Emmanuel Macron’s statement on French colonial history and memory in Algeria and his sharp criticism of the Algerian regime sparked a political crisis between the two countries, which are linked with more than 130 years of colonial history. Macron’s statement is not new to the French political elite, which since Algeria’s independence in 1962 has been playing the colonial history card on every occasion for internal political consumption in France. Given the size of the Algerian community in France, Algeria has always occupied a significant place in the sociopolitical agenda.

More than four million Algerians are living in France and more than one million French Algerians are eligible to vote in French elections. During his visit to Algeria in 2007 on the eve of French elections, former French president Nicolas Sarkozy was the first French head of state to utter words of recognition and apology for the French colonial crimes.

However, later, he explicitly withdrew his statement during a presidential visit in December of the same year. What is new in President Macron’s statement is the criticism of the ruling elite in Algeria, his direct targeting of it, and the reference to the military structure of the regime despite the good relations that link these elites with France both publicly and behind the scenes.

This is the reason why Algerian authorities reacted strongly to Macron, especially when he referred to the slackness of the Algerian regime vis-à-vis the popular movement (the Hirak Movement) that erupted on February 22, 2019. Moreover, Macron questioned the existence before French colonialism of an Algerian nation in the first place. In a clear echo of the French orientalists of the nineteenth century, he ignored Algeria’s long history and its emergence as a state, the state of Numidia, a thousand years before the French state existed.

In fact, the French cultural and scientific machine worked hard to justify Algeria’s occupation and dissolving its political structure following its colonization in 1834, claiming it as French soil and its inhabitants as French Muslims. From then onward, France employed the Catholic Church’s religious machinery under the pretext of “civilizing” Algerians by educating them.

Behind Macron’s statement lies that fact that French presidential elections are approaching and according to opinion polls, far-right candidates such as Marine Le Pen, the head of the National Rally, and Éric Zemmour, independent far-right candidate of Algerian origin, have better chances in the elections.

Stora presented his report in January 2021 to Macron, including practical recommendations to bridge the gap between the two countries politically and culturally. Macron also handed over the skulls of 24 nineteenth-century leaders of the Algerian resistance against French colonialism – out of the 500 skulls France keeps – after 170 years of displaying them at the Musée de l’Homme (Museum of Mankind) in Paris. This was a first in the history of French-Algerian relations, and it occurred on the occasion of the 58th anniversary of Algeria’s independence in July 2020.

These steps by Macron were meant to show many Algerians that he is serious about facing the crimes committed during the French colonial rule. Macron’s recent statement, however, brought the matter back to square one and escalated the Algerian position, which insists on a full apology for the crimes of colonialism in the period from 1832 to 1962. The Algerian government demands three conditions to bridge the gap: (1) giving the archival documents presently kept in France back to Algeria; (2) opening the French nuclear explosions file in southern Algeria; and (3) paying compensation and the full recovery of the skulls of the Algerian resistance fighters held in Paris.

France views the bilateral relations through a colonialist memory and logic, which goes up and down in accordance with the strength of the Algerian regime. When the Algerian regime was strong in the 1970s, French politicians and intellectuals were reluctant to rise any serious issues against Algeria in reference to colonial memory. France sought to maintain a solid and calm relationship with Algeria in an effort to preserve its economic interests as stipulated in the Évian Accords of 1962 that granted independence to Algeria.

France, in fact, signed an accord with Algeria in 1968, with which it granted exceptional privileges to Algerians living in France. However, the weakness of the Algerian regime, starting with the military coup in 1992, left the door open for France to blackmail Algerians, who were in dire need of French support at international forums. France launched a campaign to nullify the 1968 accord of its content and made a unilateral amendment to it in 1994 with Decree No. 1103/94. France made another amendment in 2001, which reduced the privileges Algerians enjoy in France, restricting the freedom of movement of Algerians between France and Algeria.

France also started to discuss thorny issues between the two countries, such as the rights of the Pieds-Noirs, the French settlers in Algeria, who left Algeria after independence, and the right of return to their homeland of Algerian Harka, the Algerians who fought with France in the 1954-1962 war and who fled with the French army in 1962, including granting them a full pardon. France has practiced all forms of pressure on the Algerian ruling elite to reverse the policy of Arabization pursued by Algeria since 1972, which aimed at achieving cultural independence from France and strengthening the Algerian identity based on three main pillars: Islam, Arabism, and Amazigh identity.

It is strange that France succeeded, through its Francophone lobbies, in infiltrating the Algerian administration, in blocking the Arabization law of 1991 and the law of 1997, and in stopping all attempts to strengthen the role of the English language in the Algerian educational system. France also obstructed all efforts to pass a law criminalizing the colonial legacy of France by the Algerian parliament. The first draft was put up for discussion in 2009. But, with France’s strong influence on Algerian domestic decision-making, the Algerian regime failed to decolonize the colonial memory, which both the regime and the Algerian people consider one of the central issues in rearranging bilateral relations with France.

