Rekindling Bonds: A Momentous Journey of Diplomacy

The recent visit of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to three prominent Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries has captivated attention, illuminating the Turkey-Gulf relations and pointing towards a rekindling of the pre-Arab Uprising era in bilateral ties. On July 17, President Erdoğan embarked on a Gulf tour, encompassing Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with an economy-oriented agenda to foster and fortify trade and investment relations with these influential Gulf nations.

Following the significance of President Erdoğan’s re-election on May 28, his visits hold special importance, with Gulf monarchies poised to form a cornerstone in Turkey’s foreign policy for the next five years. The Turkish elections garnered profound attention in the Gulf region, leading to swift and warm congratulations from Gulf leaders, underscoring their desire for continuity and stronger ties with Turkey. The GCC nations, in an unequivocal display of commitment, expressed their steadfast determination to bolster relations with Ankara throughout President Erdoğan’s forthcoming term, setting the stage for an era of promising collaboration and mutual growth.

The timing and significance of Erdoğan’s visit were of utmost importance, given Turkey’s ongoing efforts to revitalize its struggling economy, which has been grappling with currency devaluation, soaring inflation, and depleting reserves. The expectations back in Turkey regarding a potential trade and investment deal with Gulf monarchies were set high. Notably, Turkey’s new economy managers, Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek and Central Bank Governor Hafize Gaye Erkan, preceded President Erdoğan’s visit with their arrival in Saudi Arabia on July 11. Their purpose was to lay the groundwork for the high-ranking Turkish delegation’s visit, further underscoring the importance of the occasion. Minister Şimşek, along with Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yilmaz, also embarked on visits to Qatar and the UAE to strengthen economic ties with these nations earlier in July.

Enhancing Bonds: Agreements, Gestures, and Gifts

Accompanied by 200 businesspeople, the Turkish President embarked on his first visit to Saudi Arabia, where he held a significant meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman. The Saudi Arabia-Türkiye Business Forum took place in Jeddah on July 18, resulting in the signing of five key agreements between the two countries, covering investment, energy, communication, and defense industry cooperation.

Of notable importance among these agreements is the cooperation deal with Baykar Technology, which demands considerable attention. The partnership with the Saudi Ministry of Defense represents Turkey’s most substantial defense and aviation export agreement ever, as confirmed by Haluk Bayraktar, the CEO of Baykar Technologies. Beyond the scope of mere trade relations, these deals also encompass joint production and technology transfer. Baykar Technologies highlighted that the primary objective of this collaboration is to bolster the high-tech development capabilities of both nations in the foreseeable future.

Emphasizing the depth and significance of the collaboration, Baykar Technologies stated, “With this comprehensive agreement, there will be a focus on technology transfer and joint production to propel the high technology development capabilities of both countries.”

Following the business and diplomatic contacts in Saudi Arabia, President Erdoğan arrived in Qatar on the second leg of his Gulf tour. During an official ceremony at Lusail Palace, President Erdoğan met with his counterpart Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. During the visit, the two countries inked an MoU on the occasion of the 50^thanniversary of diplomatic relations.

Throughout the last decade, Turkey has proven to be a reliable and unwavering partner for Qatar, a bond that became even more evident during the 2017 Gulf Crisis. Ankara swiftly and consistently extended its political, economic, and military backing to Qatar, solidifying their relationship as vital regional allies. Both nations hold significance for each other, serving as trusted and strategic foreign policy allies in the region.

In a joint statement both countries noted, “Türkiye-Qatar relations reflect deep-rooted historical ties built on political and social foundations, as evidenced by the fact that the two countries have consistently supported each other in the spirit of brotherhood and solidarity throughout many pivotal periods in their history, and the two countries continue to mutually support each other in various fields.” The two leaders are expected to meet again later this year at the 9th Qatari-Turkish Supreme Strategic Committee meeting slated to take place in Qatar.

The third and last stop of President Erdoğan’s Gulf tour was the UAE. In a two-day official visit, Turkey and the UAE signed 13 agreements in fields such as energy, transportation, infrastructure, logistics, e-commerce, finance, health, food, tourism, real estate, construction, defense industry, artificial intelligence, and advanced technologies. The total worth of agreements announced stands at $50.7 billion. The two countries also agreed on establishing a “High Level Strategic Council” to elevate the bilateral relations to the level of strategic partnership.

