T

he United States’ military intervention in Venezuela on 3 January 2026 marked a significant turning point in the international system. The capture and transfer of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife to the United States as part of this operation constitutes a serious violation of international law and is a concrete manifestation of Trump’s ‘America First’ policy. Trump justified the intervention by claiming that Venezuela was a major player in international drug trafficking. However, his real aim was to gain control of the country’s oil resources, which he declared to be under temporary U.S. control.

The overt and covert reactions of European Union (EU) leaders to this operation are contributing to the erosion of international norms. This development reveals an approach that disregards the territorial integrity of sovereign states, raising concerns that similar scenarios could be repeated in other regions. The military operation in Venezuela adds a new dimension to Trump’s long-standing interest in Greenland.

A direct military attack by the US on Greenland is unlikely due to Denmark’s NATO membership. However, the US is likely to pose a real threat to Greenland by employing diplomatic, economic and hybrid pressure tactics. The intervention in Venezuela can be described as a precursor to neo-imperialism focused on oil and other resources, justified on security grounds. Given Greenland’s strategic location and mineral wealth, there is a high risk that this operation could trigger a similar or different one.

EU leaders’ passive stance towards the Venezuela operation, which disregards international law, highlights the possibility of a similar response in the Greenland scenario: diplomatic outcry without sanctions. In Greenland specifically, the NATO dimension is highly likely to cause a deep crisis in the already fragile transatlantic relationship. This study examines Greenland’s status, Trump’s statements and actions, how the European Union might react, and the future of transatlantic relations.

The status and geopolitical position of Greenland

Greenland is an autonomous part of the Kingdom of Denmark and, under the 2009 Selvstyre Act, has extensive administrative autonomy. With a population of around 56,000 people, mostly of Inuit origin, the island has full authority over matters such as education, health, natural resources and internal affairs. However, foreign policy, defense and monetary policy remain the responsibility of Copenhagen. Greenland is recognized as a people with the right to self-determination under the UN Charter, and independence is a legally recognized option.

While the majority of Greenland’s population wants independence from Denmark, they are also opposed to the idea of joining the United States. In a joint statement, Greenlandic Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen and Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen emphasised that the principle that ‘Greenland belongs to the Greenlanders’ forms the basis of sovereignty. The island possesses extraordinary wealth in rare earth elements, uranium and various other strategic mineral resources, which constitute a significant portion of the world’s reserves. These resources play a critical role in ensuring the continuity and strategic security of global supply chains.

Geopolitically, Greenland is a key strategic point in the Arctic region. The emergence of new sea routes as a result of glacial melting, triggered by climate change, has significantly intensified Russian and Chinese military and commercial activities in the area. The Trump administration perceives this development as an unacceptable threat within the framework of the US 2025 National Security Strategy. Unlike Venezuela, Greenland is protected by NATO and European Union defense mechanisms (Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty) via its association with Denmark. Theoretically, any military operation or annexation attempt would trigger collective defense obligations. However, while this status partially protects Greenland from conventional interventions similar to those in Venezuela, it leaves it vulnerable to hybrid warfare methods.

The Trump administration’s statements and measures regarding Greenland

Located on the island under the 1951 U.S.-Denmark defense agreement, the U.S. Thule Air Base plays a strategic role in Arctic security. Trump’s interest in Greenland dates back to his first term in office, when he proposed buying the island in 2019, and intensified during his second term. This interest was not just rhetorical, but supported by concrete diplomatic initiatives and high-level visits. Notably, in March 2025, Vice President JD Vance visited the air base and accused Denmark of failing to invest adequately in the Greenlandic people and their security. He criticized the Copenhagen administration, stating: ‘Our message to Denmark is very simple: you have not done a good job for the Greenlandic people. You have not invested enough in them, and you have not invested enough in the security infrastructure of this magnificent continent.’

Although he criticized Copenhagen’s administration, he claimed that the US would adopt a respectful approach, emphasizing the Greenlanders’ right to self-determination. Although the visit was short, lasting only a few hours, and largely confined to the military base, it was perceived as provocative in Denmark and Greenland, and not welcomed by the local administration. Vance’s visit is seen as an early manifestation of Trump’s Greenland policy, and similar initiatives accompanied by senior officials such as National Security Advisor Mike Waltz have increased US pressure on the island.

