Since the declaration of the ‘imminent’ military operation by President Erdogan in the east of the Euphrates and the U.S. decision to withdraw from Syria, many discussions have risen about the fate of the region. With Trump’s initiative, both sides are discussing the establishment of a 20-mile zone in northern Syria along the Turkish border. In order to protect its national security, Turkey is trying to eliminate the terrorist threat and trying to accelerate the return of refugees to safe zones. However, one important dynamic behind Turkey’s decisiveness to enter the east of the Euphrates is overlooked. Turkey’s local Syrian partners are pushing the government to conduct a military operation east of the Euphrates in order to expand their areal control and to return home.

Turkey’s partners want to increase their balance of power against the Assad regime and other actors involved in the crisis by increasing their areal control. The U.S. is not the only country that has to manage a relationship with local partners, as Turkey also fought together with different factions of the Free Syrian Army in two military operations against Daesh and the Marxist-Kurdish YPG. During a time in which the YPG controls vast territories, historical enmities, territorial disputes, ethnic and ideological tensions between Arabs and the Syrian Kurds are a driving motivation of local actors, such as tribes, to push Turkey into the east of the Euphrates.

High level meetings between U.S. and Turkish delegations have been continuing since the U.S. decision to leave Syria. While both sides are discussing the way to finalize the U.S. withdrawal and how to address Turkey’s national security concerns, the U.S. is seemingly in a search for a solution as to how they will protect the YPG. The U.S. attitude is not only underestimating the Turkish threat perception and the important issue of the return of Syrian refugees, but is also overlooking a facilitator factor that is pushing Turkey to go for Manbij and the east of the Euphrates.

If all legitimate Turkish concerns were to be addressed, but the interests of Turkey’s Syrian partners ignored, Turkey’s new power inside Syria will force Turkey to widen its sphere of influence. Many Syrian communities inside Turkey and in Syria have evolved a direct relation to Turkey, in which the country is seen as a leader. Many actors of the Syrian community want to bandwagon with Turkey in order to expand their own areas of control and therefore are pushing Ankara to open them the gate to Manbij and east of the Euphrates.

Turkey’s local Syrian partners are pushing the government to conduct a military operation east of the Euphrates in order to expand their areal control and to return home.

Why does Turkey have to care about the demands of its clients in Syria? Ankara has built a strong relationship with the Syrian community and military actors of the Syrian opposition. With the start of the Astana process and the Euphrates Shield Operation, Turkey’s role has increased a lot. Turkey’s institutions got in touch directly with the Syrian opposition society. From the Turkish Armed Forces to the Health Ministry, Turkey has become hugely embedded in Syria. However, the relationship between Turkey and the Syrian opposition is not one sided. Turkey has to care about the demands of its Syrian partners, as the entire Turkish Syrian policy is built upon cooperation with them.

Turkey’s leverage in Syria, its military operations and presence in Syria are based on Turkey’s Syrian partners. Ankara needs the Syrian opposition in order to be able to achieve its goals. More, the relation between Turkey and its Syrian partners are grounded in mutual interests in their animosity against the Assad regime, Daesh, and the YPG. While Turkey is a crucial supporter of the Syrian opposition, the Syrian opposition is likewise crucial for Turkey as an enabler in Syria.

During Operation Euphrates Shield, Turkey’s armed partners on the ground were visibly unprofessional, weak and unskilled, but the training provided by Turkish soldiers showed their results in Operation Olive Branch, in which the newly formed National Army displayed high capabilities. In contrast to the U.S. strategy, which trains, equips and lets the YPG fight on its behalf, Turkey trained, equipped and fought together with its local partners. The difference in this strategy can also be observed via the U.S. army losses and by the Turkish army in Syria. While the U.S. lost half a dozen soldiers, Turkey lost 71 soldiers in Operation Euphrates Shield and 41 soldiers in Operation Olive Branch. This difference is also a result of Turkey’s approach to the National Army, as Ankara does not view the National Army as a proxy but as a legitimate partner.

U.S. attitude does not only underestimate the Turkish threat perception and the return of Syrian refugees, but also overlooking a facilitator factor that is pushing Turkey to go for Manbij and the east of the Euphrates.

The National Army was formed by the Turkish-trained Free Syrian Army factions under the umbrella of the Syrian Interim Government. The gathering of the leaders of different Free Syrian Army factions elected the Chief of Staff to which 9 different offices including the Military Court, the Military Police and which the Finance Offices respond to. The Chief of Staff also controls three corps. Among the 29 Free Syrian Army factions, 13 were formerly supported by the U.S. – either by the CIA via MOM operation room or by the Pentagon. 10 factions were formed after the end of the direct U.S. support to the Free Syrian Army in northern Aleppo. The formation of the National Army is an important asset in Turkey’s Syrian policy, which also means more leverage for Turkey’s partner to push Turkey to increase its role in Syria, even if Turkey didn’t prefer to do so.

The National Army has become way oversized for the tiny area from Afrin to Jarabulus. The asymmetric situation between their controlled areas and their size and capabilities results in the need to expand. The National Army factions want to bandwagon with Turkey in order to increase their control and are pushing Ankara to green light a military operation to Manbij and east of the Euphrates. By gaining more territory, the armed Syrian opposition not only wants to increase its balance of power against the Assad regime, but also wants to return back to their hometowns. Thousands of fighters from the National Army originated from currently YPG-held areas. Factions like Jaysh al-Sharqiyyah, 20th Brigade, Ahrar al-Sharqiyyah, Thuwwar al-Jazira, Jaysh al-Ahfad and Hasakah Shield entirely originate from eastern Syria. The armed Syrian opposition is aware that it cannot launch an operation on its own, without the backing of Turkey, as Russia and the U.S. are still involved in the Syrian war. Therefore, the National Army is pushing its backer Turkey to take action.

Turkey might have its own agenda to fight the YPG, but Turkey’s Syrian partners and local actors see Turkey as a vehicle to achieve their own agenda and to liberate their hometowns.