Apart from business deals, personal gestures and significant gifts have become remarkable features of President Erdoğan’s recent Gulf tour: President Erdoğan gifted a Togg, Turkey’s first domestically manufactured electric car, to each of the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Media attention was high as President Erdoğan and Gulf leaders personally examined the car together. Apart from its importance domestically, it appears that the Togg might be a diplomatically significant tool in Erdoğan’s foreign policy over the upcoming five years.

During his official visit to the UAE, President Erdoğan was honored with the prestigious Order of Zayed by Emirates President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ). The Order of Zayed, named after the UAE’s founding father, is the highest civilian honor bestowed upon world leaders and heads of state, symbolizing humanitarianism, international cooperation, and the pursuit of peace worldwide. The award of the Order of Zayed is as a goodwill gesture in strengthening bilateral relations between the UAE and Turkey.

Beyond the Horizon: Key Reflections and Future Trajectories

The primary dimension that will define the trajectory of Turkey-Gulf relations in the upcoming five years is undeniably its profoundly business-oriented nature. This strategic focus on bolstering economic ties has been eloquently emphasized by Nail Olpak, the president of the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK). During this recent Gulf tour, which he aptly dubbed #businessdiplomacy, the profound developments and engagements with the Gulf monarchies have been unambiguously centered around forging robust business alliances and sealing consequential deals. It becomes evident that business collaborations are not merely a means to an end but, rather, they represent the very essence of the diplomatic engagements with these Gulf nations, underscoring the critical role they play in shaping the future of Turkey-Gulf relations.

Defense and energy cooperation stand out as the primary pillars of collaboration between Turkey and the Gulf. The agreements forged in these critical sectors hold the potential to pave the way for enduring and steadfast cooperation, owing to the remarkable synergy in supply and demand between Turkey and the GCC monarchies.

Within the energy domain, Turkey’s position as a net energy importer harmoniously corresponds to the pivotal role played by Gulf states as prominent energy exporters. The surging prominence of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Turkey’s natural gas imports serves as a poignant testament to the indispensability of energy relations, particularly with Qatar. Moreover, Turkey’s allure as an attractive investment destination for renewable energy projects mirrors the ambitions of Gulf monarchies seeking to transition their economies beyond oil and achieve net-zero emissions. These converging factors underscore the mutual benefits and profound significance of fostering robust energy cooperation between Turkey and the Gulf countries.

In the realm of defense, the Gulf nations are actively pursuing the diversification of their military partnerships and reinforcing their drone capabilities to counter unconventional attacks on oil facilities. At the same time, Turkey is keen on leveraging its advanced and cost-effective drone industry to reap both economic and strategic advantages. With these parallel objectives and shared interests, defense cooperation emerges as an immensely advantageous endeavor for both parties, promising mutual gains and strengthened security measures.

From a strategic perspective, defense sector productions and technologies serve as critical commodities that establish enduring dependencies between sellers and buyers. By forging defense ties, especially with technology transfer and joint production, with the Gulf monarchies, Turkey can effectively strengthen its presence and strategic importance in the Gulf region in a sustained and integrated manner. This proves particularly advantageous for the Gulf monarchies, as procuring Turkish defense productions and technologies, as a NATO member, is less likely to trigger significant backlash from the United States and Western partners, unlike military cooperation with China and Russia, which often raises concerns among these powers. Given the close alliance between the Gulf monarchies and the U.S., this advantage holds substantial weight.

Economically, the numbers speak for themselves: Turkey’s defense exports witnessed a remarkable 42% increase between 2020 and 2021, with the total export value reaching an impressive $4.4 billion in 2022. Notably, for prominent firm Baykar, foreign contracts constitute more than 90% of its revenue in this sector. Additionally, Turkey has set ambitious goals to achieve $6 billion worth of arms exports by 2023. Consequently, the Gulf states are ideally positioned to fill the trade and investment gap, thus providing crucial support to Turkey in reaching its economic objectives in this domain.