At a press conference in Palm Beach in December 2025, Trump stated, “We need Greenland for national security, not for minerals. We should have it.’ He thus designated Greenland as a national security target and appointed Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry as special envoy to oversee the process of bringing Greenland under US control. Landry explicitly stated the goal of ‘making Greenland part of the US’ on X, drawing significant backlash in Denmark. Although Trump emphasized security over minerals, analysts have noted that mineral resources, particularly rare earth elements, were the primary motivation.

Trump’s characterization of Greenland as a ‘great real estate deal’ and his appointment of a special envoy have increased diplomatic pressure, while Landry’s implication that he will ‘lead the charge’ in negotiations suggests a transactional approach. Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen has described this appointment as completely unacceptable and warned the US ambassador in Copenhagen. Following the intervention in Venezuela, speculation about a similar military operation in Greenland has increased. However, due to the NATO factor, this appears unlikely. Instead, economic sanctions, influencing local elites or covert operations are more likely. Indeed, Trump’s personality makes him unpredictable and challenges international norms.

European Union reactions

In response to Trump’s statements on Greenland, the European Union (EU) showed diplomatic solidarity with Denmark and Greenland, but avoided taking harsh measures. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emphasized territorial integrity, stating: ‘We stand in full solidarity with the people of Denmark and Greenland,’ while Antonio Costa noted that Arctic security was a ‘priority issue’. French President Emmanuel Macron also expressed support for the sovereignty of Denmark and Greenland. As with the EU’s limited ‘concern’ statements following the intervention in Venezuela, diplomatic warnings rather than explicit condemnation are at the forefront in Greenland.

This stance stems from transatlantic dependence: trade, energy and the NATO partnership prevent the implementation of harsh measures. If the US were to intervene in Greenland, objections and diplomatic isolation via the UN are expected, while military or economic sanctions are unlikely. The EU supports Denmark’s investments in Arctic defense, which amount to billions of dollars, thereby strengthening the Union’s strategic autonomy. However, divisions within the Union, such as the close ties between some EU countries, like Hungary, and Trump, could weaken the response. The submissive stance adopted by EU leaders on the Venezuela issue could also emerge in the Greenland scenario, ultimately plunging transatlantic relations into a deep crisis and eroding international law.

The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) is the latest step taken against the spiral of mistrust that emerged with the Russia-Ukraine war. The project was launched under the leadership of Germany, whose defense weaknesses have been on the agenda since the start of war in February 2022, drawing attention to its poor combat readiness and lack of basic military equipment.

Despite frequent warnings since the beginning of the war to increase ammunition production in European countries and to invest more in air and missile defense, European defense industry production has fallen further behind Russia. Meanwhile, as Russia shifted to a form of war economy, it significantly increased its production rate, further exacerbating insecurity in Europe.

Moreover, increased drone and missile strikes behind the front lines, intense attacks on critical infrastructure, and Russian missiles falling within NATO’s borders have put the need for air and missile defense in Europe back on the agenda. The ESSI is therefore expected not only to reduce vulnerability in this area, but also to encourage an overall increase in military spending on the continent and the development of a common understanding of defense.

The project aims to establish a layered air and missile defense network through the joint procurement and operation of the German Iris-T, American Patriot and Israeli Arrow-3 defense systems, thereby creating a cost-effective and interoperable network.

Why ISSI Is Needed for European Security?

Two fundamental challenges have played a driving role in the emergence of ESSI. The first is the fact that the development of missile and unmanned systems technology, as seen in recent conflicts and the war in Ukraine, could extend warfare behind the front lines.

The increasing use of large numbers of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which can be quickly and inexpensively produced and act as “missiles” with a saturation effect on air defense systems (neutralizing technologically superior enemy systems through numerical superiority), has reemphasized the importance of a multi-layered air and missile defense architecture.

Can ESSI Succeed?

The project is unlikely to succeed for a number of reasons. So far, the continent has failed to adopt a common position on security, defense and foreign policy. Although the project has been on the agenda for about a year and a half, no serious progress has been made except for the recruitment of new members due to the high cost of the systems to be procured. In addition, Germany and France have different approaches to war and common defense. All this inevitably puts the future of ESSI in a stalemate.