Turkey might have its own agenda to fight the YPG, but Turkey’s Syrian partners and local actors in Syria see Turkey as a vehicle to achieve their own agenda and to liberate their hometowns. In order to bandwagon and gain from the Turkish government, these actors need Turkey to act. While many discuss how to address threats towards Turkey’s national security, the role of Turkey’s partners in Syria is overlooked. The Syrian opposition sees a new chance in the east of the Euphrates to push its own agenda and to boost its position.

The Syrian opposition is aware that they need more area control in Syria in order to have a stronger position against the Assad regime on the negotiation table. In order to re-gain a strong position like it did in 2013, the Syrian opposition will push Turkey into the east of the Euphrates with its entire means. A more comprehensive perspective in which the needs and demands of Turkey’s partners is needed in order to find a common ground for the period in Syria after the U.S. withdrawal. Otherwise, even if the U.S. might think that it has addressed Turkey’s national security needs, it might not convince Turkey as the needs of its partners in Syria were ignored.

As the latest statements and decisions made by the U.S., such as leaving 400 troops in Syria and planning to continue their support to the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces until 2020, with a $350 million indicates that the U.S. does not want to reach an agreement with Turkey. If the U.S. isn’t going to address Turkey’s security concerns and since Turkey is being pushed from inside by the Turkish people and the Syrian opposition to launch a military operation towards Manbij and the east of the Euphrates, the best for Turkey would be not to withstand this and push and conduct another military operation soon.

Wall Street Journal reported over the weekend that the U.S. was planning to leave behind around 1,000 American soldiers after its withdrawal from Syria. The report was quickly denied by General Joseph Dunford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for being “factually incorrect.” Gen. Dunford added, “There has been no change to the plan announced in February and we continue to implement the President’s direction to draw down U.S. forces to a residual presence.”

The key wording here seems to be “a residual presence” given that President Trump had initially declared all U.S. forces would leave Syria. After much political pressure from Congress, news reports suggested 200 to 400 U.S. forces would be left behind. However, Joseph Votel, the commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), declared in February in his congressional testimony, “The fact is the president made a decision, and we are going to execute his orders here to withdraw all forces from Syria.” It is clear from these and other media reports in recent months that there is quite a bit of uncertainty among military leaders about how the U.S. withdrawal is going to be implemented.

U.S. policymakers and military planners have been negotiating with Turkey about creating a safe zone but they have yet to reach an agreement.

How many U.S. troops would remain behind in Syria is actually less important than their mission. U.S. policymakers and military planners have been negotiating with Turkey about creating a safe zone but they have yet to reach an agreement about the main parameters of how such a zone might be established and protected. While Turkey is intent on assuming the responsibility for such a region with the idea that it could start repatriating some of the refugees to the zone, the U.S. has been proposing to involve European allies in protecting the area. Turkey is opposed to this proposal as it sees an attempt to protect the YPG forces once the U.S. forces leave. As the U.S. wants to have its cake and eat it too, Turkey refuses to give any guarantees that it would not conduct military operations against the YPG forces. It would clearly be illogical for Turkey to reassure the U.S. that it will not attack the Syrian branch of the PKK.

The U.S. withdrawal decision was met with much skepticism in Turkey. The distinction between the withdrawal and the support for the YPG had to be made. Withdrawal from Syria did not necessarily mean the end of U.S. support for the YPG. Over the past three months, we have seen that there was a strong willingness especially in Congress to continue to support the YPG. The debate has been framed as whether or not to “abandon” and let Turkey “slaughter” Kurds with U.S. senators like Lindsey Graham pushing back against an immediate withdrawal while trying to reassure Turkish concerns by paying a visit to Ankara. Bilateral meetings between the U.S. Envoy James Jeffrey as well as Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan have yet to produce concrete results in terms of creating a safe zone that would satisfy Turkish security concerns.

YPG has been playing a rather smart game by slowing down the anti-ISIS operations to keep U.S. military engaged on the ground as long as possible.

Regardless of how many forces the U.S. will leave behind, the mission assigned to these troops will be the critical issue going forward. YPG has been playing a rather smart game by slowing down the anti-ISIS operations to keep U.S. military engaged on the ground as long as possible. Knowing that the U.S. military leadership is not all that excited about a quick exit from Syria, they also made strategic arguments including the possibility that Russia would be the kingmaker as the YPG would be forced to negotiate with the Assad regime.

Trump administration officials would surely be concerned about how it might look if Turkey conducted military operations against their “allies” the day they depart Syria. In this sense, there needs to be an acknowledgement of the misguidedness of allying with a group like the YPG instead of promoting it as a success story. Without coming to terms with admitting such a policy failure, the U.S. will not be able to achieve meaningful cooperation with Turkey. That will neither accomplish security and stability on the ground nor help achieve U.S. policy goals in northern Syria.

The advance of the U.S. supported YPG-led SDF forces seems to have slowed down although President Trump had announced that it was a matter of a week before the last patch of territory in Daesh hands could be retrieved. It is no secret that SDF is against the U.S. departure from the region and it has slowed down operations in the past, such as during the Raqqa operation. In their calculation, the longer the operations against Daesh take, the more likely that the U.S. would prolong its presence on the ground. In the meantime, the administration has been persuaded to leave a residual U.S. force (400 soldiers), which would certainly make SDF happier than a sudden and full U.S. withdrawal. This is where the Turkish public opinion will be uneasy once again about the U.S. strategy. Leaving a residual force can easily look like the U.S. is more preoccupied with protecting the SDF forces rather than with precluding the return of Daesh.

Leaving a residual force of 400 soldiers can easily look like the U.S. is more preoccupied with protecting the SDF forces rather than with precluding the return of Daesh. This is where the Turkish public opinion will be uneasy once again about the U.S. strategy.

The partial reversal of the withdrawal decision by leaving roughly 400 U.S. soldiers in Syria will not surprise Turkey. There has been much debate on the advisability of a complete withdrawal and the argument that the U.S. would be “abandoning Kurds” to their fate seems to have been effective. Turkey has strongly opposed the idea that it was waiting for the U.S. to attack and “slaughter” Kurds as was argued in the Western media. It has been strongly lobbying the U.S. for a policy that would satisfy Turkish national security concerns in the form of creating a safe zone in northern Syria. Turkey also argued that the Manbij agreement could be a model to work with the U.S. but limited, if at all, progress has been achieved there. In the current situation, a U.S. residual force in the region may not necessarily be a problem if it is done in coordination with Turkey. In other words, for the sake of a healthy Turkish-American relationship going forward, the U.S. presence in the region can no longer appear as providing American protection for the YPG.

