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audi Arabia said on Tuesday that its national security was a “red line” and backed a demand for United Arab Emirates forces to leave Yemen within 24 hours, marking Riyadh’s strongest language yet toward its Gulf ally amid escalating tensions in the war-torn country.

The warning came hours after a Saudi-led coalition carried out an airstrike on the southern Yemeni port of Mukalla, targeting what it described as unauthorized foreign military support for UAE-backed southern separatist forces.

Yemen’s Saudi-backed presidential council head, Rashad al-Alimi, ordered Emirati forces to withdraw and announced the cancellation of a defense pact with the UAE, accusing Abu Dhabi of fueling internal conflict through its support for the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group seeking autonomy in southern Yemen.

“It has been definitively confirmed that the United Arab Emirates pressured and directed the STC to undermine state authority through military escalation,” Alimi said in a televised address, according to Yemen’s state news agency.

Saudi Arabia urged the UAE to comply with the withdrawal demand. The UAE’s foreign ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Gulf stock markets fell following the flare-up, reflecting investor concern over rising tensions between the two longtime allies.

Mukalla strike and separatist advance

The Saudi-led coalition said the airstrike on Mukalla port caused no casualties or collateral damage. Two sources told Reuters the strike targeted a dock where cargo from two vessels had been unloaded.

Coalition officials said the ships arrived over the weekend from the UAE port of Fujairah without authorization, disabled their tracking systems, and unloaded weapons and combat vehicles intended to support the STC.

Yemeni state television aired footage showing black smoke rising from the port and burned vehicles in the area.

The STC, backed by the UAE, has recently made significant advances in southern Yemen, breaking years of military stalemate and seizing control of large areas, including parts of the strategic Hadramout province, which borders Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia had warned the STC against further military moves in Hadramout and demanded a withdrawal, a call the group rejected.

Deepening rift among allies

The UAE was part of the Saudi-led coalition fighting Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement from 2015. Although Abu Dhabi began reducing its troop presence in 2019, it has continued to wield influence through local allied forces, including the STC.

The recent STC offensive has brought Saudi Arabia and the UAE closer to direct confrontation, exposing fractures within the coalition that once fought the Houthis together.

In response to the escalation, Alimi imposed a 72-hour no-fly zone and a sea and land blockade on ports and crossings, with limited exemptions authorized by the coalition.

The STC’s leadership in Hadramout rejected the withdrawal demand, calling the Mukalla strike “a blatant attack on Hadramout and its people,” and described the UAE as an ally that should not be abandoned.

Yemen’s internationally recognized government accused the STC of staging an armed rebellion and serving Houthi interests, while praising Saudi Arabia for acting to prevent eastern Yemen from descending into chaos.

The Houthis continue to control northern Yemen, including the capital Sanaa, while the conflict remains fragmented among rival factions despite years of international efforts to end the war.

(Source: Reuters and Aljazeera)

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n the early months of 2024, global trade has encountered significant setbacks as a result of disruptions at two crucial shipping routes, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Attacks on vessels in the Red Sea area have notably impacted traffic through the Suez Canal, a pivotal maritime route connecting Asia and Europe.

Approximately 15 percent of the global maritime trade volume normally traverses this waterway. Simultaneously, a severe drought at the Panama Canal has led to restrictions, substantially reducing daily ship crossings since October, impeding maritime trade through another vital chokepoint.

The Chart of the Week, utilizing data from the PortWatch platform, illustrates the trade volume transiting through these key shipping lanes. High-frequency transit estimates reveal a staggering 50 percent year-over-year drop in trade volume passing through the Suez Canal in the first two months of 2024.

The Cape of Good Hope

In response to the Red Sea attacks and subsequent delays in the Suez Canal, several shipping companies rerouted their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. This alternative route experienced a remarkable surge of approximately 74 percent compared to the previous year’s level.

Meanwhile, the transit trade volume through the Panama Canal witnessed a substantial decline, falling by almost 32 percent in the same period compared to the prior year. The drought-related restrictions at the Panama Canal have posed additional challenges to maritime trade, further contributing to disruptions in the global supply chain.

The PortWatch platform also indicates a 6.7 percent year-over-year decline in port calls to the 70 ports tracked in sub-Saharan Africa during January and February 2024. Similar declines were observed in the European Union and the Middle East and Central Asia, with reductions of 5.3 percent.

These trends are likely reflective of the transitory effects of extended shipping times. If prolonged, the repercussions of these disruptions may temporarily hinder supply chains in affected countries and exert upward pressure on inflation, partly due to increased shipping costs.

Impact on recorded imports and exports

One significant implication of these shipping disruptions is the potential impact on official statistics related to recorded imports and exports. Customs records, upon which official trade statistics are based, may be influenced by the temporary rerouting of ships. This could complicate the accurate assessment of the underlying momentum of global trade and economic activity in the months to come.

For instance, merchandise trade reports for January in various countries across Africa, the Middle East, and Europe may show slowing import growth, as some imports that would typically be recorded in January were only delivered in February. Moreover, many low-income countries heavily reliant on import duties for fiscal revenues may report lower-than-expected revenue for January due to these delays. The situation calls for close monitoring as stakeholders navigate the challenges posed by disruptions in key maritime chokepoints.

Source: IMF

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n August 10, news of a controversial contract in the Yemeni city of Dhamar went viral. The contract, signed by the Manar tribes in 2021, resurfaced after an ex-political figure from the Islah party posted about the need to implement it across Yemen on Facebook.

The contract included restrictive measures against women in the tribe. For example, it states that women are strictly forbidden to own a smartphone, and if a woman is found having one, her male guardian will be punished. The contract also bans women from wearing makeup, travelling in taxis without a male guardian, and working for humanitarian NGOs.

The contract was reposted by Abdullah Ahmed Al-Adaini, the ex-leader of the conservative Islah party, and sparked a wave of conflicting opinions between supporters and opponents. In a now-deleted Facebook post, al-Adaini claimed that the document should be circulated and implemented throughout Yemen.

This is not the only form of oppression that Yemeni women continue to face under the Houthi leadership. The situation of Yemeni women today is worse than it was eight years ago.

The enslavement of Yemeni women

Regardless of their age, girls and women in Yemen have long suffered. Affected by Yemeni tribal customs, they have struggled for their freedom and rights as independent individuals. Yemeni tribes typically regard women in terms of “honor” and some see it as their duty to control women and restrict their freedom.

An example of extreme control is an incident in 2020, when news broke that a father had sold his daughter to a man for 200,000 YER, the equivalent of 350 USD. The agreement was made on paper between both parties, with no consideration given to the age of the girl, Laimoon, who was reportedly four years old at the time. The papers also contained a formal stamp with signatures of witnesses to the “transaction.”

The incident sparked local and international outrage. Gender-based oppression in Yemen takes place amid the harsh conditions of war, poverty, inflation, and terrible governance.

The forms of oppression against Yemeni women

In an exclusive interview with Politics Today, Nadya Abdullah, the Yemeni deputy minister at the Ministry of Youth and Sports – Women’s Sector, spoke about the different forms of oppression that Yemeni women face on a daily basis. She divided them into two categories: cultural and tradition-related oppression, on the one hand, and postwar oppression, on the other.

