pressure Turkey through its national security. Turkey lies in a circle of fire. There’s Russia on one end of the circle and the U.S. on the other.

Turkey may have economic vulnerabilities and this pressure policy of the U.S. may have an effect on the economy to a certain point, but it will not lead to changes in Turkey’s national security strategy. This is because Turkey is not an actor that can easily be overcome in the region. Second, its national security strategy is based on the security balances and the threats in the region, and it will not negotiate on these points. Third, the acceleration of its national defense industry initiative is another goal that will be executed in parallel to its national security strategy. Turkey has long expressed that it no longer wishes to be exclusively a buyer of military equipment and that it is making investments and engaging in programs towards this goal. Thus, its national defense industry initiative is directly related to the security balances and threats in the region. Turning Turkey back from this point will interfere with the future prosperity of the country.

There is currently a diffusion of power in the global arena. There is no longer a singular hegemon, but regional hegemons. The U.S. is part of this hegemony in every region. It has updated its strategy for the “new cold war” that it has entered with China and Russia according to the principles of competition with great powers and in every region, even in space, is attempting to decrease the influence and presence of Russia and China. Losing Turkey in such an environment would lead to a great loss for the U.S. and Europe in the long run. Whether this policy of pressure will help solve problems between the U.S. and Turkey is still being discussed, but what is obvious is that it is leading to a level of distrust that has never been seen before between the two governments.

Two parties are simply arm-wrestling to prove their points in a historical evaluation process of their alliance in the rapidly changing age of the new international system.

Since the July 15, 2016, failed coup attempt in Turkey, bilateral relations between Turkey and the U.S. have been deteriorating. The recent S-400 conflict may lead to a new phase of relations between the two NATO allies. The cause of this conflict is Ankara’s determined stance in buying S-400 air defense missiles from Russia. In return, the U.S. has threatened to apply CAATSA sanctions on Turkey and remove the country from the ongoing F-35 project, which involves 8 countries in total.

How did this happen in the first place? Merve Seren – Associate Professor at Yildirim Beyazit University, Ankara, argues that Turkey has been using Nike Hercules and I-HAWKS defense missiles, dating back to the 60s technology, with an updated version of i-hawks (improved hawks). However, Ankara’s neighbors have all been updating their defense systems and this has proved as a serious threat to Turkey’s national security.

Ankara’s neighbors have all updated their defense systems and this has proved as a serious threat to Turkey’s national security.

Merve Seren highlighted how Turkey declared the need of a new defense system to its NATO allies back in 2006, before the Syrian Civil War kicked off, but that no serious development took place. After the break out of the crisis in Syria, Turkey’s need of an updated defense system became vital and therefore Ankara asked for offers from producing countries. Based on price, delivery time, co-production and various other criteria, China initially won the bid. However, the contract was cancelled due to pressure coming from the U.S. administration at the time.

Merve Seren also notes that in 2015, Turkey requested missiles from NATO. Batteries arrived, but Seren adds that due to differences among Turkey and other NATO allies in their policies towards the ongoing Syrian crisis (e.g. buffer zone, YPG/PKK), batteries were removed from Turkey in 2016. According to Seren, these developments isolated Turkey among its NATO allies, which is why the country had to seek to purchase an alternative system.

The alternative came from Russia. After the Russian plane crash incident, Russia and Turkey declared a strategic alliance to find solutions to the Syrian crisis. The Turkish government signed a deal with Russia and purchased S-400 missiles to be delivered in July 2019. Meanwhile, Turkey conducted two successful military operations in Syria with the support of Russia.

The issue is not about F-35s or S-400s; the real issue is the balance of power in the region.

According to TRT Middle East producer Muhammad Valid, the issue is not about F-35s or S-400s; the real issue is the balance of power in the region. Turkey and Israel are the two most important military powers balancing each other in the region, together with other regional actors. Since the Obama administration, the U.S. has wanted to keep Turkey weak and fragile, as opposed to increasing support for Israel. Valid adds that “Keeping Turkey weak would prevent President Erdogan from criticizing Netanyahu and Sisi – two close allies of the U.S.”

Similar to Merve Seren, political analyst at TRT World, Yusuf Erim, argues that Turkey has been left alone by the U.S. administration during the process. He gives the example of cancelled Sig Sauer hand-guns to Turkish President Erdogan’s security guards. Erim argues that the U.S. strategy to keep Turkey fragile forced the latter for an alternative, and when Turkey did try alternative defense systems, the U.S. applied political pressure. This is why the HQ-9 contract with China was cancelled. However, Erim notes that this time round Turkey did not only engage with Russia to purchase S-400s, but is in a strategic cooperation, which is why Ankara did not cancel the contract on this occasion.