President Trump’s willingness to take Turkish concerns seriously is a plus but devil is in the details.

President Trump’s willingness to take Turkish concerns seriously is a plus but devil is in the details especially in the Syrian scene. It has been a major disadvantage for the U.S.-Turkey relations to have the divergence on Syria strategy dominate the conversation for several years now. There are signs of a broader conversation developing including bilateral as well as the regional issues. However, the U.S. support for the YPG will continue to be a factor consuming every other potential positive development. In the Turkish public opinion, the U.S. pullout decision was closely associated with the end of such support. It was clear the military leaders saw the decision as a hasty one and the public relations campaign to “protect the Kurds” was closely associated with that view. Now that the administration has agreed to leave a residual force to relieve the political pressure from Congress, the mission will have to be defined clearly and carefully. “Peacekeeping” will likely be an unconvincing one, especially if a clear strategy to work with Turkey on the ground is not crafted.

The importance of the U.S. working with Turkey on Syria should not be underestimated. It would be a clear commitment to Turkish security and reduce bilateral tensions, in the meantime, strengthening the NATO alliance. Perhaps even more importantly, it would serve as an anchor in preventing further instability in Syria, enabling the eventual political resolution of the civil war. This kind of coordination and cooperation between the two allies would not be solely in the interest of Turkish national security but for the sake of regional stability. This may sound like wishful thinking in an environment where virtually every actor seems to work at cross purposes. Nevertheless, it is arguably the only way for true stability and peace.

While Turkey is focusing on the local elections that will take place on March 31, certain foreign policy developments are continuing to dominate Turkey’s agenda. Syria is still at the center of Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. However, it is best to lower the expectations for Syria particularly in the context of the U.S. withdrawal. Every player in Syria has its account, priorities and game plan. Turkey, Russia, Iran, and the U.S. are the main actors that can make an impact on the ground, but their agendas and priorities certainly differ from one another, not only towards some specific issues in Syria but also against each other. Turkey’s position is exceptional in this regard as Ankara has to deal with two major interrelated problems, simultaneously.

First and foremost, the PKK issue is still the primary concern of Turkey. Ankara was able to eliminate the PKK threat through Operation Olive Branch and Euphrates Shield in the western part of the river. However, the threat emanating from the PKK is remaining in the eastern part of the river. There is a clear strategic objective of Turkey to eliminate the PKK’s military, political, economic and even territorial power. However, the problem for Turkey is that the PKK is not only an issue between Turkey and the PKK, rather it has been gradually becoming a geopolitical antagonism between Ankara and Washington. Therefore, each time Turkey has to consider its strategy of engagement against the PKK in Syria by taking into consideration the U.S.

The problem for Turkey is that the PKK is not only an issue between Turkey and the PKK, but rather a geopolitical antagonism between Ankara and Washington.    

More than two months after the withdrawal decision, it is still unclear what kind of order will be established in the east of Euphrates after the U.S. withdrawal. There are three ways for the United States. The first one is to make a deal between Turkey and the U.S. on establishing a safe zone alongside Turkey’s Syrian border under the control of the Turkish Military Force and Turkey-backed military groups. For sure, the U.S. wants to establish a mechanism to ensure that the PYD-YPG is protected by a small international protection force by creating other safe areas where the PYD can survive. With this plan, the U.S. wants to satisfy both Turkey and the PYD at the same time. One of the primary strategic goals of the U.S. in this context is to promote a “dialogue” between Turkey and the PKK if Turkey accepts a safe zone in which the PYD will be protected, as well. However, it is well known that this offer is not accepted by Turkey. 

The second way for the U.S. is to establish an order based on SDG areas outside the safe zone. It doesn’t have to be under the name of SDG. This order consists of three pillars: political, economic and military (security). In other words, in the long term, the U.S. wants to establish a governmental structure consisting of Kurdish, Arab and other ethnic elements with a strong autonomy. The only thing that the U.S. cannot trust in the long term is the Arab community. For the U.S. it is not clear whether the Arab communities, especially the major tribal ones, will accept to share the power with PYD-YPG, as it would make them lose their geopolitical superiority over the Turkish-initiated safe zone.

The U.S.’s core objective in the negotiation process is not to withdraw from Syria. In fact, the U.S. wants to appease Turkey via the negotiation process to gain time.

The third way can be more complicated and costly for the U.S. A group from the Pentagon and State Department think that the YPG should completely eliminate Turkey’s safe zone proposal by coming to terms with the Syrian regime in one way or another. For this purpose, the U.S. is carrying out negotiations with both Russia and the Syrian regime. So, the essence of the work is that on the one hand, the United States is carrying out an intense negotiation process with Ankara while keeping in touch with all the other actors involved in the case. The fact that CENTCOM’s top official, Votel, has been communicating with Mazlum Kobani, one of Turkey’s red-listed PKK’s ground leaders, proves this point.

Of course, in such a scenario, it is quite clear that Russia constitutes the main target actor to be negotiated. However, it is hardly possible for Russia to trust a process carried out by the U.S. On the other hand, Turkey is reluctant when it comes to U.S. premises. The fact that the negotiations on the safe zone has been taking more time than wanted is putting pressure on Turkey instead of enabling the country to save time.

Conditions in Northern Syria may force Turkey to follow “first act then deal” option.

The U.S.’s core objective in the negotiation process is not to withdraw from Syria after forming a safe zone as Turkey wishes. In fact, the U.S. wants to appease Turkey via the negotiation process to gain time. In this case, Turkey needs to create its own options. Turkey may be forced to create a ground plan for itself eventually, which makes the “first act then deal” mindset one of Turkey’s policy options. Besides that, the idea of ​​including Russia in the process towards the east of the Euphrates should not be underestimated. This also seems to be related to the process in Idlib soon.