Traditional cultural oppression of women centers on the idea that women can’t make good decisions about their own life matters. “Until recently, Yemeni women struggled to have an opinion or a decision about their educational future,” she told Politics Today. “Even today, there are still families who decide on their daughters’ future whether it is education, marriage, or work.”

She also mentioned the issue of inheritance for women in Yemen. “Women always have to lose something, either they fight and lose their family, or they don’t fight and lose their rights,” she said, adding that in some cases, women are forbidden to inherit, regardless of women’s inheritance rights in Islam.

The postwar oppression of Yemeni women

Postwar oppression is a new form of oppression of women, appearing after the 2015 war. It involves the arrest of politically active women and the suffocation of women working for humanitarian NGOs. What is more, Abdullah mentioned that many women have lost their limbs or been killed by mines planted by the Houthis in conflict areas.

“Tens or hundreds of women have lost their limbs or been killed by Houthi mines, and a large number of women have been arrested for political reasons and are still in Houthi prisons,” Abdullah said. Such oppression of women has gone beyond the bounds of tradition and culture.

Despite holding a position in the Yemeni government, Abdullah has also experienced oppression because of her gender. “I fled Sana’a in 2015 because the Houthi forces tried to arrest me at the beginning of Operation Decisive Storm,” she explained, referring to the Saudi-led operation against the Houthis in Yemen. She added, “Since then, I haven’t been able to see my family. All because I am a politically active woman.” What was once shameful has become the norm under the Houthis.

Abdullah is not the only one; the number of women detained in the city of Sana’a alone is estimated at between 200 and 350. Samera al-Huri, a Yemeni activist, was arrested by the Houthi forces for her involvement in politics. Unlike Abdullah, al-Huri wasn’t as lucky. She was captured by the Houthis and tortured for three months until she confessed to false charges of prostitution. The tribal traditions that once protected women from this form of abuse have disappeared under the pressure of war.

On March 12, 2022, Houthis, who currently control the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, demolished part of the memorial to the martyrs of the Ottoman Empire in Yemen. This move speaks of a series of conflicts between the Ottoman administrators and Zaydi imams, the last of which ended with the signing of the Treaty of Da’an in 1911.

The memorial was erected on the western bank of the waterway dividing the historical city of Sana’a in two, near the Al-Aridhi Complex. Its various sections were built by the Ottomans in intermittent periods, and the complex was later turned into large headquarters for the army command, becoming one of the symbols of the Ottoman presence in Yemen.

The Al-Aridhi Complex was built by the Ottomans near the southern wall of the city of Sana’a as  the most important architectural facility outside the old city. It was restored and some facilities were added to it at the end of the rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh (1978-2012), who turned the complex into headquarters for the Ministry of Defense and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Saleh exercised his presidential duties periodically during the week from the same complex.

The establishment of the memorial graveyard dates to 2011 when it was inaugurated by then Turkish President Abdullah Gül during an official visit to Sana’a, on January 11, 2011. The memorial is symbolic of the bilateral relations, and the Turkish flag continued to fly at an important place in the capital of Yemen—before it had flown only above the Turkish embassy or the ambassador’s residence. The flag flying over the memorial remained exceptional in every sense of the word.

The Zaydi Imamate and the Ottomans: A history of hostilities

It is not possible to understand the Houthi attacks on the Ottoman memorial graveyard without delving into the historical background of the incident, which was widely condemned by Yemenis, as the demolition was linked to the Zaydi Houthi group.

The Zaydi presence in Yemen dates back to the late 9th century, when a person known by his honorific title Imam al-Hadi ila’l-Haqq (835-911) came to Yemen, specifically to Saada, in the northwest of the country.

A historical assessment of the Ottoman presence in Yemen

Since the fall of the Zaydi Imamate in Yemen on September 26, 1962, at the hands of the Yemeni people, who were fed up with them, and the consequent establishment of the Yemeni Republic, the historical assessment of the Ottoman state and its role in Yemen remained a subject of tension between the majority of Yemenis that viewed it as a natural extension of Muslim nation  and a minority that went as far as to describe it as an “Ottoman invasion.”

History textbooks, which were adopted after 1962, presented a positive view of the Ottoman Empire and its rule over Yemen. Nevertheless, this did not prevent Zaydi supporters from maintaining their strict and extremist position on the Ottoman Empire and on the Sunni majority that controlled the public in Yemen during the past six decades.

The view of this historical assessment is necessary to assess the motives that led the Houthis to demolish the Ottoman monument to the martyrs of the Ottoman Empire who had lost their lives in conflicts and confrontations resulting from the Zaydi imams and their rebels in northern Yemen, whose main goal had been to weaken the Ottoman Empire. This goal seemed to have been shared with the Safavid Shiite regime in Iran, thus establishing an invisible shared aim between the hard-liner Zaydis in Yemen and the most extreme Shiite scholars and thinkers in Iran.

Therefore, the Houthis’ demolition of the historical Ottoman monument shows an extremist historical ideological reaction that indicates the fanatic background of this group which wants to revive the Zaydi Imamate. The Houthis consider themselves an extension of the Zaydi imams, and feel entitled to seize the moment to resolve the current war in their favor.

Considering the end of the war with the Treaty of Da’an in 1911, Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din’s a war against the Ottoman Empire came at a time that took full advantage of other historical circumstances. The Ottoman Empire was facing the Italian invasion of Libya, a revolution in the Balkans, and was in a dire need of ending the military attrition it suffered at the hands of the Zaydis in Yemen

The agreement maintained the Zaydis’ influence in Yemen and granted the Zaydi imam the powers to supervise his Zaydi sect. It also meant that the imam would seek outside support which came from Iran. This became a tradition that continues on from the ninth century seen in the Iranian interference in Yemen’s affairs.

The political and regional dimensions

The Houthis chose a timely moment to demolish the historical Ottoman monument: the visit of Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Ankara. In my estimation, the demolition of the monument can be attributed to three reasons.

The first is that the Shiite Houthi group, as a sectarian minority, does not want the Yemeni people to retain a positive historical memory of the role of the Ottoman Empire in their country. Thus, this is a message to Yemenis that there is no legitimate authority other than the authority of the Zaydi imams who today rule Yemen with an iron fist.

The second reason relates to the role played by regional powers, led by Iran, and Arab countries linked to the West. These countries, of course, do not want Turkey to have any historical impact on Yemen.

The third reason is that the Houthi group is trying to stop any future role for Turkey in the region, especially in Yemen. The Houthis know that a large segment of Yemenis have good relations with Turkey and aspire to implement the Turkish model in Yemen; they, on the other hand, aim to break away from Turkey. The Houthis fear the influential role of the current Turkish Republic and the history of the Ottoman Empire in Yemen.