In the aftermath of the Ukraine war, France has become more emphatic about European strategic autonomy and the development of the European defense industrial ecosystem. However, it is noteworthy that the delays in the new generation aircraft and tank projects with Germany cannot be overcome.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s contradictory statements since the beginning of the war and his inability to find common ground with German Chancellor Scholz make it even more difficult to develop common policies, a situation that was recently repeated during the debate on the possible deployment of troops in Ukraine.

France’s refusal to participate in the ESSI, and even its frequent open criticism of the initiative, is one of the incompatibilities demonstrated by these differences. France considers the ESSI to be a project that will damage the Union’s defense industrial ecosystem, as it provides for the procurement of weapons systems from outside the EU.

It is worth recalling that France, along with Greece and Southern Cyprus, vetoed the delivery of urgently needed 155mm ammunition and unmanned systems to Ukraine from outside the EU.

We know that the ESSI is not a new concept, dating back to August 2022. The lack of a tangible outcome of the initiative, despite the long time that has passed and the rapid expansion of Russia’s capabilities, indicates that Europe has not overcome its traditional sluggishness when it comes to defense projects.

Despite the announcement of large defense budgets by many European countries, especially Germany, the extent to which these will be translated into reality and military modernization is a big question mark.

While the launch and success of an initiative like ESSI would be highly desirable for European security, the current picture suggests that it will not be easy to achieve. Even if successful, ESSI will only address a small part of Europe’s defense vulnerabilities, as most countries lack sufficient offensive capabilities to provide a deterrent.

While ESSI is an attractive idea, Europe must make a fundamental shift in its defense policy which is abandoning free riding under American security guarantees and developing its own defense. While France and the United Kingdom have the self-confidence that comes with having nuclear weapons, it will not be easy for other countries on the continent to undertake serious defense projects unless their dependence on the United States changes. This has also been the main criticism of Donald Trump, who is running for re-election in the US presidential elections.

Turkey, on the other hand, has signaled that it wants to maintain its participation in the European defense and security architecture by joining this initiative alongside Greece, just as it did with its NATO membership. Turkey does not currently have a procurement agenda for an external missile defense system. However, the goal is to increase the interoperability of Turkish systems with their European counterparts and, in the long term, to include Turkish defense industry products among the systems to be procured under the ESSI project although the latter goal is likely to face significant obstacles.

I

n Eurowhiteness, Hans Kundnani, Associate Fellow in the Europe Programme at Chatham House, challenges a sanitized and linear history of the EU, prompting the reader to rethink Europe’s peaceful image against its imperial past. He goes on to tackle myopic assumptions about the European project throughout the book.

Kundnani argues that pro-Europeans, who cradled cosmopolitanism and renounced nationalism, have failed to perceive the reality of European regionalism. This provocative critique dissects both the civic and ethnic elements that shape European identity by highlighting Europe’s interaction with the “Other” and linking “Europeanness” and “whiteness.” 

Eurowhiteness may come off as unpalatable to many pro-Europeans, but it raises valuable questions against a backdrop of a rising far-right in Europe. Especially in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis, the complex relationship between European identity and race demands urgent reflection.

Q. What are some of the myths that cause blind spots in understanding the European identity?

I would mention two in particular. The first is the idea that the EU is a cosmopolitan project. Cosmopolitanism usually has something to do with the whole world, and Europe is not the whole world. There’s a tendency by pro-Europeans and the EU to mistake Europe for the world. For example, when they talk about European integration, they sometimes seem to think that they’re talking about global integration, but they’re not.

Similarly, when they say “I’m a European or I’m a European citizen,” they seem to think they’re saying I’m a citizen of the world, but they’re not; They’re saying I’m a citizen of this particular region that has a very particular history and relationship with the rest of the world.

This is what I call in Eurowhiteness “the of myth of cosmopolitanism in Europe”, and related to that is the idea to think European integration is good for the whole of the world, but that may not necessarily be the case; It may be good for Europeans or may not be good for Europeans, arguably. But even if it is good for Europeans, it’s not clear if it’s good for the whole world.