The experts we have contacted confirm that the S-400 row between the U.S. and Turkey can be solved technically by a joint group from both sides.

At the moment the U.S. administration is forcing Turkey to cancel the contract, claiming that the placement of S-400s in Turkey and F-35s flying over them is “incompatible.” The experts we have contacted so far including Merve Seren, Muhammad Valid and Yusuf Erim, confirm the possibility to some degree with some objections, but they all seem to think that the issue of security can be solved technically by a joint group from both sides.  

According to records, President Erdogan and Donald Trump had a phone call and discussed the joint group option regarding the procurement of the S-400 defense system at the end of April. During a meeting held on May 1 in Ankara, Turkish Defense Minister Huluski Akar emphasized this point to U.S. Special Envoy for Syria, James Jeffrey. During an interview, Akar stated that the cancellation of Turkey’s order of F-35s (100 planes) or removal of Turkey from the F-35 project are both against international law and would damage both the project’s future as well as the companies and countries involved.

Yusuf Erim and Muhammad Valid confirm that the removal of Turkey from the F-35 project will affect the future of the project in a negative way. In the first place, Erim argues that the project has already been delayed enough, and that the removal of Turkey from the project will further delay the process for at least two years. This would have a negative impact on the confidence of the companies and countries involved. Secondly, while there are some technological problems in the project, it is not easy to remove Turkish companies from the project as these companies are producing critical parts that require years of know-how knowledge and experience. Finally, Turkey has the advantage of using F-35s in real conflicts toward the threats from the south, test the product, record valuable information about the product and its combat capabilities. According to Erim, this point is quite important for the market confidence in F-35s. Therefore, he argues that the U.S. will keep Turkey inside the project and deliver the F-35s.

Buying F-35 does not mean Turkey can use the planes wherever-whenever. The joint system of F-35s does not allow you to act independently but only together with the U.S.

Merve Seren adds that buying F-35 does not mean Turkey can use the planes wherever-whenever. The joint system of F-35s does not allow you to act independently but only together with the U.S. In other words, buying F-35s does not give property rights to Turkey – there are only 4 countries that have this right: Israel, South Korea, Japan, and Singapore. Seren specifically highlights that purchasing S-400s would not cause Turkey to leave NATO, but rather that both NATO and Turkey will benefit from this purchase. She also adds that the locations of deployment of S-400s is quite crucial in this process. Seren argues that it is important to highlight the fact that Turkey is not a threat to NATO or the West. In fact, Turkey is protecting NATO’s western borders in the hardest line of alliance and without Turkey’s strong stand, Europe would face greater threats.

Muhammad valid argues that the U.S. administration will sell F-35s to Turkey, but that if F-35s do not arrive to Turkey, then the latter could purchase SU-35 from Russia, which are more practical, cheap and one of the best air superiority planes in the market. In fact, he adds that F-35 is not an air superiority plane (like SU-35), but a multi-function plane.

If F-35s do not arrive to Turkey, then Turkey could purchase SU-35 from Russia, which are more practical, cheap and one of the best air superiority planes in the market.

Yusuf Erim argues that the U.S. sees the situation as damage to its reputation and does not want this product to be sold to Turkey. Erim states that according to Americans, the issue has become one of precedent, which allows for Russia to emerge as a competitor in the military industrial market. Therefore, they are forcing Turkey to cancel the deal. Erim argues that the U.S. administration describes the situation as Russia selling a ‘big ticket item’ to an important NATO ally for the first time in history.

The S-400 crisis is just one of the many differences of opinion between Turkey and the U.S. Other areas of differences include the YPG/PKK existence in northern Syria, excessive U.S. support for Israel, and U.S. sanctions on Iran. Both sides are changing their policies according to their new position in the rapidly changing developments both in the region and the world. However, Turkey, which declares a strong defense system is vital for its national security – based on the developments in the region – seems to have the upper-hand in the wrestle, as opposed to the U.S., which is basically trying to keep an ally under control. The relationship between President Erdogan and Donald Trump may help find a solution to S-400 row. However, many uncertainties in the region may lead to new other crises between the two.