For decades, the geopolitical and geo-sectarian rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has played out across the Middle East in various destabilizing ways. Since the Houthi rebels usurped control of Sana‘a in 2014, Yemen has been an important flashpoint in this competition for regional influence with Riyadh and Yemeni forces loyal to the UN-recognized Yemeni government waging war against the Iranian-backed insurgents for nearly seven years. The conflict(s) in Yemen still rages on. In recent days, the Government of Yemen “liberated” energy-rich Shabwah while the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed al-Amaliqa Brigades has been advancing into Marib. Meanwhile, Houthi missiles attacks keep on targeting their enemies, most recently including the UAE, at least according to the rebel group’s claims.

A major question that analysts have been asking since Saudi-Iranian talks began in Baghdad in April 2021 is, what could such dialogue mean for Yemen? It seems safe to conclude that although these talks have not led to major strategic or necessarily tangible changes in Yemen, there have been some tactical changes that could be grounds for some cautious optimism.

An important development in late 2021 was the death of Hassan Erlou who served as Iran’s ambassador to the Houthis. His passing called into question the relationship between the Houthis and their backers in Tehran, and how that could change the face of the war in Yemen. Erlou, who was smuggled into Yemen in 2020, was likely evacuated on an Iraqi plane from Yemen to Iraq, before flying home to Iran where he died from COVID19 on December 18, 2021.

“Erlou was obviously, from the evidence that we have, someone who was quite closely tied into the [Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)] and the Quds force,” explained Dr. Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at the School of Security Studies at King’s College London, Royal College of Defense Studies, in an interview with Politics Today. “He was on the U.S. Treasury watch list. Having someone like him leaving [Yemen] without being actually arrested and then flying over Saudi territory was quite a concession from the side of the Saudis. This was only possible because of Iraqi mediation.”

Yet there were many conflicting reports about Erlou and his situation in Yemen just before leaving the country. The Saudis and Iranians told different stories about what had happened as well as the significance of and reasons for his exit from Yemen. “According to the Saudis, Erlou’s return to Tehran reflected tensions between the Houthis and Iran, but there has been little evidence of a breach in the relationship between Sanaa and Tehran,” according to Dr. Annelle Sheline, a Research Fellow for the Middle East at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Some reports even claimed that the Houthis were pushing for Erlou’s exit due to rising domestic pressure to distance themselves from Tehran.

Nonetheless, as Dr. Krieg explained, beyond all the facades and information warfare, there is a renewed willingness to talk between Riyadh and Tehran. In fact, last month when the Organization of Islamic Cooperation gathered in Pakistan to address the situation in post-U.S, Afghanistan, diplomats from the Saudi Kingdom and the Islamic Republic met.

This meeting between Saudi and Iranian officials in Islamabad “suggests that there is a willingness and also permission from the superiors to actually have these talks continue and that’s the most important thing,” according to Dr. Krieg. Additionally, in late 2021 the Saudi government granted Iranian diplomats visas at the OIC—a development suggesting that Riyadh and Tehran could possibly restore diplomatic relations this year.

Last month, the Saudi-led coalition released video footage and photographs that purportedly confirmed that the Houthis are receiving support from Hezbollah and the IRGC. The videos purportedly show a Hezbollah leader giving Houthi leader Abdullah Yahya Al-Hakim instructions, Hezbollah trainers teaching Houthis to operate drones, boxes of drone parts with the Hezbollah logo, and satellite footage showing how the IRGC has assisted the Houthis in transforming the Sanaa International Airport into a drone and missile launching pad.

“The Saudis want the Iranians to stop their surrogate operations across the region, whether it may be in Yemen or Iraq,” argued Dr. Krieg. “The problem with that is that the Iranians are saying there are no surrogate operations, and that these are local operations which we have no control over, which is obviously a lie. But it’s obviously this kind of surrogate game is one that’s based on dissociation and plausible deniability. Hence, why it’s very difficult to come to any conclusion because the Iranians will say in the first place ‘we have no forces on the ground, so we have no control over what’s going on’. It’s true to an extent. The control that the Iranians have over surrogate operations is limited. That’s something that the Saudis understand, and it always provides the Iranians with a degree of plausible deniability and disassociation to tell others that they’re actually not involved. That makes it difficult to come up with a solution that is sustainable.”

These recent developments leave us questioning how Erlou’s replacement will affect the situation in Yemen. Earlier this month, Iranian officials appointed Abdul Reza Shahlai as Erlou’s replacement without giving him an official diplomatic title, which some believe may be a sign of positive relations between Tehran and Riyadh. According to Gregory Johnsen, a nonresident fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution: “If the narrative of a split between the Houthis and Iran is true, then it is notable that Shahlai will not be given a diplomatic title, and by selecting an official already in Yemen, Iran honored the Houthi commitment to Saudi Arabia not to bring in a ‘new diplomat’.” However, his appointment could also simply be a means of convenience. Shahlai has been in Yemen for several years, meaning that they would not have to go through the effort to smuggle a new diplomat into the country and he is already a seasoned military commander with experience in Yemen.

In the final analysis, Saudi Arabia will continue to see Iran as a threat in the long term, no matter the direction that dialogue between the two countries takes in 2022. Iranian influence in Yemen will continue terrifying the Saudis. Nonetheless, one can assume that thanks to Iraqi mediation the likelihood of a repeat of the Saudi Aramco attacks of September 2019 has decreased.

Within the context of the Iranians wanting to improve their relationship with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in order to create a new architecture in the sub-region, we might see Tehran begin to show more sensitivity toward Saudi security as it directly pertains to the Gulf. But beyond the Gulf, it is tough to imagine talks in Iraq between Riyadh and Tehran leading to the Islamic Republic winding down its surrogate or “proxy” operations throughout the greater Middle East.

Since March 26, 2015, Yemen has become the focus of the international community. It has received attention due to the civilian catastrophe and famine as well as the increase in arms sales from major Arab countries in the Middle East.

Although Yemen is a poor country, its arms purchases have cost it hundreds of millions of dollars over several decades. Warring parties in Yemen have bought large quantities of conventional weapons, some of which are modern weapons from the United States and other Western countries, while most came from Russia and the former Soviet Union. Houthis have greatly benefited from this huge stockpile to fight a long-term battle, and to maintain a superior position in terms of military equipment and firepower compared to the Yemeni national army and the popular resistance groups supported by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

On the other hand, the Yemeni government of Hadi stopped buying weapons, not because it could not afford to do so anymore, but because it was not allowed. The Arab coalition, which was created to intervene militarily in Yemen in support of the legitimate Yemeni government against the Houthi group in 2015 and which was led by Saudi Arabia, imposed a total embargo on the purchase of weapons by the Houthis. This made the Saudis the main gate for the arms supplies to the Yemeni government forces fighting on the ground, allowing the Arab coalition to control the course of war completely.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution No. 2216, Paragraph 14 (April 15, 2015) authorized neighboring countries, namely the Saudi-led Arab coalition, to conduct inspections of shipments arriving at Yemen’s coasts to ensure that the ships are not carrying weapons to the parties under embargo. The embargo, by the way, does not include the Yemeni government. The resolution was explicit and clear to include the leaders in President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s party and the Houthi group and those associated with them.