The second myth would be that the EU is a peace project, and that is not entirely wrong. However, the way that pro-Europeans talk about it is sometimes simplistic; that after 1945 Europeans rejected war, and since then Europeans stand for peace. In reality, Europeans did not reject war in general in 1945. They only rejected war with each other.

In 1950 as the Schuman Declaration, which can be seen as the beginning of the idea of the EU as a peace project, is made by France’s then-foreign minister Robert Schumann, France is simultaneously fighting a brutal colonial war in Indochina.

Similarly, seven years later, when the Treaty of Rome is signed, France fought a brutal colonial war in Algeria. This demonstrates that Europeans are continuing to fight colonial wars until they’re defeated or exhausted.

Europeans like to think of themselves as being uniquely peaceful. The real story is more complicated, and in particular, as I say, to the extent that Europeans have rejected military force, it is military force within what has become the European Union, not even within Europe at large, that is being rejected.

Q. Has the EU’s focus shifted from peace to power?

I wouldn’t say it has shifted from being about peace to being about power. I think it was always about power as well as peace. In particular, it gets to what I was just saying about the idea of the EU as a peace project.

If you go back to the interwar period pan-European movement, which is the inspiration for the post-War European integration project, it is very clear that at that time already that the European integration project is about power and the perception of European decline accelerated by fighting one other.

The idea is: If we want to maintain our position in the world – and at that time this is a position of colonial domination- we have to stop fighting with each other. Not so that we can end European colonialism, but so that we can continue it. So in other words, European integration would take the competitive element out of European colonialism, allowing its practice collectively.

Part of the point of European integration in 1950s was for France and Belgium to consolidate their colonies in Central and West Africa at a time when they were no longer able to on their own. In particular, they needed an injection of West German capital.

The idea of geopolitical Europe goes back to the 1920s. It only seems new because pro-Europeans like to tell a story of Europe through the aforementioned myths. It only seems like a shift because we’ve forgotten the real history of how European integration began.

Q. Does the EU still export the European social model and the general welfare state?

Social market economy and the welfare state are no longer what the EU can to claim export anymore. It may have done once, but even in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War we observe that this is not the case. In fact, the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe had much more generous welfare states when they were communist countries.

What happened as they joined the EU during the enlargement process is that those welfare states were dismantled as part of their transition to democracy. There are obviously lots of things that you can criticize about the communist systems in those countries, such as the lack of political freedom and so on, but they did have welfare states.

What has happened now is a further stage in which the EU is putting pressure on member states to dismantle the welfare state. For example, during the euro crisis, the austerity Germany imposed on Greece dismantled what was left of the Greek welfare state.

Q. Your book suggests that civic ideas of Europe are being replaced by ethnic-cultural ones. What is the connection of the neoliberalization of Europe to identity politics?

What I try to show in the book is that there have always been both of the elements of civic and ethnic-cultural idea in the history of what I call European regionalism- which is similar to nationalism on a larger continental scale. I’m suggesting that we can think of the history of ideas of Europe in the way we think about the history of nations. Therefore, regionalism is like nationalism.

The earliest ideas of Europe are predominantly ethnic-cultural. For example, in the medieval period, Europeanness is synonymous with Christianity. From the modern period onwards, you begin to get civic ideas of Europe. Then, in the post war period is when the EU came closest to evolving into a purely civic regionalism. Particularly, in the period from the 60s to the 90s-2000s, there was an idea of Europe centered on the social market economy, the welfare state and depoliticized mode of governance which European integration had produced.

I think what’s happened is that the social market economy and the welfare state have been hollowed out by neoliberalism in the EU. Meanwhile, there has been a backlash against the depoliticised mode of governance where the older civic idea of Europe is no longer persuasive in the same way it was before.

The way I understand neoliberalism is not just financialization, but it’s also the depoliticization of economic policy. In other words, it’s taking economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation. Although, to some extent, this has happened in the whole world in the last 30-40 years through things like the World Trade Organisation rules, the EU has taken it further through the creation of the single market, and also the Eurozone and the fiscal rules. Therefore, it’s very difficult now to pursue a left wing economic policy in the Eurozone because the fiscal rules don’t allow you to do it.

My argument is basically that when you take economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation and no longer have big fights between left and right about economic policy, your democratic politics shifts to cultural questions.