For Idlib, the formula is simple: strengthen moderate opposition, oppress and persuade HTS for a solution. At the end of the day, no other state but Turkey has serious plans for the east of the Euphrates.

These two issues are directly impacting Turkey’s policy options. How the Idlib issue is going to be resolved remains unclear despite that Turkey has gained time via the Sochi Summit. Idlib offers significant opportunities for Turkey, but also contains the risk of turning into a problem. First of all, Russia is creating pressure on Turkey through Idlib. Moscow’s “either resolve it or consent to an operation” policy has impacted Turkey’s negotiation process with the U.S. unavoidably.

In sum, Turkey can provide rapid progress in both if it can create a de facto situation both in Idlib and in the east of the Euphrates by taking more initiative and producing authentic solutions. For Idlib, the formula is actually to strengthen moderate opposition, oppress and persuade HTS for a solution process! At the end of the day, it is clear that no other state but Turkey has serious plans for the east of the Euphrates.

Turkey has long called for the establishment of some sort of a safe zone in Syria over the course of the conflict. Such calls were primarily aimed at preventing regime violence against civilians and the opposition. Turkish calls on the international community to act on the principle of responsibility to protect were ignored and Russia’s direct military intervention ended any prospect of such a scenario. As the conflict evolved, the U.S.-led coalition narrowly defined its mission in terms of counterterrorism against Daesh only. Furthermore, the U.S. investment in the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK, precluded any cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey, which could have worked to establish such a zone. Today, as the U.S. withdraws, Turkey sees a safe zone as the only option to protect its national security along the Syrian border.

The course of the conflict, in other words, has shifted from a rebellion by the opposition against the Assad regime to a de facto failed state in which international powers conducted operations against terror organizations. At the same time, Syria became a battleground for regional powers with their various proxies on the ground. In an environment where there have been very little and piecemeal instances of international cooperation, a lasting solution remained elusive at best. The U.S. decision to work “by, with, and through” the YPG has simply complicated this picture by creating a major crisis between two NATO allies. Furthermore, the U.S. has refused to provide leadership to resolve the conflict through years of indecision. President Trump’s decision to withdraw, even if many argue about its manner and timing, ironically provides a clear direction of the U.S. policy in Syria. The U.S. is leaving the country, that much we know.

As the U.S. withdraws, Turkey sees a safe zone as the only option to protect its national security along the Syrian border.

As the U.S. military is gearing to depart Syria within a matter of months, the central question for the U.S. planners seems to be how to ensure that the YPG is not attacked by Turkey. Turkish policymakers are quite puzzled by this priority as the real question should be about how to ensure the national security of a NATO ally is protected. Turkey is determined to prevent the YPG from achieving an autonomous zone for its operations. A sure way for Turkey to accomplish this goal is to create a safe zone under Turkish military’s control supported by opposition forces. Turkey hopes to repatriate significant numbers of refugees to settle in this new zone. Such a zone would not only satisfy Turkey’s national security concerns but also create conditions for the repatriation of refugees. The establishment of a safe zone under Turkish control would contribute to stabilization efforts that have long relied on sub-state actors such as the YPG. True stabilization can only happen through the commitment of serious state actors like Turkey.

Creating a safe zone would not only satisfy Turkey’s national security concerns but also create conditions for the repatriation of refugees. 

If a safe zone under Turkey’s control materializes with the support and coordination of the U.S., Turkey-U.S. relations can benefit from a serious confidence building measure after years of mistrust. It would alleviate the Turkish concerns about a continued commitment to the protection of and support for the YPG even after the U.S. withdrawal. For the U.S military, protecting their “local allies” in the fight against Daesh seems to be a priority but the administration needs to recognize that such a policy has a destabilizing effect on the dynamics on the ground, not to mention asking a NATO ally to look the other way when its national security is threatened. The U.S. withdrawal without leaving a power vacuum and a renewed instability on the ground can only happen with Turkey. If the U.S. and Turkey can work together on establishing a safe zone in northern Syria with the goal of achieving stability and security, it would go a long way in repairing years of mutual distrust.  

The debate on the U.S. withdrawal from Syria suffers from a couple of frequently repeated arguments that do not reflect the realities of the conflict, especially in northern Syria. Some argue that the U.S. should not abandon their allies on the ground and leave them to their fate, which would amount to a “betrayal of the Kurds.” This line of thinking makes a couple of flawed assumptions starting with equating the PKK’s Syrian affiliate the YPG with Syrian Kurds in general. The reality is that the YPG does not represent even the majority of the Kurds in Syria, nor are they reliable partners as they have been promoted. Since the beginning of the conflict, they refused to fight the Assad regime, maintained connections with Russia, and prolonged the anti-Daesh fight as much as possible to ensure the U.S. remained in Syria as their protectors.

The U.S. military has openly promoted the “accomplishments” of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a rebranding of the YPG, despite the fact that U.S. intelligence community as well as high-level officials have repeatedly admitted on the record that the YPG is the “Syrian militia” of the PKK. The U.S. military officials, especially those at CENTCOM, have expressed displeasure about Turkey as they have perceived Turkish efforts in northern Syria as hindering their anti-Daesh mission despite the fact that Turkey has been part of the anti-Daesh coalition from the beginning. Turkey’s reservations and repeated warnings against allying with the YPG seem to have been received by the U.S. military more as an annoyance than legitimate national security concerns of a NATO ally.

Some argue that the U.S. should not abandon their allies on the ground and leave them to their fate, which would amount to a “betrayal of the Kurds.” This line of thinking makes a couple of flawed assumptions starting with equating the PKK’s Syrian affiliate the YPG with Syrian Kurds in general.

The disconnect between the U.S. and Turkey on the YPG issue has widened and deepened in recent years. As both the Obama and Trump administrations adopted a policy of “by, with, and through” local partners to fight Daesh, Turkish concerns have been ignored until very recently. President Trump’s withdrawal decision created an opening for repairing the long-simmering tensions between the two countries contingent on a rethinking of the U.S. partnership with the YPG. In the early days of the decision, I commented that the withdrawal might not translate to an immediate halt to the U.S. support for the YPG. Today, all indications are that the U.S. policy planners are trying to convince Turkey to forego any potential military operations against the YPG once the U.S. leaves. However, Turkey’s refusal to commit to not fighting the Syrian branch of the PKK should surprise no one. While the “betrayal of the Kurds” argument might have some currency among at least some policymakers, reassuring a NATO ally should take priority.