Here, I will discuss the three main countries that have been involved in arms trafficking, directly and indirectly, in the Yemen civil war: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Weapons as an indicator of a troubled strategic partnership

There is a close link between the war waged by Saudi Arabia in Yemen and the steady increase in the volume of its arms purchases to such an extent that in 2020, the country jumped to the forefront of countries importing weapons on the global level: according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Saudi Arabia ranked second after India.

There is no better evidence than the information that was revealed by Clark Cooper, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, and Heidi Grant, the director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) that is part of the United States Department of Defense, in a joint press conference held at the Pentagon in early December 2020 at the end of the Trump’s term.

They explained that the United States generated $50.78 billion in intergovernmental “foreign military sales” and $124.3 billion in “direct trade sales.” Meanwhile, President Biden’s strict position on arms sales to Saudi Arabia appears to be a thing of the past as he recently agreed to sell Saudi Arabia $650 million worth of weapons, in a deal that includes 280 AIM-120s air-to-air missiles.

Arms race fueled by regional competition

Over the past decade, the UAE has ranked third and fourth among the most important arms importing countries in the Middle East, according to the Stockholm Institute. The UAE has been the seventeenth-largest importer of American weapons between 1996 and 2020, and the fifth-largest importer between 2016 and 2020.

Moreover, the number of U.S. arms deals with the UAE increased during the past five years, and include Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and PATRIOT PAC-3 air defense systems. During the same period, the UAE received thousands of relatively low-value armored vehicles and 1,000 guided bombs from the United States. These were used in Yemen along with high-value combat aircraft and missile defenses.

Similar to Saudi Arabia, the UAE bought weapons worth billions of dollars to cover its needs resulting from its active involvement in the Yemen war. This deal is still having a hard time getting through Congress, but President Biden, who halted the deal immediately after he took office, appears to be heading towards releasing it soon, according to statements by Mira Resnick, deputy assistant secretary of state, on November 17, 2021. The United States is fully committed to selling 50 F-35 stealth fighters to the United Arab Emirates.

According to the Middle East Institute, despite the UAE withdrawal from the Arab coalition in 2019, the inheritance it left behind was local groups, including the Southern Transitional Council (STC) that was formed in May 2017, which are in possession of heavy weapons mixed with ambitions of control of contested territories. This has weakened the rule of the Yemeni government in the liberated territories and diverted the coalition’s focus from fighting the Houthis to fighting the Houthis and the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (al-Islah) party, creating inter-coalition divisions as a result.

An influence built through an invisible bridge of armaments support

Iran is one of the major parties involved in the Yemeni civil war. Although its interference remains indirect, it is very effective. Iran’s arms smuggling in Yemen has been recorded since February 2013, when the Yemeni navy intercepted the ship Jihan 1 loaded with weapons for the Houthis en route to the port of Midi in the Red Sea.

Specific weapons, especially winged missiles and drones, in addition to guided anti-armor weapons, all come through extensive and complex smuggling operations. These weapons constitute a major source of supply for the Houthis, and are primarily responsible for the qualitative shift in the course of the war. This has been exemplified since 2018 by the targeting of the Saudi depth with missiles and drones.

On November 25, 2019, a U.S. warship seized a significant cache of Iranian weapons bound for Yemen’s Houthi rebels. The U.S. Navy rarely stops intercepting boats and ships carrying weapons originating from Iran and heading to Yemen. Similar operations are carried out by the Australian Navy in addition to the ships of the Saudi-led Arab coalition. The last shipment of smuggled weapons intercepted by the U.S. military was on May 8, 2021, and it included “prohibited weapons” from a sailing boat which was in international waters north of the Arabian Sea.

In a statement the U.S. Fifth Fleet said that the weapons included dozens of Russian anti-tank guided missiles, thousands of Type 56 assault rifle and Chinese assault rifles, and hundreds of PK machine guns (Pulemyot Kalashnikova), snipers, and rocket launchers. Since the Iranian weapons smuggled to the Houthis in Yemen are not subject to international control, it is difficult to determine the quantities of weapons that have actually reached the Houthis and are being used in the fighting.

However, there is increasing evidence which suggests that individuals or entities in Iran supply significant volumes of weapons to the Houthis as reported by the United Nation’s most recent report by the Panel of Experts on Yemen (S/2021/79) and as proven by the observational shift in the course of the fighting which indicates Iran’s clear armament influence in the Yemeni war. The influence extends to include appointing and sending Hassan Erlo, an officer in the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as Iran’s ambassador in Sana’a, a move which completely ignores the Security Council resolutions and international law.

Today, Iranian weapons have become an oft-repeated topic in the Arab coalition’s political media, and a topic that preoccupies the United States which has become more understanding and aware of Iran’s serious influence on the war in Yemen, but not to the extent of deterring it.

Yemen is witnessing one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 21st century with a civil war that has been going on for the past seven years. Alongside multiple local and regional actors at play, there are new diplomatic initiatives such as the U.S. special envoy introduced by the Biden administration, whose efficacy in bringing the conflicts to an end is yet to be proven. Nihan Duran of Politics Today interviewed Maysaa Shuja al-Deen, a Yemeni researcher and non-resident fellow at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies in Yemen on the current state of war in the country and the prospects of a sustainable peace.

Q. What is the current situation of the civil war in Yemen?

When we talk about Yemen today, we are not talking about one entity nor two entities, divided into south and north, as was the case before 1990. There are several entities in Yemen both in the south and north, and the biggest power in the north is the Houthis. They control a big part of the north of Yemen, which means that they have more than half of the population under their control.

In the north, there are also other powers such as the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Al-Islah party controlling Taiz and Ma’rib, the latter being a rich governorate, now besieged by the Houthis. On the western coast of the north, we have the military commander Tareq Saleh, the nephew of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Q. What is the picture of the south of Yemen?

We have an even more complicated picture in the south, given that there are more actors than in the north, such as the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC). STC is controlling the interim capital Aden and the western governorates Dhale and Lahj and parts of Abyan. Shabwah is a tribal governorate that is neighboring Ma’rib and is affiliated the president Hadi and Islah party has presence there. Coast of Hadhramaut is controlled by Hadhramaut elite which is supported by the UAE and affiliated the STC. Hadhramaut valley is still under the government forces control.

Al-Mahrah region is under the control of local powers. Alongside different local actors, there are also regional actors involved in Yemen, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE, who are not aligned and are not very willing to cooperate either.

Q. Alongside these local and regional actors, there are also new diplomatic initiatives such as the U.S. special envoy introduced by the Biden administration. Do you believe that these initiatives are likely to make a difference in resolving ongoing conflicts?

The U.S. policy towards Yemen has changed dramatically after the Biden administration. During the Trump administration, the Yemeni file was completely ignored, but now Yemen is a top priority in Biden’s foreign policy. What is happening now is that Yemen’s war is being considered in connection with the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Deal of 2015, which sees attempts now to be revived.

