From the beginning of the Syrian uprising, several Arab countries were almost unanimous in isolating the Syrian regime to punish it for its violations of Arab League resolutions and the rights of the Syrian people. This approach was translated by Qatar’s leadership in the Arab League and the important support of Saudi Arabia and post-revolutionary Tunisia and Egypt into a resolution that led to the suspension of the regime’s membership in the Arab League in November 2011.

In the following years, most Arab countries called on the regime to stop military operations against civilians, and some of them even played a greater role in actively seeking regime change in diplomatic manners and by supporting and financing the opposition. However, in the coming years, political changes occurred in some Arab countries such as in Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, causing a departure from regime change politics to the restoration of pre-Arab spring MENA security order, thus affecting the regional attitude towards the Syrian regime.

Egypt resumed consular relations in 2013, when most Arab countries took a stand against the Syrian regime, but has not fully normalized its relations with the regime to date. This shows that Egypt prioritizes the stability of the Syrian regime in its foreign policy, as Egypt distrusts the opposition and considers it a proxy for Turkey. Moreover, Egypt prefers to work with the army and considers it more reliable.

The UAE and Jordan, on the other hand, were on the opposite side and supported the Syrian opposition to varying degrees, but after the Russian intervention in 2015, the situation on the ground had changed, which, along with other factors such as the UAE’s attempt to counter Turkey and contain Iran with a different approach in Syria, led to a change in the countries’ priorities in their foreign policy toward Syria. In 2018, the UAE and Bahrain reopened their embassy in Damascus and resumed relations with the Syrian regime. The UAE wants to normalize its relations with the Syrian regime in order to have relations with all parties on the ground.

Similarly, when the Syrian opposition lost control of southern Syria in 2018 and signed reconciliation agreements, Jordan reopened its border with Syria with some restrictions, as it had done before 2015, Jordan has not completely severed relations with the Syrian regime, but it has downgraded its representation. It normalized its relations only in October 2021 after a telephone conversation between King Abdullah and Bashar al-Assad, which was expected after King Abdullah’s speech on CNN during his visit to Washington and after his meeting with President Biden.

Looking at the factors behind this action, the first one seems to be the economic factor, because the country is in a difficult economic situation, aiming at normalization and cross-border trade, as the Arab gas pipeline will help the Kingdom’s economy. In addition, the security factor is not as important as the economy, but it plays a role because the Kingdom is concerned about stability on its northern border and normalization will help in security coordination with the Syrian regime to prevent possible threats.

Although it has not severed its relations with the regime, Jordan has taken positions close to the Syrian opposition over the past decade, but has kept its border open with the Syrian regime for economic reasons. The Kingdom believes that normalizing its relations with the regime will help its economy recover and that it wants to play a role in resolving the conflict. Jordan has also sought to reactivate the bilateral agreement with Syria on various issues such as water. It also wanted to reactivate the Arab Gas Pipeline to reach Lebanon through Syria, which is part of the kingdom’s ambitions to become an energy hub in the region.

What sets Jordan apart, however, is that it is not only Jordan that wants to engage with the regime, but also brings along other countries that have the same idea of changing the regime’s behavior through concessions and vice versa. It is an approach that has met with the approval of the Biden administration. As part of its strategy to manage the Syria conflict by focusing on changing the regime’s behavior rather than regime change, this administration’s new approach to Syria is the opposite of the previous administration, which pursued a policy of maximum pressure.

In March 2022, another important UAE rapprochement with the Syrian regime took place, namely Bashar al-Assad’s visit to the country. This visit is considered very significant, mainly because it was al-Assad’s first visit to an Arab country since the beginning of the uprising. The visit can be analyzed from various points of view, such as future investments, the possibility of the regime’s return to the Arab League, and Iran’s influence.

The possibilities of reinstating the Syrian regime in the Arab League

In terms of support for the Syrian regime, not all of these countries are equally committed to Syria’s return to the Arab League in order to normalize the country’s relations with the world, but we can see some differences. In late January this year, Arab League Secretary General Ahmed Aboul Gheit said that Syria’s return to the Arab League was not discussed at the consultative meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Kuwait. He later added that Syria’s return to the Arab League depends on consensus among Arab countries. These are indications that a return is unlikely at the next summit.

The irony is that Egypt is playing a role in the Syrian regime’s return to the Arab League but has not yet fully normalized its relations with the Asaad regime, which could happen in the near future. As mentioned earlier, Egypt sided with the Syrian regime under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and the two countries have since restored consular relations.

The UAE changed its stance on Syria after 2015 until it normalized its relations with the regime. After that, they began to support the Assad regime and promote the normalization of their relations with other countries in the region. They went even further by calling for the lifting of sanctions imposed on Syria.

In Jordan, however, we see a different approach that accepts the current status quo in Syria as a reality. For example, Jordan does not fully side with the regime in the Syrian conflict, but rather seeks to benefit from the opening of its relations with the Syrian regime on an economic level and restore the situation to what was before the border between the two countries. In doing so, it advocates its approach to Syria “step by step” as a comprehensive plan for dealing with the regime.

Ultimately, these approaches are similar in some respects, but they are not identical. This means that not all of the approaches these countries are taking have the same goals. Moreover, not all countries approaching the Syrian regime can be considered allies of the regime; rather, it is about their needs.

