here have been remarkable developments in Turkey-Egypt relations, particularly since the beginning of 2021.
Meanwhile, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey act in accordance with the realities of contemporary multipolar global politics.
This gains another meaning within the context of the ongoing efforts toward rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey.
There are fierce political confrontations in the Eastern Mediterranean such as the well-known Palestine issue, the Cyprus issue, as well as the uneasy political relations between Greece and Turkey, Egypt and Turkey, Syria and Turkey, Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon.
o understand how deep political differences between Turkey and Egypt are at the moment, one need not look further than the different reactions to the “four-finger salute” or Rabia sign in both countries.
” As such, Zalewski attempts to answer the question that Reuters asked on January 18: “What’s at Stake in Turkey’s Upcoming Elections?”Read: Turkey-Egypt Relations: Prospects for Normalization and Challenges AheadThe part of Zalewski’s article that relates to the world stresses that the main issue at stake is Turkey’s military operations in Syria and Iraq and its military support to Libya and Azerbaijan.
The visit stirred condemnations by several countries such as Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, Jordan, and Egypt, and a UN Security Council session was held to discuss the visit, as Palestinian armed factions in Gaza threatened to retaliate.
fter normalizing relations with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has overtly stated that he can meet Syria’s Bashar Assad “when the time is right.
In his statement after the agreements with Saudi Arabia, the Greek Minister of Development and Investments Adonis Georgiadis claimed that Greece has very close strategic relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel, and added, "What a great foreign policy the Turks have had for all these years, the opposite is happening now.
Read: Saudi and Emirati Pivot to Russia and China: Shift of Axis or Extreme Hedging?One of the most important highlights of this year's event was the admission of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to the dialogue partnership.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Egypt and other African countries within the scope of an “Africa tour” conveniently came right after the signing of the Grain Deal in Istanbul.
Israel approved the outline of a deal ceding control of the strategic islands from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, while Saudi Arabia opened its airspace to Israeli flights.
Saudi decision-makers and media portrayed the crown prince’s visit as the last leg of his regional tour to Egypt and Jordan, and, thus, not a special visit to Turkey per se.
In particular, the ongoing normalization of the relations between Turkey and the UAE, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel, and Turkey and Egypt have paved the way for the end of the polarization prevailing in the region during the Trump era.
On the regional realm, the easing of tensions between Qatar and the Gulf countries with the signing of the al-Ula Declaration, the launch of normalization talks between Turkey and Egypt, the weakening of the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Iran nuclear talks were significant motivational factors behind the Turkish-Saudi thaw.
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It caught my attention that when they were talking about Egypt, they were talking about the Egyptian border, and when they were talking about Israel, they were talking about the fence.
Ukraine is an important supplier to many North African markets, including Egypt and Libya, as well as the EU and China.
This approach was translated by Qatar's leadership in the Arab League and the important support of Saudi Arabia and post-revolutionary Tunisia and Egypt into a resolution that led to the suspension of the regime's membership in the Arab League in November 2011.
In parallel, some regional states, like Israel, Egypt, the UAE, and the KSA, engaged in subsequent normalizations with Turkey as insurance on the eve of great power competition in the region.