Turkey has focused on the local election results for more than three weeks. The outcome of the Istanbul elections is still under dispute between the AK Party and CHP, yet Ankara’s foreign policy agenda is much more complicated than the election results. President Erdogan has to deal with two significant difficulties simultaneously. While he is revising his political strategy to re-energize the AK Party and his constituency to maintain his strength, he is also trying to find the best approach to overcome the upcoming foreign policy crisis stemming mainly from Turkey’s decision to purchase S-400s.

In the latest bilateral meeting between Erdogan and Putin held in Moscow within the framework of High-Level Strategic Cooperation, both presidents underlined that S-400 surface to air defense missile system would be delivered to Turkey at the end of July this year. President Erdogan also stressed that Turkey is interested in different sub-complementary lower missile systems to deepen its defense and military relations with Russia.  

President Erdogan has to deal with two significant difficulties: revise his political strategy to re-energize the AK Party and overcome the upcoming foreign policy crisis stemming mainly from Turkey’s decision to purchase S-400s.

While Turkey and Russia enjoy defense cooperation, the U.S. is trying to enforce Turkey to cancel its defense deal with Moscow. According to the U.S., S-400s are incompatible with NATO’s defense network and would pose a threat to the American F-35 stealth fighter jet project when Turkey operationalizes its F-35s. Yet, Turkey has been delivered four F-35s to train Turkish pilots in the U.S.

More importantly, in case U.S. pressure does not succeed to change Ankara’s S-400 decision, Washington is set to implement a short-term road map to punish Turkey. However, the divergence between different institutions in the U.S. is still visible concerning foreign and security issues. Turkey is no exception. While Trump himself is clear about Turkey’s role in the region although he acts in a very pragmatic way on foreign policy issues, his close circle tends to act by other institution’s possible positions towards Turkey. Ultimately, the president has little leeway to counter Turkey’s many critics in Washington. The State Department is concerned by the deepening political rupture between Turkey and the U.S., yet it is prepared, in case the administration decides to place a sanction against Ankara.

In addition to the State Department’s position, prominent U.S. senators have also warned Turkey that the S-400 purchase will be too costly for Turkey. Pentagon, on the other hand, has a clear view of Turkey’s strategic role within NATO but many are suspicious about its engagement with Russia from a very strategic perspective. Last but not least, the role of the Senate is more crucial, particularly over the issue of canceling F-35 delivery to Turkey and in excluding Turkey from the project.

The recent move of prominent U.S. senators about the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act (EMSEPA) 2019 was a counter-strategic move taken for the administration to contain Turkey’s S-400 engagement with Moscow – since the purchase could trigger the imposition of a mandatory sanction under CAASTA. While the EMSEPA proposes that the U.S. should work with Greece, Cyprus, and Israel to protect U.S. national interests in the region and promote a strategic dialogue with these countries, Turkey is mentioned in the act concerning its defense and political engagement with Russia and framed as a threat. More importantly, the bill is proposing to lift the U.S. arm-sales embargo on Cyprus.

The question of how Turkey and the U.S. will overcome the possible deepening political disagreement over S-400s remains unclear.

The strategic meaning of the bill is simple and clear. If Ankara maintains its decisiveness to buy the Russian defense system, according to the EMSEPA’s strategic calculation, Turkey would be militarily balanced by the U.S. by increasing the military capacity of Greece and Cyprus. The act is also symbolic in terms of underlining that Turkey and the U.S. interests in the Mediterranean Sea are not common.  

Against this background, the question of how Turkey and the U.S. will overcome the possible deepening political disagreement over S-400s remains unclear while the two countries have already delved into strategic divergence over the issue of U.S. engagement with the YPG in Syria. Therefore, the upcoming mismanagement over the S-400 defense system may significantly affect U.S.-Turkey relations. But the risk is not limited to the deterioration of bilateral relations. The geopolitical risk of the S-400 dilemma is not one-dimensional either or dangerous only for one side. Both countries will eventually be influenced by the mismanagement of the process.  

Arming Cyprus via U.S. military supplies will deepen the insecurity in the region and eventually reiterate the lack of trust between Ankara and Washington.

Excluding Turkey from the Eastern Mediterranean geopolitical architecture is not possible since Turkey is an integral part of it. Turkey’s strategic culture has been shaped and reshaped by the geopolitical vision of Ankara towards its surrounding seas over the years, particularly in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas. More importantly, arming Cyprus via U.S. military supplies will deepen the insecurity in the region and eventually reiterate the lack of trust between Ankara and Washington. It forces Turkey to recalculate its national strategy not only towards the Cyprus issue but also towards Greece. The possible exclusion of Turkey from the F-35 program is another geopolitical risk for the future strategic calculations of NATO. Taking into consideration the upcoming geopolitical challenges, Turkey is one of the most critical countries. From the Balkans to the Caucasus and from Ukraine to the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey is an active partner of NATO and also has its particular national interests over the regions where it is located.