The successive French policies of obstructing the presence of Algerian Harkis, who fought alongside France during Algeria’s War of Independence, on French soil escalates during electoral campaigns, and has strengthened and consolidated the official and popular Algerian position. Perhaps the best evidence is Law No. 2005-158, which glorifies colonialism and was passed by the French General Assembly in February 2005 during the time of President Jacques Chirac.

Chirac considers the colonization of Algeria and the rest of African peoples as a matter of French pride.

Chirac considers the colonization of Algeria and the rest of African peoples as a matter of French pride. The fourth article of the law includes a paragraph stipulating that school programs should praise the positive role played by the French presence abroad, especially in North Africa. As expected, this law caused a deep rift in Algerian-French relations.

Even though Macron’s recent statement was a strategic move for the upcoming presidential elections in order to win the support of the French far right and to break the popularity of the National Rally, it reflects a deep French conviction not to retreat from the French position on the issue of colonial memory in Algeria.

For Algerians, the best option is a full recognition of French colonialism and its brutality. However, the only way to change the French position and secure a full apology is closely linked to the establishment of a strong and coherent government in Algeria. Macron’s positive statements and promises made before September 2021 and his retreat reflect a state of confusion among the French political elites that began since Nicholas Sarkozy came to power in 2007, and became even worse after Emmanuel Macron became the president in 2017 – a development that shook the French political system.

Liberation legitimacy occurs when a group that is fighting a liberation war in the context of foreign domination enjoys the feeling of the support of the masses and attains international legitimacy to fight the war. This feeling of being legitimate often remains as the only force on the ground in the context of foreign domination, occupation, or colonization.

Liberation legitimacy derives its validity from the self-perception of non-state actors fighting a liberation war, the continuation of the foreign occupation, and the relevant international laws that provide that people under occupation have the right to self-determination. This argument, from the point of view of non-state actors and international law, appears to conform to the existence of occupying foreign forces occupying another nation. But the question is, what happens if these forces leave?

In some examples, non-state actors have engaged in civil wars as a result of the emergence of other forces that adopted different views on how to deal with the foreign presence on their soil. This includes Algeria, Palestine, Angola, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Vietnam, among others. A major justification for the use of force by dominant non-state actors is the legacy of fighting foreign forces which very often provides them with a valid legitimacy. This legitimacy ends when the presence of foreign forces ceases; however, some self-described liberation groups behave as if it lasts even after the foreign forces have left.

Some liberation movements (non-state actors) in many parts of the world, be it in Algeria, Zimbabwe, Mali, and Ghana, have (mis)used liberation legitimacy even after the foreign occupation ended. This has created a dilemma for these self-described liberation groups as in the transition to democracy many of them have leaned on their entitlement to rule which derives from what they view as their liberation legacy. Some non-state actors, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Palestine and the National Liberation Front (NLF) in Algeria, act as if this legitimacy is stronger than electoral boxes.

Voters, who might be the same base that gave support to liberation groups during wars of independence, might vote for another group or individuals who didn’t emerge out of liberation groups. In many instances such as the NLF in Algeria, voting a liberation group out of government results in the army’s opposition to such unfavorable electoral results and its intervention which impacts the country for years to come. In other cases, the leaders of the liberation war stay in power indefinitely, claiming a liberation legitimacy and legacy.

An example of a leader who stayed in power by utilizing liberation legitimacy is Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, the leader of the liberation war, who stayed in power for 30 years despite becoming very ill towards the end of his life. Although Mugabe adopted reforms that defended the rights of his people to better access to education, healthcare, and land, his last years in power saw the deterioration of his country’s economy to record levels. Claiming his right to rule as a result of fighting a liberation war, he even appointed his wife as his deputy. Mugabe was forced out only after the army intervened and pressured him to resign in 2017.

In many cases, liberation movements fail at government because they lack the understanding of the dynamics of governance which are different than waging a liberation war and taking arms. Fighters waging a liberation war tend to have a different understanding and working mechanisms than those involved in government.

Viewing decision-making in absolute terms does not help people on the ground. For this reason, many liberation groups, whose expertise is limited to armed struggle, fail to present solutions to the struggles of people on the ground.

The claim to liberation legitimacy creates a dilemma for liberation groups in government; they sometimes act against the will of their people although they were meant to exist to defend this very same will. Liberation groups need to establish bodies and mechanisms that can ensure a smooth transition to providing good governance after the end of liberation wars.

Once a liberation war is over, it is the electoral box that gives a government its legitimacy. Once liberation groups refrain from respecting the will of the people under the claim of enjoying an absolute liberation legacy, they lose the people’s respect.