As we all know, Iran supports the Houthis for Iranians wish to be a powerful regional player and their influence in Yemen gives them a lot of leverage vis-à-vis the West, as we can see in the negotiations for the Nuclear Deal. For Iran, Yemen is the easiest card to be capitulated for a possible concession to Saudi Arabia.

The parties involved in negotiations to end the Yemen war need to understand that one cannot stop this war without addressing the local disputes and disagreements.

Q. In other words, Yemen is the soft spot for the Saudis.

Yes, they can accept the Iranian influence elsewhere, but not in Yemen. The U.S. is now trying to reach a peace settlement between the Saudis and the Houthis. There are also official meetings going on between Iran and Saudi Arabia around regional issues. Though these developments do not necessarily mean Iran will cut through all the relationships with the Houthis, it may put some leverage on the Houthis to accept a peace agreement that recognizes other local parties.

However, what I see right now is that the focus is too much on the regional dimensions of this war, and local dimensions, which are as crucial to consider, are largely overlooked. The parties involved in these negotiations need to understand that one cannot stop this war without addressing the local disputes and disagreements.

Q. On the other hand, we see in the south of Yemen a desire for a two-state or a two-region solution. What is the motivation behind that?

The south and the north were two different states until the unification in 1990. The Republic in the North, which had represented the capitalist camp, was established in 1962, and when the British withdrew from the south, the Southern state was founded in 1967, which represented the communist camp. However, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the desire for unification grew stronger, especially in the south. Yet, we need to note that, although they were united, the army remained divided and they could not agree on the constitution. So, there was a political crisis directly after the unity, and in 1994, a civil war erupted between the south and north. Yet, it is not very easy to refer to the new tension as a dispute between the south and the north in a classical sense.

Q. What do you mean?

During the civil war in 1994, some Islamist groups in the south fought for the government in the north against the socialist party in the south, who were defeated at that time. Whereas this victory made the north the hegemonic power across Yemen, it was received with resentment in the south, where people felt that they were being politically marginalized.

On top of that, after the discovery of the oil resources in the south, they eventually felt they would be better off without the north, who they have felt had neglected and marginalized them right after the 1994 war. Not surprisingly, the Houthis’ invasion of the south of Yemen in 2015 revived the two-decades-old injuries, which made the south feel that they cannot continue, especially with the Houthis controlling the capital in the north, Sanaa.

Q. Do you think the southern aspiration to have an independent status is realistic?

We need to highlight that the south is not a single entity. There are different groups that are not united, and this was a huge problem. Internationally as well, we can see that most of the countries are not very supportive of the idea of a separation, because if there is a separation in Yemen, there is the risk that it may encourage the aspirations for secessions in other parts of the region. Therefore, it is not very easy to convince the regional powers of this idea. This is one of the reasons why the U.N. resolutions in Yemen emphasize the unity of the Yemeni state. So, here we have a legal obstacle to southern aspirations to separation.

Q. What other barriers are there for these aspirations?

Another reason why some countries would not support the idea of a two-state solution is related to the sectarian composition of the country. In the north, there is a Zaidi Shia sect under the influence of Iran. Given the circumstances, the large Sunni population in the south balance the situation. This is why the Saudis, who were against the unity during the civil war in 1994, are now in favor of the unity of the Yemeni state, because otherwise they will have the risk of a Shia state at their borders. This is another problematic issue.

I do not know what is the price that Yemen is going to pay under these circumstances, but most of the people now are talking about a federal state or confederal state in Yemen. I think this is the most realistic scenario applicable to the current situation in Yemen.

Q. Given the current situation of war, what do you think are the prospects for peace in Yemen?

I think, any peace process in Yemen should follow the principle of inclusivity. Inclusivity of not only two parties, the government of Hadi and the Houthis, but all other local actors that have emerged during these seven years of war. A sustainable peace requires, first and foremost, the political will of political powers. The people of Yemen cannot attain peace without the political will of the STC, the Houthis, or whoever is there. This should also include enhancing the local governance in general because they are more in touch with the real situation there. But without the necessary political will, it is impossible reach peace in Yemen.

The London-based organization Friends of South Yemen (FOSY)  a grass roots organization has developed a three-staged road map to end the war in Yemen, where there are numerous political, economic, and security issues at stake, as well as an ongoing unimaginable  humanitarian crisis. Nihan Duran interviewed Dr. Abdul Galil Shaif, the chairman of FOSY and the former chairman of the Aden Free Zone Public Authority in Yemen, on the current state of war in Yemen and the way forward to finding a peaceful solution.

Q. Before going into details of the three-stage road map, could you please explain the current state of the war in Yemen?

First, this is not just  a war between Yemenis. It is also a  proxy war at a regional and international level  on Yemeni soil. All the partners in this war are self-imposed, and I think it is now obvious that there is no military solution to this conflict. The only solution is a peaceful resolution, and our immediate objective as Friends of South Yemen, a grassroots, self-financed, and independent organization, is to bring an immediate end to the war through a military ceasefire. Otherwise, it is going to be very difficult to find a peaceful solution as people continue to be displaced and killed.

It is evident that so far, the international community and the diplomatic efforts have failed miserably to materialize or  bring a peaceful solution to the war in Yemen. We have 85,000 children who have died in this war among the 250,000 people killed and the millions displaced. Fifteen million people are facing starvation, which could be one of the biggest humanitarian crises in the world. The economy has been damaged immensely. GDP in 2015 was 43 billion dollars in 2020 it was 21 billion dollars cut by more than half. While the population has grown from 25 million to 30 million. It is  unbelievable in these economic circumstances how the people of Yemen are surviving.

Q. Why do you think previous efforts have failed to bring an end to the war?

Most of the proposals in the past have been short-term. They were only concerned with how to bring about a ceasefire, without any reflection on how to move forward when the fighting has stopped. But in order to find a peaceful solution that will work, we need to understand the different regions, players, and their positions in this war.

The south of Yemen has been liberated from Houthi control in 2015 and there is now a power sharing government mediated by Riyadh between the legitimate government and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), and the north has almost been taken over by the Houthis, who are trying to expand their influence and territory. Our main objective is to bring an immediate end to the killing fields in Yemen and to do that, we need to make sure that we do something about what is happening now in Marib.

If the Houthis take over the rich oil region of Marib, it will make the peaceful solution much more difficult and complex to resolve.

Q. Why do the cities of Hudaydah and Marib play such a critical role?

If the Houthis take over the rich oil region of Marib, it will make the peaceful solution much more difficult and complex to resolve. It will also give the Houthis the upper hand militarily politically  and economically  as they could be on the verge of taking over  Marib, the last stronghold of the legitimate government of Hadi, which many depend on for oil and gas resources in that region.

Taking over Marib will strengthen the Houthis  and play into their expansionist policies.  This could become very dangerous for the south and the Houthis persuing this policy may  decide to take over the south again through Shabwa. And, I think, such a development is not in the interest of anybody since if they could, the Houthis would take over the whole of Yemen – as they tried to do in 2015.

Allowing the Houthis to take over the country will be a  huge  disaster for the whole of Yemen considering that this is a self imposed unelected  group  that does not want to share power with anyone because they believe they have a God-given right to rule Yemen as they see themselves as descendants of the Prophet Mohammed.

