New realities have surfaced on the ground in Syria after the US and Turkey inked their mutual agreement. The partial withdrawal of the US’s troops from Syria led the PKK/PYD to cooperate with the Assad regime,m an alliance designed to restrain Turkey’s intervention by inviting regime forces to areas of critical importance. The PKK/PYD’s also attempted to keep the US’s support at the south of Turkey’s security corridor, in order to reduce the burdens of its new pledges to the Assad regime and Russia. The balance in Syria has clearly changed from its previous position. Less interested actors, such as European states, are still late to perceive the overall picture. And although Turkey has often been accused of an ‘axis shift’ due to its collaboration with Russia, this allegation may also be applied to other actors in the region who face new decisions. Hence both ‘friends and foes’ will have to reassess each other and determine to whom they can lean on. In order to understand the overall picture in Syria, the positions of each actor should be individually scrutinized.

The U.S.

The US was keen to provide support to the PKK/PYD and benefit from them as a tool in their plans to redesign a narrower Middle East, from Iran to Syria. But the US devastated its own policy after a long awaited decision by President Trump, most probably because of the PKK/PYD’s lack of capacity despite the billions of dollars spent by the US government.

However, internal political dynamics confused the overall process, President Trump made a U-turn in order to reiterate the ‘America First’ narrative of his election campaign. The way Trump sees the Syrian case is actually smart and pragmatic. The US has gained nothing from its relationship with the PKK/PYD, who falsely claimed credit for defeating Daesh, while the role of US Special and Air Forces in this victory has always been underestimated.

In parallel to the Iranian case and the energy politics in the Middle East, President Trump projected long term goals of the US that required him to erase the PKK/PYD folder from his cache. Although he still confused whether to embrace or repel Turkey based on his contradictory tweets, the wider politics of the Middle East, along with the Mediterranean and Black Sea region pushed President Trump to review his engagement with Turkey.

Russia

Russia’s approach has been to emphasize the Adana Agreement of Turkey and Syria which allows Turkey to intervene between 5 to 10 kilometers into Syria in case there exists a terror threat inside Syrian territory. The goal of Russia’s recent discussions at the Tehran, Moscow and Ankara summits were to have Turkey and the Assad regime engage with each other in favor of Russian interests. Such an expectation appears impossible for Turkey since Turkey expects the Genova Process to find a political solution, one that could see Assad removed pending constitutional amendments and the facilitation of free elections. Hence Russia can only push one button: choose the PKK/PYD or the Genova Process.

However, Russia does have the ‘luxury’ of including the PKK and its affiliate organizations in a new Syrian apparatus after the US’s withdrawal. The PKK/PYD’s rapprochement with both the Assad regime and Russia facilitated the expansion of Russia’s sphere of influence in shaping what will be the ultimate outcome of the Syria crisis. Meanwhile, Russia provided a shield to the Assad regime to achieve more territorial gains while the PKK/PYD terror network has been left humiliated by the imposed conditions, destined to compromise with Assad.  After all, the main question for Russia appears to be if it needs to stick with the Turkish cause as was agreed to before Operation Peace Spring or allow the PKK/PYD to serve in Syria unless the US Government changes the Syria policy one more time. On the other hand, the Genova Process seems to be a wise option for Russia in order to achieve a cost-effective resolution to the overall crisis.

Turkey

The PKK/PYD has exhibited how incapable it is, and how it must lean on another actor for its own protection and survival. The release of Daesh (ISIS) prisoners proved it cannot handle its responsibilities. The success of Turkey’s military operation has marginalized its status in the eyes of its sympathizers and has tarnished its dream of building an autonomous region in Syria. The PKK/PYD has now subjected itself to a higher authority and clearly demonstrated its inability to sustain an armed movement except for the use of terror strategies. As the reality of the PKK/PYD is being understood by both Russia and the US Government, Turkey is now in-between both countries to find a wise solution to the decade-long Syria conflict.  

Turkey’s political balance needs to be understood to determine its preferred course. It is a fact that the big picture of the Middle East and global politics requires Turkey to align itself with Russia. But long-term conditions will push Turkey to mend its ties with the US. However, the parameters are not that easy. Turkey need to enjoy the support of both parties to destroy the PKK/PYD threat and at the same time deescalate tense inter-state relations facilitate smoother regional politics with the USA.

At the final stage, Turkey’s growing relations with Russia and the US, along with the moderate opposition under the authority of the Syrian Transition Government, are relations which will offer new opportunities for de-escalation of the Syrian conflict. Turkey will be a bridge between the big players and effective local actors. Then should we not we think about a trilateral summit between the US, Russia, and Turkey to end the Syrian crisis?