The last phase of liberation should always be moving to good and democratic governance. Nelson Mandela, the charismatic leader of South Africa, has set a good example by running for president only once. Refusing to let go of power based on claims of liberation legacy does not sell. What sells for the ordinary people on the ground is providing them with solutions to their problems especially in a post-liberation phase, where transition to government faces many structural challenges.

It does not matter if a group won the country’s independence through arms or through dialogue – what matters at the end of the day is meeting people’s increasing needs. It is up to liberation groups to present people with leaders who can win elections. Once a group is unable to do so, by no means should it use its liberation legacy as an excuse to continue being in power in opposition to the will of the nation’s people.

Settler-colonialism is violent in nature and is built on the negation of natives’ basic rights and their very existence. Algeria under French rule and Palestine under Israeli rule are no exception to such colonial violence. In an attempt to push them to surrender to the will of their colonial masters, the use of excessive and brutal violence against settler-colonized people in both countries has been well documented. But history has proven that this tactic does not work, and it backfires at a high human cost.

On May 8, 1945, France killed 45,000 Algerians who took to the streets to demand independence from France following the victory of the Allied Forces over Nazi Germany. Today, the world is watching the ongoing violent displacement of Palestinians in Jerusalem and elsewhere in silence, without doing more than condemning it.

The proven violent nature of settler-colonialism often produces violent reactions from the colonized people. This is true about the National Liberation Front (NLF) in Algeria, and all Palestinian factions and groups such as Fatah, Hamas, and the PFLP. The NLF in Algeria engaged in a campaign of revolutionary violence that was extraordinary in nature and included, among many other methods of torture, cutting the throats of French soldiers captured by the group “like sheep.” The same applies to the Palestinians who have used various violent means including bombings and kidnappings.

In the cases of both Palestine and Algeria, the state violence against colonized people has excessively surpassed the violence used by non-state Algerian and Palestinian actors. To give an example, France’s use of violence against Algerians was remarkably brutal with hundreds of NLF members being killed under torture – in some cases, they were thrown from high places and announced to have committed suicide. In its most recent confrontation with the Palestinians in May 2021, Israel killed more than 250 Palestinians in 11 days compared to 13 Israelis killed by Palestinian fire.

The use of violence by non-state actors in Algeria and Palestine does not negate their attempts to end colonial rule by dialogue. The NLF was ready to engage in dialogue with the French authorities, but France, which called Algeria “French Algeria,” refused any form of dialogue with the NLF. Although many Palestinian factions consider armed resistance central to their struggle with Israel, factions such as Fatah and Hamas have in many instances engaged in non-violent resistance against Israel, which was also met with violence.

Just like in Palestine, in Algeria, France responded with full force to Algerian non-violent actions, including the 1956 strike, as it viewed any Algerian action against its rule an issue of law and order, negating Algerians’ desire for independence.

This is also true for the protests of the first Palestinian Intifada, which started as non-violent and turned violent as Israel used excessive force against protesters, including breaking their bones. The Great March of Return in the Gaza Strip is another example of how Israel responded to Palestinian engagement in non-violent resistance, with Israeli snipers killing 214 Palestinian, and injuring 36,000 others, while many were intentionally shot in the knee to be maimed. Just like in Palestine, in Algeria, France responded with full force to Algerian non-violent actions, including the 1956 strike, as it viewed any Algerian action against its rule an issue of law and order, negating Algerians’ desire for independence.

The refusal of state actors to use violence can’t win moral ground as long as it permits the use of violence against colonized people. Israel’s creation was accompanied by a surge of violence not just against the Palestinians, who were made refugees, but also against the colonial British forces in Palestine.

In addition to dozens of documented massacres against Palestinians, Zionist militias have used car bombings and assassinations both against Palestinian and British targets, forcing some 750,000 Palestinians out of their towns and villages. The same applies to France, which today glorifies the French (violent) resistance to the Nazi occupation of France during World War II. Glorifying the use of arms by states and denying its use by the very people they occupy deprives these states, namely France and Israel, of the moral high ground.

Today, the use of violence is condemned by most world governments, and non-state actors engaged in violence are often isolated and placed under pressure. The anti-colonial movement of the 1950s and 1960s no longer exists. Today, the challenge for the Palestinians is to be committed to their rights and exert all needed efforts to obtain these rights without being internationally isolated because of their use of violence.

Committing to non-violence as a strategy is one way to achieve this and it proved effective during the Civil Rights Movement in the U.S. and the Salt March in India staged by Mahatma Gandhi. However, whether this will be the case in Palestine is debatable. So far, the use of violence and non-violence alike have not led to their liberation.

The morality of the use of violence in (settler-) colonial contexts should not be questioned in isolation from the state violence used against the colonized people. Settler-colonialism is violent in nature – including that of France and Israel – in the same way the response to it is also violent. Violence creates a vicious cycle and the way to end it passes through ending colonial violence, which creates this cycle in the first place by denying people their national and political rights.