Geopolitics 101 says that Turkey and the U.S. have to agree, one way or another, over the issue of S-400s. It seems likely that Turkey will receive the S-400s as promised, yet the issue will be solved with the U.S.        

The U.S.-Turkey relationship is up for renewed tensions in the coming months as a result of the pending S-400 air defense system purchase from Russia. The U.S. Congress has introduced several legislative measures, clearly designed to send Turkey a message about the potential transfer of these systems to Turkish soil. Congress had already asked Pentagon to produce a report about the state of relations with Turkey and blocked the potential transfer of F-35s to Turkey unless the S-400 transaction was canceled. Given the increasing role of Congress in especially Russia-related foreign policy matters as a result of the showdown with President Trump due to the Mueller investigation, Turkey’s S-400 purchase from Russia is destined to become a part of this domestic political struggle.  

At the technical level, various news reports indicate that U.S. military leaders think the security of F-35s would be compromised if they are operated alongside S-400s. Turkey has recommended to create a technical group to address these concerns but the U.S. is considering this as a tacit acknowledgement that purchasing Russian military systems might seem acceptable. Turkey has also made it clear that the decision to purchase S-400s was made after years of an air defense system that met Turkish requirements on price, tech transfer, and delivery schedules. After years of negotiations with the U.S., Europe, and China, Russia took the opportunity to provide Turkey with a deal that met all the Turkish conditions, adding favorable financing terms that were meant to sweeten the deal. However, the evolution of the Turkish position and how we got here seem to have little impact on the U.S. military leaders who find it unimaginable to allow a Russian system being operated alongside F-35s.

Given the increasing role of Congress in especially Russia-related foreign policy matters as a result of the showdown with President Trump due to the Mueller investigation, Turkey’s S-400 purchase from Russia is destined to become a part of this domestic political struggle.  

There is surely an economic aspect of this issue as well. The U.S. is not particularly thrilled about the Russian S-400 System’s encroachment into the international arms market, especially on the soil of a NATO country. For Turkey, however, various NATO members’ and the Obama administration’s decisions to pull the Patriots from the Turkish border with Syria without consultations with Turkey is a sore point. Turkey was exposed to missile threats from within Syria, where the civil war was raging and the absence of Turkey’s own air defense capabilities was laid bare in the face of a relatively sophisticated air defense system enjoyed by the Syrian regime at the time. Ever since, Turkey felt a diminished sense of solidarity in protecting Turkish security by its NATO allies. The Syrian conflict’s various threats pushed Turkey to urgently find solutions to its security capability gaps.

Turkey has traditionally been a strong customer of the U.S. defense industry. However, in recent years, the negative environment in U.S. Congress has prevented Turkey from enjoying a strong defense partnership with the U.S.

Turkey has traditionally been a strong customer of the U.S. defense industry. However, in recent years, the negative environment in U.S. Congress has prevented Turkey from enjoying a strong defense partnership with the U.S. The U.S. support for the YPG in northern Syria has soured bilateral ties as well. The current standoff about the S-400s threatens the decades-long strong defense relationship between the two NATO allies. There is no question that it would simply benefit Russia to give Turkey ultimatums rather than work with the Turkish leadership to resolve the issue. The U.S. needs to reassure Turkey about its security needs and repair the damage done by the U.S. support for the YPG. The two NATO allies have cooperated on creating a safe zone plan in recent months, thanks in large part to the U.S. team on Syria that is much more willing to take Turkish concerns seriously and address them properly on the ground. A similar cooperative attitude rather than a confrontational one needs to occur with the S-400 issue. Neither the U.S. nor Turkey would benefit from a strategic drift from one another.     

Soviet Russia was the first country that recognized the new Republic of Turkey, even before its official proclamation in year 1923. In the forthcoming year, 2020, the two countries will celebrate the 100th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between them. Besides the fact that this is a significant anniversary in itself, it is also a good occasion to analyze what has been achieved over the century and to think about the prospects of development in bilateral relations.

The leader of the Bolshevik revolution and the founder of the Soviet Republic Vladimir Lenin and the leader of the War of Independence, the founder and the first president of the Republic of Turkey Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, by joint efforts, set a new vector of relations between the two countries, as the successors of the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire.