Turkey has not only supported the U.S. withdrawal decision but also offered ways to make it an orderly and successful process by leaving no room for a political vacuum. Turkey’s insistence on establishing a safe zone along the border with Syria in the north aims to achieve two main goals, which would ensure its national security and allow for stability in the region. First, the YPG would no longer control the border, which would reassure Turkish security concerns about arms transfers into Turkey and the PKK control in the region. Second, significant numbers of refugees would be settled in northern Syria to relieve Turkey of some of the political burden of hosting more than 3.6 million refugees. From the American perspective, however, the safe zone appears to be a demarcation zone where Turkey and the YPG would be separated from each other so that the U.S. forces would not leave the YPG at the “mercy” of Turkey. Just as the two NATO allies’ approaches to the YPG has diverged, their conceptions of the function of the potential safe zone are not aligned. Once again, their basic disagreement about the YPG spells potential for disaster in bilateral relations.

By establishing a safe zone along the border with Syria in the north, Turkey aims to achieve two main goals: First, the YPG would no longer control the border, which would reassure Turkish security concerns about arms transfers into Turkey and the PKK control in the region. Second, significant numbers of refugees would be settled in northern Syria to relieve Turkey of some of the political burden of hosting more than 3.6 million refugees. 

It is time for a truly honest and in-depth strategic conversation between the two allies about the U.S. relationship with the YPG. Characterizing it as a tactical and temporary alliance will not suffice as the withdrawal discussions show that the U.S. feels it owes the YPG as if it is actually a strategic partner for the long haul. Turkey needs reassurance that this is not the case and the reassurance cannot be in words only. The U.S. policy planners need to make it clear to Turkey that they are not looking for ways to protect the YPG as part of their withdrawal plan.

2018 has been a year of some historic developments in the Middle East, which has been witnessing an era of instability and uncertainty since the start of the Arab Spring 8 years ago. The political events of 2018 may show their effects in 2019 as the region approaches a much more complicated political atmosphere. The most important of these events is undoubtedly the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate General in Istanbul. The incident that took place on October 2 not only had a global impact but also had an impact on the Saudi political leadership as well. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who was being groomed to the top position of the Kingdom, had to reconsider his options. MbS was subjected to an international campaign as he was accused of having links to the murder of Khashoggi. Despite the dramatic turn of events, the Crown Prince has so far managed to keep his position and continues to oversee the country’s reform process.

Another important aspect of criticism toward Mohammad bin Salman is the on-going civil war in Yemen and the role of Saudi Arabia in this war. Tens of thousands of civilians lost their lives in Yemen because of the Decisive Storm Operation that was launched in 2015 when Mohammed bin Salman was the Minister of Defence. This operation has created further damage in Yemen as air bombardments targeted civilian areas indiscriminately. A humanitarian crisis has been experienced recently in the country due to the blockade of the coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Due to the blockade in some regions, hundreds of thousands of Yemeni civilians have been facing hunger and disease. The international community increased its criticism of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi – the two countries that are accused of being responsible in the deteriorating situation in Yemen.

The Jamal Khashoggi murder, civil war in Yemen, U.S. withdrawal from Syria, and Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel are among the events that will have their effects on the Middle East in 2019. 

The year 2018 has also seen significant developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The most important of these is the decision of the U.S. President Trump to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. On 14 May the opening ceremony was held with the attendance of Trump’s daughter Ivanka and his son-in-law Jared Kushner, as well as his advisor Steven Mnuchin. This has been considered as a historical development for Israel. Tel-Aviv has achieved a new phase in its occupation policies and reached an important goal of eliminating the Palestinian state’s presence in Jerusalem. The move attracted little reaction from the Muslim world, except with harsh criticism from Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The increasing U.S. support for Israel and Tel-Aviv’s aggressive policies in Palestine caused a violent reaction within the Palestinians with a new wave of protests that continued throughout 2018. Tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip organized a Great March of Return, which began in Gaza on March 30, 2018, in order to express their desire to return to their lands that were taken away by Israel in 1948. The March  has turned out to be one of the biggest mass protests movements against Israel since the second Intifada. The Palestinians called Israel to end its occupation and let them return to their lands and homes that were forcibly taken from them 70 years ago. The protesters also called the 11-yearlong blockade on Gaza by Israel to be removed. At least 200 Palestinians were killed and more than 25 thousand civilians were injured during the protests by Israeli forces. Despite international calls, the Israeli army continues to use live ammunition against civilians and targets Palestinians who participate in protests indiscriminately.

Two other important events of 2018 are related with the U.S. policies towards the Middle East. The first is Donald Trump’s decision to implement new sanctions against Iran. The first phase of the sanctions was put into effect in August, while the second and more comprehensive part, which was planned to last for 180 days, was initiated in November. Despite the international outcry and criticism, the Trump administration continued with its plans and argued that the sanctions are needed to deter Iran from nuclear activities and prevent its expansionist policies in the Middle East. Trump argued that Iran’s policies are a threat to the U.S. and its allies in the region. It is however uncertain how sanctions will affect Iran as previous experiences in this regard did not prevent Tehran from achieving its policy goals both in nuclear and expansionist activities.

The increasing U.S. support for Israel and Tel-Aviv’s aggressive policies in Palestine led to the Great March of Return, which expressed the Palestinian desire to return to their lands that were taken away by Israel in 1948.