The strategic alignment of interests in these areas not only ensures mutual benefits, but also sets the stage for sustained, long-term partnerships, further solidifying the bond between Turkey and the Gulf nations providing that the political will and trust-building measures between both sides continues.

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he Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani recently celebrated 10 years in power. His father, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, abdicated in his favor in 2013 when his son was 33 years old. The handover was significant and exemplary in that it did not involve a coup d’état which is quite common in the region; however, it coincided with a very difficult period. The Arab Spring was in full swing, and the state of Qatar found itself at odds with the authoritarian Arab regimes in the region for actively supporting popular uprisings.

Regional and international actors wondered whether the emir would change the country’s foreign policy which was based on Doha’s active partisanship. A U-turn in foreign policy was seen as normal, but what if he followed the path of his father? Would he be able to cope with the difficulties at a time when The Arab Spring was slowly turning against the people who were rebelling. The answer to this question was on everyone’s mind.

As soon as Sheikh Tamim came to power, he decided to continue the foreign policy inherited from his father and to use a slightly softer discursive language. But Sisi’s Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain wanted to hold Qatar accountable for supporting popular uprisings. In fact, they triggered a diplomatic crisis by withdrawing their ambassadors from Doha in March 2014.

The emir asked these countries to reconsider their decision, but to no avail. While dealing with hostile states, Sheikh Tamim also sought to revive the mediation diplomacy that had been a feature of Qatari foreign policy before the Arab Spring. For example, he acted as a mediator between Iran and the West, and brought the Taliban and American officials together in Doha to find a lasting solution.

The blockade of Qatar

In June 2017, Qatar’s neighbors, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and further afield Egypt, began to blockade Qatar by air, land, and sea. Qatar suddenly found itself on the verge of losing its independence. The angry four demanded full allegiance from Qatar. They made a series of demands, from the closure of Al Jazeera to a commission to verify that Qatar had fulfilled the commitments they had demanded—officially all this meant taking over Qatari sovereignty. If the emir accepted the demands, Qatar would become a kind of satellite state. If he didn’t, Qatar would face sanctions.

Although his country was besieged from all sides—even the sending of food was forbidden—the emir did not give up and, with the support of his closest ally, Turkey, and his neighbor Iran, he reduced the destructive aspect of the blockade and managed to keep his country afloat for four years until the Al-Ula agreement was signed in 2021, which lifted the blockade.

Qatar was able to emerge from the blockade without any significant damage, which was a great personal success for Sheikh Tamim. The effect of the soft power factor, invested in since Sheikh Hamad’s reign, was crucial to this success. Since Sheikh Hamad came to power, the Qatari government has been nurturing good foreign relations and making new friends. Thanks to soft power moves such as hosting the U.S. army at the Al Udeid Air Base, actively using the Al Jazeera media group in foreign policy, providing a base for the Turkish army, balancing Saudi Arabia with Iran, and attracting Western support through investment, the blockade was overcome with almost no serious repercussions.

The 2022 FIFA World Cup

Sheikh Tamim also continued to work to improve the country’s image at a time when its sovereignty was under threat. Under his leadership, Qatar organized the 2022 FIFA World Cup. He began preparations for the tournament as soon as he succeeded his father and managed to organize the world’s largest event at an unusual time, in November-December 2022, spending a total of almost $200 billion. The 2022 FIFA World Cup has always had an important place in the image of Qatar. For decades, Qataris have wanted to put Qatar on the map for all to see and thanks to this event, the whole world had the opportunity to get to know Qatar better. In addition, the fans gained knowledge about the Arab Muslim culture.

Meanwhile, Qatar’s investment in football encouraged its Arab neighbors and brought them into the competition. For example, Saudi Arabia brought top players, including Cristiano Ronaldo, to the Saudi Football League; bought Premier League’s Newcastle United; and invested heavily in e-sports and golf—all after Qatar boosted its image thanks to the World Cup.

On the domestic front, Sheikh Tamim allowed elections for the Shura Council, even though Qatar is an emirate. The first elections took in October 2021. By law, 30 of the council’s 45 members are elected by popular vote. Although the council does not share power, it is an important development that the members of such an institution are elected by the people. Sheikh Tamim also abolished the kafala (sponsorship) system before the World Cup in response to criticism of labor rights abuses.