Despite the fact that the century of relations between the two new states was marked by many ups and downs, often accompanied by acute political crises, the main task set by the leaders at the very beginning was solved: peoples’ perception of each other ceased to be only hostile, as it was during several centuries. And, moreover, mutually beneficial cooperation resulted in concrete results and visible projects that laid the foundation for the future. The parties started to establish a new positive historical memory and laid its foundation, in particular, by cooperation at the most difficult stage after the proclamation of two young states. The memory about this still lives both in Russia and in Turkey.

Numerous Russian-Turkish wars of the past gradually faded into the background and remembered in the context of making predictions for the future less often. Rather, the societies of the two countries perceive the clashes of the past as two neighboring empires at a time when war was the main instrument for settling interstate disputes and disagreements. Moreover, and this is also essential, the Russian-Turkish wars have never been wars of annihilation, unlike the Second World War, which is still a non-healing wound for Russian society.

Fortunately, times have changed in the direction of resolution, even the most controversial issues through dialogue. Moreover, modern Russian-Turkish relations demonstrate a success story: the disputed political issues are localized by the parties and considered separately, mostly without affecting trade and economic relations.

Modern Russian-Turkish relations demonstrate a success story: disputed political issues are localized by the parties and considered separately, mostly without affecting trade and economic relations. 

It is extremely important not to forget about the projects implemented by the parties in the 20th century and, in particular, about the Soviet industrial heritage that is preserved and continues to operate in Turkey, including textile, metallurgical, chemical, glass, energy facilities and enterprises. That is why the project on the inventory and documentation of this heritage, with making the results public, is one of the priorities for the Russian-Turkish Project Development Association (TUR RUS), headed by undersigned.

At the center of modern trade and economic relations between the parties are several foundation stones, including energy trade, mutual investments, tourism and humanitarian ties.

Separately, it is worth noting the projects that have become a symbol of bilateral relations, such as the first Turkish nuclear power plant “Akkuyu,” the “Turkish Stream” gas pipeline and cooperation in the defense industry, which will start after the delivery of the Russian air defense systems S-400 to Turkey at the end of this year. The strategic importance of each of these projects lies in the fact that these are not just purchase and sale agreements, but triggers new opportunities and areas of long-term cooperation in technology areas with high added value.

Regarding humanitarian ties, it may be noted that the year 2019 was declared the Cross Year of Culture and Tourism by the presidents of the two countries. Those 6 million Russian tourists who visited Turkey in 2018 by themselves contribute to an intensive dialogue between the Russian and Turkish people.

The years 2015 – 2016 were marked by one of the most acute crises in the new history of Russian-Turkish relations – by the so-called “airplane crisis.” However, it is worth noting the main thing – despite the political crisis, the economic basis of bilateral relations, in particular, the supply of energy resources to Turkey by Russia continued to function properly.

Projects between Russia and Turkey are not just purchase and sale agreements, but trigger new opportunities and areas of long-term cooperation. 

Restricting bilateral cooperation in other areas turned out to be so unprofitable for both parties, that it forced them to sit down at the negotiating table and promptly resolve the conflict, which many observers considered to be insoluble, at least in the short and medium terms. Let’s just realize that the crisis lasted only seven months.

First of all, this crisis became a vivid evidence that the economic and humanitarian ties between the two countries reached such a level of depth, that they were able to balance even the most acute political crises in the new history. Secondly, the parties received a sad, but, apparently, necessary experience of what the rash actions can lead to and what damage to their interests can be caused.

It would be wrong to assume that the economy balanced policy, but did not suffer losses. On the contrary, the seven crisis months, as well as the transit period for the full restoration of Russian-Turkish relations, were unacceptably expensive. One can count on the fact that this experience will be taken into account by the parties in the future, in order to prevent its repetition.

But this should be recognized, in the present conditions, already insufficient.

It should be recognized that modern trade and economic relations between Russia and Turkey need to open new pages of cooperation and to implement new projects. The goal that was declared by the presidents of the two countries on a fourfold increase of trade turnover – from 25 to 100 billion dollars – itself shows that the leadership of the two countries is aware that the existing potential is not just not fully utilized, but is also very far from its real capacity.