They are also a sectarian group who are creating sectarian divisions that did not previously exist in Yemen.  We need to be aware that the more land they take and the influence they have, the stronger they become as a group at the international negotiating table. The intensification of the war  and Houthi expansionist policy gives them no motivation to engage in international negotiations.

Q. How do you evaluate the recent development of U.S. President Joe Biden taking the Iran-backed Houthis off the country’s terror list?

I believe that the Houthis are a power and a part of Yemen’s reality that we cannot ignore, and therefore they have every right to be involved in a peaceful, negotiated settlement. I also think that being taken off the list of terrorists by the United States has emboldened them. They have seen this as an opportunity to advance into Marib.

I believe that the peaceful solution is the only way forward, but it needs tough and consistent diplomatic effort. I think that an international intervention at this point is critical. I hope that U.S. President Biden is going to push forward a strong diplomatic effort, as was his campaign promise, because the international interest in that region is huge. That is why I think that the international and regional partners of Yemen have a huge role to play.

Yemen might not be a priority for Western countries now, but it will be a priority in the future if extremist elements take over. If geographic areas in Yemen end up ungoverned, Al Qaeda, Daesh (ISIS), and other forms of extremists may fill that vacuum. Therefore, it is in the interest of the international community to bring this war to an end.

We encourage all actors involved to have a look at our proposal seriously because we are confident that our proposal provides a peaceful solution. We also believe that if people have a road map, a vision with regard to their future in Yemen, they will eventually start settling their differences through  proposed peaceful solutions.

Q. The first stage of the Road Map (2021-2022) primarily focuses on an immediate ceasefire and a meaningful series of negotiations with the actors involved. A transitional government could be set up for one year paving the way for a two region solution and ensuring the provision of essential servies. What does the second stage of the proposal entail?

After we manage to resolve the issue of ceasefires during the first stage (2021-2022), we can move towards the second stage (2022-2025), which proposes a two-region solution. While President Hadi may continue to be the president of Yemen, the two regions, one in the north, one in the south, will have their own parliaments, political parties, ministries, legislative and judicial powers, budget, internal security forces, and police. A central administration will be responsible for defense, foreign policy, and the allocation of an equitable share of national revenue to the two regions. There should also be national reconciliation within the northerners and the southerners.

Q. What is the key motivation for your proposal to have a two-region solution in Yemen?

If you look at the north, there are different actors and they are all fighting each other. If you look at the south, there are still skirmishes, even though there is the Riyadh Agreement. If we can achieve a reconciliation among the political divisions in the south and north, we would have extremely positive results. I believe that having two national conferences on both sides would lead to much more trust and understanding between the warring factions in each region.

The two-region solution would also give them time to build the country, the institutions, and the infrastructure, which have been destroyed during the war. Yemen is not a poor country; it is poorly governed. Yemen can be in a better situation. It has almost everything that a country requires to become a great nation. It has rich resources of oil, gas, fisheries, beaches, and tourism.

I would rather have two states live in peace side-by-side than have one state fighting within itself  which is what we have had since 1990. It does not matter whether we have one state or two states or two regions? What matters is that people begin to understand that there is a  potential win-win situation for everybody. That is why the two-region solution is a coherent strategy, which the international community should support with its diplomatic efforts.

Q. The second stage chiefly focuses on the political organization and institutionalization in south and north Yemen. How does this transitional stage relate to the third and final stage (2025–2030) that should determine the future of Yemen?

I believe that once we have the two-region solution running for a couple of years, eventually during the third stage (2025-2030), we could have a national referendum, one in the north and one in the south, where people can decide in each region whether to opt for two independent states (as was the case before 1990) or continue with the two-region solution.

Q. What other challenges or opportunities should we expect with regard to the feasibility of the road map to end the war in Yemen?

The failure to reach an international peaceful settlement in Yemen is a failure of the whole world. Fifteen million people are facing one of the biggest humanitarian crises in the world. There is a new generation of young people, who have not been to school for the last six or seven years.

This crushes the ambition of the children in Yemen, who should aspire to be doctors, engineers, or teachers. Instead, today, we have children carrying guns because they think that the war is a solution to their problems. We need to reverse this psychology. We need to make sure that people think we can make peace possible.

We believe that our peaceful solution is a real opportunity for the Houthis, the STC, and the internationally recognized government to get together around the negotiation table and pursue a peaceful solution that will break divisions among them, the people, the region, and the international community.

APPENDIX

Keynotes from “The First Road Map to End Yemen’s War (2021-2030)

The first stage (2021-2022) focuses on a permanent ceasefire and the imposition of sanctions on anyone profiting from the war. Economic development is given precedence over humanitarian aid with an international body supporting the development of the north and south, and ensuring accountability in the use of the Central Bank funds.

The second stage (2022-2025) proposes a two-region solution: one region in the north and the other in the south each with its own parliament, political parties, executive, ministries, legislative and judicial powers, budget, internal security forces, and police. A central administration will be responsible for defense, foreign policy, and the allocation of an equitable share of national revenue to the two regions.

During the third stage (2025-2030) a national referendum, one in the north and one in the south, would be held to decide whether or not to opt for two independent states (as was the case before 1990) or continue with the two-region solution.

Friends of South Yemen (FOSY) was founded in June 2020 to provide information about Yemen in the English language. Such information was lacking after the suspension of the publication of the Yemen Times and the Yemen Observer due to the ongoing war.

On 10 January, then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the U.S. government would be designating the Houthis as a terrorist organisation drawing criticism from aid agencies and U.N. diplomats.

However, the decision also drew praise from Yemen’s internationally-recognised government and other Yemenis who have lamented the descent of their country into war following the Houthi overthrow of the democratic transition in 2014. Nevertheless, the extent to which the designation will affect the conflict, or even the peace process is unclear.

Aid agencies

Human rights organisations and aid agencies have decried the designation, asserting that it hampers efforts to assist a population that is in the midst of one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.

The designation complicates the process of acquisition of aid, and its subsequent delivery in territories that are currently under the control of the Houthis. This includes the capital Sanaa which continues to reel from the impact of the conflict, and the wider famine that the country is experiencing.

Moreover, aid agencies have argued that the designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organisation is ill-considered as it fails to clarify the necessary exemptions to prevent shipping companies, banks, and other commercial entities involved in the supply of emergency assistance to the country from falling foul of designation.

This therefore threatens to deter these necessary entities from engaging with Yemen, exacerbating the already dire situation.

U.N. diplomats involved in peace efforts have also lamented the designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organization, asserting that it complicates efforts to bring the parties together in what is already a complex political and military landscape. By designating the Houthis as terrorists, the argument is that they will be less inclined to engage with international efforts to bring the parties back to the table once more.

Moreover, the designation is believed to have come at the worst possible time as optimism was increasing prior to the announcement that Saudi Arabia and the Houthis were seriously considering negotiations.

Impact on peace efforts

However, the suggestion by aid agencies and the U.N. that the designation hampers peace efforts has been received by many as naïve, and another example of the failure of the international parties to fully grasp the nature of the conflict and understand its complexities.