The point of democratic politics is to reconcile different interests and to have fights about questions where people in your society have different ideas or different interests. I think a healthy democratic politics is one where you do that about economic issues because there are real differences between the interests and different ideas as well.

What has happened now is that the center left parties and the center right parties converged in the center around neoliberal economic policy, which the EU has constitutionalized. Therefore, the way parties can differentiate themselves from each other now is around cultural questions.

In terms of what Europe says to the rest of the world, there was a time it would say it stood for the social market economy and the welfare state and now it says it stands for European civilisation.

A good example of this is the phrase “the European way of life,” which used to be used by French socialists, specifically, to refer to the social market economy and the welfare state and the idea of solidarity that it was meant to embody, saying “that’s what we in Europe stand for as opposed to the United States.”

Now when you look at the way that the phrase is used, it is in more civilizational terms. In the current European Commission, the Commission of Ursula Von Der Leyen since 2019, a European Commissioner for promoting the European way of life and his job is to keep migrants out, which makes it very explicit that migrants- only migrants from the South, not migrants from the east- are a threat to the European way of life. That is a very explicit expression of civilizationalism where the European way of life is defined in terms of culture and civilisation, not in terms of the social market economy and the welfare state.

Q. In your book you imply that the center right is increasingly mimicking the far right. Is there a pro-European version of the great replacement theory, if so, what is it?

There is an idea that the EU represents a European civilisation which is being increasingly threatened. This is basically a far right idea that has now been taken on by the center right in Europe.

For example, a couple of weeks ago, Eric Zemmour was doing a rally in the South of France with the young far right leader Marion Maréchal, and the slogan on the lectern at which he was speaking was ‘Defend our civilization.’  The way the far right is thinking about Europe is there’s a European civilisation that is threatened right now. The far right tends to talk about this in the context of migration. That is, it’s the migration of non-white and non-Christian people that is threatening European civilisation.

For example, Valérie Pécresse, the Republican candidate in the French Presidential election in 2022, was talking about white replacement theory or alluding to it in terms of migration. However, in addition, what the centre right tends to do is not talk so much about migration as a racial threat, but more in foreign policy terms as a threat to European civilisation. Macron has given speeches where he’s quite explicit about this.

In other words, international politics is a clash of civilizations, like how Samuel Huntington argues, and Europe is a distinct civilization. Moreover, for someone like Macron, the West is not one civilization, which is what Huntington thought but that Europe is a distinct civilisation, separate from the United States as well.

Where I see a connection with great replacement theory is that this is almost the international political equivalent of the great replacement theory. It’s not about migration but it’s that if Europe does not unite and defend itself, it will be also replaced by other civilizations. Macron has basically said that.

Q. What are some key takeaways from history regarding Europe’s interaction with those who it sees as the “Other”?

I try to show in Eurowhiteness that there’s a long history of defining Europe against various different “Others” at various different times and it’s constantly shifting. But roughly, I would say, in the medieval period when Europe is pretty much synonymous with Christianity, Jews are defined as the primary internal other and Muslims as the primary external other, excluding the divide between Western Christendom and Eastern Christendom.

Then, in the modern period, I try to show how there is a new complex modern idea of Europe, which is partly to do with the European enlightenment and the scientific revolution. It is a rationalist, secular idea of Europe rather than a religious one. At the same time, the idea of Europe also emerges in the context of the encounter of Europeans with the populations of Africa and Asia, and especially the Americas, and that’s the context in which the idea of whiteness emerges.

So, the modern idea of Europe is not just a rationalist one as opposed to a religious one, it’s also a more racialized idea of Europe that is closely connected to the idea of whiteness. What I think happens in that context is that non-white people around the world are the “Others” against which Europeans define themselves.

In the 20th century and particularly after World War I, you have the new idea of Europe as a geopolitical bloc, which I mentioned earlier. European civilisation or the European spirit, as they talked about it at that time, is being threatened by the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other hand. In that context, Russia and also the United States are respectively an “Other.” What I think we’re seeing today is a mixture of all of those “Others.”

Rather than a “New Cold War,” we are now witnessing the culmination of an economic war with Russia, where the financial, energy, and capital markets are the battlegrounds. In his timely book, Economic War: Ukraine and the Global Conflict between Russia and the West, political risk analyst and consultant Maximilian Hess takes the reader through the period in which the seeds of economic warfare are sprouting into full bloom: from the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 to Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 and beyond.  