It is no coincidence that today Palestinians and Algerians can relate to each other based on their experiences under colonial rules – similar experiences produce a sense of solidarity emanating from relating to the experience of others. For this reason, the Palestinian flag is a familiar object at Algerian protests and the Algerian flag is an equally familiar object at Palestinian protests against the ongoing Israeli colonization.

A substantial part of my research investigates the postcolonial history of Algeria. During the data collection process, I had the chance to interview an ex-Algerian mujahid who fought in the Algerian War of Independence and we had the chance to extensively discuss the colonial history of France in Algeria.

The violence and brutality of French colonialism in Algeria was horrendous and undeniable. The vast majority of families have been traumatized by the cruel settlement of France in Algeria, including my own. My paternal grandfather, along with his two brothers, assisted the mujahideen and played a part in the resistance during the seven-year War of Independence. My grandfather was captured by French soldiers when my father was six years old. He was detained and tortured for days until his lungs collapsed and he died.

He was hanged upside down and immersed into a container of ice-cold water repeatedly in order to confess and provide leads on the hideouts of the mujahideen – but he never did! It cost him his life and traumatized my father to this day; however, his legacy will remain for decades to come.

There has been an ongoing discussion about France’s duty and responsibility to provide an official apology for its colonial history and war crimes, which has been met with ignorance and denial. Algeria was the only French colony to be considered a French territory. It was largely exploited and “…was considered ‘the door’ to the Third World and the ‘jewel’ of France’s territorial possessions.”

It wasn’t until 2011 that an Algerian scholar living in France, Ali Farid Belkadi, discovered that the Museum of Mankind in Paris holds skulls of Algerian martyrs and that some of them could be identified. Although his discovery didn’t receive support, Ibrahim Senouci, a professor of physics at the University of Cergy-Pontoise, took a different approach and launched an online petition gathering approximately 30,000 signatures to pressure the French authorities to return the remains of the Algerian martyrs as agreed on the the Évian Accords.

In 2016, France admitted that they are in possession of 18,000 skulls, 500 of which were identified including 36 leaders of the Algerian resistance who were beheaded in the mid-19th century.

The Museum of Mankind was established in 1937 by Paul Rivet. The skulls were taken back to France between 1800 and 1881 as trophies of the slaughter in Algeria and kept in boxes to preserve them.

In 2016, France admitted that they are in possession of 18,000 skulls, 500 of which were identified including 36 leaders of the Algerian resistance who were beheaded in the mid-19th century. France claims that the skulls have been kept for anthropological and scientific purposes.

In 2017, French President Emanuel Macron stated, “I have agreed to a request expressed by the Algerian public authorities several times regarding the return of the skulls of the Algerian resistance fighters, and have taken a decision to initiate the process.”

In the same year, which marked the launching of his presidential campaign, in one of his speeches, Macron declared that the French colonial history in Algeria represents “crimes against humanity.” However, the statement was not followed by an apology.

In July 2020, on the eve of July 5, Algerian Independence Day, 24 skulls of Algerian mujahideen who fought against the French colonial rule and played a crucial role in the resistance were brought back from the museum in Paris.

For over 170 years, the remains of these Algerian national heroes had been deprived their right of burial in the country for which they shed their blood.

The skulls belong to prominent resistance fighters, including Muhammad Lajd bin Abd al-Malik, known as Sherif “Boubaghla”; the “mummified head” of the Algerian officer Issa Hammadi; Sheikh Bouziane, leader of the Za’tasha Resistance in Biskra; Musa al-Darqawi; Si Mukhtar bin Qwaider al-Titrawi; and Muhammad bin Allal bin Mubarak who fought side by side with El Emir Abdelkader, the leader of the first resistance against French colonialism and founder of the modern Algerian state.

According to the writer and political analyst Fayez Abu Shamala, French crimes will not be easily forgiven. He asks, “Will the Algerian people forgive the murderers for their deeds? Will they forget?”

It is believed that this French compromise aims to silence the Algerian public opinion and polish the French image among the Algerian population.

On January 20, 2021, Macron received a report from the French historian Benjamin Stora about the French colonial era in Algeria (1830-1962). The report generated distress, criticism, and anger in the Algerian public opinion, and was considered to be manipulative and biased in terms of providing an accurate and truthful version of French colonial history in the country.

France announced the establishment of a “memories and truth” commission to review the country’s colonial history in Algeria. However, the report ruled out the issue of an official apology for France’s crimes.

Moreover, although the report proposes ways to promote healing, it provides data related to the 1954-1962 period and puts much less stress on the events that took place in the period before the  War of Independence (1830-1954). More importantly, the report is short of advising in favor of a proper and official apology for the atrocious crimes that France committed against the Algerian people for decades.