After Turkey and the Syrian opposition started a joint military operation against the YPG terror group in northeastern Syria, many new developments are beginning to reshape the situation in the region and the future of Syria. One of the most important will be the summit to be held today between the Turkish and Russian presidents in Sochi. While many are awaiting the outcome of the summit, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov’s recent remarks about the possibility of amending the Adana agreement raises the question if this might be one of the outcomes today’s meeting. Sergei Lavrov stated: “This is the existing international legal framework that has been recently confirmed by both parties, including in the context of current events. If the parties, in the course of contacts, consider it necessary and mutually accept to clarify or amend this agreement in any way, this will be their decision, we will certainly accept and support it,”

In his following remarks, according to Sputnik News Agency, Lavrov underlined that “all Kurdish structures on Syrian territory should be solidly covered by the Syrian legislation, the Syrian constitution, so that there are no illegal armed groups on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, and so that there is no threat to security of the Republic of Turkey”

The Adana protocol signed by Turkey and Syria in 1998 outlines that the Syrian government will recognize the PKK as a terror group and will ensure the total destruction of PKK networks and operations in Syria, it also allows Turkey to cross five kms into Syria if necessary.

Russia has long argued for the reactivation of the Adana protocol to facilitate direct contacts between Damascus and Ankara, knowing that direct contact will change the diplomatic and political environment dramatically in favor of Russia and the Assad regime it backs. However, the Turkish government argued that direct contact with Damascus is only possible after a genuine political transition process and the election of a new government in free and fair elections.

Currently, the new dynamics in Syria have forced Turkey and Russia to find a new pathway forward. With the US withdrawal and the joint Syrian-Turkish military operation, the dynamics in Syria have changed dramatically. The Assad regime signed a deal with the YPG to control the front lines and borders with Turkey and the Syrian opposition, and to prevent their further incursion. After the entry of the regime into Manbij and Ayn al Arab, the operations in those areas were halted. During his announcement of the Turkish-American agreement for the safe-zone in northeast Syria. The Turkish Foreign Minister also said that Turkey will discuss the removal of the YPG from these areas with Assad backed by Moscow.

However, Ankara is frustrated that the Assad regime has not cracked down on the YPG in the areas it entered after a deal with the US. Most notably, the region of Tal Rifaat is of great importance as a present example. Not only did the residents who fled the region after its capture by the YPG not return, but the YPG has continuously attacked Turkish soldiers and the Syrian National Army from Tal Rifaat.

Turkey knows that the regime is unlikely to crackdown on the YPG and will likely use it as a tool against Turkey, and that Syrian refugees won’t return to regime-held areas. This would mean that the Turkish safe-zone project might fail to achieve its objectives. The recent deal with the American side allowed Ankara to gain important leverage ahead of the summit in Sochi, but no one can foresee what the two presidents will agree on in today’s summit. At the end of the day, the outcome of the summit will be determined by the personal relationship between Erdogan and Putin as well as their negotiation skills.

The shooting down of a Russian bomber aircraft by the Turkish Air Force in November 24, 2015 near the Syrian border represents the nadir of Turkish-Russian relations since the turn of the 21^st century. One might also emphasize that these 16 years (2000-2015) have witnessed the highest level of Turkish-Russian cooperation in the last three centuries, with the notable exception of the 1921-1936 period when Turkey and the former Soviet Union were allies.

Thus, we have been witnessing the lowest point in Turkish-Russian relations in the last decade and a half, which still compares very favorably with the bilateral relations in the preceding three centuries.

Syrian civil war is only a secondary front in Russia’s struggle against the West. Therefore, it is not possible to understand the Russian-Turkish clash over Syria by only focusing on Syria. The primary front in Russia’s struggle against the West is undoubtedly the Ukrainian civil war. What some observers label as Russia’s irrational and erratic behavior in international politics began in earnest after the overthrow of the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych government in Ukraine following months of protests in February 2014, and its replacement by a staunchly pro-Western government.

Ukraine is central to Russia’s core national interests and identity at multiple levels and it is unsurprising that losing Ukraine to the West was interpreted as an existential threat by the Russian policy-makers. Russia’s reaction began with the swift occupation and annexation of Crimea, which was completed by March 2014.

Russia’s heavy military intervention in Syria in the Fall of 2015 can be interpreted as part of a broader escalation strategy aimed at increasing Russia’s leverage against the Western alliance (i.e., NATO) in any future negotiations over Syria and Ukraine.

The Russian annexation of Crimea is the first time since the end of the Second World War that international borders in Europe are changed through occupation and annexation. This was the cause of the international embargoes on Russia, which will continue for many years and perhaps decades, since there is no sign that Russia will ever withdraw from Crimea.

Just as the occupation and annexation of East Jerusalem and the West Bank in 1967 continues to haunt Israel 48 years later, despite the implicit and explicit support that Israel receives from several key great powers, the illegal annexation of Crimea will continue to haunt Russia, especially since no great power or any state of international significance sides with Russia on this conflict.