Finally, these approaches are similar in some respects, but they are not identical. This raises the question of which of these approaches will be successful and how this will affect the situation on the ground. To what extent these approaches will be able to bring the Syrian regime back to the Arab League.

So far, these approaches have not been able to change the position of Riyadh and Doha in terms of normalizing relations with the Syrian regime, which may show how effective these processes have been so far. On another level, will the relations between the Syrian regime and the international community remain the same? Will we see some changes in the position of some countries like the U.S., or could other approaches be taken?

Europe as a whole is not ready to normalize relations with Damascus, but some countries are exploring their options with their eyes closed.

A few European Union member states have mixed opinions about normalization with Bashar Alassad and their policies reflect that.

Denmark and Germany started sending refugees with criminal records back to Syria declaring that Damascus is a safe place to live.

But that may not be enough to meet the requirements of the Dublin Accords which protect refugees from being sent back to their home countries if they face possible detention or revenge attacks because of their political views.

Even though discussion about normalization with Alassad has become a geopolitical trend, the reality is that the situation in Syria is unstable and unpredictable.

European countries, along with the United States, and a long list of Arab countries, are unable to solve the huge humanitarian crisis in Syria, and some would rather revert to the pre 2011 revolution status quo.

Hundreds of thousands of Syrians amassed on European borders.

The most prominent example of this policy was the European migration deal struck with Turkey in 2016. Europe offered Turkey monetary incentives to prevent the massive flow of migrants across land and sea towards Europe. At the time, hundreds of thousands of Syrians amassed on European borders and lined back roads and footpaths across the European continent with hopes of starting new lives.

They were escaping a Syria that was in decline but already unlivable in many ways.

Even before the revolution individual rights were heavily restricted, free market conditions were abhorrent, opportunities for youth were limited, long droughts negatively impacted agricultural production, intelligence agencies were loyal to the Alassad family, and the dictatorial tendencies of Bashar Alassad were no mystery to Syrians inside and outside the country.

Many countries conveniently ignored the fact that the Daesh terror group was coordinating directly with Bashar Alassad’s intelligence agencies and many of the members, including mid to top level leaders, were released from Syrian prisons only to directly join the terror group. This was a major turning point in the progression of the revolution, since the regime was able to convince European countries that the revolution was actually a threat to them because Daesh represented the kinds of ideas that the antigovernment protesters carried.

It was Alassad’s intention to force Europe’s hand using the fear card from the very beginning of the revolution. Recently forced into retirement, then Grand Mufti of Syria Ahmed Bedreddin Hassoun, threatened to send suicide bombers to Europe in 2011 if western countries intervened in Syria.

Years later, multiple Daesh inspired terror attacks took place across Europe. Then in 2018, German parliament members of the far-right political party, Alternative for Germany, visited Damascus, and met with many people including Hassoun. They wanted to find a way to send Syrians back and they needed to declare the country safe.

Despite mounting evidence of human rights violations going back decades, some European countries are more comfortable looking the other way.

The most recent evidence of Europe turning a blind eye to the horrors of Alassad family is the return of Bashar’s estranged uncle Rifaat.

Rifaat was exiled from Syria by his brother Hafez, Bashar’s father, in 1984. While in Europe, Rifaat embezzled money and was investigated in both Spain and France for related violations. But his criminal record began years before he went to Europe.

Rifaat Alassad worked hand in hand with his brother Hafez to conduct the coup that put Alassad family in power and according to most informed sources directly oversaw what is now known as the “Hama massacre”.

In 1982, Rifaat Alassad, or the “Butcher of Hama”, was the commanding General who carried out the siege of Hama where according to some estimates up to 40,000 people were killed. The military operation put to an end a religiously motivated political uprising that started in 1976 by the Muslim Brotherhood.  Two years later, Rifaat failed to overthrow his brother Hafez and went into exile, settling in France.

Rifaat Alassad recently escaped France on a private jet avoiding a four-year jail sentence for embezzlement but more importantly he was also able to escape possible prosecution resulting from an ongoing investigation in Switzerland about his role in committing possible war crimes in Hama.

Some European countries are using normalization with Alassad to put pressure on Turkey, especially Greek Cyprus and Greece.

It remains a mystery how Rifaat was able to flee France unhindered and why Swiss authorities were unable to impress upon the French the severity of the allegations against him. For Rifaat, Bashar, and Europe – the uncle’s return to Syria carries significant implications.

Bashar allowed his uncle to return to build comradery with the Alawite community which holds Rifaat in high regard and have grown frustrated with Bashar. Using his uncle as a counterbalance to his cousin Rami Makhlouf who spent the past two years pleading with Bashar via social media to stop expropriating his personal assets.

But more importantly for Bashar, he wanted to prevent his uncle from cooperating with European authorities revealing family secrets implicating Bashar, his narco-trafficking kingpin brother Maher Alassad, or others, in a long list of crimes, both past and present.

While some European countries are happy to see Alassad family consolidate its criminal enterprises and reign in the vast network of beneficiaries relieving Europe from having to face off with the mafia-like family in European court rooms; other European countries are using normalization with Alassad to put pressure on Turkey, especially Greek Cyprus and Greece.