However, the international community’s insistence on talks at such an important crossroads in the war eliminated this possibility. Houthis fully welcomed the call for talks, using the negotiation period effectively to re-entrench themselves and regroup, before deciding to renege on the agreement that they never had any intention of abiding by in the first place.

The Houthis have made it increasingly clear that their preferred system of governance is one that recognizes the divine right of the Houthi family to rule over Yemen in a manner similar to the Imamate that was overthrown in 1962.

It is in this context that the international community has been heavily criticized by many for failing to consider Yemen’s unique history in that the Houthis’ armed overthrow of the internationally-recognized government in 2014 was not uniquely the result of circumstances specific to the time, but rather a seventh armed attempt at asserting Houthi supremacy.

Even Houthi participation in the National Dialogue alongside all of Yemen’s political parties and representatives of civil society, and their subsequent agreement to abide by its outcomes and eventual elections, did not suffice to prevent a renewed armed attempt at seizing power. Therefore, the suggestion that the designation hampers peace efforts is detached from Yemen’s more complicated recent history with peace processes generally.

Rather, many have argued that what truly hampers the peace process in Yemen is the imbalance in military power that enables the Houthis to remain entrenched in the capital, and that renders the internationally-recognized government that emerged from the democratic transition (that included the entire spectrum of Yemen’s political landscape) militarily impotent to reassert itself.

In military terms, the designation changes little. The Houthi offensive on Ma’rib continues to rage, and their grip on the capital Sanaa has tightened to the extent that Tehran has sent an ambassador to recognise the Houthi ‘administration’.

The internationally-recognised government, while welcoming of the decision to designate the Houthis as terrorists, is unable to capitalise as it remains hamstrung by its official ally UAE’s preference for the Southern Separatists who are more inclined towards secession, and as Saudi Arabia scrambles to prepare to navigate pressure to rein in military activity from the new Biden administration.

Iran

However, while the focus of the discussion over the designation has been on Yemen, the reality is that it has far more to do with Iran and scuppering prospective attempts by the new Biden administration to pursue a new deal with Iran. Biden has already made clear that he intends to pressure Saudi Arabia and the Arab coalition into ending the war.

This means that Washington is less interested in restoring the internationally-recognised government, and is more inclined to push for negotiations.

Based on the current political and military dynamics, the three main parties that will dominate the negotiating table will be the Houthis who are backed by Iran, the internationally-recognised government which is tentatively backed by Saudi Arabia, and the Southern Separatists who are backed by the UAE. In other words, any negotiations superimposed by the Biden administration will require the buy-in of Tehran, and therefore some form of dialogue between them.

Iran is likely to view negotiations in Yemen as part of the wider talks over a nuclear deal as it seeks concessions and compensation over Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the 2015 agreement.

The conflict in Yemen began in September 2014 when the Houthi rebels commenced their gradual, but violent takeover of the capital city Sana’a. This led to a coup that forced President Abdurabbuh Mansour Hadi out to his home town and temporary capital city, Aden in February 2015.

By March, Saudi Arabia formed a military coalition, including the United Arab Emirates, to oust the rebels, restore the government and to bring stability to the region. The coalition became notorious for violating human rights, bombing civilians and destroying vital Yemeni infrastructure.

Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE agree that the Houthis are the main threat to regional security. Despite the rebels’ military capabilities have never been enough to change the balance of power in the region, their strong links to the Iranian regime turns the Houthis into a threat by proxy.

The group, which is based in the northern province of Sa’ada, which borders Saudi Arabia, has the capability to attack major Saudi cities, including Jeddah. Rockets fired from Yemeni territory are regularly intercepted, however in situations where they aren’t, the Houthis are able to inflict damage.

On November 23, 2020, the Houthis claimed responsibility for attacking an Aramco oil company distribution station in the city of Jeddah. Houthi spokesman, Yahya Sarea, warned foreign companies and residents in the neighbouring kingdom, saying they should exercise caution as “operations will continue.”

“The strike was very accurate, and ambulances and fire engines rushed to the target,” Sarea said, explaining that the Houthis used an Iranian-made Quds-2 type winged missile to carry out the attack.

Such attacks not only harm Saudi Arabia, but demoralize the rest of the Gulf Arab countries as weaknesses in their military powerhouse begin to show. Therefore, restoring relative stability and disarming the Houthis in Yemen is paramount to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Where differences begin

Whilst Riyadh and Abu Dhabi agree that a stable Yemen is important to regional security, a problem therein lies in what a stable Yemen looks like and where they are able to secure their separate political and economic interests.

The UAE entered the coalition understanding the way in which Aden is significant to Abu Dhabi’s economic and strategic standing in the region. Having a strong presence in Aden means the UAE would have the luxury of the Bab al-Mandab strait, along with easier access to the Indian Ocean and more control over the Red Sea.

Spreading its sphere of influence to the Socotra Island means the UAE would be able to strengthen its commercial and military projection in the Indian Ocean, as it has shown interest through quietly pumping investment into the island and arming secessionists.

The southern separatists seek renewed independence for southern Yemen, which was ruled as a separate state until 1990.

The UAE also heavily backed local resistance forces in Aden and other parts of the southern regions to liberate them from the Houthis. However, areas from the northern areas such as Taiz, which has a reputation for being a Muslim Brotherhood stronghold, did not receive as much help from the UAE, despite it being besieged by the Houthi rebels.

On August 6, 2019, two fighters from the UAE-backed Southern Security Belt were killed during clashes with pro-Hadi government forces. A day later, the STC deputy leader, Hani bin Breik, marched on the Maasheeq Palace in Aden and called on secessionists to overthrow Hadi’s government in the coastal city.

It became clearer than ever that the UAE is fuelling a “war within a war” inside Yemen; not only distracting from the original aim of ousting the Houthis, but putting its interests in Yemen before achieving the aim of the Saudi-led coalition.

From the outside looking in, the coalition was divided which was creating yet more bloodshed in Yemen in addition to the casualties the indiscriminate coalition airstrikes have caused.

Reconciliation and hope for the future

In a bid to restore relative stability, the two sides signed a power-sharing agreement in Riyadh on November 5, 2019. The ambitious Riyadh Agreement aimed to create a 50-50 cabinet and to work together to restore the Hadi government back to Sana’a.

The unity government was initially supposed to be formed in 30 days, but it took more than a year. By December 19, 2020, the government was formed.

The unity government can be as successful as long as the reasons behind its formation remain stronger than the divisions that continue to haunt northern and southern Yemen. It’s impossible to say that the newly formed government will solve a problem that created wars between the two populations and caused southern separatists to believe that northern Yemen was occupying the south.

In order to nurture a strong unity government that goes beyond temporarily sustaining peace, grievances of both populations need to be heard and longer-term solutions must be brought to the table by creating a democratic space and ample conflict resolution. The unity government must be seen as a stepping stone to lasting stability, not an ultimate achievement.