Turkey-U.S. relations have been in a state of crisis since the July 15 coup attempt, which many in Turkey believed that the U.S. was somehow involved. The arrest of Pastor Brunson by Turkish authorities just added more fuel to the fire and the bilateral relations were further damaged. However, the release of Pastor in October changed the course of events. As a first step, the Trump administration reconsidered his country’s ill-mannered support for the terrorist organization PYD in Northern Syria. In mid-December Trump announced that U.S. soldiers will withdraw from Syria. Trump’s  announcement of pulling U.S. troops from Syria has been a landmark for not only the country’s Syria policy but also for U.S.-Turkey relations. Trump’s decision came after his long phone calls with Turkish President Erdogan. When announcing his decision Trump underlined that Erdogan convinced him that Turkey would continue to fight against Daesh. Despite the fact that the U.S. President did not emphasize that his country will no longer support the PYD, his decision was welcomed in Turkish political circles and seen as a positive step towards Turkey. However, the U.S. withdrawal from Syria should send waves of caution for countries like Turkey as a number of other actors will intend to fill in the power vacuum in the war-torn country in the post-U.S. period.

The U.S. withdrawal from Syria should send waves of caution for countries like Turkey as a number of other actors will intend to fill in the power vacuum in the war-torn country in the post-U.S. period.

The legacy of 2018 will be clearly visible during the following year. There would be serious consequences as a result of the political developments of 2018, such as the murder of Khashoggi, the Yemen war, Israel-Palestine conflict, sanctions on Iran, the U.S. withdrawal from Syria, and the changes in the U.S.-Turkey relations. Other developments such as Turkey’s increasing involvement in Syria, tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the Gulf crisis would also dominate the agenda of the 2019.

The U.S. withdrawal symbolizes a new phase for local and regional actors in Syria. Particularly for Ankara, the U.S.’ “slow and coordinated” pull out strategy, which involves 2,000 troops in North East Syria, is a game changer; it was an unexpected move that no one saw it coming two weeks ago in Ankara. However, President Erdogan had a very strong expectation that President Trump would take responsibility to reshape Turkish-American relations before it would be too late. He never gave up on maintaining his communication with President Trump.

The mobilization of Turkish troops and the declaration of high military readiness in the region following Erdogan’s Ankara speech was a direct message not for the YPG but for the U.S. government to change its policy towards the YPG. More importantly, Turkey’s unexpected yet comprehensive air strike against PKK positions in Northern Iraq was a strong sign that Turkey would extend same military campaigns against YPG positions in Syria. In this regard, it was the last chance for the Turkish-American relations to reevaluate the escalation on the YPG issue. Otherwise, Turkey would have been militarily involved in the North East Syria where the U.S. has been operating alongside YPG forces. During the phone call on December 14, as it is claimed, President Erdogan strongly stressed Turkey’s position on military action, and it was followed by Trump’s decision.

At this stage, the operational and strategic dynamics, as well as the new geopolitical calculations among the actors involved in the Syrian conflict should be reconsidered. The post-American Syria revealed the dynamics, especially for Turkey. Hence, President Erdogan should reevaluate his overall strategy on Syria. Turkey’s priority, as president Erdogan repeatedly expresses, is to eliminate the YPG threat for Turkey’s imminent national and regional security concerns.

The cooperation between the U.S. and the YPG, and the U.S. operational military presence in NE Syria were some of the important dynamics that restricted Turkey’s freedom of military action against the YPG. Trump’s withdrawal means that Turkey gained freedom of military action in eastern Syria, yet the development brings a challenging road-map for Turkey to achieve its strategic priorities. If Turkey delivers its priorities on the ground and redesigns the current balance of power, the Syrian conflict is likely to be reshaped soon.

Following the cleaning of the Manbij pocket from the YPG forces, Turkey will reach its initial goal to take full control alongside its border in the western part of the Euphrates River. This might bring Turkey freedom of military action not only to reshape the overall region including Idlib but also to accommodate refugees.

The challenges that Turkey has to reconsider are multidimensional. First and foremost, what type of military move, in an operational manner, that Turkey will adopt following the U.S. withdrawal is significant. It seems that Turkey’s first military mission is to establish a full-scale military control in the Manbij pocket where Turkey and the U.S. had already agreed, yet the YPG maintains its presence there. The intense military mobilization of Turkey and Turkey-trained National Army near the Turkish border and inside Jarablus demonstrate that Ankara will take military action in Manbij.

Even though the regime tends to mobilize its militias towards the Manbij pocket to retake the city from the YPG, Turkey certainly perceives Manbij as a military threshold to maintain its military deterrence. At this stage, deterrence for Turkey is the use of threats to dissuade the Syrian regime from initiating an undesirable act in the region. Following the cleaning of the Manbij pocket from the YPG forces, Turkey will reach its initial goal to take full control alongside its border in the western part of the Euphrates River. This might bring Turkey freedom of military action not only to reshape the overall region including Idlib but also to accommodate refugees. Up until now, 300,000 returned to their homes in the western part of the River.

Following the takeover of Manbij, Turkey’s second military move against the YPG is expected to be alongside the border. This military operation will have a different character as the YPG would probably want to defend Ayn Al Arab (also known as Kobane), Rasul Ayn, and Tel Abyad against Turkey’s military action. The YPG’s search for a new ally at this stage is one of the significant steps that can influence Turkey’s potential military action, yet it seems that no credible actor at this stage can prevent Ankara from taking military action in these regions.

The strategy that Turkey might adopt following the liberation of Manbij has two broad aims. While the first aim for Turkey is to disassemble the YPG’s territorial continuity alongside the Turkish-Syrian border, the second one is to provide a safe haven for the refugee community who were forcefully displaced by the YPG. If this will is the case, Turkey is set to accomplish its original aim to establish a secure zone alongside its Syrian border. This also means that fighting against Daesh is a secondary mission that should be carried out following the establishment of a safe zone for Turkey’s military presence.

Trump’s decision brought many opportunities to repair especially the U.S.’s wrong strategy of working with a terrorist organization to fight against another terrorist organization, but at the same time brought Syria into a new rivalry between the regional countries.

This probably brings the third dimension for Turkey’s post-American roadmap in Syria. Fighting against Daesh at this stage is a complicated issue from a military perspective in which Turkey has the capacity, yet the geographical distance where Daesh militants operate makes Turkey’s military engagement riskier. While Turkey was calculating a limited military operation against the YPG in its borderline, now Turkey has to reconsider its military strategy.