Second, following the annexation of Crimea, Russia fomented civil war in Ukraine by supporting the rebels in two provinces, Donetsk and Luhansk, in East Ukraine. However, the rebellion against the new pro-Western Ukrainian government did not spread to other key Ukrainian cities of significance, such as Kharkiv and Odessa.

Neither the annexation of Crimea, nor the insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, led the Ukrainian government to change its pro-Western orientation for a pro-Russian one.

Moreover, neither the annexation of Crimea, nor the insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, led the Ukrainian government to change its pro-Western orientation for a pro-Russian one. Thus, Russia’s plan to regain control of Ukraine failed, and Ukraine appears to be on a staunchly pro-Western course despite overt and covert Russian military interventions to alter that course.

Russia’s heavy military intervention in Syria in the Fall of 2015 can be interpreted as part of a broader escalation strategy aimed at increasing Russia’s leverage against the Western alliance (i.e., NATO) in any future negotiations over Syria and Ukraine. By changing the balance of power in Syria and restoring staunchly pro-Russian Assad to power, Russia might hope to partially compensate for the loss of Ukraine, both strategically and also in terms of Russian national prestige and pride.

Russia’s heavy military intervention in Syria in the Fall of 2015 can be interpreted as part of a broader escalation strategy aimed at increasing Russia’s leverage against the Western alliance (i.e., NATO) in any future negotiations over Syria and Ukraine. By changing the balance of power in Syria and restoring staunchly pro-Russian Assad to power, Russia might hope to partially compensate for the loss of Ukraine, both strategically and also in terms of Russian national prestige and pride.

Another reason for Russia’s direct military intervention in Syria is one that was noted by almost all the media, and perhaps overemphasized at the expense of all other motivations: Namely, the preservation and the development of the Russian naval military base in Tartus, the only Russian base of its kind in the entire Mediterranean Sea. Tartus naval base is situated close to Syria’s border with Lebanon, and also somewhat close to Turkey, Israel, and Cyprus, the latter of which is home to two major British military bases. Thus, it is fair to say that the Russian naval base in Tartus is at a strategic juncture.

The Russian Air Force bombing insurgents backed by Turkey in Syria, combined with recurrent violations of Turkish airspace by the Syrian border demonstrated Russia’s disregard both for Turkey’s sovereignty and also for any understanding of a Turkish “sphere of influence” in neighboring Syria.

What probably explains the timing of the Russian military intervention in Syria in Fall 2015 were a series of defeats that the Assad regime suffered in the summer of 2015 against the opposition forces that are supported by Turkey, France, and the United States in some cases. These opposition victories began to threaten the area around the biggest Syrian city by the Mediterranean, Latakia, which is also the core of support for the Assad regime.

Russian intervention aimed to safeguard its military-strategic investment in the Assad regime and around the Tartus naval base, perhaps with the aim of carving out a pro-Russian client state that would control the capital city of Damascus, the key port city of Latakia, and the strategic connection points between the two in Western Syria.

The Russian Air Force bombing insurgents backed by Turkey in Syria, combined with recurrent violations of Turkish airspace by the Syrian border demonstrated Russia’s disregard both for Turkey’s sovereignty and also for any understanding of a Turkish “sphere of influence” in neighboring Syria.

This sharply contrasts with Turkey’s reserved and cautious attitude in the face of Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea as well as the earlier Russian re-occupation of South Ossetia and the bombing of Georgia, all of which severely damaged Turkey’s allies in its immediate neighborhood, or in the case of Georgia, one of Turkey’s immediate neighbors with which Turkey maintained very friendly relations.

While Turkey sought to salvage its good relations with Russia by not reacting very forcefully against the Russian occupation of Crimea or the invasion of Georgia, Russia did not hesitate to order numerous airstrikes against insurgents supported by Turkey in Syria while also violating Turkish airspace by the Turkish-Syrian border during its offensive in coordination with the Assad regime.

In Syria, Russia’s policy is to revive the Assad regime by destroying the moderate opposition supported by Turkey, the United States, and France, and thus leaving ISIS as the only option other than Assad, at which point Russia is counting on the great powers and the world opinion to favor Assad as the lesser of two evils. Putin is incensed by the fate of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, two formerly pro-Soviet and later pro-Russian Middle Eastern dictators who have been killed, the latter brutally, after being removed from power.

Nonetheless, the most likely decisive turning point that motivated Russia’s aggressive interventionist stance in the Middle East was the removal of Viktor Yanukovych, the pro-Russian Ukrainian leader, in February 2014. Assad regime in Syria, being responsible for the large majority of the estimated 250,000 people killed during the civil war, already ranks among the most violent Middle Eastern dictatorships in modern history.

However, with the Russian and the Iranian military, along with thousands of foreign fighters from Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon flooding to Syria to rescue the Assad regime, a military solution to the conflict seems unlikely in the near future. Instead, both sides are likely to score tactical victories in the battlefield as a way to increase their political leverage at the negotiation table.