The contract on the construction of the first Turkish nuclear power plant “Akkuyu,” involving the transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies from Russia to Turkey, creates a wide range of opportunities for the establishment of joint ventures, whose products may be in demand in Russia and Turkey, and may be also supplied to third countries. It is worth recalling that the Russian-Turkish Intergovernmental Agreement does not define any borders on the transfer of Russian technologies to Turkey. It means, if to express this idea with a one sentence, Russia expressed its readiness to transfer to Turkey as much technology as Turkey is ready to get and utilize. This is a big importance of the “Akkuyu” project and the greatest opportunity for the parties to cooperate, which takes the deal far beyond the construction and operation of another power plant.

The gas pipeline, got the name “Turkish Stream,” which implements what the undersigned proposed ten years ago, when said, that Russia, as a producing country, and Turkey, as a transit country, are not competitors in the energy market. Turkey is interested in uninterrupted, in sufficient quantities and in direct supplies of Russian energy resources, without another transit countries. Russia, in its turn, is interested in Turkey, as in the second largest client (after Germany) – consumer of its natural gas, as well as in a reliable corridor for the delivery of its energy resources to Europe. Let’s repeat, Russia and Turkey are not competitors in this sense, they complement each other. The establishment of an important energy hub in Turkey does not contradict the interests of Russia. Moreover, the two countries should analyze the possibilities of cooperation in such an important energy region as the Eastern Mediterranean.

Among the promising areas of Russian-Turkish cooperation in the defense industry are rocket production, aircraft construction, shipbuilding (including submarines), unmanned aerial vehicles, etc.

And finally, it is worth to mention the contract for the supply of the Russian air defense systems S-400. Obviously, it is perceived in Russia as a pilot project, which is supposed to launch new supplies of the Russian defense industry’s products to Turkey. Moreover, the fact that there is a transfer of Russian technologies foreseen in the deal indicates that Russia is ready to establish joint ventures with Turkey in the defense industry, and, moreover, perform supplies to third countries. The Russian government has overcome an important psychological barrier that previously existed in relation to Turkey, as the country is a member of NATO. Among the promising areas of Russian-Turkish cooperation in the defense industry are rocket production, aircraft construction, shipbuilding (including submarines), unmanned aerial vehicles, etc. Separately, it is worth noting the opportunities for cooperation between Russia and Turkey in the space industry and researches.

It should be noted that these are the areas that were launched by just three projects of Russian-Turkish cooperation, where the Russian and Turkish sides abandoned clichés and showed their readiness for flexible thinking. What other areas may be equally breakthrough?

In this sense, let’s name just one specific area and one project where Russian-Turkish cooperation can make a breakthrough.

Firstly, such results may be brought by Russian-Turkish cooperation in the field of software development, in the field of Big Data and in cyber security. Naturally labelled “Russian hacker” is another black propaganda. However, at the same time, it is recognition of the indisputable fact that Russia is one of the world leaders, which owns its own search engine, its own anti-virus systems, its own social network, and its own developments in the field of ensuring cybersecurity of the country, both in terms of external, and internal threats. All these are globally competitive. Some of these products are widely known in Turkey, including Yandex search engine and Kaspersky antivirus.

The main risks for the future of relations between Turkey and Russia are related to the exerting external pressure and provocations in order to prevent their further development.

Secondly, it is worth to mention the Istanbul Channel. In Russia there is the opinion that there is no financial model for the project, which provides a return of investments. And, therefore, the probability of its construction is not too high in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the problem of the growing traffic through Bosporus may negatively affect Russia. Russia is also interested in a preservation of the security regime in the Black Sea basin, within the framework of the Montreux Convention. And, in this sense, the parties, at least, have a reason to start a conversation about the Turkish initiative related to the Istanbul Channel.

The main risks for the future of relations between Turkey and Russia are related to the exerting external pressure and provocations in order to prevent their further development. Especially when it comes to sensitive issues for bilateral relations, in particular, Syria and the post-war settlement in the country, the Crimea and the Crimean Tatars, relations in the Turkey-Ukraine-Russia triangle, and Russian-Turkish competition in the Central Asia and Caucasus region.

There are contradictions in each of these issues between Russia and Turkey. However, there is also a field for cooperation. In this sense, along with successful and mutually beneficial trade and economic relations, which, as we said, balance political risks, it is worth noting the lack of institutional ties between Russia and Turkey. As Russia has its own initiatives such as the Eurasian Economic Union and The Collective Security Treaty Organization, Turkey is a member of the Customs Union with the EU and NATO. Objectively, the parties are lacking a strategic cooperation platform, both in economic and military/defense fields, which would bind them strategically to each other even more. This is most arguably the biggest gap between Russia and Turkey nowadays, which the parties should think about firstly.