This requires a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy for Turkey to clean the area from YPG and Daesh, hold the liberated territories to sustain military presence and finally to build the post-conflict places. More importantly, Turkey’s potential far-reaching military operation towards the southern flank of Syria might also bring the Syrian regime, Russia and Iran into the geopolitical rivalry in the region, which is a situation Turkey would not want to get into. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that “Syrian government should assume control of areas vacated by the U.S.” This means that Russia does not tend to accommodate with Turkey’s own roadmap for the post-American withdrawal. Therefore, cooperation with Russia and the U.S. is the most significant part of Turkey’s strategy in NE Syria.

The game changer development for Turkey would be a potential and quick dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces. If the non-YPG forces (mainly the Arab forces) inside the SDF decide to detach themselves from SDF, then Turkey’s strategy has to take the Syrian regime’s move towards the eastern part of the Euphrates into account

The game changer development for Turkey would be a potential and quick dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces. If the non-YPG forces (mainly the Arab forces) inside the SDF decide to detach themselves from SDF, then Turkey’s strategy has to take the Syrian regime’s move towards the eastern part of the Euphrates into account, which poses another trouble, not just for Turkey but also for the U.S.  

The Syrian crisis is fundamentally localizing geopolitics, in which each actor has strategically different priorities regarding every single terrorist formation in Syria. Trump’s decision brought many opportunities to repair especially the U.S.’s wrong strategy of working with a terrorist organization to fight against another terrorist organization, but at the same time brought Syria into a new rivalry between the regional countries. Undoubtedly, Turkey needs a comprehensive strategy for its Syrian road-map following the American withdrawal.

Speaking at the award ceremony of The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) and the Turkish Academy of Sciences (TUBA) at the Nation Congress and Culture Center at Bestepe, Ankara, President Erdogan made some important comments after celebrating the work and effort of all scientists who had been awarded.

Highlighting the importance of the ‘national treasure’ that will carry Turkey stronger to the future, Erdogan said: “For a long time, we did not open the cover of this ‘treasure’ and benefit from it. For the past two centuries, not just as a country, but also as the Muslim world, we did not reach the success in intellectual studies, production, industry, scientific research, culture and arts. As a result of this, there is a huge impact of the attacks of imperialism on our country and the Muslim world.”

In addition to the sphere of intellectual production, Erdogan added that the Muslim world, which has a population of 1.7 billion, does not even have a permanent member at the United Nation’s Security Council.

“This is why I say ‘The world is bigger than 5.’ This is not far, not in terms of continents, religions, or ethnicities. An answer that comes out of their [permanent members] mouths finalizes everything. There are 194 members; 5 permanent members and they added 15 temporary members along just to raise and drop their hands. There is no meaning. The institution [UN] has been established to bring justice to the world, but this has not been the case. Do not expect or look for any justice from both the Security Council and the UN in general. There is no such thing.”

The Turkish president also added that during the past 16 years, the AK Party administration has managed to dismantle the ‘dependency suit’ that has been forced upon Turkey and its surrounding civilizations for centuries. He added that Turkey has made major improvements in terms of the economy, technology, industry, trade, transportation, democracy, and freedom. With these steps taken, the President underlined that the Turkish nation has increased its faith and self-esteem.

In addition to President Erdogan, during a press conference in Ankara yesterday, leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahceli, also made important remarks and answered questions.

Responding to a question regarding the expected Turkish military operation in the east of the Euphrates, Bahceli stated that Turkey has a keen and determined attitude to wiping out terrorism, which was manifested with its two military operations – Operation Olive Branch and Euphrates Shield – and their successful results.

“The Turkish nation is aspiring the expected military operation in the east of the Euphrates. We also believe that this will take place. With regard to the fight against terrorism, we [MHP] continue to give our full support to the presidential system.”

In his answer to a question on whether it was necessary to start a dialogue with the Assad regime in order to maintain Syria’s geographical integrity and to limit the influence of the YPG/PKK, Bahceli answered, “I’m against any type of dialogue with the Assad regime as a thought. Turkey has walked a long way in the name of fighting terrorism and has paid high costs in this regard. At this point, it would be a shame and a loss for Turkey to give up on this process to the will and choice of Assad.”

Bahceli underlined that saving Syria from the Assad regime had to be done through democracy and that the policies that began in Sochi and continued in Tehran ought to be followed in order to reach a result.

Commenting on the phone call between President Erdogan and U.S. President Trump on December 14, which occurred just before Trump announced his decision to withdraw troops from Syria, Bahceli said that “Turkey has already ripped its shell” and is imposing its strong state tradition to different domains.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi 

News agencies reported yesterday that the Syrian regime is dispatching forces and equipment to the village of Arimah, 25 km west of Manbij.

Reporting from the region, news agencies stated that 40 pickup trucks, 2 military tanks, several trucks with military equipment and military personnel together with armored vehicles have entered Armiyah, a village near Manbij.

Reuters claimed that the Syrian regime backed by Russian forces are in coordination with YPG leaders in the Manbij region and are working together in order to respond to the expected military assault by Turkey-backed Syrian rebels who are waiting for the ‘signal’ to come from the Turkish military. Yousef Hamoud – a spokesman for the National Army – the main rebel force in the region backed by Turkey – said “the battle will start soon.”

According to experts in Turkey, after the decision of Turkey to enter the east of Euphrates and the decision of the US administration to withdraw its troops from Syria, the recent move of Syrian regime will once again change the balances in the region. The move of Syrian regime is understood by some experts as the ‘move’ of Russia indicating that ‘Russia cannot be left aside’ after the withdrawal decision taken by Trump in consultation with Erdogan.

Speaking to the Turkish press yesterday, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu remarked that Turkey is determined for a military operation in the east of the Euphrates. He added that Turkey is pleased with the withdrawal decision of the U.S. administration and will continue its military and diplomatic conducts in the process of this withdrawal.

Cavusoglu also remarked that both the U.S. and Turkish governments agreed on the Manbij issue and informed reporters that both countries are working closely in order to complete the process. It is reported that Cavusoglu will visit Russia in the upcoming days in order to discuss the U.S. withdrawal process.

The Turkish Ministry of Defense also commented on the developments in Manbij by tweeting, “In accordance with the developments in Manbij, the activity in the Arimah area has been observed to belong to the Syrian regime, which has been in the mentioned area since 2017. The developments are being followed.”