The book skillfully delves into various economic fronts around the world, demonstrating the weaponization of economic tools such as pipelines, mining, credit, and cryptocurrencies. Each chapter unfolds like a chess game between Russia and the West, allowing the reader to map the moves of the contestants both chronologically and regionally, including Russia’s response to Western sanctions and what is at stake for each party.

There were a number of disputes in the early and mid-2000s between Russia and Ukraine over gas supplies and the terms thereof that led Russia to cut off deliveries and precipitated gas supply crunches in the wider European market. What I think people forget is that Nordstream 2 and Nordstream 1 were never intended to increase the total amount of Russian gas that could be pumped to Central Europe.

Instead, they were designed to ensure that Russia didn’t have to do it through Eastern Europe, in particular through Ukraine, so that Russia could then increase the leverage of its gas policy over Ukraine. We should have understood this risk at the time of Nordstream 2, because it was essentially designed to give Russia the same kind of leverage over other Eastern European states that it had gained over Ukraine.

Q. Why do you think Putin choose to invade Ukraine specifically in February 2022?

I think he thought it was an important time economically, when the West was weak and divided. He hoped that the sanctions response and the economic response would be less intense than it might have been at another time. Thinking in terms of change in 2020 and 2021, the end of the Trump administration and then the Biden administration that follows made it clear that there would be a concerted sanctions strategy.

He hoped that European unity would be weak and insufficient to resist him. Inflationary pressures from COVID-19 had already increased, and Russia had already begun to cut off its gas supplies to Europe. At the same time, he was preparing his troops to invade Ukraine and saw it as a moment when the West would be relatively weak economically and relatively vulnerable. Therefore, less likely to act against him and less likely to act in support of Ukraine. Which, of course, turned out to be a very big strategic miscalculation on his part.

Q. Has Russia’s strategy of crippling Europe with gas cuts failed?

Largely, I think it has failed. Not because of any failure within the strategy itself but because of collaborative actions on the part of the West. Intelligence was shared by the United States, by officials who had spoken on the record and had reached the assessment that there was a small chance that Russia wouldn’t invade Ukraine in October 2021, simply the brutal nature of Russia’s onslaught in February, and the fact that the Europeans saw an army of the largest form that had taken this action in Europe since World War II, made it clear to many European leaders that they had no other choice.

Putin was preparing, and did prepare, for a scenario in which Europe was fully on board with the sanctions regime through Russia’s fortress balance sheet strategy, the Kremlin’s process of building up large reserves of ‘hard currencies’ and gold. But now that the initial pain of that gas strategy is being felt, and inflation has been at such high levels for a year and a half. There are obviously still many politicians, particularly in Europe, such as former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who are calling for a softer approach to Russia on these issues. That’s why Putin’s strategy is not one that is over; by threatening more economic pain, he can also undermine support for Ukraine in the long term. Global gas markets are much more fragile, and we could still see a new spike in gas prices this winter as a result of the Kremlin’s actions.

Q. Did Putin pull out of the Black Sea grain deal in an attempt to revive the inflation weapon?

I believe very strongly that this is what he is trying to do. It also gives him the tool of offering grain to African countries to gain more support there. I think we should be prepared for more actions by the Kremlin to deliberately try to stir up inflationary pressures, possibly trying to find a way to drive up prices, as well. The Kremlin really has only one major option, which is to threaten an export embargo and actually take action to make it look credible. That option is difficult because Russia’s budget is now so skewed toward the military.

The situation in Ukraine is becoming more and more dangerous each day with additional Russian troops and military equipment heading towards the border. Some reports and analyses predict that Russia may initiate a full-blown military conflict any time although a large-scale ground invasion is unlikely given the consequences Russia would face for such a move. Despite the unprecedented troop movement towards Ukraine, Russia’s strategy seems to be headed towards a grand bargaining with the U.S. at a time when the West is visibly fragmented.

The lack of sufficient European security assurances and military aid to Ukraine demonstrates that there are limits to how much help the country can receive against Russia. Russia’s smart foreign policy strategy that targets the West’s unity and the shifting focus of the U.S. from Eastern Europe to the Pacific are two of the most important parameters that limit the West’s ability to counter Russia.