Women, local leaders and religious and tribal figures need to be included and sustainable vision for a well-represented and localised Yemeni government must be on the table for a fruitful post-war vision. As it stands, the unity government is all-male, creating a cabinet that excludes women for the first time in 20 years.

Can the explosion create more divisions?

On December 30, 2020, an aircraft carrying members of the recently formed unity government landed at Aden International Airport, only for the passengers to be met with explosion and gunfire as they disembarked.

The attack left 25 people dead and 110 others injured, but none of the passengers were hurt. At the wake of the attack, there were concerns how such an assault could affect the unity government.

Both the Hadi government and the STC blamed the Houthi rebels of the attack. Yemen’s Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik sustained accusation that the Houthis were behind the explosions.

“Preliminary investigations indicate that Houthi militias stand behind this crime,” Saeed said as the newly reshuffled Cabinet met for the first time in Aden on December 31, 2020, adding that “intelligence also indicates that some Iranian experts were prepping for such an operation over the last few months.”

Yemenis are not going hungry. They are being starved.” This statement from the UN Under-Secretary-General Mark Lowcock accurately describes the famine in Yemen which is a man-made disaster brought about by five years of civil war.

The areas worst affected by acute food insecurity are the Marib, Taizz, and Al Jawf governorates in the north, and those of Al Bayda, Abyan, and Hadramaut in the south.

After the Houthis, a hardline Shia sect backed by the Iranian regime overthrew the internationally recognized government in Sanaa in 2014 and took control of most of the north, an Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia began airstrikes against areas held by the Houthis in March 2015. The bombings still continue; ceasefires are violated and civilians suffer as the infrastructure and health facilities are destroyed.

More than 1,900 of the country’s 3,500 health facilities are currently either not functioning or partially functioning with insufficient staff and equipment, leaving half the population without adequate healthcare. Yemeni forces, the Houthis and the Saudi-led Arab coalition have attacked over 100 medical facilities. Water and sanitation systems have also been destroyed.

According to the UN, as of November 5, 2020, there have been more than 900,000 suspected cholera cases and 2,192 associated deaths have been reported. More than half of the suspected cases are children. People have also been affected by malaria, dengue fever, shortages of clean drinking water, severe flooding, and locust swarms.

Lack of adequate food supplies leading to hunger, malnutrition, and famine is the greatest humanitarian tragedy caused by the war.

Yemenis, many of whose health conditions have already deteriorated, now face the COVID-19 pandemic. As of August 30, the government confirmed 1,950 cases and 564 COVID-19-related deaths, but the UN has warned that the actual number of cases and deaths is much higher.

The World Health Organization’s (WHO) prediction of a worst-case scenario, namely that 93% of a population of nearly 30 million would be infected with the virus, is about to become a reality.

An estimated 4.3 million people have fled from their homes since the start of the conflict in 2014 and approximately 3.3 million remain displaced. The camps of internally displaced persons are fertile ground for the spread of COVID-19 and other diseases such as cholera and scabies.

Lack of adequate food supplies leading to hunger, malnutrition, and famine is the greatest humanitarian tragedy caused by the war. In March 2020, UNICEF estimated that 2 million children under the age of 5 suffer from acute malnutrition.

The magnitude of the crisis is illustrated by the fact that one child dies every 12 minutes.  In May, UNICEF described Yemen as “the largest humanitarian crisis in the world” – a country where 80 percent of the population, which amounts to over 26 million people, were in need of humanitarian assistance.

In 2018, Save the Children reported that over 85,000 children had died since the beginning of the conflict as a direct result of famine. Since then, entire communities have been decimated by hunger. Nearly half of all Yemeni children suffer stunted growth because of malnutrition which also impairs their cognitive development.

However, aid agencies say that in 2019 and 2020, they spent vast amounts of their time and energy struggling to get approvals countrywide to provide assistance in accordance with humanitarian principles and without the authorities’ interference.

In late 2019, the UN-commissioned report by the University of Denver Assessing the Impact of War on Development in Yemen confirmed that more Yemenis had died of hunger, disease, and lack of health clinics than from fighting; the figure was estimated at 131,00 people.

War in comparison was responsible for 100,000 deaths – a figure published by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) which tracks confirmed fatalities of war.

Between 2015 and 2019 international donors gave the UN-led aid response in Yemen $8.35 billion, including $3.6billion in 2019 that reached almost 14 million people each month with some form of aid. This was up from 7.5 million people in 2018.

However, aid agencies say that in 2019 and 2020, they spent vast amounts of their time and energy struggling to get approvals countrywide to provide assistance in accordance with humanitarian principles and without the authorities’ interference.

Partly in response to the obstruction of aid, donor support to UN aid agencies collapsed in June 2020, particularly from Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States. As of August 28, aid agencies received only 24 percent of the $3.4 billion they requested for the year.

While funding the aid efforts, the Unites States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, and others have sold arms to the Saudi-led coalition, worsening Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. The U.K. has given £1 billion in aid to Yemen but has licensed £6.5 billion worth of arms to the countries bombing it.

The funding crisis has had a dire impact on Yemeni civilians, including the halving of food assistance to 9 million people and the suspension of support to healthcare services, which the UN says has put the lives of millions on the line.

But there is money in Yemen to assist humanitarian efforts.

A UN Panel of Experts reported in June 2017 that the Houthis had earned up to $1.14 billion from fuel and oil distribution on the black market and that fuel was “one of the main sources of revenue for the Houthis.” However, for the warring factions, humanitarian aid is not a priority.

All parties to the conflict in Yemen have stood in the way of humanitarian aid delivery, demanded that taxes be levied, and aid rerouted so that it would benefit their respective militias.

In September 2020, Human Rights Watch published a 65-page report titled Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 which details systematic interference in relief operations by the Houthi authorities, Yemen’s internationally recognized government and affiliated forces, the UAE, and the Southern Transitional Council.

The Houthis have a particularly egregious record of obstructing aid agencies from reaching civilians and diverting aid to their supporters and fighters.

In 2019 and 2020, aid workers had to push back against Houthi officials insisting they hand over their cars, computers, and cell phones at the end of projects.

But obstruction of aid agencies in government-held areas in the south and east is also on the rise. In July 2020, Lowcock said that aid agencies reported an “uptick in violent incidents, targeting humanitarian assets and [that] local authorities were adding new bureaucratic requirements.”

In March 2015, in violation of the laws of war, the Saudi-led coalition imposed a naval and air blockade that severely restricted the flow of food, fuel, and medicine, on which the vast majority of the population depends.

Yemen’s humanitarian crisis is not a by-product of Yemen’s institutional and political failures. It is solely the result of a protracted military conflict and only an end to the conflict will bring an end to the humanitarian crisis.

The country cannot fight a war on two fronts: the military conflict and the fight against famine and disease. The Yemenis have different political agendas: the Houthis want to continue creating an Islamic state while most southerners want to be independent from the north and establish their own state.

But they are united in their common condition of poverty, hunger, and disease. Ending the fighting and solving the humanitarian problems together can help to end the political stalemate and the pointless war which has no winners except those who trade in arms and the warlords who buy and sell people’s lives.