Normalization of diplomatic ties

On the foreign policy front, relations with the blockading Arab states have been normalized and ambassadors have been appointed on a reciprocal basis. The Qatari government has also abandoned its active interventionist foreign policy in recent years and begun to play the role of mediator again. In particular, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan through Qatar and the Taliban’s opening to the world through Qatar are the most notable achievements of Qatari foreign policy in recent years. In the upcoming period, the Emirate of Qatar under Sheikh Tamim is expected to continue its mediation diplomacy and not to get involved in regional conflicts.

Among others, Sheikh Tamim is expected to play an active role in foreign policy, bring the conflicting parties in the region to Doha, pursue a policy of balancing between the great powers, continue to be involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, personally deal with issues of the Islamic world, and increase aid to other countries. In short, Qatar’s maverick foreign policy, handed down from father to son, will continue as it has for the past three decades.

It should be noted, however, that this will come at a price. Although Sheikh Tamim has improved relations with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt, it is certain that rivalry will continue. UAE leader Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) are locked in an unrelenting rivalry to become the leaders of the Gulf and even the Arab world.

If, despite their rivalry, they continue to be hostile to Sheikh Tamim’s Qatar, then competition will be inevitable. If the fierce competition is confined to MBZ and MBS, there is a possibility that Qatar under Sheikh Tamim will benefit from it. However, given that the latter has a different character and style from the other two leaders, it seems more likely that relations will be strained again and that the Qatari emir will refrain from aligning himself with either MBZ or MBS.

It is safe to say that Sheikh Tamim will somehow bring his country safely to shore with each new problem. In the last decade, he has successfully dealt with complex problems, effectively protecting his country and gaining valuable experience. It appears that Qatar is in safe hands and will continue on its chosen path without compromising its principles.

The Gulf reconciliation at the Al-Ula Summit suddenly changed the regional atmosphere and the rhetoric of war among Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari decision-makers. The themes of building trust and confidence over broader regional security moved out of the Gulf context, given the new trend of Gulf diplomacy that favors economic interest over political conflict. The emerging Gulf portrait requires Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar to polish their international image as the region’s natural stabilizers and peaceful actors.

Although the Al-Ula Summit put an official end to the Gulf crisis, it threw a veil over political divergences for an unpredictable period of time, at which point it may lead to the redefinition of the Gulf states’ security interests. In fact, there is an intolerant ambiance in the post-Al-Ula era. Peace appears on the surface; however, beneath it lies the spirit of competition and aggression via the indirect foreign policies of Qatari and Emirati decision-makers who hide behind the foreign policy rhetoric of peace and stability for the eyes of the international community and, particularly, the United States.

Both Qatar and the UAE use their financial and media powers to challenge each other’s narratives as the central stabilizer establishing regional order. While other regional powers like Turkey, Israel, and Iran expect to benefit from the new Gulf diplomacy and its economic offers, the overall security perceptions of political actors in the Gulf and the Middle East continue to be unstable.

The central question here is to what extent Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE can tolerate each other’s regional aspirations in negotiating the process of regional order? As the Gulf states don’t have a joint foreign policy and a common defense agenda, establishing bilateral military relations with Gulf and non-Gulf actors independently seems inevitable.

It has been over a year now since Qatar and the UAE agreed on restoring bilateral ties and ending adverse statements against each other. However, the institutional rhetoric of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) on foreign policy and bilateral relations do not change rapidly as illustrated in a speech by Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, the foreign minister of Qatar, who stated, “It could take some time to move past this difficult period.”

Official delegations of Qatar and the UAE held a meeting in Doha in early February 2022, and stated their commitment to creating joint mechanisms and procedures for implementing the Al-Ula Declaration. Afterwards, the photograph of Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani and Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan shaking hands during the opening of the Olympic Games Beijing 2022 demonstrated the intention of the parties to portray a positive diplomatic ambiance at the highest level.

Before the Al-Ula declaration, Qatar and the Emirates continuously utilized their financial power through media and lobbying abroad to put pressure on each other. Recently, Qatar objected to the Abraham Accords signed between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain, by criticizing the UAE’s efforts to initiate a diplomatic move without negotiating a solution to the Palestinian cause.

After the Al-Ula declaration, one might mention the continuity of the indirect competition over the Hollywood movie The Misfits that portrays Qatar as “Jazeeristan,” a terrorist state and a global financier of terrorism.

The movie, co-produced by the UAE, Paramount Pictures, and Highland Film Group, mentions actual Qatari institutions such as Al-Emadi Hospital, the Lekhwiya police force, and Al Jazeera supporting the state’s “terrorist” activities. Another incident of behind-the-scenes competition can be seen in the UAE’s attempts to encourage journalists in Africa to campaign against Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

In another case, the UAE’s ambassador to Israel, Mohamed Al Khaja, accused Al Jazeera of continuously manipulating the narrative of the Palestinian cause and shifting the credibility of the events from the truth.

Likewise, Qatari newspapers published the visit of Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, the foreign minister of the UAE, the first Emirati official to visit Damascus since 2011, to discuss “new horizons” by referring to the Syrian civil war as a brutal and multifaceted war that has killed innocent civilians.

One can also come across news in Qatari media criticizing the UAE’s labor sponsorship system as problematic given that thousands of migrant children lack schooling and access to healthcare because they are not issued birth certificates by the authorities as a result of being born to unmarried or single parents and not paying medical bills.

The marring of the UAE’s international image during its military involvement in the Yemeni civil war decreased the chances of the Biden administration perceiving the UAE as the primary peacebuilder in the Gulf. The Biden administration’s recent selection of Qatar as a major non-NATO ally to cooperate in security and investment sectors demonstrated that the U.S. foreign policymaking would not tolerate aggressive foreign policies against the region’s instability and neighbors.

The Biden administration’s intolerance of aggressive foreign policies and military activities benefited Qatar’s previous regional narratives during the blockade period.

As the issue of Muslim Brotherhood is no longer on the table in intra-Gulf discussions or a factor in the Gulf states’ relations with other countries, ideological war narratives  are now replaced with a competition over the display of state capacity to promote peace-building and regional stability.

The process favors Qatar for now, but all this is tied to the U.S. administration’s foreign policy. Upon realizing that, the UAE recently established a new foreign policy built upon the theme of “good neighborliness” so as not to return to the hostile competitive environment and to avoid recalling its notorious military aggression in Yemen.

The UAE’s diplomatic move to reconcile and improve ties with Turkey through highest level visits and positive statements about the visit of Israel President Isaac Herzog to the country in January 2022  indicate the UAE’s determination to diversify regional allies peacefully and independently of its Gulf neighbors. In this new era of narrative wars built upon peace rhetoric, Qatar as a major non-NATO ally of the United States, appears to be the UAE’s primary competitor.

In the wake of the Arab Awakening in 2011, ties between Turkey and the Gulf duo, namely Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), began to deteriorate. This is particularly true after the counterrevolution led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Egypt where they bankrolled the bloody coup against the democratically elected government of the late president Mohamed Morsi and installed their henchman Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

The failed coup in Turkey in 2016, the unjust blockade of Qatar in 2017, the Arab duo’s constant support of counterrevolutionary forces in Syria, Libya, and Sudan, and their anti-Turkey stance in the Eastern Mediterranean, have vitiated any chance to recuperate the fraught ties between Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

The rise of Mohamed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia and his alliance with UAE’s Mohammed bin Zayed made a deadly anti-revolutionary combination in the Middle East. This convergence of counterrevolutionary states ultimately resulted in putting Turkey and Saudi Arabia on the opposite sides of the conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Iraq.

Turkish-Saudi rapprochement is more likely

In the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia is a “real” country with a huge land mass, significant native population, natural resources and, of course, the custodian of Mecca and Medina. All these aspects make Saudi Arabia an important player in the region and beyond.

Therefore, in the long run, Turkey would naturally want to avoid a direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, there is no such direct competition between Turkey and the UAE. In fact, the UAE is the pawn of major powers that are opposed to Turkey’s growing profile in many important regions of the world.

There is no match between the national power of Turkey and that of the UAE. That’s perhaps one of the reasons why we see direct criticism of the UAE by Turkish authorities.

Conversely, one could argue with great confidence that Saudi Arabia’s capacity to withstand Mohamed bin Salman’s perturbations and the kingdom’s chances to remain a major regional player are high, unlike the Emirati “sand castle” that is open to vulnerabilities of all sorts and is even open to collapse as a result of Mohammed bin Zayed’s erratic foreign policy decisions.

In the last few years, due to its reckless foreign policy, Saudi Arabia has squandered a lot of good will and this seems to have been realized in Riyadh, which used to be a considerable soft power and, for good reason, held the status of an arbiter among its fellow Muslim countries.

The Saudi reconciliation with Qatar after the three-year embargo which was later followed by the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt may pave the way for a possibility of Saudi-Turkish rapprochement.

Turkey does not pose any kind of threat to Saudi Arabia and its internal political consensus. What Turkey expects from Saudis, though, is to disassociate itself from UAE policies in the region, which Turkey feels are designed in Western capitals for the purpose of destabilizing the region.

Turkey has made sure to avoid direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia, while the Saudis are cognizant of the fact that they stand to lose a lot in any direct conflict with Turkey. All these factors make the rapprochement between Turkey and Saudi Arabia more likely. The Saudi reconciliation with Qatar after the three-year embargo which was later followed by the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt may pave the way for a possibility of Saudi-Turkish rapprochement.

The demands included closing Al-Jazeera TV, shutting the Turkish military base, and downgrading ties with Iran. Qatar rejected all demands. Besides Qatar, two other GCC member countries, Kuwait and Oman, have long been developing their ties with Turkey. In this regard, Turkey’s increased profile in the GCC and in the Middle East may prompt Saudis toward a reconciliation.

A substantial number of Saudi Arabia’s power brokers have always viewed the embargo on Qatar as a bad policy and have known that a direct confrontation with Ankara would be harmful for Riyadh. Saudis also know that the ghost of journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s brutal murder in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul will not disappear easily.

The Saudis and Emiratis mostly rely on the United States for their security, and regionally they rely on Egypt and Pakistan.

Though there have always been uncertainties in Saudi policies and abrupt changes can be expected, Saudis usually do not go beyond a certain point when it comes to confronting or criticizing the major Muslim countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, and Egypt.

The Saudis and Emiratis mostly rely on the United States for their security, and regionally they rely on Egypt and Pakistan. Since Pakistan signed the bilateral security agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1982, it has been assisting the Saudis in areas like military training and defense production.

It is extraordinary that the Pakistan government allowed General Raheel Sharif, who retired as army chief in November 2016, to move to Saudi Arabia as a top military advisor. It’s not talked about in a pretentious way, but there is a Pakistani commitment to intervene in a decisive manner if Islam’s holiest cities come under threat and Saudi Arabia seeks help.

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he first priority of Saudi Arabia and the UAE has always been the preservation of their regimes. They are now anxious as their chief security guarantor, the United States, is going through a tumultuous period in its domestic politics. The Biden administration appointees are not giving clear indications as to what sort of foreign policy goals they will pursue in the Middle East.

The multibillion-dollar investment in Egypt is also not sustainable since el-Sisi himself is engulfed in many crises and won’t be able to rescue the Saudis and Emiratis even if he wants to do so. On the other hand, Pakistan, which has long played a role in guaranteeing Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity and the regime’s security, holds significance for Saudi Arabia beyond a desire to cultivate religious ties and assert its soft power.

As the world’s fifth most-populous country and a nuclear power, Pakistan’s market and security dimensions have been attractive to the Saudis. However, Pakistan is wary of joining Saudi regional power games and its feckless rivalries with other countries in the region as was evident in its unwillingness to support the kingdom in the imprudent Yemen war. Therefore, the monarchies of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain feel very anxious in the fast-changing regional and global scenarios.

A Beleaguered UAE?

Saudis in particular would not want to annoy Turkey. Even after putting maximum pressure, the Saudis and Emiratis could not discourage their close ally Pakistan from deepening political and military ties with Turkey. It seems that Saudi Arabia has now realized that it can’t do much to stop the new realignments in its neighborhood, and any new realignment -with or without Iran- in the region will definitely not toe the line of abrasive Saudi policies.