Russia’s foreign policy strategy is aimed at further weakening the West’s cohesion and thus depleting impairing the position of the latter against it. To regain its lost power and status with the dissolution of the USSR, Russia strove to become a strong economic and military power while targeting the unity of the West through developing bilateral economic and energy relations with European countries.

Having become Europe’s largest energy supplier, Russia managed to carve out a form of coexistence with Europe. Despite being aware of such a threat and the existence of common platforms such as the EU and NATO, European nations have not been able to meet on common ground against Russia.

The shift of the U.S. foreign policy priority from Eastern Europe to the Pacific limited Western efforts to counterbalance Russia.

The shift of the U.S. foreign policy priority from Eastern Europe to the Pacific has also played a significant role in limiting Western efforts against Russia. Within the framework of China’s rapid economic growth that has acquired momentum since the early 2000s and in order to balance China, the U.S. diminished its security commitments in the Middle East and pulled out of Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. moved thousands of its troops overseas from NATO bases in Europe to its bases in the Pacific.

According to the budget of the United States Department of Defense, China is the country’s  number one target. With the U.S. giving more emphasis on China, its European allies are looking to manage their security with diminished U.S. involvement. Having made a habit of outsourcing their security to the U.S. throughout the Cold War and beyond due to the lack of appropriate mechanisms under the EU roof, the Europeans were caught off guard by the type of challenge Russia created in Eastern Europe.

It should be noted that Turkey is in a precarious situation since it is developing relations with Russia within the framework of Turkey’s pursuit of an independent foreign policy strategy. Turkey’s sale of Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine is being cautiously observed by Russia. Putin described the sale as “destructive behavior” in a phone conversation with Erdoğan. Turkey also proposed to act as a mediator in the crisis between Ukraine and Russia, a call both countries received favorably.

Germany and France, the EU’s strongest economies, remained hesitant when it came to providing military aid to Ukraine.

Germany and France, the EU’s strongest economies, remained hesitant when it came to providing military aid to Ukraine. In her visit to Kyiv, German Foreign Minister Baerbock refused to promise military aid to Ukraine citing the restrictive nature of Germany’s arms control policy. However, such hand-wringing may also have to do with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, which will transport Russian natural gas directly to Europe circumventing Ukraine when it is completed.

In August 2021, during Merkel’s visit to Ukraine after the completion of Nord Stream 2, Ukraine’s President Zelensky and Merkel revealed their differences regarding the issue. Ukraine also protested Germany’s blocking of British arms in its airspace. Critics point out the double-standards of Germany’s arms sales citing its record-breaking arms exports to Egypt last year.

Following the footsteps of Germany, France, on top of not providing any concrete military assistance to Ukraine protested Ukraine’s use of Turkish-made drones in the battlefield – a  stance that angered Ukraine. At the end of the day, Ukraine was not able to receive support from leading European Union members.

The latest reports suggest that more anti-tank missiles might be coming to Ukraine as multiple Baltic nations received approval from the U.S. to send American-made anti-tank missiles to Ukraine. Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, along with Poland, are the most sensitive NATO member states vis-à-vis the Russian threat. Rising tensions in Ukraine stirred fear in the Baltic nations which fear that they might be Russia’s next target.

In the late 2000s, a plan for the placement of U.S. missiles in Poland created an outrage in Russia, which considered the move as a provocative one. Baltic nations, however, will be unable to send any German-made weapons to Ukraine as Germany blocks arms exports from third countries as well.

The supply of military weapons in the form of anti-tank missiles is intended to be used in the event of a ground invasion of Ukraine by Russia. Such an invasion may never materialize, but Russia’s threat to European security and the unity of NATO will persist. A long-term solution to the regional crisis could come only through concerted efforts to strengthen the Ukrainian armed forces.

As the crisis escalates, the limits of Germany’s and France’s readiness to protect European security emerges. The security challenge Russia created for Europe in Ukraine will continue to haunt it until Russia is either reassured or deterred. Europe’s apparent failure to deter Russia through providing sufficient military support to Ukraine may encourage future Russian provocations and endanger European security and unity.