Anadolu Agency reported that the military equipment and trucks of the Turkish army have reached Elbeyli, Kilis – less than 150km north of Manbij.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi  

U.S. President Trump has once again rocked the world agenda with his tweets. He declared that he will withdraw the American troops in Syria. The order to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria was signed shortly after. According to American news sources, the order will start the withdrawal of 2600 American servicemen in Syria; it is “expected to begin in the next several weeks and could take several weeks to finish.”

President Trump’s decision led to severe repercussions in the American state apparatus as Secretary of Defense James Mattis quit and the top U.S. envoy leading the international coalition fighting Deash, Brett McGurk resigned. General Joseph Votel of CENTCOM has also made it clear how upset they are because of this decision. All this shows that Trump took this decision not only independent of this bureaucratic apparatus and some of his own men but also against them.

For so long, the circle around Trump tried hard to persuade him that the PYD is the only partner that they can work with on the ground. Despite Turkey’s persistent calls and warnings with regard to the PYD terrorism against Turkey, the U.S. has so far walked with the PYD. But it seems like those days are over now. Turkey’s President Erdogan has persuaded Trump to leave working with the PYD in Syria in a phone call. The unexpected part was that Trump decided not only to leave the PYD but the country altogether, which was a surprise to everybody. Nobody was ready to this new situation and it will be a whole new challenge. What might happen next then?

Despite Turkey’s persistent calls and warnings with regard to the PYD terrorism against Turkey, the U.S. has so far walked with the PYD. But it seems like those days are over now.

Assuming that the U.S. will pull out, this leaves us with a territory composing more than a quarter of Syria’s land mass. This huge mass of land will attract the interests of many global, regional, and local actors. Of course, the timing and style of the American withdrawal will limit the options but in any way, the land mass is too big not to catch some interested eyes. The first thing to know about this new vacuum is that is it too big not to catch such an attention but again, it is also too big to be controlled by a single actor alone.

As for Turkey, it would prioritize to clean its immediate neighborhood from the PYD. For this reason, Turkey might start its cleaning with Manbij in the west of the Euphrates and go on along its border toward the east. But with regard to the further south toward Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, it might be quite a bit of stretch for Turkey and its local partners to control all alone. I believe Turkey will be open to negotiate with other involved powers in the control of these southern territories and in the fight against DEASH.

Assuming that the U.S. will pull out, this leaves us with a territory composing more than a quarter of Syria’s land mass. This huge mass of land will attract the interests of many global, regional, and local actors.

European powers, Iran, and Russia all have already shown or will show interest in this landmass but it seems like it will be Russia that Turkey and its local partners will have to deal with. Iran will not make a good partner in the East of the Euphrates as its involvement will also produce the need to counterbalance from Israel and Saudi Arabia, which will bring further trouble to the already suffering Syria.

European powers, on the other hand, are too weak on the ground to have a say in the bargain. This leaves Russia as the most prominent actor in the future of the area for Turkey. This is not too bad for Turkey given the coordination level the two countries reached in Syria is impressive. The Astana process did not resolve the Syria case so far but achieved to prevent the war to escalate. The two countries share this goal of ending the war and further to keep the territorial integrity of Syria intact.

Hence, it is not too hard to imagine that Turkey and Russia can cut a deal for the east of the Euphrates as well. Further, if the U.S., one way or another, wants to dictate the terms of filling in the vacuum it will leave, Turkey again can play its hand to find a middle ground with the U.S. It seems like Turkey has learnt how not to lose the diplomacy game with great powers in the Syria theatre.

In a press meeting after a cabinet meeting yesterday, spokesman for the Turkish presidency, Ibrahim Kalin, told reporters that Turkey has long borders and different interests, which makes it possible for the country to buy both the S-400 and Patriot air defense system if necessary.

Kalin answered questions on issues such as Turkey’s ongoing fight against terrorism, the U.S. withdrawal from Syria, developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and recent developments in relations between Ankara and Washington.

Commenting on the decision of the U.S. Department of Defense regarding the Patriot sales to Turkey, the spokesman highlighted that the U.S. administration expressed the fact that there are no obstacles ahead of the sale of the defense system to Turkey. However, in regards to the amount, Kalin said, “The decision made by the U.S. administration is pleasing for us. However, the nature and content of the offer is important. The details of the offer regarding issues such as co-production, price, credits, transfer of technology, and delivery time are important. Turkey turned to Russia for S-400s because we got the best offer from Russia. Turkey has long borders and is dealing with different problems in various regions, and therefore it will not be surprising to purchase both systems if necessary.”

Ibrahim Kalin also commented on the U.S. withdrawal from Syria and stated, “The decision to withdraw will contribute to the diplomatic solution of the Syrian crisis. The decision came after a telephone conversation made between President Trump and President Erdogan on December 14. This phone conversation was a historical one.”

Answering a question on the developments in the East Mediterranean, Kalin stated that Turkey will continue to maintain its economic policies with determination in the region in 2019 and highlighted the importance of this by stating, “The East Mediterranean is a region constantly in motion. We have not allowed any de-facto situation in the north, south, east, or west of Cyprus, and will not allow this in the future. Our goal is to make the region a sea of peace.”

The presidential spokesperson also mentioned that a delegation from the U.S. will arrive in Turkey this week and will discuss the details of coordination for the Manbij deal. He informed reporters that both Erdogan and Trump agreed on the issue of coordination in Manbij and that this coordination will have a road map. “The U.S. delegation is coming to have a meeting with the Turkish delegation in order to discuss the details of this coordination.”

He also added that there will be a delegation from Turkey visiting the U.S. in January and that a meeting between Erdogan and Trump is not expected due to Turkey’s pre-occupation with the local elections in March. However, he did mention that President Erdogan invited Trump to Turkey and that while Trump accepted the offer, a date has not been set yet.

Meanwhile, Trump’s decision to withdraw from Syria is still showing its effects in Washington. After the resignation of Secretary of Defense – James Mattis – another important actor within the U.S. administration – Brett McGurk – the U.S. special envoy for the global coalition against DAESH – also resigned from his position.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi