Identity Archives - Politics Today https://politicstoday.org/tag/identity/ Sat, 11 Nov 2023 06:20:50 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.4.8 The EU’s Two-Dimensional Thinking about Integration is Myopic: Interview with Hans Kundnani https://politicstoday.org/eu-integration-interview-hans-kundnani/ Sat, 11 Nov 2023 06:20:50 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/eu-integration-interview-hans-kundnani/

Eurowhiteness may come off as unpalatable to many pro-Europeans, but it raises valuable questions about the place of culture and race in the European project.

The post The EU’s Two-Dimensional Thinking about Integration is Myopic: Interview with Hans Kundnani appeared first on Politics Today.

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n Eurowhiteness, Hans Kundnani, Associate Fellow in the Europe Programme at Chatham House, challenges a sanitized and linear history of the EU, prompting the reader to rethink Europe’s peaceful image against its imperial past. He goes on to tackle myopic assumptions about the European project throughout the book.

Kundnani argues that pro-Europeans, who cradled cosmopolitanism and renounced nationalism, have failed to perceive the reality of European regionalism. This provocative critique dissects both the civic and ethnic elements that shape European identity by highlighting Europe’s interaction with the “Other” and linking “Europeanness” and “whiteness.” 

Eurowhiteness may come off as unpalatable to many pro-Europeans, but it raises valuable questions against a backdrop of a rising far-right in Europe. Especially in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis, the complex relationship between European identity and race demands urgent reflection.

Q. What are some of the myths that cause blind spots in understanding the European identity?

I would mention two in particular. The first is the idea that the EU is a cosmopolitan project. Cosmopolitanism usually has something to do with the whole world, and Europe is not the whole world. There’s a tendency by pro-Europeans and the EU to mistake Europe for the world. For example, when they talk about European integration, they sometimes seem to think that they’re talking about global integration, but they’re not.

Similarly, when they say “I’m a European or I’m a European citizen,” they seem to think they’re saying I’m a citizen of the world, but they’re not; They’re saying I’m a citizen of this particular region that has a very particular history and relationship with the rest of the world.

This is what I call in Eurowhiteness “the of myth of cosmopolitanism in Europe”, and related to that is the idea to think European integration is good for the whole of the world, but that may not necessarily be the case; It may be good for Europeans or may not be good for Europeans, arguably. But even if it is good for Europeans, it’s not clear if it’s good for the whole world.

The second myth would be that the EU is a peace project, and that is not entirely wrong. However, the way that pro-Europeans talk about it is sometimes simplistic; that after 1945 Europeans rejected war, and since then Europeans stand for peace. In reality, Europeans did not reject war in general in 1945. They only rejected war with each other.

In 1950 as the Schuman Declaration, which can be seen as the beginning of the idea of the EU as a peace project, is made by France’s then-foreign minister Robert Schumann, France is simultaneously fighting a brutal colonial war in Indochina.

Similarly, seven years later, when the Treaty of Rome is signed, France fought a brutal colonial war in Algeria. This demonstrates that Europeans are continuing to fight colonial wars until they’re defeated or exhausted.

Europeans like to think of themselves as being uniquely peaceful. The real story is more complicated, and in particular, as I say, to the extent that Europeans have rejected military force, it is military force within what has become the European Union, not even within Europe at large, that is being rejected.

Read: Superstates: Empires of the Twenty-First Century

Q. Has the EU’s focus shifted from peace to power?

I wouldn’t say it has shifted from being about peace to being about power. I think it was always about power as well as peace. In particular, it gets to what I was just saying about the idea of the EU as a peace project.

If you go back to the interwar period pan-European movement, which is the inspiration for the post-War European integration project, it is very clear that at that time already that the European integration project is about power and the perception of European decline accelerated by fighting one other.

The idea is: If we want to maintain our position in the world – and at that time this is a position of colonial domination- we have to stop fighting with each other. Not so that we can end European colonialism, but so that we can continue it. So in other words, European integration would take the competitive element out of European colonialism, allowing its practice collectively.

Part of the point of European integration in 1950s was for France and Belgium to consolidate their colonies in Central and West Africa at a time when they were no longer able to on their own. In particular, they needed an injection of West German capital.

The idea of geopolitical Europe goes back to the 1920s. It only seems new because pro-Europeans like to tell a story of Europe through the aforementioned myths. It only seems like a shift because we’ve forgotten the real history of how European integration began.

Q. Does the EU still export the European social model and the general welfare state?

Social market economy and the welfare state are no longer what the EU can to claim export anymore. It may have done once, but even in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War we observe that this is not the case. In fact, the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe had much more generous welfare states when they were communist countries.

What happened as they joined the EU during the enlargement process is that those welfare states were dismantled as part of their transition to democracy. There are obviously lots of things that you can criticize about the communist systems in those countries, such as the lack of political freedom and so on, but they did have welfare states.

What has happened now is a further stage in which the EU is putting pressure on member states to dismantle the welfare state. For example, during the euro crisis, the austerity Germany imposed on Greece dismantled what was left of the Greek welfare state.

Read: The Resettlement of Refugees: A Test for European Values

Q. Your book suggests that civic ideas of Europe are being replaced by ethnic-cultural ones. What is the connection of the neoliberalization of Europe to identity politics?

What I try to show in the book is that there have always been both of the elements of civic and ethnic-cultural idea in the history of what I call European regionalism- which is similar to nationalism on a larger continental scale. I’m suggesting that we can think of the history of ideas of Europe in the way we think about the history of nations. Therefore, regionalism is like nationalism.

The earliest ideas of Europe are predominantly ethnic-cultural. For example, in the medieval period, Europeanness is synonymous with Christianity. From the modern period onwards, you begin to get civic ideas of Europe. Then, in the post war period is when the EU came closest to evolving into a purely civic regionalism. Particularly, in the period from the 60s to the 90s-2000s, there was an idea of Europe centered on the social market economy, the welfare state and depoliticized mode of governance which European integration had produced.

I think what’s happened is that the social market economy and the welfare state have been hollowed out by neoliberalism in the EU. Meanwhile, there has been a backlash against the depoliticised mode of governance where the older civic idea of Europe is no longer persuasive in the same way it was before.

The way I understand neoliberalism is not just financialization, but it’s also the depoliticization of economic policy. In other words, it’s taking economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation. Although, to some extent, this has happened in the whole world in the last 30-40 years through things like the World Trade Organisation rules, the EU has taken it further through the creation of the single market, and also the Eurozone and the fiscal rules. Therefore, it’s very difficult now to pursue a left wing economic policy in the Eurozone because the fiscal rules don’t allow you to do it.

My argument is basically that when you take economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation and no longer have big fights between left and right about economic policy, your democratic politics shifts to cultural questions.

The point of democratic politics is to reconcile different interests and to have fights about questions where people in your society have different ideas or different interests. I think a healthy democratic politics is one where you do that about economic issues because there are real differences between the interests and different ideas as well.

What has happened now is that the center left parties and the center right parties converged in the center around neoliberal economic policy, which the EU has constitutionalized. Therefore, the way parties can differentiate themselves from each other now is around cultural questions.

In terms of what Europe says to the rest of the world, there was a time it would say it stood for the social market economy and the welfare state and now it says it stands for European civilisation.

A good example of this is the phrase “the European way of life,” which used to be used by French socialists, specifically, to refer to the social market economy and the welfare state and the idea of solidarity that it was meant to embody, saying “that’s what we in Europe stand for as opposed to the United States.”

Now when you look at the way that the phrase is used, it is in more civilizational terms. In the current European Commission, the Commission of Ursula Von Der Leyen since 2019, a European Commissioner for promoting the European way of life and his job is to keep migrants out, which makes it very explicit that migrants- only migrants from the South, not migrants from the east- are a threat to the European way of life. That is a very explicit expression of civilizationalism where the European way of life is defined in terms of culture and civilisation, not in terms of the social market economy and the welfare state.

Read: The Fear of Decline: Cultural Pessimism in Europe

Q. In your book you imply that the center right is increasingly mimicking the far right. Is there a pro-European version of the great replacement theory, if so, what is it?

There is an idea that the EU represents a European civilisation which is being increasingly threatened. This is basically a far right idea that has now been taken on by the center right in Europe.

For example, a couple of weeks ago, Eric Zemmour was doing a rally in the South of France with the young far right leader Marion Maréchal, and the slogan on the lectern at which he was speaking was ‘Defend our civilization.’  The way the far right is thinking about Europe is there’s a European civilisation that is threatened right now. The far right tends to talk about this in the context of migration. That is, it’s the migration of non-white and non-Christian people that is threatening European civilisation.

For example, Valérie Pécresse, the Republican candidate in the French Presidential election in 2022, was talking about white replacement theory or alluding to it in terms of migration. However, in addition, what the centre right tends to do is not talk so much about migration as a racial threat, but more in foreign policy terms as a threat to European civilisation. Macron has given speeches where he’s quite explicit about this.

In other words, international politics is a clash of civilizations, like how Samuel Huntington argues, and Europe is a distinct civilization. Moreover, for someone like Macron, the West is not one civilization, which is what Huntington thought but that Europe is a distinct civilisation, separate from the United States as well.

Where I see a connection with great replacement theory is that this is almost the international political equivalent of the great replacement theory. It’s not about migration but it’s that if Europe does not unite and defend itself, it will be also replaced by other civilizations. Macron has basically said that.

Q. What are some key takeaways from history regarding Europe’s interaction with those who it sees as the “Other”?

I try to show in Eurowhiteness that there’s a long history of defining Europe against various different “Others” at various different times and it’s constantly shifting. But roughly, I would say, in the medieval period when Europe is pretty much synonymous with Christianity, Jews are defined as the primary internal other and Muslims as the primary external other, excluding the divide between Western Christendom and Eastern Christendom.

Then, in the modern period, I try to show how there is a new complex modern idea of Europe, which is partly to do with the European enlightenment and the scientific revolution. It is a rationalist, secular idea of Europe rather than a religious one. At the same time, the idea of Europe also emerges in the context of the encounter of Europeans with the populations of Africa and Asia, and especially the Americas, and that’s the context in which the idea of whiteness emerges.

So, the modern idea of Europe is not just a rationalist one as opposed to a religious one, it’s also a more racialized idea of Europe that is closely connected to the idea of whiteness. What I think happens in that context is that non-white people around the world are the “Others” against which Europeans define themselves.

In the 20th century and particularly after World War I, you have the new idea of Europe as a geopolitical bloc, which I mentioned earlier. European civilisation or the European spirit, as they talked about it at that time, is being threatened by the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other hand. In that context, Russia and also the United States are respectively an “Other.” What I think we’re seeing today is a mixture of all of those “Others.”

Read: The Future of Far-Right Parties in Europe

Q. In the context of the current European enlargement talks, how does Eurowhiteness influence the accession process for Eastern European countries and Turkey?

Enlargement is back and it has very quickly become the central priority for the EU, including the question of how to reform the EU in order to get it ready for enlargement. But it is quite extraordinary that there’s all these discussions regarding enlargement and the topics surrounding it such as reform and the countries awaiting membership, namely Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and even the Western Balkans, and Turkey has never been mentioned at all.

I was watching a discussion online that the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), a foreign policy think tank, was having- a 90-minute long discussion about exactly these questions and Turkey was never mentioned. Nobody thought to even bring it up. This is an answer to your question of how eurowhiteness plays into the EU enlargement.

It’s apparent that this time is very different from the “big bang” enlargement in the 2000s. Enlargement is now thought about in a much more civilizational way. Ukraine is in and Turkey is out.

When it comes to the Western Balkans the situation is complex, given not just their histories but also the different populations that they have.

The way I’ve described it in the book is that there’s a contrast between Europe’s borders to the east and Europe’s borders to the South. Europe enlarges to the East, but not to the South. And I think for Turkey and the Western Balkan countries, located in South East of Europe, they’re geographically somewhat in the middle, and so, it gets quite complicated.

I think we can see quite clearly how that plays out with Turkey in the way that I just described, which has largely to do with the fact that even if it’s a secular country, it’s seen as a Muslim country. The countries of the Western Balkans are even more complicated in that respect, because additionally there is the Russia factor, which is also to some extent an “Other.” In short, for the Western Balkans, I think, it’s gonna be a long, complicated process.

Read: Brexit and Re-discussing European Democracy

Q. How could the EU stop thinking in terms of less integration or more integration, which is a criticism you make in your book?

That question goes way beyond my book and is something I thought for a long time about, which is that so many of these discussions about European integration, especially as they take place in Brussels and among pro Europeans, are entirely through the prism of “do we have more integration or less integration.”

It’s a very linear way of thinking and the assumption is: more integration is good, disintegration is bad. Therefore, Brexit is bad, obviously. Whereas, I’ve always thought, long before I came to write this book, “well, maybe some integration is bad and some disintegration is good?”

In terms of what I mentioned earlier on the depoliticization of economic policy, if you constitutionalize right wing economic preferences, then from a left perspective that’s bad European integration.

I think fundamentally what the problem with the EU is around democracy, and in particular, the way in which it depoliticizes economic policy. So, I think the crucial question for the EU is not, “Do you have more Europe or less Europe? Do you integrate or do you disintegrate?” It’s how you deepen democracy in Europe, period. Therefore, the key question about policy should be: “Is it making Europe more democratic or not?”

Q. As a person who formerly identified as a pro-European, would you like to share your story of how your perception of the EU changed?

I think part of my perceptions of and interest in some of these questions has to do with my own background. I was born and grew up in Britain, which has a famously semi-detached relationship with Europe. On top of that, I have two parents who are immigrants to Britain. My father was Indian and my mother was Dutch. So in other words, I have one parent from a EU member state, which in some ways I think made me feel more European than a lot of Brits who just have two British parents, and one from a country outside of Europe. I felt a certain sense of being European, but not quite.

It started with looking at Europe from a slightly peripheral perspective, and then emerged when I was working at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), a pro-European foreign policy think tank, from about 2009 to 2015. When I first started working there, I was kind of a pro-European and I thought I understood the EU. In retrospect, I didn’t.

It was while I worked there that I learned more about the EU and I began to conclude that a lot of what I thought I knew about it, especially about its history, was actually myth created by the EU about itself. For example, the story I told you earlier about the colonial history has been completely written out of the story that pro-Europeans tell about themselves. My former colleagues at ECFR have no clue about any of this history until I tell them- and these are people who are experts on the EU.

I wrote an essay in the New Statesman, a British magazine, two years ago which Eurowhiteness expands upon. What inspired me write the book was the reactions to this essay. My former boss at the ECFR, Mark Leonard, wrote a response to the essay claiming that the EU is a post-colonial project.  At ECFR, they didn’t know this is the real history; which shows, as I say, how successful the EU is in mythologizing itself.

The more conversations I have about the book and I realize that a lot of what I write in the book is much clearer to people outside of Europe than it is to people within Europe. For example, if I say that Europeanness has something to do with whiteness, I think, to most people outside of Europe it is kind of obvious, but it’s horrifying to a lot of people within Europe. They’re outraged when you even try to connect the two things.

Hence, the title of the book angers a lot of people. A part of the reason I insisted on that title was exactly to say that there is a connection between Europeanness and whiteness, and I want us to talk about it. Most people don’t want to do that, at least within the pro-European bubble in Europe.

Q. Do you think that the EU is still on a civilizing mission?

A Polish academic, Jan Zielonka, who was at Oxford for many years, has an analysis of the civilizing mission of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe as part of the enlargement process, which he calls a ‘post-modern civilizing mission’, and I think he’s absolutely right.

But I remember, for example, having that discussion with my former boss at the ECFR when I was working on Eurowhiteness a couple of years ago, and he said that when pro-Europeans refer to a civilizing mission, it’s ironically. Well, it’s not. It’s an actual civilizing mission.

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]]> The World’s Largest Democracy Goes Wrong: Three Books on Hindu Nationalism in India https://politicstoday.org/books-on-hindu-nationalism-india/ Wed, 08 Nov 2023 05:19:25 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/books-on-hindu-nationalism-india/

In this month’s BookBundle, we examine how Modi’s India oppresses and suppresses its minority citizens and silences critical voices through state-sanctioned violence.

The post The World’s Largest Democracy Goes Wrong: Three Books on Hindu Nationalism in India appeared first on Politics Today.

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Narendra Modi is roaring to the world that India is a worthy contender on the global scene. India has come to the fore with its massive economy, recent successes at the space front, potential megaproject linking India, the Middle East and Europe via rail and sea, and playing the role of a distanced ally towards to the competing world powers: the U.S. and China.

All eyes were on the G20 summit taking place in New Delhi this year, and Modi surely wanted to make a good impression. Schools and offices were shut, roads were blocked, and street vendors were removed. Even whole slums near the venue were covered in tarpaulin! Ironically, Modi’s speeches repeatedly described India as the world’s largest democracy and the ‘voice of the Global South’.

However, behind this sterilized facade lies discrimination, oppression, and erasure— on brand with the Hindu nationalism fueled by Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Numerous attacks on minority communities sweep through the country, including demolitions of Muslim houses, mosque and church attacks, grave desecrations and violent killings. Meanwhile, the government takes every step to define India as a Hindu nation.

In this month’s book bundle, we examine how Modi’s India both oppresses and suppresses its minority citizens. Through books that explain the political dynamics in India, the impact of state-sanctioned violence, and the silencing of critical voices, we observe how the world’s largest democracy goes wrong.

Read: The Hindutva War on Christians in India

In the book Modi’s India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy, Christophe Jaffrelot delves into the intricate dynamics of Indian politics over the last two decades, with a particular focus on the rise of Hindu nationalism coupled with national-populism, largely attributed to Narendra Modi’s leadership. This confluence of factors has not only secured Modi’s electoral success, starting in Gujarat and extending to the entire country but has also transformed the very nature of democracy in India.

Jaffrelot’s work spotlights Modi’s ability to captivate a significant portion of the Indian populace by offering promises of development while simultaneously exploiting ethno-religious fault lines within the electorate. This national-populism is marked by Modi’s personalized political style, characterized by direct communication with voters through various channels, effectively saturating the public discourse.

To shed light on the consequences of this political shift, Jaffrelot conducts original interviews across India, revealing a troubling evolution toward what he terms an “ethnic democracy.” In this model, the majority community is equated with the nation, while religious minorities, specifically Muslims and Christians, find themselves relegated to the status of second-class citizens, vulnerable to harassment by ‘vigilante’ groups.

Furthermore, Jaffrelot elucidates how the political landscape in India has developed authoritarian tendencies for various reasons. In its quest for power not only at the national level but also in the states, the government has centralized authority at the expense of federalism, eroding the very institutions that once served as checks and balances, including India’s Supreme Court.

In sum, Modi’s India showcases a government, supported by popular mandate, stifles dissent and grows increasingly intolerant of ethnic and religious minorities. The book provides essential insights into politics, nationalism, and populism in contemporary India.

Christophe Jaffrelot, Modi’s India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2021) ISBN: 9780691206806, 656 pages

Read: Hindutva Ideology: India’s Gradual Move Towards Genocide

In Composing Violence: The Limits of Exposure and the Making of Minorities, Moyukh Chatterjee examines the haunting memory of the 2002 anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat, India, where armed Hindu mobs unleashed brutal attacks on Muslims in broad daylight, resulting in a staggering death toll that shocked the nation. Chatterjee’s investigation goes beyond the horrific events themselves, aiming to dissect how such highly visible political violence against minority communities serves as a catalyst for profound transformations in the domains of law, public culture, and power dynamics.

Contrary to the expectation that exposing state-sanctioned anti-Muslim violence would lead to its suppression, Chatterjee argues that these incidents actually set the stage for a fundamental shift in India, pushing it toward a Hindu supremacist state. He contends that examining the responses of both the state and civil society to this violence offers crucial insights into the inherent features of modern democracy, where riots and pogroms become tools for molding a society defined by a vulnerable minority and a dominant majority.

Chatterjee’s exploration focuses on multiple facets, including courtroom procedures, police archives, legal activism, and mainstream media coverage. Through this multifaceted approach, he constructs a theory of violence as a form of governance, effectively engineering minority populations.

Composing Violence invites readers to grapple with the profound and unsettling implications of anti-Muslim violence in India. Chatterjee’s meticulous analysis paints a picture of how violence can shape the course of democracy, raising profound questions about the fragility of minority rights and the complex interplay between power and prejudice in contemporary societies.

Moyukh Chatterjee, Composing Violence: The Limits of Exposure and the Making of Minorities (Duke University Press, 2023) ISBN: 978-1-4780-1966-4, 184 pages

Read: “Godi Media” in Modi’s India: A War on Journalists?

What happens to those who dare question the injustices of the Modi regime? The book How Long Can the Moon Be Caged? provides a piercing examination of the authoritarian regime under Narendra Modi in India, where the suppression of critical voices and the silencing of dissent have become central objectives for the ruling BJP party. Their ethno-nationalist aspiration of establishing an exclusively ‘Hindu’ India, involves targeting anyone who dares to voice questions or opposition.

Authors Suchitra Vijayan and Francesca Recchia present a unique perspective highlight the experiences of political prisoners. Their approach combines astute political and legal analysis with firsthand accounts, offering readers an in-depth exploration of the subtle acts of resistance that occur both within and beyond prison walls, involving not only the prisoners themselves but also their families. The narrative unravels a tale of institutional decay and the erosion of fundamental rights.

The book spotlights the stories of those who have been falsely accused of inciting the Bhima Koregaon violence, student leaders who have protested against the discriminatory citizenship law of 2020, and activists associated with the Pinjra Tod movement. By weaving together these voices, How Long Can the Moon Be Caged? celebrates the remarkable bravery, unwavering humanity, and moral integrity of individuals who have been incarcerated for their unwavering solidarity with marginalized and oppressed communities.

In a world where the struggle for dissent and the preservation of civil liberties are ever more vital, this book serves as a powerful testament to the resilience of those who refuse to be silenced, while painting a vivid picture of the ongoing battle for justice and equality in India.

Suchitra Vijayan and Francesca Recchia, How Long Can the Moon Be Caged?: Voices of Indian Political Prisoners (Pluto books, 2023) ISBN 9780745347981, 216 pages

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]]> Does the Politics of Native-National Signify the AK Party’s Decline? https://politicstoday.org/does-the-politics-of-native-national-signify-the-ak-partys-decline/ Fri, 06 Apr 2018 01:46:44 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/does-the-politics-of-native-national-signify-the-ak-partys-decline/

The AK Party’s political paradigm is shaped by an amalgam of liberal, conservative and nationalist values. The relative importance and impact of these discrete values fluctuates as to changes in political conjecture.

The post Does the Politics of Native-National Signify the AK Party’s Decline? appeared first on Politics Today.

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Last week AK Party’s Istanbul Mayor uttered that “the municipality will give priority in providing certain services to the districts who vote for the AK Party.” Some analysts comment that this rather unfortunate statement has revealed the culmination of the AK Party’s retreat to its communal frontiers. Thus, it is taken as an acknowledgement that the governing party is no longer able to represent the political whole, or the state, but that it is one of the groups within society.

Indeed, this argument of the AK Party’s decline has been in circulation for a while and is linked to the party’s shift to the politics of native-national. This political shift is argued to have taken place once the AK Party’s move for stretching and deepening its clout in society was stopped by the Gezi Park Protests in 2013 and subsequently pushed back to its communal frontiers. The general elections on June 7, 2015, where the AK Party failed to obtain a majority of the votes and to form a single party government for the first time, and the success of the “no” campaign in the April 16, 2017 referendum on constitutional change over the government system are usually cited to mark the critical moments of the AK Party’s decline. Ironically the political opposition in Turkey also celebrates the political discourse of native-national as they believe it amounts to the weakening of the AK Party’s quest to build a new Turkey.

However, almost in complete contradiction with this decline argument, some other analysts stress and take a critical posture towards the politics of native-national, which is viewed as signaling the AK Party’s further integration with the state. The upshot of the decline argument, as noted above, is that the AK Party can no longer stand for the political whole, or the state. This second argument, on the other hand, points to the opposite direction, which highlights the AK Party’s excessive integration with the state. For this reason, the AK Party government and its politics of native-national is condemned as being undemocratic and polarizing.

Hence, there are two yet contradictory interpretations of the politics of native-national in circulation. The politics of native-national is claimed to epitomize either identification or disengagement with the state. There are two questions here: First, does politics of native-national symbolize the AK Party’s decline? And second, is politics of native-national undemocratic?

On the basis of its relations with power the AK Party has two moments, which is consonant with modern democratic politics. To state briefly, modern democratic politics harbors two contradictory tendencies: One involves emptying the place of power whereas the other encapsulates providing a particular content to that empty place of power. That’s why in the modern era we tend to separate the state (the place of power) and the government (the particular content).

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During its first phase (2002-2008), the AK Party struggled to democratize the political system. This involved ending the situation that the Kemalist forces “own” the state. In line with modern democratic politics, its policies were directed towards freeing the political from the state. Thus, as the institutional structure of bureaucratic tutelage was dislocated, there emerged a distance between the state and politics, accordingly the sphere of democratic politics continually expanded and democratic political structures began to consolidate. In short, the government has become more powerful vis-à-vis the bureaucracy.

During its second phase (2008-present), on the other hand, testified the AK Party’s various attempts to fill the place of power with a particular content. The AK Party has taken decisive steps towards increasing its grip on power by providing the most inclusive political content, yet it has remained faithful to the basic democratic norms that in principle the place of power should remain empty. For this goal, in the period of 2008-2015 the AK Party came up with the politics of civilization in order to bring society together. Once this identity failed, especially owing to the lack of concreteness, the politics of native-national was proposed.

The switch to the politics of native-national does not denote political decline, or withdrawal from power. The politics of civilization was hegemonic, so is the politics of native-national. The AK Party has not switched to a counter-hegemonic position as it has started to implement the politics of native-national. Both lines of politics endeavor to produce the largest coalition possible at societal and state levels in order to render the party as the ruling force. The basic difference between these two lines of politics, therefore, is not of their political function – since both were hegemonic – but their contents and their levels of inclusiveness. Whereas the politics of civilization was formed around the AK Party’s conservative identity, the politics of native-national underscores its nativist and nationalist identity. Indeed, the AK Party’s political paradigm is shaped by an amalgam of liberal, conservative and nationalist values. The relative importance and impact of these discrete values fluctuates as to changes in political conjecture.

All in all, while the AK Party has not yet been able to put forward an all-compassing identity, the politics of civilization and the politics of native-national have provided the most inclusive and diverse representations of the political community at different times. This situation has kept the AK Party as the hegemonic force in Turkish politics thus far and seems to prolong it in the foreseeable future.

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]]> The Plural States of Cinema in Turkey https://politicstoday.org/the-plural-states-of-cinema-in-turkey/ Sat, 16 Sep 2017 02:10:59 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-plural-states-of-cinema-in-turkey/

Yeşilçam cinema was a particular mode of filmmaking which had developed its own unique, homegrown film language, utterly different from the Western conventions of filmmaking. Instead of relying upon classic Hollywood cinema’s strict practices of continuity editing and the creation of cinematic illusionism, Yeşilçam offered a modest yet ingenuous vocabulary of storytelling.

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“Whither Yeşilçam?” was a question asked frequently in the 1980s and 1990s – until it was realized that Yeşilçam, the popular film industry of Turkey, was indeed gone for good. Yeşilçam cinema was a particular mode of filmmaking which had developed its own unique, homegrown film language, utterly different from the Western conventions of filmmaking. Instead of relying upon classic Hollywood cinema’s strict practices of continuity editing and the creation of cinematic illusionism, Yeşilçam offered a modest yet ingenuous vocabulary of storytelling. Although some of these conventions were simply not adopted for practical and economic reasons (resulting in a lack of dubbing, poor special effects, and continuity mistakes), the quirks of Yeşilçam cinema also emerged as a continuation of the longstanding practices of the literary and performative arts in Turkey.

While Yeşilçam was gone for good, popular cinema in Turkey reemerged in a different form in the second half of the 1990s. This comeback triggered new questions at the turn of the millennium. Was this a “new” cinema? What made it new? Is it a movement similar to various movements which are called “new:” Italian Neorealism, French, British and Czech New Waves, Cinema Novo, Nuevo Cine Mexicano, New German Cinema, and New Hollywood? Is it less a movement than just a way of understanding the ongoing transformation of cinema after the demise of Yeşilçam?

There have been two intertwining arguments about the newness of cinema in Turkey: one revolved around the longstanding separation between art house and popular cinema (less evident in the Yeşilçam era) and the other, to which I will return at the end of this article, around a larger socio-political backdrop in relation to the transformations in the definitions of identity. At the time, the post-Yeşilçam era (i.e., since the 1990s) seemed to clearly separate popular filmmaking practices including production, distribution, and exhibition network and those of the art house and/or festival cinema. For some, popular filmmakers are seen in part as a continuation of Yeşilçam, while the “new cinema” encompasses art house and festival films. Obviously, this rendering of new cinema was a result of changing filmmaking practices (the introduction of international funds like Euroimages, new co-production dynamics, filmmakers having multiple passports and identities, and the minority filmmakers). However, while this initial separation was also about a struggle to “name” the changes and the transformations in the sociocultural practices, it later left its place to further bifurcations.

In my book , Cinema in Turkey: A New Critical History, which was published in 2011, I termed this era post-Yeşilçam or the New Cinema of Turkey. However, when I look back to this now, it might have been more accurate to identify the decade from the early-1990s to the mid-2000s as properly post-Yeşilçam (Burçak Evren initially noted this term) and what happened since then as a more pluralistic and competitive phase. To put these in perspective, the initial turn at the box-office took place between 1996 and 2002 with almost ten films selling over a million tickets. This initial wave of box-office success took another turn in 2003 with five films selling over a million tickets and the top two billed around 4 and 3 million tickets respectively. This continuous rise at the box-office culminated into high marks and since 2013, around ten domestic films are selling over a million tickets every year.

As Deniz Yavuz noted in his report on the “Last Five Years of Turkish Cinema in the Digital Age,” while on average 173 domestic and international films were released in Turkey between 1990 and 2003, since 2004 this average increased to 278 films. Additionally, the average number of domestic films shown at film theaters since 2007 is around 82, while this figure between 1997 and 2006 was only around 17. When one also looks at the annual total domestic and international ticket sales figures, since 2007 this figure was always above 30 million and it also exceeded the 50 million mark since 2013. Interestingly enough, when one looks at the tenth film at the box-office in those years, we have a sharper rendering of this change. Until 2003, the tenth highest grossing film consistently sold fewer than 80 thousand tickets. The tenth film sold over 250 thousand tickets in 2003 and since 2005, this figure was always more than at least 300 thousand tickets. This has also meant that since 2004, no art house and festival films found a place among the top ten grossing domestic films.

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While this picture seems quite bright, total ticket sales in Turkey is low in comparison to some major film countries such as the United States, France, Japan or India. Moreover, the majority of domestic productions still do very poorly at the box-office. Despite this, the continuation in the high number of domestic productions is enabled by the low cost of digital filmmaking technologies, market proliferation (the films are also making money through different channels such as sales of film rights to television, cable networks, IPTV, and even transportation companies), the influx of numerous young, first-time filmmakers, and finally non-profit oriented funding schemes (oftentimes, various filmmakers cover the total or the majority of the cost of their production through the Ministry of Tourism and Culture or other international funds).

Together, such changes in the production and exhibition of films show us that since the mid-2000s, the industry in Turkey not only rejuvenated itself but has also diversified in terms of production practices and filmic narratives. Unlike in the early post-Yeşilçam era where there was a straightforward separation between major popular filmmaking and art house cinema, now we have a more complicated picture: high budget popular films produced by major production houses, mid-range popular and independent films produced by different production companies, first-time filmmakers often relying on governmental and private funds and finally, established art house directors doing co-productions by utilizing domestic and international funds, as well as festival exhibition and award incomes.

Thus, the major productions are better organized and monitored in economic terms by practices unprecedentedly similar to those in Western countries: major local production companies use higher budgets (although still much lower than those in Western countries), employ star actors and better film crew and equipment, and market the films aggressively. The majority of Turkish film distribution and exhibition in Turkey is currently controlled by international companies (e.g., Warner Bros., UIP, Mars) which also help monitoring the market more closely with better data. A similar claim might also be made for established art house productions which are realized through better co-production mechanisms. However, the mid- to low-budget popular, independent, and first-time filmmaker films are the current wild world of production. These risky and poorly planned productions experience huge difficulty in terms of distribution and exhibition.

When one looks at the films themselves, in the last decade, usually half of the top ten grossing films are comedies. A few are dramas, often revolving around a love story. A few feature action-adventures (historical and crime). Horror films and documentaries are rare. On the other hand, established art house directors belong to what one might call as either “World Cinema” or as the Turkish New Wave, similar to recent new waves from various non-Western European countries such as Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Romania, and Iran. As for the mid- to low-budget popular and independent films, the picture is less bright and only a handful of them are successful either at the box-office or the international festivals.

One question that one might ask here is the following: while the contemporary Turkish TV series are doing very well internationally and while art house films perform reasonably well at international film festivals, why is this not the case for the top ten grossing films? A basic and straightforward answer to this question has to do with belonging and identity: both the TV series and art house films belong to readily accepted, clear-cut categories, the former to televisual melodrama (telenovelas, soap operas) and the latter to non-Western new wave cinemas. However, the top ten domestic films of the last decade are still very local in terms of their identity politics and cultural references. If they try to be global in terms of their storytelling and appeal, they are not strong enough to stand the competition coming from Hollywood, French and British comedies or dramas which have better production quality and a higher global appeal. It can be suggested that this also has a lot to do with the contemporary identity politics of Turkey, which is still laden with and driven by various domestic and regional problems. In this regard, what seems to be more necessary than ever is to address global issues and themes in popular cinematic narratives.

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]]> How to Make an Ottoman Clock in the Twenty First Century, An Interview With Professor Lutfi Sunar https://politicstoday.org/how-to-make-an-ottoman-clock-in-the-twenty-first-century-an-interview-with-professor-lutfi-sunar/ Fri, 10 Feb 2017 03:22:30 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/how-to-make-an-ottoman-clock-in-the-twenty-first-century-an-interview-with-professor-lutfi-sunar/

When a team at the Scientific Studies Association (İLEM) designed a clock with Ottoman features, it sparked a debate over the object’s place in today’s society as well as history. Lutfi Sunar, a Sociology professor at Istanbul University who lead the team, speaks with Dr. Faruk Yaslıçimen about the clock, and the larger lessons one can learn about how society, the state, and individuals perceive their place in a history that is often self-manufactured.

The post How to Make an Ottoman Clock in the Twenty First Century, An Interview With Professor Lutfi Sunar appeared first on Politics Today.

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When a team at the Scientific Studies Association (İLEM) designed a clock with Ottoman features, it sparked a debate over the object’s place in today’s society as well as history. Lutfi Sunar, a Sociology professor at Istanbul University who lead the team, speaks with Dr. Faruk Yaslıçimen about the clock, and the larger lessons one can learn about how society, the state, and individuals perceive their place in a history that is often self-manufactured.

Firstly, I would like to thank you for allowing me to hold this interview with you. I want to talk to you about the Turkish society’s perception of the past, the society’s relations with it and how the past is reproduced and consumed. If you please, let’s start with a work of your institution and its background. You had prepared a bookmark for the tenth anniversary of the Scientific Studies Association (İLEM) in 2012 and there was a design of an old clock on it. In time, this visual started to be circulated on the Internet as the “Ottoman Clock” and even become a product. What was your initial intent?

Initially, we wanted to design a bookmark looking like a clock, which had several of the most prominent concepts of the Islamic civilization. Selecting these concepts took some time. Eventually, we tried to place the concepts hierarchically on the clock; however, it was not possible, as we were unable to establish a hierarchy between the concepts. Depending on perspective, a hierarchically superior concept could also be perceived as an inferior when compared to others. Therefore, we decided to place representations of the concepts on only the numbers 3, 6, 9, and 12. We placed “Hakk” (God or the Truth) on 12, while placing the concept of “human” on 6, establishing a hierarchy on the vertical axis. Similarly, we placed “irfan” (knowledge or wisdom) on 9 and “ahlak” (morality or principles) on 3, establishing a hierarchy on the horizontal axis. So we accepted these as the vertical and horizontal axes of science and knowledge. We placed certain concepts like “justice” and “comprehension” in between these. This was a gift prepared for the 10th anniversary of İLEM. It was a plain and simple bookmark. Behind the bookmark, we inscribed these details along with the name of the designer. Yet this visual spread on the Internet and gained new meanings besides the one we attributed to it. It was seen as an Ottoman clock.

Had you named this visual?

We hadn’t named it. It was just a gift for the 10th anniversary of İLEM. After its perception as an Ottoman clock, people started to see it as “a monument to the value attributed to science by the ancestors.” Even now, when you Google “Osmanlı Saati” (Ottoman Clock), you find the bookmark we prepared. Eventually, this visual was made into a watch, a clock, t-shirt and such. The people started to see it as their own. Moreover, some renowned figures shared the visual on their social media accounts and sparked discussions, some of which were very interesting.

Could you provide an example?

Of course, for instance, when Hamza Yusuf shared this visual as the Ottoman clock on Facebook and Twitter, a serious debate began on whether the clock was Ottoman or Iranian. A follower of his was saying that this could never been an Ottoman clock, but it could be an Iranian one. We had used the ta’liq script to write the concepts and Ottomans didn’t use this type of script when copying the Holy Quran. Iranians predominantly used it. However, the reality was different; the calligrapher we had an agreement with knew ta’liq and we didn’t have much time for its preparation, we just thought that it was only a bookmark and the details aren’t that important.

But ta’liq was also used extensively by the Ottomans. They had also used this script in their official correspondences.

Yes, it was being used by Ottomans in their official correspondences and literature, along with other fields. Nonetheless, as Iranians used it more commonly than the Ottomans, for instance even in the Holy Quran, Hamza Yusuf’s follower was not that wrong. Looking at it from the perspective of historical methodology, if you had found such a visual in a book, you would first think that it probably belonged to Iranians.

So, what is the current condition of your clock?

It seems like a new product that is popping up every day and it’s continuously being marketed with new marketing strategies. Our bookmark became a part of pop-culture.

Was a real clock made out of your bookmark design?

Of course, there are even various versions of it. Certain firms are making these clocks out of wood or iron. Moreover, the designs of the clocks started to evolve. It created its own neoclassicism; the colors and shapes started to change. It’s become a truly popular item. We are also seeing that it’s evolving further with special orders.

Are you forcing the firms to pull these clocks from the market?

We’re unable to do so. At first, we chose to send cease and desist letters to these firms through the notary. Everything aside, it is a work of art and intellectual property. It’s an original design, which was designed by a designer. Therefore, it’s about protecting our rights. We didn’t want this to spread for this reason. And, it’s spreading a false kind of idea. Then, I realized that history consists only of these false ideas. Some of the firms we sent cease and desist letters pulled their merchandise from the market. A couple of them apologized, but, as when we saw an unstoppable culture of imitation in the country, we stopped pursuing it.

I have to object as a historian. Let’s start from the beginning; a product, which is deemed good, beautiful or faithful to history, is made. It’s not being made in the name of history; it’s produced for today with a script that isn’t being used in our daily lives. Then, this product becomes a part of the social belief and it becomes spread due to its historical references. Rather than fakery, we are talking about what the society believes in. Doesn’t history have this kind of a dynamic aspect? History is something that is believed in. So, it’s more than just the recollection of what happened in the past; it’s like a poem of what we believe has transpired in the past. Isn’t that right?

As you know, Ibn Khaldun expresses that rulers, scholars, illiterate people and the masses alike have an interest in history, while he talks about history as a science. “The people and even the careless want to know history,” he says. History is an intriguing subject, but why? It actually serves as a means to provide a meaning to today, to provide security, while allowing us to find our way to the future through the events that transpire. Ibn Khaldun calls this “the history of commoners.” On the other hand, he talks about another form of history which focuses on the causes of events appealing to the scholars. Isn’t history as popular in Turkey? There are history pages in newspapers, and there are primetime TV programs. Moreover, there are radio shows on history and the politicians constantly make history everyday; there are even some which still fight over an event that has transpired 300 years ago. Therefore, history is never-endingly current. After the said events, I started to think once more on this subject. Why are the people interested in the past? Why do long gone events bother the people this much?

If we’re talking about history in Turkey, the identity problem can also a factor, right?

Yes, I think it is both about security and identity problems. It’s an ontological state and identity is affiliated with it. History is a suitable conduit for one to position himself/herself in the world.

On the other hand, you came up with the idea for this bookmark that looks “historical”.

That’s correct. This reveals our subconscious. For instance, why didn’t we create a modern bookmark, but designed a bookmark with Islamic concepts on it? Nevertheless, I can say that initially it didn’t have any historical meaning for us.

Yet, you didn’t use the current Turkish alphabet, but the Ottoman Turkish alphabet.

A phenomenon we believe to be ahistorical or not necessarily historical may be perceived as historical by the society. Today, anything related with Islam is considered as historical by people. However, I think that they also believe Islam has become outdated, but it could still be made relevant by updating certain aspects of it.

Here, it appears to me that you are shaping how it is going to be understood by the society with your preferences. Firstly, these concepts belong to the Islamic civilization. It’s your preference and it corresponds to your position in semantics. Then, you decide to make it in Ottoman Turkish. These concepts were mostly created and used at that time. By using ta’liq script, which was again used by the Ottomans, you connected the text to a wider context. Thus, all of these are references to the past and I believe it’s only natural that people perceive it as a part of the past. Could this be a result of you having a similar background while creating the bookmark?

The real question here is do the people perceive other things in a similar way. There is the idea that the reality of certain historical figures might be different. For instance, people are watching the TV series Diriliş Ertuğrul today. There is an idea about Ertuğrul; however, his very existence is being debated by historians. Again, the people are watching Game of Thrones, yet they know that it’s fiction, even though it replicates certain historical eras and has characters inspired by historical figures. On the other hand, Diriliş Ertuğrul is a series about a figure that is believed to be historical and the series attributes certain contemporary concepts to this reflected history. On this subject, we can say that in our imaginations many of the past events are associated with today’s situations.

For instance, the [early 18th Century] Tulip Period is perceived as an era of immense entertainment, indulgence and pleasure which caused the Ottoman Empire to regress. Even though the reality is completely different, this image was created during the Republic era to create a cause for the fall of the Ottoman Empire. This image was needed at the time and, thus, it was created.

The shift in the image of the Tanzimat period is more interesting. While it was first seen as an act of treason by the early Republic scholars, later it was praised as the first steps of Ottoman modernization.

Similarly, the images of Abdulhamid II are all baseless, as they are fictitious to an extent that could deprive Abdulhamid II of his historical character. Left-wingers, right-wingers, Kemalists and conservatives all have a fictitious image of the Sultan.

On the other hand, all of these images are evolving as the elements of identities shift; different aspects are brought to the fore and discussed. The adventure of this clock made me think about how we can differentiate fictional narratives from reality.

It’s known that the bourgeois class in France, which lacked an aristocratic background, created their own background stories. This has a fictitious aspect. “The past is static, but the history is dynamic” or “the past is certain, the history isn’t”, they say.

I believe that history has some aspects which are certain. I believe that the causes behind the sequences of events and the knowledge extracted from the abstraction of how the events in the past took place have more certain data. It’s mostly perceived as if events represent the reality, while their interpretation is fictional; however, if a conclusion on history is reached through a meticulous process of distillation, I believe it’s more a part of the reality and definitely more helpful in understanding what has transpired.

Let’s return to the subject of society and history. Do you refer to your own clock as “Ottoman clock”?

Yes, we’re referring to it in that way now.

There are many imitations of your clock out there. We see a similar trend in the shop names, as well. We’re hearing that people are creating new phrases in Ottoman Turkish, looking at an Ottoman Turkish dictionary or consulting people of letters for the names of their shops. Analogous to this, we are seeing attempts in architecture to connect with the past, resulting in both meaningful and superficial examples, along with being pastiche. The truly exemplary products, on the other hand, aren’t that widespread and as famous. Today, the past is something that we both produce and consume. What is the future of this need?

For some, it seems like the society is reconciling with history; however, I believe it’s associated with the search for identity and security. Especially during times of great social changes, society believes that their identity is in danger and the elements that make them are fading away. As I said, this is a belief, not knowledge.

Wasn’t this always the case?

This belief always exists; yet, it becomes accentuated during times in which changes are swift, political tensions are high and there is a fear for survival. There’s an inclination in the society towards creating an identity to guarantee its existence. For instance, the spread of Nazism in Germany after WWI is a great example for this inclination. Similarly, the emergence of German romanticism after Napoleon’s invasion is another example. When survival is at stake, the society looks for something to hold on. This is sometimes religion. As religions have roots in history, this paves the way for referring back to history. This leads to holding on to certain historical figures, recreation of certain historical periods or resurrection of traditional ideas and concepts. It’s a part of the reality of social existence. I’m not judgmental towards it, but we have to think about the outcomes. This belief sometimes creates a rigid conservatism in the society. Standing against the swift changes and searching for shelter are common reactions. However, when this transforms into conservatism, the zealotry may become an element which prevents the society from adapting to the reality. History becomes an escape, a shelter.

Aren’t there meaningful reasons to escape certain aspects of the existing reality?

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Of course there are. As I’ve said, I’m not being judgmental, but interested in the outcomes. It sometimes makes people adapt to the contemporary world, as history has a soothing attribute. It consoles people with “the glorious past.” They become happy by reminiscing on “the golden days.”

What if they don’t want to accept the reality which is imposing itself on them and go for another reality?

If the interest in history breeds a dynamism that is required for the creation of another reality, which is a very rare case, it allows the society to assume a new position against the change and grants a power to direct the changes, along with rendering threats ineffective. As I’ve said it’s a very rare case; history usually is a sedative or even an opiate, in this sense.

Doesn’t the society need to be soothed from time to time?

If there is a case of anxiety, you should use sedatives, as you will need it. However, according to my observations, the nostalgic interest in history makes it hard to accept the reality and to take necessary measures against threats in today’s Turkey. The necessity of historical education for creating a correct identity has always been discussed. For instance, in the past, the name of the history course was “national history.” It was national in both senses: it told the history of the nation and it employed a national perspective. When recounting the events of the war between Ottomans and Serbians or the struggle between Tamerlane and Bayezid I, it’s biased in favor of the Ottomans.

Considering history is continuous and is a part of the society and its perception, isn’t it natural to have such narration?

It’s definitely normal; however, it requires looking at history from a singular point of view. The national is believed to be a means to reestablish our society; yet, with time, different data emerges, revealing that it’s not as it’s told. “Truth hates delay,” as the saying goes.

History has multiple dimensions; each perspective provides a different reality. An identity set on a singular perspective starts to become fictitious, leading the people to question the once unquestionable aspects.

Let me tell you the story of my friend. His father was a Turkish nationalist and he claimed that he was a purebred Turk. One day he was ill and went to the doctor. According to the result of a medical examination, it was found that he had Thalassemia. A purebred Turk couldn’t have Thalassemia, as it is a Semitic illness; so, at least one of his ancestors had to be of Semitic origins. Learning this, my friend’s father was devastated. Everything he believed in was destroyed by a simple reality. It’s absolutely devastating to learn that the reality you created in half a century is wrong… The same is correct for the society. If you absolutize a singular historical narration and interpretation, while basing the social identity on it, the society will start to question their collective identity as a result of emerging data.

The objective perception of history emerged with modern academism and they’re still trying to make it more common. However, since the beginning, the past was always perceived from a certain perspective, which was probably true for all societies, and, in this sense, it’s inevitable that social identity is based on this. Isn’t that so?

Here, we have to talk about the multiple historical narrations. Before the emergence of the nation-state, the history was told from various perspectives. However, with the emergence of the nation-state, one of these interpretations was absolutized as the only truth.

After that, the perception and knowledge of the past are fragmented; thus, the existence of different narrations is natural. On the other hand, nation-states absolutize a certain narration to create a common identity for the society. If you open a schoolbook on history or look at the general direction of historical research, you will see a bunch of research which was conducted to address the deficiencies of the created identity. This research creates perspectives that are theoretically contradictory and incompatible.

For example, looking at the relatively short history of the Republic of Turkey, we can see that three contradictory perspectives on the Ottomans are told in three different eras as the only reality. After a time, this transforms history into an ideological utility. Its subjectivity is being utilized. In this sense, I believe history works in a similar way with the human mind; both find and process past events and base what is transpiring today on it. The human mind constantly restructures the memories in accordance with today’s conditions; meaning that if we love somebody, we will remember the best memories with them. The same is true for the opposite situation as well. Thus, we interpret the past according to our notions. Our minds erase certain memories that could make us unhappy and revive those memories when we are expected to be happy.

So, you mean we’re always fictionalizing the reality.

Definitely, like in Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s novel, Red Monday. All characters know the event beforehand, yet they explain the outcomes differently. The mind fictionalizes the past according to the events of today and we’re actually fictionalizing many aspects of the memories that we are very certain of. Our minds trick us in many ways.

Adalet Ağaoğlu has a beautiful essay at the beginning of her book, Göç Temizliği. For a periodical, Ağaoğlu reviews her recollections of the past and tries to write down the details. Then, she shows what she has written down to her siblings. After reading it, they object to certain details: “That event didn’t happen that way. Also, the house had three rooms, not two”, “You say that there was a tree in the front of our house, but that tree was elsewhere.” In her essay, Ağaoğlu tries to retrospectively analyze why she believed that the tree was in front of the house and why she interpreted certain events the way she did. It’s a lovely essay on how our minds work. We actually do the same; we always relocate, merge or divide certain aspects of the past. We remember it in a certain way. Therefore, I believe that it’s reasonable to utilize history in this way; however, a constantly shifting history and its utilization may cause issues with people’s identities, rendering them insecure. In this sense, I think the role that history should play was inverted.

Then, you believe that history should supply us with accurate information about the events and concepts of the past?

We have to consider that all information comes with doubt, as history doesn’t possess certain and absolute facts. These facts can be only extracted from putting events into a sequence, synthesizing different historical narrations, thus creating causality. It’s next to impossible to do this. People are mostly attracted to the intricacies of the events.

Today, historians are appearing on the television and providing information about the field that they are specialized in. These shows are pretty popular. How do you evaluate them?

I regard them as tabloid programs. As you know, they’re also very popular; a celebrity dining with someone, rumors, expenses of celebrities and such. The history programs on the television have the same format. They’re extracting the lives and manners of historical “celebrities.” They’re also mystifying the events and the historical figures; there’s mystification, rather than objectification. These programs are offering to reveal the mysteries and to tell a never known fact about their subject matter. This offer intrigues the people.

It’s believed that the society will consume it. In those programs, history merges with stories, literature and legends, creating a product for popular consumption.

People are interested in the unknown. They are probably trying to understand the unexplained dimensions of their lives through these programs.

Isn’t it only a facet of the issue? Perhaps the other facet of this is to reconnect with historical events which shape their identity by relearning them. For instance, subject matters like Selim I, Mehmed II, the conquest of Istanbul and Abdulhamid II shape people’s identities, or people define themselves in reference to these historical figures or events. Can we talk about agency of the people here?

Sure, we can. Once I had been to Andalucía. When I was little, I had read a novel on the fall on Andalucía, which fascinated me. While I was there, I realized that I was actually living the novel.

How?

I mean, I was in Andalucía, for sure; visiting Alhambra, the Mezquita of Cordoba and the  Alcazar in Sevilla… Yet, I was experiencing the feelings that the novel had shaped. I was always looking for it. Even when I was really there, the image of the novel shaped me. Was I discomforted by this fact? Maybe not much, but I remember telling myself “I believe I should travel here once again to see the real Andalucía.”

Why?

I have to erase the image that the novel has imprinted on me. I realized this by the end of my trip there, that I wasn’t interested in the reality of the place. Andalucía was there, along with a community, their lifestyle and such; yet, I was pursuing a five centuries old image of the region, rather romantically. That image was only fiction. Most of the people are interested in history in a similar way; they seek a fiction within history and that fiction is shaped by contemporary notions and needs. For this reason, I’m always reserved towards so-called accurate historical facts, as we learn in time that they aren’t that accurate.

How do history, politicians, social memory and expectancies intersect?

We see that when politicians discover this inclination and interest, they use it masterfully. Sometimes they identify themselves with a historical figure, or use a historical figure as a take-off point. If the society is in a bad shape, myths of heroism are spread; there is an immense effort to identify certain politicians with figures of these legends in order to manage the social imagination. In 2001, right after 9/11, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad made a speech in front of the Saladin monument [in Aleppo], while constantly referring to Saladin. As a uniting figure, Saladin was used by al-Assad, as he believed the invasion of Iraq would affect Syria. Similarly, Saladin’s image is also used in Turkey; however, it’s a contradictory image in Turkey which actually threatens al-Assad’s rule in Syria. There only was one Saladin, but he has multiple images and perceptions.

If history is fictional, uncertain, dynamic, and could be repurposed according to the needs of the day, it will never cease to exist and it will be perpetuated, as the politicians are a part of the social reality. In this sense, maybe we can consider it as the swift and effective reemergence of radical interpretations and a reconnection to the early Republic era.

Today, I believe any perspective on history could become dominant and none would surprise me. Once it becomes a malleable object, history is a fiction that can be authored by the ones that have adequate power.

Or, maybe we have to continue facing our past.

We don’t face the past; we only discuss our positions today. That’s why the discussions are so heated. Sometimes politics functions through allegoric discussions. Even though we are actually discussing the events of the day, we always refer to the past events, as we can’t discuss today’s event that clearly. I believe that the future, rather than the past, has to be discussed in an ordered and well-functioning society.

As far as we know, today the politicians in China, Russia, Europe or the US don’t refer to history that much? What would you say about this?

They only employ symbols from time to time and that’s it. For instance, Russian President Vladimir Putin participated in a mass service in a church where previous Russian tsars participated in masses. This symbolization was enough. Returning to one of your previous questions, I believe it’s closely tied with the identity crisis. Societies which aren’t certain about their identities and which feel as if they are under threat look more into the past.

Would you like to add anything?

Apparently, people’s interest in history will continue to exist. This interest has to be transformed into something useful. If we can discuss today’s issues without sticking in the past, we’ll achieve this aim. Disregarding the issue at hand and placing in the past will only make these issues more complicated.

Prof. Sunar, thank you very much again for sharing your valuable time with us for this exclusive interview.

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]]> Diyanet Center of America: An Architectural Quest for Identity https://politicstoday.org/diyanet-center-of-america-an-architectural-quest-for-identity/ Fri, 01 Apr 2016 09:18:26 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/diyanet-center-of-america-an-architectural-quest-for-identity/

A visitor of the Diyanet Center in Maryland notes that the mosque is already filled with Muslims from various backgrounds, all gathering every week for Friday sermons and excited by the scene that makes them feel “at home”.

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Turkey has been witnessing proliferation of the traditional architectural forms as the country reconciles with its Ottoman past. The early republican regime took radical steps during the 1930s and 1940s to systematically downgrade and erase the cultural memory inherited from a more cosmopolitan and sophisticated Ottoman heritage. This caused a deep controversy and made a traumatic impact on the Turkish society. The persistent war on culture and the discursive hegemony of the republican elite produced lots of tragedies with which the people of Turkey still have to face. In fact, rediscovery of the Muslim heritage was a general phenomenon all over the Muslim world from East Asia to North Africa since the 1980s. However, this development halted in Turkey in the 1990s due to the secular establishment’s suspicion of conservative masses and their traditional values. Heavy hegemony of the secularist elite over “culture” only recently tended to be lifted and the past has been relatively emancipated from monolithic readings of history, a great opportunity for enhancing democracy and cultural diversity in Turkey.

Reflections of the current process of reconciliation with history can be seen in different spheres of life from the shop names to architectural forms of public and private buildings, ever growing interest in the television series based on historical figures or periods in addition to the TV shows hosting popular historians and discussing popular historical subjects. Even the daily language, which is slowly being occupied with Ottoman-Turkish words, rediscovered and occasionally reinvented with a sense of amazement as well as amusement. No doubt, this is not a refined or a painless process which creates its own set of problems like the production of kitsch or generating not always accurate reflections of identity based on the revisionist readings of the past. However, conservative religious circles have lately begun to question their perception of history, which is overall torn between exalting and disparaging. A popular Ottoman historian has baldly claimed “history is poisoning us” in a monthly journal called Lacivert referring to the current problematic interpretations of the past. Another author in the same journal complained the superficial appropriations and understandings of the past that are both likely to waste a lucrative opportunity and thus preclude proper contemporary reconfigurations addressing the present needs and expectations. The tension and competition between and within secularist and conservative “quarters” over culture and history will apparently continue in the following decades to define the public space in Turkey and the architectural forms and preferences will constitute one of the most visible and hot topics of this debate.

In this broad socio-political framework, one should analyze the architectural choice of the Diyanet Center of America in Maryland which is being inaugurated this weekend by the participation of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The center is built on 60,000 square meters, half of which is covering the constructional area. The huge project consists of a conference hall, library, cultural center, a mosque with a capacity for 1,500 people (3,000 including the courtyard, being the largest mosque in the U.S.), a fellowship hall including a restaurant, cafe and shops, a double Turkish bath with its pool and indoor sports hall, a guesthouse, a state-of-the-art Museum of Islamic Civilizations, a neighborhood consisting of Turkish houses, a Turkish-Islamic garden, open sport areas, picnic areas, fountains and parking area for 400 vehicles.

The architect of this huge complex is Muharrem Hilmi Şenalp who is known with his great amount of knowledge and expertise on as well as his firm commitment to the classical Ottoman architecture. His office, Hassa Architecture, was named after the Mimaran-ı Hassa Ocağı (State Architecture Corps) which was an official organization founded by the Ottoman Empire and that the corps was responsible for the architectural design along with undertaking the construction projects. Şenalp’s symbolic reference is not designated for a synthetic namesake but undoubtedly has some essential characteristics. His devotional determination in reproducing classical Ottoman architectural forms while designing today in the twenty-first century is due to a deliberate identity quest which was not in the slightest imposed or supported by the construction material, concrete and steel. The Hassa Architecture manifests its objective in their website, epitomizing the project as “an opportunity to represent our deep-rooted millenary civilization by handling it as a whole with its overall course and originality.” Therefore, this experiment actually stands out as a bald manifestation and perhaps a radical response to the contemporary post-modern and deconstructivist architectural currents which one may fairly criticize for their decontextualizing effects through disregarding the existing architectural landscapes and suggesting a definite rupture from the past.

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The architectural designs of various constructions in the Diyanet Centers of America can be traced back in the earlier works of Şenalp. For example, the mosque in the Center resembles very much to Ankara Subayevleri (1996), Tokyo (1993-2000) and Berlin Sehitlik (2004) mosques from an external glance. Likewise, the Turkish houses and other buildings with similar functions bear a clear resemblance to the Küçük Çamlıca Kiosks (1998) and to certain buildings in the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives Complex (2009), both in Istanbul. The architectural ancestry of this choice recalls a more substantial question that is to what degree such designs can be regarded as up-to-date examples of historicism or anachronism. A great number of pictures generously shared by the Hassa Architecture in their website recalls the Ottoman pavilions in the sumptuous World Fairs of the late nineteenth century, a time period in which eclecticism and, from a critical perspective, historicism was predominant all over Europe. One may also feel uneasy about the relationship between these architectural forms and the place where they were built.

However, from one perspective, Şenalp’s approach can be regarded one of the several legitimate architectural choices and innovative at least as much as the postmodern and deconstructivist architectural experimentations. Şenalp’s architecture follows the principle of renewal from within the tradition, which means that the design, freed from virtuosic concerns, communicates with the forms of the past and associates them through new configurations with due respect to their proportions. It uses the old technics and craftsmanship but also benefitting from new materials and expertise. Although having clear predecessors, inlaid doors, for example, are not direct replications of any existing historical doors. Instead they are original designs fashioned by the living craftsmen adding their own minimal stylistic contributions and even more vaguely addressing the “modern” taste as well. Şenalp’s recently inaugurated Marmara University Theology Faculty Mosque in Altunizade Istanbul demonstrates his openness and perspective regarding the new forms of architectural designs. The mosque looks entirely “contemporary” but at the same time full of references to the past. In fact, the dome of the mosque, being the most impressive part of the building, is inspired by an existing traditional form, called kırlangıç kubbe which can be seen in some public and civil architectural examples in Erzurum.

Beyond doubt, the architectural designs of Şenalp, whether traditional or contemporary, is a deliberate manifestation of a quest for identity of its architect and of its sponsors. This approach reinterprets the traditional forms in such a way that it is related to the past, history and memory. This is one architectural quest for identity, along with various other approaches, and a response to the globalizing world in which values are being homogenized and social memory is altered through a structural imposition of decontextualized spaces. A visitor of the Diyanet Center in Maryland notes that the mosque is already filled with Muslims from various backgrounds, all gathering every week for Friday sermons and excited by the scene that makes them feel “at home”. With respect to the contemporary discussions in Turkey, it seems that the public space, though still on its long way, is becoming more pluralistic in terms of the cultural manifestations of Turkey’s past in present.

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